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The thesis is the outcome of research that considers ontological and political 
conceptualisations of the notion of institution in relation to practices and 
discourses in the contemporary European art world and the power relations 
therein. The concept of ‘instituent praxis’, as theorised in Pierre Dardot and 
Christian Laval’s Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century (2019), is 
centrally employed. The thesis proposes an extended theoretical framework 
around this concept, taking into account the late capitalist socio-political 
condition and responding to aspirations for political autonomy. Τhe conceptual 
move from institution to instituent praxis is advocated in the belief that the 
second concept enables a more productive angle from which to address 
configurations of power in the context of contemporary art institutions and 
across their diversity in Europe.  
The first part of the thesis delineates this move from institution to instituent 
praxis. Chapter 1 traces definitions of institution in accounts of European 
(neo)avant-gardes and threads of Institutional Critique. Chapter 2 outlines 
instituent praxis, i.e. the collective and common creation of significations that 
can become rules of law. The concept’s engagement with notions of power 
and the creation of the historically new is accentuated against other (politically 
transformative) understandings of institution. The analysis also expands on 
Félix Guattari’s ideas on signification and the production of subjectivity through 
affect – already incubated in Dardot and Laval’s definition. Chapter 3 deploys 
this theoretical framework and speculates on art-institutional intersections with 
non-art-world practice – around issues of labour organisation, managerialism, 
algorithmic and institutional infrastructure.  
In the second part (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), art-world case studies are further 
dissected in three thematic sets. First, discourse in the art world, in relation to 
Michel Foucault’s notions of power and parrhesia, as well as concepts of 
(counter-)publics. Secondly, a geopolitically minded contribution to the 
discourse on experimental European art institutions. Finally, the condition of 
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the real, as advocated by instituent praxis and portrayed in alter-, para- and 
mock-institutions. Overall, the analysis underlines interweavements between 
affect / desire and the production of meaning as rule-making; sketches the 
contribution of instituent praxis to political transformation; and ponders on 
persisting or parallel functions of power.  
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As evident in its title, From the Art Institution to Instituent Praxis, this thesis 
observes and explores shifts around a key term – institution – in contemporary 
art writing. Furthering this discourse, the study at hand proposes the transfer 
of focus from the ‘institution’, as an established site or (customary) regime 
mediating a range of activities, to ‘instituent praxis’, as a complex process of 
acting that may engender transformative results. The aim of this research has 
been to attend critically to the conceptualisation of such process; to explore its 
intellectual history, and even propose such an intellectual history; and to 
consider a range of case studies that relate, one way or another, to this 
process. The subtitle of the thesis, Configurations of Power, indicates how this 
research proceeded: to theorise the proposed shift from the ‘institution’ to 
‘instituent praxis’ required a critical attendance to how various sets of 
antagonisms have entered the theoretical frameworks examined but also 
actual art contexts alert to instituting and its dynamics. The question of power 
has been found to play a key role in both discursive analysis and efforts to 
advance change in given material and ideological circumstances. What this 
thesis has sought to achieve is a theoretical framework that interrogates but 
also substantiates the complexity and importance of the shift from the 
institution to instituent praxis. 
This Introduction opens with a presentation of the registers selected to 
advance such an analysis. It then proceeds with an elaboration of the 
geopolitical remit of the thesis and the context of some of the major case 
studies discussed. Subsequently, a cartography for the political positionality in 
my research is outlined, before introducing the main theoretical debates, 
research questions and lines of argumentation that shape the thesis. The final 




Institution and art: An indexical selection of registers 
 
The notion of institution, its social and historical function, and the relation of 
this function to art (communicative cultures of the aural, the visual, the sign) 
have chronicled a growing multiplicity of registers since the latter half of the 
twentieth century – at least in Western-centric artistic discourses and 
practices. Without intending to contrive an archaeology of origins on the 
relation of institution and art, this thesis employs an indexical selection of such 
registers in terms of a theoretical and historical background, presented briefly 
in this section. The critical discussion (or contribution) of this thesis addresses 
a contemporary period defined by globalisation and hallmarked by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 – a period prefaced by visions and realities of economic, 
political and mediatic international convergences and integrations in previous 
decades. It is also a period fractured by economic, political and institutional 
crises. Furthermore, the majority of the case studies discussed are pertinent 
to the European continent. Europe is seen as a geographical core of tensions 
whereby traditionally imperial economies interact with emerging or peripheral 
economies in a global context leading to a recent shift from an East-West 
binary to a North-South one. At the same time, Europe concentrates a 
multiplicity of practices that relate remarkably diversely with institutions and 
institutional power. 
A first annotation in this indexical selection of registers would seek to specify 
notions of the institution and its relation to art through discourses of twentieth 
century artistic avant-garde(s). In this context, I discuss the institution of art in 
terms of aggregate social and historical function, alongside the retrospective 
framing of avant-garde(s) as incubating institutionally relevant issues, such as 
functions of aesthetic conventionality and markers of artistic validity. A related 
indexical assemblage is encountered in practices associated with Institutional 
Critique and refers to thematisations and anxieties around the conditioning of 
art by institutional variants, such as the spatial, social or economic limitations 
and prescriptions within art production and distribution. Institutional Critique 




has largely been historicised as a branch of Conceptual Art that appeared in 
the 1960s and permutated since into subsequent waves.  
Arguably, although Institutional Critique persists at least as an artistic 
methodology in the contemporary period, some key institutional shifts extend 
beyond artistic or curatorial methodological nuances. Such shifts denote 
another set of registers that point to the global proliferation and diversification 
of art institutions (such as museums, galleries, artist-run or non-profit spaces 
of diverse scope and scale, various cultural media outlets) and nudge the 
possibility of a (creative) practice that could be examined as distinctly 
institutional, even though it might be artistic, curatorial, organisational or other. 
Institutional practice could, then, be regarded as performable by artists, 
curators and artistic directors as much as institutions or organisations. This 
hypothesis leads me to a wider indexicality that could be seen as permeating, 
but also exceeding, art-historical registers of the notion of the institution, even 
when art history involves an extended frame that considers equally the function 
of art institutions and their creative/organisational practice. This wider 
indexicality latches on to social and political ontology, judicial aspects, power 
and psychoanalysis, and poses questions around the processual meaning of 
institution, its interrelation with the making of history and temporality and its 
capacity to confine, exclude, empower or create. This thesis is premised on 
theoretical developments that engage such questions, speculating on and 
exploring their reflection on critical practices and debates in the art world and 
beyond.  
 
Research affinities and tales of institutional turmoil: On 
Europe and the thesis’ case studies 
 
Between 2011 and 2014, the years before I conducted this research, I was 
involved curatorially and collegially with contemporary art institutions in 
Athens, Greece. For the most part, my work entailed assisting operations and 
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only occasionally tasks where I was sharing a significant part of the creative 
responsibility. Some of the institutions I engaged with in more or less direct 
ways were entirely run on a voluntary basis or employed a number of unwaged 
workers in positions that were supposedly internships but often demanded full-
time work. In Athens, such working conditions are typical in commercial and 
profit-making private galleries of a global purview that may even participate in 
global art fairs, such as Frieze Art Fair. But the same working conditions are 
also present in other kinds of art institutions that aspire to a more public and 
less commercial function. Such institutions often survive on visitors’ donations 
or other precarious sponsorships while relying on the free labour of artists and 
curators (who hope for future recognition through networking opportunities) 
and/or underpaid and unofficially hired manual and technical labourers. In such 
contexts, even venue-related costs can be kept to a minimum through informal 
arrangements as ‘personal favour’ (between the venue owners and the 
organisation seeking temporary or more permanent occupancy) or ‘friendly 
sponsorship’ amidst a rapidly shifting and unregulated property market, 
financial recession and non-structured gentrification. Nepotism and network-
building through interpersonal relations have traditionally been the main job-
seeking methods, across the art institutional spectrum in the country, although 
there have been steps towards more meritocratic hiring methods in some 
large-scale public institutions. In comparison to other national contexts from 
which the thesis’ cases studies are drawn, Greek art workers but also art 
institutions are disadvantaged by the absence of a public funding body for 
contemporary art. Moreover, the basic public regulatory frameworks that could 
attend to the initiatives of independent artists or other cultural workers are 
lacking in terms of scope of responsibility and outreach within the artistic 
community. Contemporary art and its institutions are forced to stagnate around 
private clients/collectors and their entourages that operate as patrons, 
perceived often as a substitute for a public or state infrastructure – that is, 
large-scale private foundations are supposed to be of public benefit.1 The 
                                                          
1 Such foundations include the Onassis Cultural Centre Athens and The Stavros Niarchos Foundation 
Cultural Center. 




Greek state has consistently fostered this process of private-public 
governance that essentially entails outsourcing to private realms functions, 
whose equivalents in other national cultural policies and bodies (such as the 
Arts Council in the UK) are publicly governed. This tendency is prescribed 
more by financial instability and less by the respective political leaning of 
different governments. The poor public infrastructure and policy for 
contemporary art is also related to the latter’s typical casting as of lower 
cultural importance by the Greek State, which has focused on the institutional 
promotion of the Greek antiquity. The conditions described above long 
precede the Greek fiscal and debt crisis of 2010, even though the ensuing 
recession led to the further deterioration of the art economy.  
Summarily presented above, most of the problems encountered in the Greek 
art field are far from exceptional. Rather, they appear to be more or less 
common across the art centres and peripheries in Europe and beyond – and 
they provided the main impetus to undertake this research.2 The 
commonalities that sparked off my initial research interest have to do with the 
conditions of work and relations of power within art institutions and in the arts 
more broadly. Such issues have largely been tackled by – also widespread – 
traditions of artistic and other discourses and practices that have been critical 
towards institutions and/or the institution at large, which is why my research 
developed as a broader theoretical exploration into power relations in the art 
world and the notion of institution as such. 
The case studies explored in specific chapters, or in some cases in more than 
one chapters, are representative of diverse engagements and interrogations 
of the institution, or the process of instituting, or both. A thread of discussed 
                                                          
2 See Minna Henriksson, Erik Krikortz and Airi Triisberg, eds, Art Workers: Material Conditions and 
Labour Struggles in Contemporary Art Practice (Berlin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Tallinn: Nordic-Baltic Art 
Workers’ Network for Fair Pay, 2015) accessed November 6, 2016, http://www.art-
workers.org/download/ArtWorkers.pdf; 
Michał Kozłowski et al., eds., Joy Forever: The Political Economy of Social Creativity (London: 
MayFlyBooks, 2014);  
Zoran Erić and Stevan Vuković, eds, ‘Precarious Labour in the Field of Art,’ OnCurating.org, no. 16 




practices responds to issues of labour in the context of art institutions. For 
instance, Carrot Workers’ Collective and close affiliates (since 2010) 
Precarious Workers Brigade are UK-based artists collectives – notably, of 
mixed nationalities – that have focused on the condition of art workers through 
a range of activities both within and beyond art institutions. Another stream of 
case studies mainly in Chapter 4 pertains to discursive practices that have 
been or could be considered critical or propositional in art-institutional, 
curatorial or pedagogical contexts. I have taken into account the diversity of 
such practices in terms of their scale, format and institutional affiliation, so as 
to complicate theoretical observations. In one case, I look at four different 
discursive platforms that sought to reclaim education from institutional contexts 
of Higher Education – the Copenhagen Free University in Copenhagen; the 
Anti-university of London; the Free Slow University Warsaw; and Silent 
University which has been operating transnationally. I also discuss a long-term 
research project, Former West, conducted under the aegis of BAK in Utrecht, 
in order to consider the relationship between the project’s discursive/curatorial 
format and the delivery of its proclaimed intentions towards a Former West. 
Chapter 5, the penultimate chapter before Conclusions, focuses specifically on 
case studies drawn from contexts that self-identify or could be seen as 
European semi-peripheries. This was in response to the observed and often 
unintended reproduction of geopolitical power relations within a discourse that 
assigns socially-engaged and critical value to certain art institutions that in one 
way or another oppose dominant neoliberal narratives or conditions. Such 
critical practice from within art institutions is often historicised as mainly but not 
exclusively relevant to Western and Northern European contexts, even though 
there is ample historical evidence suggesting that art institutions performed 
socially responsive and critical experimentations well before the 1990s and 
beyond Northwestern Europe. In this context, Chapter 5 refers to art 
institutions such as the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art (NIFCA) in 
Helsinki that explicitly attempted to challenge narratives and exclusions around 
the Nordic identity within a European context, while it focuses centrally on art 
institutions and initiatives from Eastern and Southern European semi-




peripheries – for instance, Vector in Romania and Kunsthalle Athena in 
Greece. The case of Documenta 14, 2017, also features among the thesis’ 
case studies, not least as it sought to work across the power relations of the 
core and the semi-periphery. One case study in Chapter 6 is the New World 
Summit, a transnational project/organisation of global remit, self-identified as 
both political and artistic and initiated in 2012 by the Dutch artist Jonas Staal. 
Even though this is a global project, it is largely funded by European sources 
and thus, in some respects, it could be seen as reflecting European geopolitics.  
 
It should be then clear that this research approaches Europe as an intricate 
constellation of not just of institutions and instituent practices but as a 
geopolitical space traversed by asymmetrical power relations. The thesis has 
not sought to map and define concretely these power relations, but rather 
grasp the dynamic that dictates or enables particular occurrences in relation to 
institutional politics, including the orientation of discourse, in concrete settings. 
I would argue that in very few cases we can witness, or even claim 
retrospectively, processes of uninterrupted praxis – if by the latter we mean a 
genuinely transformative procedure. Yet observing what I would call an 
instituent problematic in Europe holds undiminished value, especially in the 
period this research focuses on. Although presenting a short history of Europe 
since 1989 lies beyond the scope of this research, this is a period that opened 
with the violent dismantling of Yugoslavia that impacted, and still does impact, 
the entire region of the Balkans (including Greece) where a number of the case 
studies are drawn from. The approach to instituting in Former West would have 
been unthinkable had it not been for structural adjustment programmes 
associated with the in/famous ‘transition’ of Eastern Europe and the re-
examination of the relationships between perceived ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries.’ 
The New Institutionalism, as a discourse advanced mainly in more affluent (if 
not core) spaces of Europe, did not survive the austerity wars that re-shaped 
European art scenes and politics even before the outbreak of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Art theorists have reviewed the recent history of the continent 
captured by neo-liberalism as ‘post-socialist’ at large – that is, as unfolding 
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overall, and beyond the confines of the former East, as beyond the principles 
of public or state protection of the arts.3 As the austerity wars intensified, the 
image of the European Union or, at least, of the Eurozone as an (economic) 
institution and their historical foundational premise of integration begun to be 
questioned, even in mainstream media and not just by radical Left marginal 
voices that traditionally opposed to them. The period between 2014 and 2019 
saw the proliferation of cases of institutional exodus or expulsion of single 
nation-states from a supranational institution, such as the European Union, 
that, up to a historical point and at least in mainstream discourses, had been 
growing inclusively gained real and mediatic traction. The Scottish 
Independence Referendum in September 2014 was not unrelated, considering 
the intensity of a collective imaginary of national self-determination that already 
involved radical institutional projection as transformation. Equally pertinent 
was the Catalan independence referendum in 2017, not least due to the 
phenomenal internal dissensus regarding its institutional legitimacy that led to 
its suppression through police violence and legal annulment. In the period I 
was concluding the thesis, in 2019, and throughout 2018, Europe remained of 
a fractured mentality led by the rise of right-wing populism. A number of 
commentators have considered the impact of these developments. For 
instance, Kuba Szreder’s curatorial, academic and activist practice (discussed 
in chapter 4 and 5) has engaged with the rise of authoritarianism in a Polish 
context and Larne Abse Gogarty has discussed the implication of extreme 
right-wing politics in institutions of the art world in London.4 Questions around 
‘democracy’ as the model of art institutional deliberation have come to the fore, 
                                                          
3 On Europe as a post-socialist geopolitical reality, see Angela Dimitrakaki, ‘Art and Instituting for a 
Feminist Common/s: Thoughts on Interventions in the New “New Europe”,’ in Inside Out: Critical 
Discourses Concerning Institutions, ed. Alenka Gregoric and Suzana Milveska, 38-49 (Ljubljana: 
Museums and Galleries of Ljubljana and City Art Gallery Ljubljana, 2017). See also Zdenka Badovinac, 
‘The Critical Institution’ and Nina Möntmann, ‘A Letter from Europe,’ ibid, pp 50-61 and pp 140-54 
respectively.  
4 Kuba Szreder, ‘Exercises in the Curatorial Open Form: On the Example of Exhibition Making Use; 
Life in Postartistic Times,’ Art & the Public Sphere 6, No. 1-2, (September 2017): 51-67, accessed 
October 3, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1386/aps.6.1-2.51_1; 
Larne Abse Gogarty, ‘The Art Right,’ Art Monthly, April 2017, 6-10. 




not least in the research of Bassam el Baroni discussed in Chapter 4.5 The 
above suggest that the examination of instituent praxis is framed in 
environments of extreme polarity.  
 
Documenta 14, which was shaped while I was carrying out research for the 
thesis, aimed to consider such shifting European dynamics. The controversy 
that grew around it is a salient example of the new terrain in which art 
institutions are having to operate. Documenta 14 is the latest edition of one of 
the most important global large-scale periodical exhibitions of contemporary 
art. Documenta has been taking place every five years in the German city of 
Kassel since 1955 with the mission to showcase and curate the most important 
tendencies of contemporary art globally. Under the artistic directorship of 
Adam Szymczyk, Documenta 14 adopted a dual location shared between 
Athens and Kassel. A great part of the exhibition preparation as well as a long-
term public programme took place in Athens during the years before the official 
show and in a context of escalating confrontation between the Greek left-led 
government that came to power in 2015, the Eurozone where German capital 
was playing a dominant role and global financial institutions such as the IMF 
overseeing neoliberal adjustment policies.6 This was a historical decision for 
the institution of Documenta that only twice before had used sites outside of 
Kassel and only in the form of either relatively short-term events prior to the 
main exhibition in Kassel (Documenta 11, 2002) or as satellite venues 
(Documenta 13, 2012). Documenta 14’s dual location was a response to the 
recently emergent austerity crises within Europe and the perceived national 
power shifts, not least in the German – Greek dynamic. Already since its pre-
                                                          
5 Bassam El Baroni, ‘The Post-Agonistic Institution: Four Positions on the Structural Relation Between 
Art and Democracy,’ in How Institutions Think: Between Contemporary Art and Curatorial Discourse, 
ed. Paul O’Neill, Lucy Steeds and Mick Wilson, 229-35 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017). 
6 See Angela Dimitrakaki, ‘Hospitality and Hostis: An Essay on Dividing Lines, Divisive Politics and the 
Art Field’ 
in Greece: Archaeology of the Future, ed. Kateryna Botanova and Christos Chrissopoulos, 128-47 
(Basel: Culturescapes, 2017); 
Kate Allen and Guy Chazan, ‘Germany reaps a €2.9bn gain from Greek bond holdings,’ Financial 




exhibition activity, Documenta 14 had adopted the ‘working title’ Learning from 
Athens. Szymczyk stated that the title did not imply that the Germany-based 
exhibition suddenly desired to be condescendingly influenced or instructed by 
Athens as a beleaguered case of exception, but rather that the curatorial 
process which is always formative to the curatorial team was now to be 
conducted from the location of Athens and directed towards the globe.7 
However, Szymczyk and Documenta 14’s intentions to precisely condemn the 
harsh treatment of the German government towards the Greek state were to a 
great extent received negatively or as another form of neocolonial art 
washing.8 Despite the perhaps temporary but obviously booming effect that 
Documenta had for contemporary art in Athens, accusations of exoticising 
Orientalism and aiding the intensification of gentrifying forces within the 
already impoverished Athenian context were widespread and diverse. A large 
part of the criticism towards Documenta 14 targets a non-profit, non-
commercial art institution of liberal and relatively inclusive principles and 
opposes primarily the institution’s symbolic power, from which economic 
consequences can arise. Especially when such symbolic power is mobilised 
by the institution to expose economic disparities or (perceived) associated 
hierarchies, but instead it is seen as exacerbating them, questions arise 
regarding the precise stakes within (art) institutional crises and their 
interrelation with political narratives and imaginaries.  
 
And yet, noteworthy in all the aforementioned historical developments is the 
unprecedented pace of institutional creativity and dissolvability within financial, 
bureaucratic, judiciary, governmental and political frames. These could be 
apprehended as ongoing institutional crises and micro-decay of structures 
such as the trade union and the political party, but also the nation-state and 
                                                          




8 Helena Smith, ‘”Crapumenta!”...Anger in Athens as the Blue Lambs of Documenta Hit Town,’ The 
Guardian, May 14, 2017, accessed February 2, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/may/14/documenta-14-athens-german-art-
extravaganza. 




supra-national institutional edifices, whose borders and permitted population 
influxes are increasingly plunged in new indeterminacies. Global turbulences 
of institutional alteration and the ensuing imaginaries for restructure are 
inseparable from processes of othering as well as the construction and 
mythification of otherness, often in ways that flatten profound ambiguities into 
seemingly self-evident narratives.  
 
Such processes constitute the backdrop for my research, which takes into 
account and discusses dominant conditions of rhetoric and discourse as also 
pertinent to the modalities for the mediation and narrativisation of events of 
global institutional importance. Inaccurate, obfuscating, sensationalising 
tendencies that often misconstrue and vilify underprivileged and violently 
displaced social groups have been alarmingly on the rise and usually seek 
output in authoritarian solutions. Concurrently, new technological capitalist 
imperatives that are hardly democratic have appeared as unprecedentedly 
exploitative of psychographic information, data and profiling and 
psychologically manipulative towards human behaviour, potentially even in 
cases that have led to or contributed towards historical institutional shifts, such 
as the EU referendum in the UK.9 In such conditions, democracy itself is at risk 
of either being reduced to a capitalist pretense or downright authoritarianism. 
 
On writing the thesis: The case for political positionality  
 
An articulation that (inadvertently) points to the theoretical proximity of 
institution to politics and democracy comes from philosopher Jacques 
Rancière. According to him, ‘[d]emocracy is […] not a political regime in the 
sense that it forms one of the possible constitutions which define the ways in 
which people assemble under a common authority.’10 Rather, he suggests, 
                                                          
9 See Anthony Barnett, ‘Democracy and the Machinations of Mind Control,’ The New York Review of 
Books, December 14, 2017, accessed June 5, 2018, 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/12/14/democracy-and-the-machinations-of-mind-control/. 
10 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2010), 32. 
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‘[d]emocracy is the very institution of politics itself – of its subject and of the 
form of its relationship.’ Thus, for Rancière, democracy is in some sense 
effectuated in and through the institution of politics. This process is rather 
liminal – a ‘state of exception’11 or an anomalous ‘deviation from [the] normal 
order of things’ or ‘an always provisional accident within the history of forms of 
domination.’12 If a subject is defined in its relation to its participation within a 
condition of ‘arkhêin’ or ‘the power to rule’ and if there are ‘qualifications’ 
appropriate to ruling, the subject of politics or the ‘demos’ or the ‘people’ rests 
on those without any such qualification.13 The political subject or ‘the people is 
a supplementary existence that inscribes the count of the uncounted, or part 
of those who have no part […] as a surplus in relation to every count of the 
parts of society.’14 As subject, this supplementary part makes possible its 
identification ‘with the whole of the community,’ but not as ‘the labouring and 
suffering populace that emerges on the terrain of political action’ nor as the 
‘greedy masses’ or the ‘ignorant populace.’15 Rancière alludes here to a 
‘structural’ surplus or ‘void’ that always ‘separates the community out from the 
sum of the parts of the social body.’ This is directly related to his assertion that 
‘political subjects […] are not social groups but rather forms of inscription that 
(ac)count for the unaccounted.’16 
 
Democracy as the institution of politics takes place when the political subject, 
which is beyond any commonality apart from having no qualification to rule, 
ruptures ‘the nemeïn upon which the nomoi of the community are founded’ and 
thus overthrows the given or normal ‘distribution of the sensible.’17 Rancière 
and the literature on his theory have largely focused on the definition and 
significance of such distribution within an aesthetic and political framework. My 
thesis is more preoccupied with the thread of the nemeïn (i.e. partitioning or 
                                                          
11 Rancière, Dissensus, 31. 
12 Ibid., 35. 
13 Ibid., 30. 
14 Ibid., 33. 
15 Ibid., 33-34. 
16 Ibid., 35. 
17 Ibid., 36. 




distributing) that founds nomoi (i.e. rules of law). Lingering on this etymological 
connection between nemeïn and nomoi, Rancière also defines politics as ‘the 
instituting of a dispute [‘litige institué’] over the distribution of the sensible, over 
that nemeïn that founds every nomos of the community.’18 Rancière’s account 
barely focuses on the precise process of this instituting. He is more 
preoccupied with the democratic subject as one that does not pre-exist but is 
always formed in its qualification of having no qualification to rule. My thesis 
seeks to accentuate and expand on the instituting process that refers to 
nemeïn and founds the nomos of the community. It speculates on and aspires 
to theorisations of democracy understood as moments, processes or horizons 
of political autonomy, by accentuating and exploring the neighbouring relation 
of the instituent. 
 
Despite its potency, democracy is convoluted with problems both in 
contemporary thought and politics. Anthony Gardner has offered an updated 
and extensive critique of a broad spectrum of political philosophy that has 
focused on definitions of democracy, annotating the concept’s dangerous 
cohabitation with processes of so-called democratisation, that can range from 
the aggressive marketisation and neoliberalisation of post-socialist economies 
to legitimised direct military action on behalf of coalitions – or impromptu 
institutions – of ‘democratic’ nation-states – a legitimation that is often 
belatedly debunked within a United Nations legal framework.19 For Gardner, 
both ‘neoliberal politics and much critical political philosophy ultimately 
replicated each other’s strategic employment of democracy as the means to 
consign legitimizing value to whatever politics were conducted in its name.’20 
In relation to Rancière’s theory of democracy, Gardner suggests that despite 
                                                          
18 Ibid., 37. 
19 Anthony Gardner, Politically Unbecoming: Postsocialist Art Against Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2015), 40. Gardner deconstructs retrospectively the narrative adopted for the invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003: ‘it was found that Iraq could not comply with UN Resolution 1441 because it did 
not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction, and thus could not disarm what it did not have.’ The 
invasion was led by the impromptu, US-initiated international institution that came to be known as 
the ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ The UK, Australia and Poland were some of the protagonist states in 
the Coalition. 
20 Gardner, Politically Unbecoming, 42.  
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its ‘ungovernable’ and ‘unnameable’ aspects, the democratic ‘signifier’ 
continues to autocratically designate the only ‘viable, radical, and supposedly 
unnameable politics after Soviet communism.’21 Gardner appears to be 
alluding to what could be democracy’s limit, which is also incubated in the 
Rancièrian definition: would the disruption of democracy as the normative or 
dominant political signifier still constitute democratic politics?22 In this context 
and centrally due to the tendency of the democratic signifier to be co-opted in 
regimes and discourses that at best replicate what already exists, Gardner 
underscores ‘the need to seek an alternative politics to democracy.’23 
 
Taking this critique into consideration, my thesis attempts to preserve what is 
useful in Rancière’s definition in order to consider the possibility of a 
democratic politics without necessarily clinging to the name or signifier of 
democracy. Rather than devising an answer to the question of the democratic 
limit, I attempt to rethink the question’s overdependence on a face-value binary 
of signifier and signified and perhaps rearticulate the democratic limit closer to 
interrelations of power and desire. Against Gardner who would abandon 
democracy, because, as appropriated and appropriable signifier, it has 
historically operated as a vehicle for the legitimisation or the non-alternativity 
of neoliberalism, I advocate for the preservation of the possibility for 
democracy, and any other useful concept, to be, however marginally, 
emancipated from the tyranny of the signifier. Parallel to this intention is my 
examination (mainly in Chapter 2 and through Félix Guattari’s philosophy) of 
the complex system of signification and the insistence on the intricate potential 
relations within and at the margins of signification.24 Yet, perhaps in line with 
Gardner, the Rancièrian definition of democracy does not offer adequate co-
ordinates for imagining an alternative to neoliberalism. Indeed, apart from the 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 38. 
22 Ibid., 38. 
23 Ibid., 42-43. 
24 Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995). 
Félix Guattari, Psychoanalysis and Transversality: Texts and Interviews 1955-1971 (South Pasadena, 
CA: Semiotext(e), 2015). 




commonality of being unaccounted for, it is unclear what this process of 
dissensus or disagreement would entail so that the democratic subject would 
come together, identify with the whole of society or shared community, call into 
question the communal nomos and ultimately have a say in it. But the theory 
in itself should not be discarded; as this thesis suggests, neither searching for 
anti-neoliberal co-ordinates nor the aim of establishing a (provisionally) 
consensual nomos immediately preclude a process of dissensus with any 
given order or distribution of the sensible. 
 
I use some aspects of Rancière’s theory as broader caveats or ‘red lines’ for 
my thesis. Gabriel Rockhill considers the ‘disagreement’ or ‘dissensus’ 
instantiated by the Rancièrian political subject to be ‘less a clash between 
heterogeneous phrase regimens or genres of discourse than a conflict 
between a given distribution of the sensible and what remains outside it.’25 This 
warning of the exclusion that can cast the latently sensible as non-sensible 
(perhaps beyond any hierarchies and ruptures within signifier-signified 
relations) must be kept in proximity. This is more an acknowledgement of a 
possibility rather than an attempt or plea to alleviate or pre-empt the relevant 
clash or conflict. Relatedly, what, I argue, should be preserved is the potential 
for the emergence of a non-preexisting subject which is not based on 
commonality or identity. For Rancière, community is at play as what is 
distributed in the form of the sensible following the logic of a ‘police order’ or a 
normative logic of allocation, which is always antithetical to the liminal 
moments of politics and democracy.26 Criticisms of Rancière’s theory have 
mainly targeted this discarding of the potential for any crystalised, teleological 
or pre-determined community, which is always to be disrupted by the 
unaccountable, supplementary part of those who have no part. However, even 
if, as per Gardner, this state of exception or anomaly that Rancière pinpoints 
should not be called democracy, and the general aim should be instead a 
                                                          
25 Gabriel Rockhill, ‘Jacques Rancière’s Politics of Perception,’ introduction to the Politics of 
Aesthetics, by Jacques Rancière, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2004), 4 [emphasis 
added]. 
26 Rancière, Dissensus, 148. 
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radically inclusive or even a whole non-residual society as democratic or as a 
society of the common, the political potential of those who might remain 
unaccounted for (in any theorization, thus resting beyond any socially 
determined commonality) should by no means be precluded or forgotten. At 
least not until the whole of society finds itself in a consensual utopia. 
 
Rancière sought to distance what is proper about politics from philosophical a 
priori principles that associate it with (ethological) qualifications to govern, as 
well as from sociological reductions that assign ways of life proper to the 
political life, foreground ‘the community on the basis of a univocal partition of 
the sensible’ and cast democracy as ‘the collective effectuation of the 
properties of a type of man.’27 This multi-faceted Rancièrian agenda for politics 
does not have to be sacrificed in an effort to think through and mobilise the 
principle of the common, both within political but also socio-economic and 
other terrains. The preservation of the Rancièrian caveat within such an effort 
would be realisable through the assertion that the demos, or the political 
subject, is indeed mobilised on the grounds of what Rockhill has called ‘the 
perennial persistence of a wrong’ that has been done to the demos, even if 
this wrong ‘cannot be resolved by juridical litigation.’28 The Rancièrian 
democratic imprint would then direct me to a definition of the common that 
asserts the democratic process of claiming stakes in the nemeïn that founds 
the communal nomos. 
 
In their book Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century (published in French 
in 2014, translated in English in 2019), Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have 
explicitly defined the principle of the common as ‘self-government' of an 
institutional form, in the sense of ‘the institutions and rules people create’ for 
themselves and their interrelations.29 The common is understood as 
                                                          
27 Rancière, Dissensus, 41-42. 
28 Rockhill, ‘Rancière’s Politics,’ 3-4. 
29 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Commun: Essai sur la Révolution au XXIe Siècle, Paris: La 
Découverte, 2014, translated by Matthew MacLellan as Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 414. All subsequent citations are from the French original. 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 




inextricable from ‘the institution of new power structures in society.’30 This 
definition distinguishes the common from iterations of self-government as self-
determination or self-organisation that have been preoccupied with the 
management, administration or organisation of affairs, without engaging with 
or intervening in the framework of the governing rules.31 For the two authors, 
the common is the principle of politics par excellence, if politics is defined as 
the collective deliberation towards defining ‘what is just’ and making according 
decisions – a deliberation which is ‘public’ in the sense that anyone can take 
part in it, regardless of social status or profession.32 As a political principle, the 
common is defined away from the necessity of a common ‘belonging.’ It refers 
instead to ‘political obligation’ that is solely ascribable to the ‘co-activity’ whose 
participants have co-determined the rules thereof.33 Dardot and Laval’s 
theorisation of the common is an attempt to imagine an alternative to 
capitalism, not least through advocating for the limitation of private property via 
the co-institution of rules of common use. This conception goes beyond the 
commons as things that are used commonly, and away from the idea of the 
common as an a priori ‘common good.’34 Their conception of the common 
seeks to do away with both state violence and market competition, through a 
more democratic participation of workers in the collective rule-making in 
processes that somehow involve them. Dardot and Laval understand work as 
‘common action’ that also involves moral, cultural and aesthetic aspects.35 In 
their understanding, both the basis and end point of work is not individual 
interest but co-operation, which should be instituted as ‘unappropriable’ 
through rules that have been shaped collectively.36 Instituting the 
unappropriable does not refer to the recognition of an inherent incapacity of 
work or a kind of work to be appropriated. Rather, it refers to collectively 
instituting such appropriation as unjust and conversely, such unappropriability 
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as just.37 The apparent contradiction between institution and unappropriability 
has to do with the subjectivity that institutes, the peculiarities of which I analyse 
in Chapter 2. It has also to do with Dardot and Laval’s advocated shift from a 
type of appropriation that is always tied to property and belonging to an 
appropriation that strives towards a ‘destination,’ understood as ‘the 
satisfaction of social needs.’38 All in all, the emancipation of labour through the 
principle of the common forms a key part in the two authors’ theory, which 
combines Marxist and Proudhonian traditions and transverses political, 
economic and social functions. 
 
Discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the concept of ‘instituent praxis’ is even more 
central to one of Dardot and Laval’s main theoretical contributions; namely, 
that the common must be instituted rather than left to chance or (historical) 
spontaneity – a position they attribute to earlier theorisations of the common 
such as that by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. My thesis sides with Dardot 
and Laval’s viewpoint in that it underlines the importance of autonomy, read 
closely or etymologically in its pertinence to nomos; in other words, as self-
governance through the co-creation of rules and institutions. My analysis also 
attempts to remain faithful to a democratic function, by which a non-pre-
existing (and hitherto undeserving) subject intervenes and overthrows the 
allocated relations of the power to rule, or better yet, the nemein of communal 
nomos. From this position (also a political positioning), I elaborate and expand 
on the potential of the concept of instituent praxis, in its possible contribution 
as well as contingency in relation to an art historical and theoretical thread that 
deals with questions of institution and power. 
 
In order to elaborate on the possible limits of instituent praxis as well as some 
of its aspects (subjectivity, signification, the psyche, rule-making) as potentially 
taken up by art-related practices, I employ Guattari’s thinking. His philosophy 
features centrally in my argument throughout the thesis, as it provides the 
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framework from which I critically examine instituent praxis and its possible 
practical relevance. Dardot and Laval have grounded a large part of their 
conceptualisation of instituent praxis on Guattari’s thinking, although mainly 
through his earlier writing which has been informed by institutional 
psychoanalysis. In Chapter 2 but also throughout subsequent chapters, I seek 
to further this consideration and expand on the echoes of instituent praxis 
within a Guattarian framework. This forms the main theoretical node from 
which I develop my critique in the thesis, as attentive to an ontology of the 
institution in its creative instances, and conducive to a sociopolitical proposition 
in a nuanced relation to subjectivity and power. 
 
Theory, debates and research questions 
 
In this section, I provide the context for the particular debates and theories 
against or within which I situate and further problematise parts of my argument. 
I converse with most of these debates and theories in order to address 
particular research questions without losing sight of the overarching theoretical 
node of the thesis inquiry.  
Lived realities of institutional absence, crisis, or in some sense, proliferation 
that have often led to stagnating or irreversible power asymmetries and work 
exploitation resonate with the historical project of Institutional Critique and the 
relevant discourse. Upon researching Institutional Critique’s methodologies 
and grounds for exposing or framing institutions, an unresolved or barely 
formed question seemed to emerge and hover in this artistic discourse: are 
stagnation, corruption and oppressive concentration of power intrinsic to the 
(process of) institution? Conversely, is the radical overthrow of oppressive 
power regimes extrinsic to it? And perhaps there is something to be learnt if 
this question referred to institution in the abstract, rather than to particular 
institutions. This could involve both the institution as a general system or 
regime of legitimate or legitimised affairs but also the process of instituting – 
the setting up of the institution. 
20 
 
The edited volume Art and Contemporary Critical Practice: Reinventing 
Institutional Critique (2009) that included the writings of Gerald Raunig on 
‘instituent practices’ was of particular relevance to my thesis.39 Raunig 
considered artistic and political impasses of the legacy of Institutional Critique 
through the lens of critical theory, mainly branches and precursors of 
autonomist Marxism and post-structuralism. He sought to theorise less 
traditionally art-related or art-historical practices as distanced from both the 
grip of neoliberalism and outdated (modern) myths of an enlightened and 
enlightening artistic genius. For Raunig, instituent practices are institutionally 
critical but also propositional and self-determinant. Raunig as well as Irit Rogoff 
have referred to Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘parrhesia’ as a particular kind of 
truth-telling that might help sketch out the ethico-political outline of instituent 
practice(s).40 In Chapter 4, I consider Foucault’s concept of parrhesia and his 
related notion of ‘Cynicism’ from the perspective of instituent praxis.41 
Raunig’s argument also draws on Autonomist Marxism (for instance, Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s thought) that sets itself against sovereign state 
power. Hardt and Negri’s theorisation of the tension between ‘constituent 
power’ and ‘constitution’ (as developed in Commonwealth and other writings) 
is also key in Dardot and Laval’s critique, which, however, I only came across 
later on in working on my thesis.42 Thus, Raunig’s context for instituent 
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practices was initially formative to my thesis, in many respects. However, 
aspects of the theoretical specificity of Raunig’s instituent quality remained 
obscure and required further research. For instance, the theoretical distance 
or relation between the instituent and the constituent remained vague. The 
scope of potential practical relevance of the instituent has also been a point of 
interest in my thesis. Beyond Raunig’s suggested focus (mainly on activist 
collective practices of a broadly-understood self-organised politics), questions 
arise regarding whether and how the instituent could be related to practices or 
concerns within the contemporary (art) world.  
A controversy that resonates both with contemporary art institutions and the 
aims of institutionally critical art has taken the form of an apparent clash 
between theories that defend the possibility of reclaiming and even 
transforming already existing (art) institutional schemata and more anti-
institutional views that would side with wider institutional exodus. Political 
theorist Chantal Mouffe, whose work has had broad resonance in the art field, 
is an advocate of the first category. Mouffe maintains that institutional social 
spaces should not be abandoned insofar as they operate as sites for conflict 
and contestation and thus conduce to democratic/agonistic processes.43 
Mouffe also regards autonomist Marxism as – by contrast – condoning 
withdrawal or ‘exodus’ from existing institutions in favour of self-organised 
initiations that should in turn be deserted once they acquire institutional 
status.44 In Chapters 1 and 3, I complicate aspects of this debate, against its 
tendency to loop into a futile inside/outside schematic dichotomy that often 
detracts from a politically and theoretically sustained set of alternatives. 
 
                                                          
43 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London: Verso, 2013), 97-103. 
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A typical shortfall in the largely essay-based recent bibliography on the 
intersections of art institutions, curating and politics is a terminological and/or 
ontological vagueness around institutions and the process of institution. The 
term ‘institution’ appears to refer to organisations, social bodies or systems. 
The edited volume Institutional Critique and After attempted to rectify this by 
fronting philosopher John Searle’s essay ‘What is an Institution?,’ which was 
first published in the Journal of Institutional Economics.45 Yet, Searle’s positive 
sociolinguistic analysis does not paint the full picture on what is socially and 
politically at stake with institutions. In some of the art-relevant literature, the 
definition of institution is more adequate, if related in the abstract to a field or 
ideological apparatus. However, the politically creative moments inherent in 
the process of institution tend to be ignored, sidelined, or assigned to 
insurrectional functions or concepts that exclude or demote this process.  
 
My thesis attempts a selective mapping of definitional registers of institution, 
starting from some of the main art historical and theoretical sources of the 
twentieth century. Chapter 1 delves into mainly western European literature 
from the late 1960s onwards, whereby key definitional features of institution in 
their relation to art can be extracted – often laterally – from accounts on 
European (neo)avant-gardes. For instance, I have revisited Peter Bürger’s 
widely influential study The Theory of the Avant-garde (1974, in German).46 
Discussions of Bürger’s study have focused on issues and ideas around the 
early twentieth century avant-gardes and the possibility of avant-garde 
resurgences in the practice of institutionally critical strands of conceptual art in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Instead, I have been reading Bürger 
in terms of a critical ontology of the art institution. Examining such literature 
resources with a focus on their potential insight on institutional or instituent 
qualities has been a marginal approach in the relevant bibliography. Piecing 
together a history of ‘extracted’ insights on the art institution since the 
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emergence of modern art could be a most useful exercise, but the contribution 
of this thesis is to reflect on how such insights might work in contemporary art-
world settings, including some of the latest articulations and predicaments of 
its (constitutive) ‘outside’, through a propositional prism that considers the 
wider current sociopolitical problematics of institution.  
 
Even though many of the authors I discuss in Chapter 1 have also considered 
Eastern European avant-gardes in their research, my thesis is largely based 
on a western or rather ‘westernised’ discourse, in the sense of the authors’ 
own assumed context in their writing rather than their national origin or identity. 
For instance, in Bürger’ argument, the reality of a culture industry permeated 
by capital relations plays a critical role, when, in state-socialist Eastern 
European contexts, such permeation does not apply. I want to thereby 
acknowledge a western discursive hegemony that might be obfuscating 
accounts of social contexts that did not align with the Western art institutional 
experience. 
 
Alongside Raunig’s theory of instituent practices, there are instances whereby 
the curatorial/art-theoretical discourse converses with the political potential of 
an instituting process in the contemporary art world. Simon Sheikh advocates 
for ‘instituting differently’ and ‘insist[ing] on instituting’ despite the erosion of 
institutions.47 He has substantiated these claims through various justifications, 
one of which is an insistence on democracy within the policies and structures 
of art institutions, by invoking Chantal Mouffe’s notion of agonism.48 Sheikh 
has also employed Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt’s ‘counter-publics’ to 
consider the art world in terms of a public sphere whereby counter-publics as 
non-dominant voices could form and claim space for their political realisation.49 
                                                          
47 Simon Sheikh, ‘From Para to Post: The Rise and Fall of Curatorial Reason,’ Springerin, no. 1, 2017, 
accessed March 17, 2019, https://www.springerin.at/en/2017/1/von-para-zu-post/.  
48 Simon Sheikh, ‘The Trouble with Institutions, or, Art and its Publics,’ in Art and its Institutions, ed. 
Nina Möntmann (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2006), 149. 
49 Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the 
Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere (Minneapolis: University of Minessota Press, 1993), quoted 
in Sheikh, ‘The Trouble with Institutions,’ 145.  
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Thus, a large part of my analysis in Chapter 4 considers whether Sheikh’s 
invoked political/theoretical contexts do justice to the complex politics of the 
concept of institution as an instituting process. This entails a discussion of 
Sheikh’s conception of curatorial articulations within art institutions, through 
the pertinence of the exhibitionary complex alongside discursive contexts that 
uphold the production of knowledge. In such context, I critically examine 
notions of the public as well as invocations to agonism from the perspective of 
the theory of instituent praxis. Sheikh has also discussed art institutions in 
relation to Cornelius Castoriadis’s notion of the ‘radical imaginary’, and the 
related distinction between societies that ‘self-institute’ autonomously and 
those that alter themselves in a state of ‘heteronomy’.50 I discuss Castoriadis’s 
ideas further in relation to instituent praxis in Chapter 2.  
 
To build on theoretical agendas that try to imagine instituting otherwise in the 
world of art, my thesis turns to sociopolitical contributions of institutional 
ontology that resonate with the current historical condition. Gaps in this latter 
literature emerge from the uneven accentuation of particular definitional 
aspects of institution. Schematically, for instance, there is a recurring 
disjunction between often sociological conceptions stressing the determining 
relation between the reproduction of existing institutional structures and the 
subject, through the prescription of norms, rules, behavioural patterns or 
expectations, and theories that underscore and focus on the potential of 
institution-making or institution-breaking, possibly in tandem with specific 
political understandings of transformation. However, even in theories whereby 
this apparently irreconcilable disjunction collapses – as, for instance, in Dardot 
and Laval’s – questions can be raised regarding possible limitations in the 
emancipatory potential of instituent praxis (for example, in terms of instances 
of power that might elude such potential). The issue of power and its relation 
to the institution, which the existing literature on instituent practice or praxis 
                                                          
50 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 371-
373, quoted in Simon Sheikh, ‘The Magmas: On Institutions and Instituting,’ in How Institutions 
Think: Between Contemporary Art and Curatorial Discourse, ed. Paul O’Neill, Lucy Steeds and Mick 
Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), 126-31. 




only partly elucidates, form an underlying research question in my thesis. In 
this respect, Michel Foucault’s later philosophy in The Courage of Truth (1984) 
has been pivotal. He was particularly concerned with the role of power in the 
‘interplay between the subject and truth,’ if power relations are understood ‘not 
as an emanation of a substantial and invasive power, but in the procedures by 
which people’s conduct is governed.’51 My analysis considers the liminality of 
power in the theoretical specificity of instituent praxis and expands 
generatively on such frictions within discourse, not least, through Foucault’s 
notion of parrhesia. I also examine the pertinence of other theorisations of 
power, such as Castoriadis’s distinction between ‘explicit’ power and ‘ground-
power’ as well as Hardt and Negri’s concept of constituent power.52 My central 
employment of Guattari’s thought is strategic in that it echoes latently 
Foucault’s diffused notion of power that stretches out to sexuality and 
madness. At the same time, Guattari offers a conceptual as well as 
terminological framework that could be seen as relatively more propositional 
than Foucault’s in the context of the contemporary period. 
 
Before elaborating on this framework, it should be noted that Foucault’s 
preoccupation with the notion of power has been traditionally read as 
incompatible with more transformative, emancipatory or propositional 
articulations, such as Guattari’s. However, despite its repressive forms within 
disciplinary apparatuses, power could also be seen as productive or 
transformative. This is not simply because power relations fall short of a 
substantial and invasive emanation. Power relations are also inextricable from 
the truth-telling and subject-forming aspects of parrhesia – at least in later 
Foucauldian writing. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the irreducible link between 
truth-telling, power relations and the formation of the subject makes a claim to 
a ‘transformation of the self and the world,’ through which ‘a new style of 
relation to self, a new type of power relations, and a different regime of truth’ 
                                                          
51 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 8-9. 
52 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Power, Politics, Autonomy,’ in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in 
Political Philosophy, ed. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 150.  
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might emerge.53 In a similar light, Guattari has associated his psychoanalytic 
thought on desire with Foucault’s power:  
 
[Foucault’s] quite distinct notion of power has, if I may say so, 
the effect of ‘pulling’ this concept in the direction of desire. It is in 
this way that he deals with power as a matter that has to do with 
an investment and not with an ‘all or nothing’ law. Throughout his 
entire life, Foucault refused to conceive of power as a reified 
entity. For him, relations of power and, by consequence, 
strategic struggles, never amount to being mere objective 
relations of force. Rather, these relations involve the processes 
of subjectification in their most essential and irreducible 
singularity.54 
 
Thus, in this thesis, I frame power through Foucault’s postulate of diffusion 
across socio-political institutions / structures and the non-individual subject / 
self, which is connoted with regimes of truth, ethics and the psyche. At the 
same time, my exploration of instituent praxis will seek to be situated in relation 
to the Guattarian reading of Foucault’s power as open to productive and 
transformative moments through processes of subjectification.  
 
I expand on the Guattarian threads already present within the theory of 
instituent praxis, through upholding a psychoanalytic angle and affective 
understandings of signification and subjectivity, as well as accentuating the 
artificiality of instituent praxis. In this, Guattari’s conception of the real as 
artificial becomes key. Reality and artificiality should not be understood as 
caught up in a debatably postmodern conundrum that would signal the 
impossibility of determining what is real within an all-encompassing, multiple 
and fragmented mediatic chaos of (institutional) artificiality. In fact, my thesis 
departs from the practical hypothesis of this conundrum and employs 
Guattari’s poststructuralist theory to break from the empirical, simplistic 
articulation of the duality between the real and the artificial. In this context, 
Guattari’s thinking could be seen as elaborating on and advancing the aspect 
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of instituent praxis that Dardot and Laval have connected with Castoriadis’s 
notion of an instituting radical imaginary. The underlying question here is not 
about deciphering real instances, struggles, identities against artificial ones, 
but rather, framing the real as essentially crafted and curatable and pondering 
upon the complexities of a self-determining potential within the significational 
artifice of subjectivity and instituent praxis.  
 
More broadly, the theory of instituent praxis together with Guattarian 
philosophy open up a framework for rethinking the production of subjectivity 
alongside the artificial and within a politics adjacent to autonomy. This 
examination inhabits the remit of the art world and its coextensive parameters 
of discourse, curatorial and organisational paradigms, labour conditions, and 
institutional, administrative or algorithmic infrastructure. My thesis implicates 
the art world as distinct from, but also potentially paradigmatic of, a broader 
social practice that could resonate with an economics of the artificial, 
understood as a speculative and propositional remit for instituent praxis and 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Possible limitations to this are also 
examined in a fashion that critically articulates predicaments within 
contemporary capitalism, ranging from new facets of corporate/technological 
concentration of power and psychosocial relapses to authoritarianism and 
fascism to recuperations of aesthetic and critical modalities performed by 
alternative or experimental institutional formats. Chapter 6, the final chapter of 
the thesis before Conclusions, considers the self-determining potential of the 
micro-management and channeling of visibility, signification and legitimisation 
(all aspects akin to the artificiality of instituent praxis) in alter-institutional or 
para-institutional practices. In such context, the chapter also considers the 
possibilities of fascistic tropes and permutations as close to the para-





Methodology and structure  
 
My methodological approach synthesises literary overview, textual analysis, 
interviews and research in situ in cases of selected case studies and close 
examination of art institutions and other projects. The first two chapters of the 
thesis employ literary overviews as well as close readings and analysis of 
theoretical texts. The last four chapters combine case-study-based 
approaches with theoretical analyses.   
Chapter 1 critically constructs a thread of understandings of the concept of 
institution in its relation to art by tracing pivotal accounts from art history and 
theory from the 1960s onwards. It begins with Peter Bürger’s theorisation of 
the institution of art and its relation to the question of art and life as it was 
raised through European avant-garde movements of the twentieth century. 
Subsequently, it examines accounts of art historians associated with the 
October journal (Hal Foster and Benjamin Buchloh) and of feminist artist 
Andrea Fraser, who have been more or less central figures in the discourse 
(and practice) of Institutional Critique.55 The aim is to address the definitional 
gaps that arise when the institution of art is discussed and delineated in relation 
to European avant-garde art movements and the potential reemergence of 
avant-garde features in Institutional Critique. This analysis is by no means 
exhaustive of the discourse that has discussed the art institution as such or 
through its relation to the European avant-gardes of the twentieth century. 
Instead, it revisits renowned parts of western art discourse in order to extract 
generative discrepancies between takes on the institutional that will orientate 
the subsequent sociopolitical discussion.  
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Chapter 2 moves from art discourse to sociopolitical theory and places the 
focus on the concept of instituent praxis. The relation of the instituent and the 
constituent is discussed through a critique on Hardt and Negri's concept of 
constituent power. I present Dardot and Laval’s meticulous and rigorous 
theoretical construction of the concept of instituent praxis, as an emancipatory 
one. In this construction, they are critiquing and repurposing Cornelius 
Castoriadis’s theory and his concepts of instituent power or ground-power, the 
social-historical and the (radical) imaginary. They are also centrally implicating 
Karl Marx’s ideas on the relation between subjectivity and praxis as well as 
Castoriadis’s configuration of this relation that also involves autonomy. In order 
to outline the pertinence of subjectivity within instituent praxis, Dardot and 
Laval employ Guattari’s framework of institutional psychoanalysis, mainly 
through his book Psychoanalysis and Transversality. I expand critically on 
some of the specific aspects of instituent praxis, such as its postulation of new 
significations and its pertinence to a Guattarian subjectivity, through later 
Guattarian philosophy (mainly in Chaosmosis). In this context, I elaborate on 
Guattari's concepts of autopoiesis, heterogenesis and the machinic. I also 
address the artificiality of instituent praxis and its possible channeling within 
the current techno-political system of signification.  
Chapter 3 aims at articulating the potential synergic scope of reach for the 
instituent and/or for instituent praxis. At this point, my analysis starts focusing 
on the terrain of art institutions and considers counter-claims to and 
misconceptions of institutional exodus. The issue of work is brought to the fore, 
through arguments regarding the ‘back office’ of art institutions. However, this 
examination is one that widens the co-ordinates for the instituent, through 
exploring functions of work and administration and tracing their relation to 
notions of creation and subjectivity. In relation to this, algorithmic governance 
is interrogated as well as the institution’s relation to infrastructure. This 
widening of the co-ordinates for the instituent aims at sparking off the 
perspective of a contemporary economics of artificiality, if economics point 
towards both nemein (distributing) and nomos. In this, the politics and theory 
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of instituent praxis can play a crucial role that involves a particular configuration 
of the relation between desire, machinic subjectivity and code. 
Chapter 4 considers overlaps between instituent praxis, discourse and 
discursive practices through a focus on pedagogical/discursive practices 
diversely situated within or at the fringes of the art world. Raunig’s instituent 
practices have often been discussed as pertaining to Foucault’s notion of 
parrhesia, i.e. a certain function of speaking truth to power in and through self-
knowledge, thus possibly annotating such practices with a discursive aspect. 
Curatorial or art institutional practice has also been framed as not necessarily 
yielding to power as control, through a possible implication with the production 
of public or democratic formations. I consider approaches that have used the 
concept of the public and some of its theoretical iterations, which might be 
seen as challenging the theory of instituent praxis and its appeal to the 
production of subjectivity. I also return to Foucault’s theory around parrhesia 
and Cynicism in The Courage of Truth and cross-examine it with the theory of 
instituent praxis and in relation to a contemporary context of discursive 
imperatives and curatorial/institutional practices. In these debates, I seek to 
emphasise the role of affective knowledge as posited by instituent praxis as 
well as Guattari’s theory of affect and signification. Relatedly, I also seek to 
identify and interrogate possible limits to certain aspects of instituent praxis. 
In Chapter 5, I seek to further and complicate a well-established and 
predominantly western discourse that identifies and puts a spotlight on art 
institutions that present an experimental or alternative character against 
dominant oppressive or capitalist tendencies in the art world. At the same time, 
I attempt to address the ways in which the geopolitical parameters of the case-
study selection in my thesis could be informed through the lens of instituent 
praxis. I employ the concept of the semi-periphery, as a key mechanism at 
play in terms of geopolitical asymmetries and power relations among 
European regions, while I discuss the concept’s responsiveness towards some 
of the challenges posed by the theory of instituent praxis. In this reconfigured 
context, I examine case studies from European semi-peripheries that have 




only marginally been researched, if at all, within academic art-historical 
discourse. Main points of my analysis are the relation of the semi-periphery to 
affective understandings of infrastructure, the questioning of reductive 
economic approaches and the synthesis of a framework that attends to the 
production of collective subjectivities in the context of the instituent. 
Chapter 6 considers particularities of institutional iterations such as alternative 
institutions, para-institutions and mock-institutions, by focusing on practices 
that take forms of activism while maintaining an ambiguous relation to the art 
world, and thereby, to reality. The aim is to examine these particularities 
through configurations of the imaginary, the real and the artificiality of instituent 
praxis. For instance, the New World Summit features centrally as an 
artistic/political project that experiments with the reality of alternative 
parliaments and notions of stateless democracy. The latter could be seen as 
potentially informative both in contexts where the actuality of parliamentarism 
is relatively assumed and in so-called older democracies whose realities still 
tend towards authoritarian totalities. A sub-theme that emerges is the micro-
management of signification and the visible and its potential pertinence to 
deontology and processes of legitimisation. Another facet of this examination 
addresses the possible political variations of para-institutional iterations that 























1. The (Art) Institutional: The Search for Definition 
within Art Historical/Theoretical Accounts 
 
‘The Greeks had discovered the phusis/nomos (nature/institution-convention) 
distinction and had already put it into practice by changing their institutions. 
But their most important philosophies stopped short of using it, obviously – at 
least in the case of Plato – out of fear of opening the way to 'arbitrariness' 
and freedom.’1  
 
In this first chapter, I seek to locate definitional aspects of the institution within 
key art historical and theoretical readings of the European artistic (neo)avant-
gardes. The aim is to retrieve pertinent readings of the relation between 
institution and art that can ultimately point to what is at stake in a contemporary 
understanding of the institutional and its theoretical potential within an 
expanded field of practice that includes art, curating and organisational work. 
I employ a thread of accounts mainly from the 1960s onwards, beginning with 
Peter Bürger’s theorisation of the institution of art through his viewpoint of the 
intent of European artistic avant-gardes in the early twentieth century.  
Art as institution and the intent of the European avant-
garde(s)  
Peter Bürger’s landmark study Theory of the Avant Garde, first published in 
German in 1974, is among the first to have offered a thorough analysis and 
elaborate theorisation of art as an institution. The Marxist theorist developed 
some of his ideas on the institution of art in his later essay ‘The Institution of 
                                                          
1 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary,’ in The Castoriadis 
Reader, ed. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 320. 
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‘Art’ as a Category in the Sociology of Literature’ (1985) which includes a 
detailed presentation of key attributes of art when approached as an institution. 
Art as institution [conveys] the general views about art 
(definitions of function) which prevail in a society (or in particular 
classes) in their social contingency. It is assumed that these 
definitions of function are connected with the material and 
spiritual needs of the public and that they stand in a definable 
relationship to the material conditions of the production and 
reception of art. Mediated by aesthetic norms, definitions of the 
function crystallize on the side of the producers in and through 
the artistic material, on the side of the recipients through the 
establishment of attitudes of reception.2  
Bürger makes it clear that he is not referring to ‘mediating agencies’ or 
‘establishments such as publishing, the book-trade, the theatre and museums 
which mediate between the individual work and the public’.3 Rather, he 
associates the institution of art with the ‘manner which regulates the commerce 
with works […] in a given society’; a category that conditions – without however 
being reducible to – the production and reception of art in its social 
contingency.4 Thus, for Bürger, the institution of art amounts to the prevalent 
definition of the social function of art in its social and historical contingency. 
Bürger’s definition can be better grasped through his lengthy analysis of the 
historical specificity of the institution of art in bourgeois society. He argues that 
in ‘developed bourgeois society’ whose chronological emergence is situated 
at the end of the eighteenth century, the defining characteristic of the institution 
of art or the prevalent definition of art’s social function is its ‘autonomy status’.5 
Autonomy is hereby understood as the dissociation of ‘creation’ from societal 
purposes and interests such as religion or other regimes of patronage.6 Bürger 
is not simply referring to works of art or artists which he sees as gradually 
becoming less subservient to social or political entities. Rather, the 
                                                          
2 Peter Bürger, ‘The Institution of “Art” as a Category in the Sociology of Literature,’ Cultural Critique, 
No. 2 (Winter 1985:1986): 8, accessed January 18, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1354199. 
[emphasis in the original] 
3 Bürger, ‘Institution of “Art”,’ 7 
4 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 12 
5 Ibid., Iii 
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dissociation from societal purposes is applied to what he calls ‘the entity of 
“art” as a sphere of non-purposive creation and disinterested pleasure […] 
contrasted with the life of society which it seems to be the task of the future to 
order rationally and in strict orientation toward definable goals’.7 Unlike 
theorists before him who approached artistic autonomy through particular 
artists or works, Bürger locates in developed bourgeois society the emergence 
of the possibility for art to exist as a separate sphere or indeed as a distinct 
institution. The sphere of art is seen as dissociated from the life of society or 
what Bürger elsewhere calls the ‘praxis of life’.8 What defines the praxis of life 
or the life of society is a ‘means-end’ rationality by which the ‘citizen has been 
reduced to a partial function’, through the division of labour and all-pervading 
competition.9 As Bürger emphatically states, ‘values such as humanity, joy, 
solidarity are extruded from life as it were, and preserved in art’.10 The citizen 
who is reduced to a partial function ‘can be discovered in art as a “human 
being”.’11 Thus, the institution of art is ‘burdened with the demand that it be an 
alternative to the real world which it can only be when it is opposed to that 
world as the wholly other’.12 
It is important to stress that this is a picture of art painted by philosophers and 
theorists of modernity and their conceptions on the function of art in bourgeois 
society. Bürger is very explicit about the fact that he is tracing prevalent 
definitions of the function of art within formulations that could be seen as 
epochal landmarks ‘via the romantic conception of art and all the way to 
Aestheticism.’13 For instance, he suggests that art was seen as ‘the only 
possible sphere in which man’s lost wholeness could be recovered’ in the 
context of the writings of late Enlightenment and early Romanticism theorists 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 48 
9 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 48-50 
Bürger, ‘Institution of “Art”,’ 11. Bürger refers to the means-end rationality in both texts; the 
competition aspect in the first text (Theory) and the division of labour in the second (‘Institution’). 
10 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 50. 
11 Ibid., 48. 
12 Bürger, ‘Institution of “Art”,’ 12. 
13 Ibid., 14. I discuss Aestheticism further in subsequent pages.  
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such as Karl Phillipp Moritz and Friedrich Schiller who critiqued the means-end 
rationality of society or what came to be called ‘alienation’.14 Bürger points out 
that art’s investment with values such as humanity, joy and solidarity is 
concurrent with the ‘period when essential fundamental principles of 
developing bourgeois society (means-end rationality and the division of labor) 
were being recognized.’15 The ‘nexus’ that Bürger posits between ‘the critique 
of alienation and the concept of autonomous art’ at a specific historical moment 
is to a large extent convincing. 16 Which is however the precise modality of art’s 
institutionalisation as autonomous?  
Bürger is crucially arguing that the institutionalisation of art as autonomous in 
bourgeois society is ‘ideological’, or ‘affirmative.’17 He draws on Herbert 
Marcuse’s essay ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’ (1937) and the concept 
of affirmation to describe the way art has been institutionalised in bourgeois 
society.18 According to Bürger (and Marcuse), affirmation rests on a 
contradiction. On the one hand, bourgeois culture (art, in Bürger) is critical to 
social conditions in that it presents or allows the imagination of an unalienated 
realm which contradicts and ‘protests against’ actual reality.19 On the other 
hand, ‘bourgeois culture’ (or art) ‘exiles humane values to the realm of the 
imagination’ which is ‘detached from reality through the medium of aesthetic 
semblance (Schein)’ and thereby, the realisation of such values remains 
‘precluded’.20 As art is ‘detached from daily life,’ the experience of the ‘self as 
personality’ that art offers ‘remains without tangible effect, i.e., it cannot be 
integrated into that life.’21 Bürger describes this contradictory condition thusly: 
To make it possible for art to be the advocate of humanity in a 
society in whose actual life-process humanity is not realized, art 
is institutionalized as autonomous. […] To the extent that the 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 11. [emphasis added] 
15 Ibid., 11. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Ibid., 13. 
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98 (London: MayFly, 2009). 
19 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 11. 
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critique of society and of its means-ends rationality, which is 
institutionalized as a deceptive experience of harmony, 
simultaneously undercuts the possibility of its realization, it is 
ideological or, to use Marcuse's concept, affirmative.22 
The idea that the institution of art has a social function begins to unravel. 
Bürger suggests that the status of autonomy does not render the institution of 
art ‘functionless’ nor does it entail complete independence from society.23 
Rather, the institution of art is ‘the fully developed partial sphere which 
functions according to its own rules’ and ‘remains dependent on the larger 
society on behalf of which it takes on certain tasks’24 or ‘functions […] which 
cannot be exercised, or exercised adequately, by other institutions.’25 Alluding 
to the aforementioned process of affirmation, Bürger considers ‘the specific 
function of art in bourgeois society’ to be ‘the neutralization of critique’ whilst 
becoming humanity’s ‘advocate’.26 It is important to note that Bürger regards 
the institution of art as having an ‘effect’ in the sense of the ‘shaping influence 
an institutionalized conception of art has on the production and reception of 
works’.27 This will be further discussed in relation to Aestheticism and the 
European avant-garde movements of the twentieth century. 
Bürger considers ‘Aestheticism’ to be a culmination of the autonomous 
institution of bourgeois art.28 All bourgeois art is seen as severed from the life 
praxis at least in terms of form. However, Bürger regards Aestheticism as that 
stage in the development of bourgeois art whereby its ‘apartness from the 
praxis of life’ becomes its content.29 Art is rendered tautological, self-reflecting 
and self-referential (i.e. art for art itself).30 Art in Aestheticism no longer claims 
to refer to or interpret the praxis of life and thereby voids itself of all means-
end rationality. In this light, one might be tempted to think of it (art) as a sphere 
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of pure promise that carries the potential to restore humanity’s values in the 
realm of social life. However, in accordance with Bürger’s logic of affirmation, 
Aestheticism (and all bourgeois art for that matter) is inherently incapable of 
fulfilling any such promise since it is detached from the realm of life and needed 
remain so, if it were to claim the aforementioned potential. Thus, bourgeois art 
as the autonomous institution whose autonomy culminates in Aestheticism can 
be seen as affirmative. 
Interestingly though, Bürger thinks of Aestheticism as the ‘necessary 
precondition’ for the work and intent of the avant-garde to formulate.31 He 
argues that the European avant-garde movements of the early twentieth 
century sought to reconnect the autonomous institution of art with the praxis of 
life.32 Refusing to take refuge in the autonomous yet affirmative institution of 
art, the avant-garde wished to destroy this autonomy and reconnect art and 
life to the point of their complete indistinctness. As Bürger maintains, the avant-
gardist intent to create a ‘new life praxis’ could not have been formulated 
without Aestheticism’s previous negation of the means-end rationality of the 
current life praxis.33 Importantly, Bürger suggests that the avant-garde intent 
was to ‘sublate’ the art institution rather than destroy it: ‘art was not to be simply 
destroyed, but transferred to the praxis of life where it would be preserved, 
albeit in a changed form.’34 This meant that the praxis of life itself would have 
to be radically re-organised ‘from a basis in art’.35 
Notably, Bürger discusses Marcel Duchamp’s art practice as paradigmatic of 
the avant-gardist intent to eliminate the distinction between art and life by 
negating both the individuality of the production and reception of art and the 
distinction between them. Duchamp’s readymades were randomly selected 
mass-produced objects, signed by Duchamp (with pseudonyms) and exhibited 
(or proposed to be exhibited) in art shows. Bürger regards the readymades as 
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‘manifestations’ which sought to expose the art market by proving that ‘the 
signature means more than the quality of the work’.36 More importantly, he 
sees them as provocations towards ‘individual creativity’ and the assumed 
category of the genius through the juxtaposition of the signature, which 
indicates an exhibited individual creation, and the mass-produced object, 
which blatantly precludes individual production.37 Furthermore, Bürger assigns 
a collective aspect to the shock provoked by Duchamp’s manifestations to the 
public.38 He sees the shock reaction of the public as diametrically opposed to 
an individualised reception pertinent for instance to aestheticist art. Bürger also 
asserts that the avant-garde vision challenges the distinction of production and 
reception and that such a challenge is exemplified in the recipe character found 
in artists’ written instructions for writing Dadaist poems or automatic texts.39 
Duchamp’s ‘Specifications for “Readymades”’ could be added here, in the 
context of Duchamp’s work The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors Even 
(The Green Box) in 1934.40 Bürger finds in the recipe aspect of the artists’ 
writings a call to ‘activity on the part of the recipient.’41 Such activity would not 
indicate a shift to the separate side of ‘artistic production’; rather, it would 
become ‘part of a liberating life praxis’. In this sense, the division between 
producers and receivers is no longer valid as everyone is active in producing 
the liberating life praxis. 
What has become then of the avant-garde vision that emerged in the beginning 
of the twentieth century and where does it leave the autonomous institution of 
art in bourgeois society? Bürger maintains that the way Duchamp’s 
‘manifestations’ functioned within the art institution eventually cancelled out 
their intended effect.42 Duchamp’s readymades would soon be accepted as art 
objects worthy of exhibition. Thus, there would no longer be a contradiction in 
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them being both signed art exhibits and mass-produced objects. Without this 
contradiction, the readymades can no longer provoke. Bürger contends that 
the avant-garde movements failed irreversibly to connect art and life in a new 
liberating praxis.43 In a somewhat circular logic, he associates this failure with 
the inherent affirmative function of the autonomous institution of art that 
‘prevents the contents of works that press for radical change in a society (i.e., 
the abolition of alienation) from having any practical effect’.44 Richard Murphy 
has described it very concisely: ‘any social or political content is instantly 
neutralized when the work of art is received as a purely ‘‘imaginative’’ product, 
an aesthetic illusion that need not be taken seriously.’45 Furthermore, since 
Bürger thinks the avant-garde’s failure is ‘irreversible’ as soon as its gestural 
negation is ‘accepted as art’, he regards any neo-avant-garde attempt as not 
only affirmative but ‘inauthentic’ too: ‘having been shown to be irredeemable, 
the claim to be protest can no longer be maintained’.46 Bürger also refers to 
‘pulp fiction and commodity aesthetics’ as loci where we find a ‘false sublation 
of autonomous art’; art and life have been reconnected without resulting in a 
new liberating praxis.47 Such a reconnection takes place through the ‘total 
tailoring of production to the socially produced “false” needs of recipients’.48 
Bürger concludes that this is the only way art and life can be reconnected in 
bourgeois society and in this light, in a statement that might seem contradictory 
to his overall theory, he favours preserving the autonomy of the institution: 
Given the experience of the false sublation of autonomy, one will 
need to ask whether a sublation of the autonomy status can be 
desirable at all, whether the distance between art and the praxis 
of life is not requisite for that free space within which alternatives 
to what exists become conceivable.49 
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Decades later, in 2010, Bürger writes an article-long response to his critics, 
concluding as follows:  
I pointed out that the most lucid avant-gardists were themselves 
aware of the extravagance of their project to revolutionize 
everyday practices and hence recognized its unrealizability. […] 
On the other hand, I also suggested that the failure of an 
historical project should not be equated with a lack of 
effectiveness and importance. Measured against their goals and 
the hopes that they carried, all revolutions have failed: this fact 
does not lessen their historical significance.50 
Relatedly, in the same essay Bürger writes: ‘The difficulty of fulfilling this 
demand underscores how far removed the avant-garde's impulse to transform 
real social relationships is from us today. This does not exclude, but rather 
includes, the possibility that the avant-garde could gain a renewed relevance 
in a future that we cannot imagine.’51 Arguably, the echo of optimism in these 
later responses regarding the (future) potential of the avant-garde does not 
indicate a shift in Bürger’s position. Rather, it accentuates the determining role 
of historicity for the social function of the institution of art as well as the avant-
garde intent and action. Such historicity has fundamentally informed Bürger’s 
theoretical formulations around the institution of art in bourgeois society. For 
Bürger, the failure of the avant-garde had to do with the aforementioned 
neutralisation of social and political content as well as affirmation and its 
hidden character – all of which are idiomatic of the era of bourgeois society 
(and are discussed in subsequent sections). Thus, Bürger continues to hold 
the view according to which the historical avant-garde movements failed 
irreversibly to sublate the institution of art; the institution’s autonomy remained 
intact as it transformed and stretched so as to accommodate the avant-garde 
manifestations as art.52 
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Preliminary note on the concept of the norm and its 
relation to the institution 
As the definition of the institution by Bürger states, the institution of art as the 
socially contingent definitions of the function of art is mediated by aesthetic 
norms. In bourgeois society, he regards the autonomous work of art as 
overthrowing its subjection to norms in the sense of rules while it ‘aspires to 
being judged by the rules it lays down itself’.53 This is again in direct antithesis 
with courtly-feudal society where art was produced according to 
‘institutionalized aesthetic norms’.54 Furthermore, as Bürger suggests, there is 
a social aspect to the concept of the norm, which is in a dialectical relation to 
the aesthetic one and conditions the work of art.55 As in bourgeois society the 
autonomous work of art tends to overthrow the concept of the norm, Bürger 
thinks that it should be able to upset the ‘sphere of social norms’ and possibly 
lead to the eventual collapse of the institution of art.56 However, according to 
Bürger, bourgeois society only allows criticism to the extent that it remains 
within the spectrum of ‘relative inefficacy’.57 Therefore, regarding social norms 
he suggests that ‘the concept of autonomous art makes possible their 
discussion as part of the work. This renders them innocuous but also enlarges 
the scope of the work vis-à-vis prevailing ideas and norms.’58 
This further elucidates Bürger’s conception of the mechanism through which 
the institution neutralises social and political content, including the 
manifestations of the historical avant-garde: ‘in recognizing these 
manifestations as art works and acknowledging their value in the development 
of modern art, the art institution retracts its claim to establish norms.’59 Bürger 
is hereby referring to the historical association of aesthetic norms to epochs 
and periods, that used to be a correlate of the art institution and that fades with 
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the failure of the historical avant-garde. The only norm that the art institution 
maintains thereafter is its aesthetic autonomy, which, according to Bürger, is 
a social one: 
In retreating to its core domain of aesthetic autonomy, the art 
institution demonstrates a resistance to the attack of the avant-
gardes, yet also adopts avant-garde practices. Seen in this light, 
the failure of the avant-garde's aspirations to alter social reality 
and its internal aesthetic success (the artistic legitimation of 
avant-garde practices) are two sides of the same coin.60 
Bürger is right to tackle the concept of the norm and his analysis is not 
misguided in identifying an enlargement in the scope of the work. However, 
the articulation that autonomous works of art are ‘no longer governed by any 
aesthetic (implicitly or explicitly socially determined) norm’ seems questionable 
outside its initial context of opposition to courtly-feudal society and patronage. 
The articulation is doubtful both in the case of the historical avant-garde and 
in the case of later art, predominantly because it places a 
compulsory/inescapable aspect to the concept of the norm while, arguably, 
norms are essentially different to rules. That the autonomous work of art 
aspires to be judged by the norms it lays down itself does not exclude the 
possibility of the work’s governance by norms too. As it will be suggested, 
autonomous art has always been governed by norms and the type of 
governance exerted by norms pertaining to the institution of art needs to be 
further examined. An initial hypothesis would be that norms in the post-
historical-avant-garde condition are of a different kind: indeed, not visual 
features of objects that would normally grant them artwork ontology, nor 
aesthetic norms inextricably associated with and attributable to historical 
periods but micro-streams of qualities (conceptual, material and formal, 
discursive and significational, managerial, economic,) that appear relevant or 
timely within the field of (current) artistic (visual/aural/literary/etc) production.  




The autonomy of the institution of art and the question of 
art and life 
Bürger has emphatically argued that the ‘category art as institution’ became 
‘recognizable after the avant-garde movements had criticized the autonomy 
status of art in developed bourgeois society.’61 He has also suggested that the 
‘bourgeois institution “art” survived both the attack of the historical avant-garde 
movements (that uncovered the institution’s functional mode) and the 
development of the possibilities of mass reproduction’ and that this resilience 
disproves the assumption that ‘to enlighten others about the functioning of an 
ideological institution will necessarily result in that institution’s collapse.’62 Is it 
not however precisely the hidden quality of affirmation that allows it to operate? 
Bürger has suggested that the hidden character of affirmation is similar to the 
way the state operates in ‘late-capitalist society’: in order for the state to ‘fulfill 
its function’ of ‘securing the investment interests of capital’ it needs to conceal 
that function and implement ‘social measures’ that in principle contradict the 
function.63 Thus, if the avant-garde indeed  enlightened others about the 
process of affirmation and therefore effaced its hidden quality, why did it not 
automatically annihilate the ideological mechanism altogether? Arguably, 
questions should be raised regarding both the actual remit of outreach of the 
function of affirmation and the validity of Bürger’s viewpoint of the intentions 
and illuminations of the historical avant-garde. I discuss first, the former issues 
and subsequently, the latter, in relation to pertinent critiques of other authors. 
Without himself formulating a theory of aesthetics, aesthetic theories occupy a 
predominant – if not exclusive – position within Bürger’s traced ideological 
framework for the institution of art, as he identifies prevalent definitions of the 
social function of art from such theories. In this light, he has been critiqued for 
‘equating’ the ‘institutional frame’ with ‘aesthetic theory’ and for disregarding 
the significance of ‘physical institutions such as school, university, academies, 
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museums, etc.’ to the ‘functioning of art’.64 In turn, Bürger has responded that 
even though aesthetic theories are no longer (1980) the ‘exclusive domain of 
philosophers’ and ‘the ideas they formulate enter the heads of producers of art 
and their publics by way of various mediating instrumentalities (school, 
especially the Gymnasium, the university, literary criticism, and literary 
histories, to name just a few)’, aesthetic theory comprises ‘prevailing ideas 
about art in the most developed form’ and therefore, the examination of such 
theory is of primal importance.65 He adds that ‘it is precisely when one 
assumes that art is institutionalized as ideology in developed bourgeois society 
that its critique must engage its most developed exemplification’.66 Thus, 
theory is seen as an exemplification and a full-blown development of prevalent 
ideas with which any critique should seek to engage.  
Against his constructed ideological framework that draws from the 
Enlightenment to Aestheticism – including Valéry’s writings in 1926, Bürger 
seems to posit a neo-Marxist framework (to which himself belongs) that 
recognised and theorised the ideological mechanism at play, after the avant-
garde movements had rendered it recognisable.67 Marcuse’s essay ‘The 
Affirmative Character of Culture’, written as early as 1937 and anchored to a 
long pre-existing Marxist tradition, perplexes and nuances the determinants of 
a prevalence of theory that is concerned with the social function of art. In other 
words, can it be accurately argued that affirmation continues to operate based 
on its hidden quality, after the avant-garde (supposedly) sheds light on the 
ideological function of the institution of art, Marcuse’s and other materialist 
writings begin to be relatively influential and Bürger’s adaptation of affirmation 
in relation to art as institution is put into blatant words? Arguably, critical 
sociology that seeks to restore a materialist perspective to a pure idealist one 
often operates within a methodology that makes it assume a privileged, 
exclusive insight into a broadly concealed reality. Such assumption has 
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historically operated in tandem with another assumption: that as a tradition and 
methodology it never becomes the predominant one – rather, it remains 
marginal and obscure. However, could it not be reasonably counterargued that 
the viewpoint of the materialist, anti-idealist critical sociology – at least as 
employed by Marcuse in relation to culture – has become if not the prevalent, 
one of the prevalent definitions of the social function of art? An adequate 
answer to such a question would obviously require entire bodies of dedicated 
historical research, but an indicative critique can be found in Susan Sontag’s 
essay ‘The Literary Criticism of Georg Lukács’ (1965) that preceding Bürger’s 
writings already attests to the remit of contested wake caused by the legacy of 
German neo-Marxist criticism:  
[…] both the strength and the limitation of the Marxist approach 
to art arise from it is commitment to a “higher point of view.” 
There is no question in the writings of the critics I have cited (the 
early Lukács, Benjamin, Adorno, etc.) of a narrow forcing of art 
per se into the service of a particular moral or historical tendency. 
But none of these critics, even at their best, are free of certain 
notions which in the end serve to perpetuate an ideology that, for 
all its attractiveness when considered as a catalogue of ethical 
duties, has failed to comprehend in other than a dogmatic and 
disapproving way the texture and qualities, the peculiar vantage 
point, of contemporary society.68  
Through Sontag’s criticism I do not seek to endorse a liberal context for art. 
However, the higher point of view that she mentions has been the focus of 
criticism by post-structural and post-modern authors that I employ centrally in 
my thesis, who, rather than aligning with a liberal approach, complicate further 
the Marxist tradition. Sontag’s viewpoint only serves here to suggest that the 
outreach regarding the function of affirmation has been more widespread than 
Bürger would have it, at least at the time of his writing. The questions this 
hypothesis would raise (apart from the ones regarding the avant-garde’s 
intents and revelations) have to do with the ambivalent applicability of the 
concept of affirmation to the category of art as institution and its potentially ad 
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hoc attachment to the intent of the historical avant-garde. The historical 
occurrence of the neutralisation of social and political content, as Bürger 
describes it in relation to the workings of the avant-garde, seems to be pre-
destined since it is interpreted and defined through the uninterruptable self-
perpetuity of the function of affirmation, a concept that Marcuse inextricably 
associated with a specific conceptualisation of culture as it emerged in 
bourgeois society. This conceptualisation dissociates culture from the concept 
of civilization, turns it against the material conditions of social reproduction and 
attaches it to eternal and ahistorical values such as specific concepts of 
‘soul’.69 Could Bürger’s theoretical formulations around the categorically 
hidden nature of the affirmative be thwarting or precluding historical shifts 
towards what he has referred to as a ‘future that we cannot imagine’? Hal 
Foster’s analysis which I discuss further considers the possibility that Bürger’s 
position is too deterministic as it constructs a lineage that pre-empts the failure 
of the avant-garde. 
Returning to Bürger’s main theses, the German theorist asserts that the 
institution of art amounts to the prevalent definitions of the function of art in its 
social contingency. In bourgeois society, the prevalent definition of art’s 
function refers to the institutionalisation of art’s autonomy as a critique of 
alienation and the means-end rationality of everyday life praxis. Examining 
closely Marcuse’s writings on the affirmative character of culture from which 
Bürger is directly taking his cue, it becomes clear that the former author is 
referring to ‘objects of art’ as bearers of the ‘medium of beauty’ whose realm 
is situated well beyond the realm of the everyday:  
The culture of souls absorbed in a false form those forces and 
wants which could find no place in everyday life. The cultural 
ideal assimilated men’s longing for a happier life: for humanity, 
goodness, joy, truth, and solidarity. […] They are either 
internalized as the duty of the individual soul (to achieve what is 
constantly betrayed in the external existence of the whole) or 
represented as objects of art (whereby their reality is relegated 
to a realm essentially different from that of everyday life). […] The 
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medium of beauty decontaminates truth and sets it apart from 
the present.70 
In a different passage Marcuse writes: ‘Only in the medium of ideal beauty, in 
art, was happiness permitted to be reproduced as a cultural value in the totality 
of social life.’71 Marcuse emphasises the exclusive association of the sphere 
of art with great art as the medium of ideal beauty in bourgeois society as 
opposed to everyday, so-called low-brow, trivial or folk art which is excluded 
from such a sphere. Even though Bürger does not refer to ideal beauty, 
Marcuse’s description fits Bürger’s in that the distance from the everyday or 
everyday life praxis is only diminished through a false or ‘bad’ sublation in 
terms of the culture industry.72 Marcuse too comments on culture that 
integrates with ‘material life’ processes in a false ‘abolition of its affirmative 
character’:  
The integration of culture into the material life process is 
considered a sin against the mind and the soul. As a matter of 
fact, its occurrence would only make explicit what has long been 
in effect blindly, since not only the production but also the 
reception of cultural goods is already governed by the law of 
value. […] Happiness is calculated at the outset with regard to its 
utility just as the chance of profit is weighed in relation to risk and 
cost. It is thus smoothly integrated into the economic principle of 
this society.73  
Importantly, Marcuse does not deny that such culture involves fulfilled (as 
opposed to desired) happiness and gratification, even if they are seen as pre-
planned and calculated as utility. As regards the ‘real abolition of affirmative 
culture,’ Marcuse states that it ‘must appear utopian,’ if the ‘status quo’ is to be 
preserved.74 Nonetheless, he attempts a few predictions and observations:  
A foretaste of such potentialities [culture as real ‘fulfillment’ and 
no longer as ‘desire’] can be had in experiencing the unassuming 
display of Greek statues or the music of Mozart or late 
Beethoven. […] Every attempt to sketch out the counterimage of 
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affirmative culture comes up against the ineradicable cliché 
about the fools’ paradise. It would be better to accept this cliché 
than the one about the transformation of the earth into a gigantic 
community center, which seems to be at the root of some 
theories of culture.75 
It is telling that Marcuse does not even remotely refer to any art of his time as 
attesting to such foretaste and, admittedly, his reference to the Greek statues, 
Mozart and Beethoven is brief and without elaboration. His reference to the 
fool’s paradise comes across as the most representative of his overall 
viewpoint and at least in this respect he is being more faithful than Bürger to 
his utopian sketching of art or culture’s horizon in the context of bourgeois 
society. Bürger’s elevation of the historical avant-garde’s intent and workings 
to a utopian position and the subsequent failure and condemnation to 
irreversible unrealisability, if examined against the Marcusian background, 
betray a sense of methodological mannerism adapted to suit the anxieties of 
the time of writing and, therefore, the related assumptions require further 
interrogation.  
However, the extent to which the aspect of the distance, separation or false 
sublation between the everyday praxis of life and the sphere of art should be 
considered as the definitionally prevalent element of the institution of art is 
contestable. As Bürger himself has already implied in relation to the post-
historical-avant-garde condition, the rise of mass-reproduction and the 
pervasiveness of entertainment has eroded art’s autonomy as critique of 
alienation to the extent that such autonomy is now in danger of extinction and 
therefore, desirable, as the second-best alternative following the irreversible 
purging of the possibility of sublation. If it is granted that the post-avant-garde 
condition still falls within a historical periodisation of bourgeois society, the 
question of whether the autonomy of art as a unified sphere and the imaginary 
realm it permits still nominally purport to articulate a critique to societal 
alienation needs to be at least revisited.  
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The ontological question of the institution persists and Bürger’s formulation 
needs to be confronted: why is the institution of art defined as the prevalent 
definition(s) of art’s social function and what is the use of such a definition of 
the institution of art? A hint could be found in Bürger’s suggestion that the 
‘singular “art as institution”’ underlines the prevalence of a single ‘concept of 
art in bourgeois society’, while other concepts of art need to be defined against 
the dominant one.76 In other words, the aspect of definitional prevalence and 
its conditions are arguably more crucial than the alleged affirmative function of 
art’s institutionalisation as autonomous specific to bourgeois society. Even if it 
is granted that art’s autonomy in Bürger’s terms is the predominant definition 
of art’s social function in bourgeois society, it is doubtful that this predominance 
suffices in exhausting the concept of the institution in its relation to art.  
Benjamin Buchloh’s ‘specular’77 paradigm and its relation 
to institutional power 
In his October essay ‘Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of 
Administration to the Critique of Institutions’, Buchloh attempts to historicise 
the conceptual art of the 1960s (in Europe and the United States of America). 
Buchloh’s thesis is complex and often intertwined with his close examination 
of individual artists and their work through an underlying micro-periodisation of 
liminal phases such as ‘early’78 minimal art and ‘proto-Conceptual’79 art. For 
the purposes of uncovering the historical parameters of the institution in art, I 
will extricate the main currents of his thesis which will in turn yield, albeit 
laterally, useful registers and art historical articulations on the issue of the 
institution.  
Buchloh understands conceptual art as voiding the traditional aesthetic criteria 
(taste and connoisseurship) and replacing them with linguistic, legal and 
institutional ones. He follows closely the different ways in which minimal and 
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conceptual art negated visuality and artistic manual skill while proclaiming 
linguistic and conceptual aspects. He also observes that many conceptual 
artists including Robert Morris with his work Document (Statement of Aesthetic 
Withdrawal) accentuate a proposition that was also latent in the first ready-
mades: the work of art as ‘the ultimate subject of a legal definition and 
institutional validation’.80 He thus argues that such art corresponds to an 
‘aesthetics of administration,’ by which defining the aesthetic becomes a 
‘matter of linguistic convention’ and a ‘function of both a legal contract and an 
institutional discourse (discourse of power rather than taste).’81 
Buchloh argues that this shift takes place gradually, beginning with proto-
conceptual art which redefines aesthetic experience as something that now 
includes ‘linguistic’ and ‘specular’ conventions. Linguistic conventions 
designate the ‘institutional determination of the object’s status’ while specular 
ones relate to the ‘reading competence of the spectator’ whose function is 
explored and emphasised through works such as Morris’s Four Mirrored 
Cubes (1965).82 In this context, the specular is employed to formally denote 
issues of parity between the art object, the physicality of the space of display 
and the spectator.83 In the late 1960s however, Buchloh identifies a tendency 
which, as I will argue, permits conceptual art (at least the work of Daniel Buren 
and Hans Haacke) to acquire avant-garde features comparable to those 
Bürger had attributed to the early-twentieth-century European avant-garde 
movements. Such conceptual artists reject the specular aspects of the work in 
what Buchloh calls a ‘perceptual withdrawal’ which allows for ‘a physical and 
symbolic intervention in the institutional power and property relations 
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underlying the supposed neutrality of “mere” devices of presentation.’84 An 
example of such practice is the implied equivalence and interchangeability of 
authorship among the participants of the art group BMPT (Daniel Buren, Olivier 
Mosset, Michel Parmentier and Niele Toroni). According to Buchloh, by signing 
each other’s individual work the artists questioned artistic production as the 
result of unique and individual authorship.85 Moreover, in the Paris Biennale in 
1967, a poster for the art group’s contribution (or ‘manifestation’) featured ‘mug 
shots’ of the four artists (fig.1).86 Buchloh understands this as an instance of a 
mechanically (re)produced ‘aesthetic of anonymity’ as well as an implicit call 
for audience participation which further challenges the ‘notion of artistic 
authorship’.87 In other words, the (real or perceived) possibility for anonymous 
audience members of producing ‘pictorial signs equivalent to those produced 
by the artists themselves’ challenges the traditional division and hierarchy 
between artist and audience and thwarts the traditional status of the artist-
author.88 Such practice becomes a ‘critique that operates at the level of the 
aesthetic “institution”’ by exposing visual, linguistic and cognitive aspects as 
‘always already inscribed within the conventions of language and thereby 
within institutional power and ideological and economic investment.’89 In order 
to perform this critique, conceptual art ‘mimed the operating logic and positivist 
instrumentality of late capitalism’ and turned ‘the violence of that mimetic 
relationship back to the ideological apparatus itself.’90 
Buchloh’s thesis is a complicated one. On the one hand, he attributes to the 
conceptual art of the late 1960s (in the West) a critical or even radical 
dimension. Interestingly, this dimension has to do with an administrative 
aesthetic closely associated with a legalistic and institutional acuteness. It is 
telling that the art to which Buchloh attributes Bürgerian avant-garde features 
is the one that exposes institutional power and ideological and economic 
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investment. On the other hand, he is quick to notice that ‘the critical annihilation 
of cultural conventions itself immediately acquires the conditions of the 
spectacle.’91 He also wonders about the subversive aspect of conceptual art 
given that the work performed by the artist is administrative and often tedious. 
He is led to conclude that a key difference between historical avant-garde 
movements and conceptual art is the absence of a utopian vision in the latter: 
‘from its inception Conceptual Art was distinguished by its acute sense of 
discursive and institutional limitations, its self-imposed restrictions, its lack of 
totalizing vision, its critical devotion to the factual conditions of artistic 
production and reception without aspiring to overcome the mere facticity of 
these conditions’.92 In an updated version of Bürgerian pessimism, Buchloh 
sees an ‘irreversible loss’ in the workings of conceptual art; in order to subvert 
the dominant artistic paradigm, conceptual art sacrificed the self-sufficiency of 
image, skill and memory without realising that this would be fatal to ‘traditional 
aesthetic experience’ and the ‘traditionally separate sphere of artistic 
production’.93 And yet, alongside the irreversible loss of the traditional self-
sufficiency of aesthetics, Buchloh refers to the historical moment of conceptual 
art as an ‘Enlightenment-triumph’ (‘its transformation of audiences and 
distribution, its abolition of object status and commodity form’), albeit a fleeting 
instance that would soon be replaced by the previously dominant and now 
reinvigorated ‘specular regime’.94 
At this point it should be noted that the term specular acquires permutable 
connotations throughout Buchloh’s text. In relation to proto-conceptual art, 
specular aspects refer to the mirroring of the spectator, which, along with 
linguistic aspects, feature in works of art challenging preceding canons. In 
relation to later Conceptual Art which critiques institutional power, specular 
aspects are associated with the perceptual and visual aspects that make way 
for linguistic/ administrational/ legalistic ones, while in the context of the 
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‘specular regime’ (also in later Conceptual Art) specularity is associated with 
the ‘spectacle’ as a broader political, economic and cultural determinant of 
society. When Buchloh refers to the conditions of the spectacle, he is alluding 
to the kind of instances pertinent to the practice of BMPT whereby ‘the 
insistence on artistic anonymity and the demolition of authorship produces 
instant brand names and identifiable products,’ or ‘the campaign to critique 
conventions of visuality with textual interventions, billboard signs, anonymous 
handouts, and pamphlets inevitably ends by following the preestablished 
mechanisms of advertising and marketing campaigns.’95  
In a similar pattern to Bürger’s defence of the institution’s autonomy as a 
response to the irreversible failure of the avant-garde with the acceptance of 
its workings as art, Buchloh sees an end to conceptual art’s enlightened 
moment in its submission to the specular regime. However, despite the 
authors’ common frustration and pessimism, it is the major differences 
between their perspectives that may appear insightful.  For Bürger, the 
irreversible failure of the historical avant-garde to sublate the institution of art 
into a liberated life praxis both sustains the institution of art as distinct and 
autonomous from life praxis and reunites art and life in the culture industry 
through a false sublation. For Buchloh, Conceptual Art succeeded albeit 
temporarily in its intention to critique and expose institutional power and 
ideological and economic investment that always lie beneath visual and 
specular conventions. Relatedly, Buchloh observes that with Conceptual Art a 
latent aspect of the first readymades surfaces; they are revealed as the 
ultimate bearers of legal definition and institutional validation – a viewpoint that 
both clashes with Bürger’s overall dismissal of post-avant-garde art and 
perplexes his clear-cut idea of the workings of the historical avant-garde.96 
Conceptual Art’s failure was its obliviousness towards the irreversible and fatal 
erosion of the separate sphere of artistic production (as well as the traditional 
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aesthetic sphere). Albeit paradoxically, Buchloh does mourn as a casualty 
what he sees as the irreversible loss of the last traditionally aesthetic remnants 
that would preserve the importance of skill, memory and physical substance. 
Thus, what Conceptual Art tried to do was not to sublate art’s autonomous 
sphere but to unsettle the dominant artistic paradigm or, as Buchloh puts it, ‘to 
emulate the regnant episteme within the paradigmatic frame proper to art 
itself.’97 For Buchloh, the purging of the traditionally aesthetic sphere would be 
fatal, especially given that Conceptual Art’s temporary success was overridden 
by the subsequent prevalence of the specular regime.  
Thus, the way Buchloh registers the institutional problem and its divergence 
from Bürger’s approach begin to fully surface. For Buchloh, the institutional 
determinant is explicitly associated with power and linguistic convention and 
directly pertains to legalistic, administrational and economic aspects that 
constitute and condition the specular regime. The ideological apparatus 
reflects the economic investment regime that governs particular artistic 
institutions and their relationship to artists, collectors and the public. 
Furthermore, the aesthetic sphere becomes the ground that allows Conceptual 
Art to afford its critique of the ‘social institutions from which the laws of positivist 
instrumentality and the logic of administration emanate in the first place,’ even 
if ‘these institutions […] determine the conditions of cultural consumption and 
transform artistic production into a tool of ideological control and cultural 
legitimation.’ 98 The inevitable erosion of such sphere means for Buchloh that 
such affordance will run out. On the other hand, Bürger discusses the 
prevalence of definitions of the social function of art – a formulation that could 
indeed be thought of as involving a kind of regulation upon the production and 
reception of art and thus, possibly relating indirectly with a discourse of power. 
However, he is far more preoccupied with the institutionalisation of art as 
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autonomous in bourgeois society through affirmation than with an elaboration 
on the generative conditions of the definitional prevalence. What potentially 
attests to this is Bürger’s volatile grounding of the production of the dominant 
definitions; there is little investigation into who creates such definitions and 
how they circulate or ‘enlighten others.’ By contrast, in Buchloh, it is first and 
foremost through social institutions that ideological control is transferred to 
artistic production and leads to cultural legitimation, as though the autonomy 
of the aesthetic sphere is not de facto already associated in itself with an 
ideological affirmative mechanism.  
Note on the economic/material aspect and its relation to 
the institution 
While, as I have suggested, Bürger does not address the organisational aspect 
of the institution of art he does address its relation to the economic/material 
factor. According to him, ‘the capitalist conditions to which the work of art is 
subject in its distribution do not affect the sphere of the social function of works’ 
and therefore ‘the commodity-character of works of art does not sufficiently 
enable us to understand their function’.99 Bürger refuses to exhaust the 
complexity of the social function of works of art into their commodity status, 
even though he admits that this refusal is problematic, insofar as it resorts to 
the same logic of the autonomous aesthetic sphere which he considers 
ideological and affirmative.100 Bürger does not resolve this debate. He seems 
to suggest that the matter of essence in this case should be located in the 
material conditions of production rather than the commodity status of a work 
of art. This position becomes more acute considering art that minimises 
aesthetic or object-based parameters, evades its commodification through 
temporality or in broader terms, makes work itself (or even life itself) its primary 
matter. In such cases, the question of the commodity status becomes 
redundant, or at least dependent on the conditions of production. The latter 
can operate as a relatively more solid basis from which the relation of the 
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material to the institutional can be addressed. Bürger acknowledges a 
‘connection between the institutional status of art and the material condition of 
its production in a given society’.101 This connection is interesting to Bürger as 
he stresses that it is only with the advent of the institution of art in bourgeois 
society (i.e. the institutionalisation of art as autonomous and free from the 
means-end rationality) that the material conditions of artistic production can be 
conceived as ‘alien to art’, as opposed to the courtly-feudal period which 
precedes artistic autonomy and where material conditions of artistic production 
and the social function of art coincide through patronage.102 Additionally, 
Bürger maintains that in courtly-feudal society this relation (of artists and 
patrons) is an exceptional one (in relation to other kinds of social relations in 
the courtly-feudal society) as it does not contribute to the reproduction of such 
society, whereas in bourgeois society, the market ‘is far more than something 
that governs the relation between the producer and the recipient of art; it is the 
central economic mechanism of bourgeois society’.103 This connection is to be 
found in the subjection of art to capital through Marx’s concepts of ‘formal’ and 
‘real subsumption’ as Bürger retrieves them from economist Gerhard 
Leithäuser:   
formal subsumption largely leaves to the producer of art the 
disposal over his instruments of work and thus over an essential 
aspect of its autonomy. Real subsumption under capital 
transforms the artist into a proletarian employee who follows 
instructions and has been almost wholly deprived of the 
requirements for autonomous artistic activity. What is specific in 
his use-value oriented work is threatened with extinction.104 
Bürger suggests that formal subsumption pertains to autonomous art while real 
subsumption would ‘put an end to it as an art’. He argues that the institution of 
art remains autonomous in the post-avant-garde condition, and therefore still 
in the realm of formal subsumption, unlike the culture industry whose 
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‘production is wholly governed by investment criteria.’105 The question that in 
any case arises is to what extent one can still regard art today (or at least part 
of it) as autonomous in that it is only formally subsumed by capital.106 
Furthermore, the variety of operative art institutions and the role of artists 
therein suggests possibly a mixture of formal and real subsumption. Theorists 
Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have referred to the ‘subjective subsumption 
of labour under capital’ that pertains to a particular subjectivation as 
interiorisation of the unlimited condition of capital to an extent of absolute 
intimacy.107 Dardot and Laval argue that this kind of subsumption does not 
coincide with the ‘real’ one which is of a lesser remit.108 
Returning to the issue of material conditions, according to Bürger, 
‘autonomous art can only refer negatively to the material conditions of its 
production because it was only in opposition to the sphere of means-end 
rationality that the autonomy of art constituted itself in the first place’.109 Based 
on this assumption, Bürger suggests that  
the artist who produces under conditions where art is viewed as 
autonomous by the bourgeoisie finds himself impelled to obscure 
all traces of work in what he creates. That creation must be seen 
to be a natural product, for it is only on that condition that it can 
be a counter image to the prevailing principle of means-ends 
rationality.110 
Arguably, this assessment is hardly valid in relation to avant-garde art or at 
least notable streams of post-avant-garde art that not only expose, display or 
are even identical with the making process but also centrally and visibly 
implicate the material conditions of production. Examples abound in avant-
garde art where making process and work are inseparable; from the Dada 
cabarets to Surrealist automatic writing techniques, the artists were focally 
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upholding rather than concealing the making process. In the post-avant-garde 
condition – irrespectively of whether such artistic streams are or should be 
described as ‘neo-avant-gardes’ – the material conditions of artistic production 
as well as social reproduction of labour become central concerns and are 
accentuated and incorporated both formally and thematically in the art. Arte 
Povera as well as materialist feminist practices, such as Mierle Laderman 
Ukeles’s preoccupation with maintenance in terms of social reproduction, 
constitute two obvious examples.111 In this light, there can be two possible 
conclusions.  
Following Bürger’s theory of the institution, one conclusion could be that, even 
in this kind of art, the elements that expose its material conditions of production 
somehow lose their means-end rationality as they would be absorbed by the 
affirmative and ideological realm of the institution of art whose sole purpose is 
to be the means-end-rationality-free realm. Alternatively, one could conclude 
that such art does actually carry a purpose or in any case leads to the 
transference of a message that directly addresses and affects real life – to the 
point that it is inseparable from real life. Accepting the second conclusion 
would mean that Bürger’s theory – at least thusly articulated – is insufficient to 
fully elucidate ontological questions on the institution of art, possibly because 
the German theorist is ‘blind to the ambitious art of his time’, a fallacy of which 
he has been accused by Foster.112  
Nonetheless, one of the contradictions that troubles Bürger in the part he 
devotes to the relationship of the institution to the material conditions of 
production showcases the beginning stage of the multiplicity of ways in which 
capital forces pervade art (apart from affirmation): 
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A part of the tricky dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy is that 
art's most radical claim to autonomy, formulated by aestheticism, 
coincides historically with the submission of the aesthetic to the 
investment interests of capital. It is precisely the experience of 
colors, form, and sounds, which is wholly devoid of social 
content, that is harnessed by advertising and emerging 
commodity aesthetics. Just as elements of autonomy could be 
discerned in the dependence of the producer of courtly art, so 
the total emancipation from any and every social content tends 
to subject art to the very principle against which its institutional 
status makes it rebel, and that is the rationality in the utilization 
of capital.113 
This could be seen as one phase within a multiple and complex process, 
through which aspects of art of varying degrees of autonomy (i.e. not 
necessarily from Aestheticism) will come to fuel the capitalist industry of 
advertising and commercial aesthetics. However, this ‘harnessing’ process is 
gradual, variable in degree and quality, uncertain and in no way as automatic 
as Bürger presents it. It is within such range that neo-avant-gardes operate 
and Buchloh’s complex position regarding Conceptual Art attests to this. 
Institution as subject   
In his influential essay ‘Who’s Afraid of the Neo-Avant-garde?’, Foster attempts 
a psychoanalytic reading of the avant-garde whereby the institution of art is 
treated ‘as a subject capable of repression and resistance’.114 In this reading, 
Foster argues that the avant-garde cannot be discussed in a chronology of 
origin and repetition since, like a traumatic event, it ‘is only registered through 
another that recodes it’ in a type of ‘deferred action’. Historical and neo-avant-
garde should be understood in a ‘complex relation of anticipation and 
reconstruction’ of ‘disruptive’ and ‘restorative’ operations. Foster identifies two 
phases in post-war neo-avant-garde; the first repeats ‘hysterically’ the trauma 
of the historical avant-garde while the second works it through ‘laboriously’.115 
Buchloh has approximated this view regarding the laborious character of the 
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neo-avant-garde when he refers to Conceptual Art’s acute sense of discursive 
and institutional limitations and its devotion to the factual conditions of artistic 
production and reception without aspiring to overcome the mere facticity of 
these conditions. As Foster has succinctly written: ‘Bürger and Buchloh also 
agree on the failure of the avant-garde, but not on its ramifications’.116 Foster’s 
historical and theoretical reading goes well beyond disappointment due to 
Conceptual Art’s non-utopian nature, the purging of the aesthetic or any type 
of failure attributed to the avant-garde. Unravelling some of the knots of this 
reading will laterally inform some of the questions already raised in this chapter 
regarding the institution. 
Foster’s thesis is based on a direct critique of Bürger’s theory of the avant-
garde. Specifically, Foster accuses Bürger of an ‘evolutionist’ approach that 
comprises three subsequent stages; the first stage takes place when art’s 
autonomy is ‘proclaimed as an ideal in Enlightenment aesthetics’, the second 
one comes with Aestheticism, when art’s autonomy becomes art’s content in 
a complete shunning of actual life relevance and the third one is the historical 
avant-garde’s attack to the aestheticist shunning.117 Foster suggests that the 
problem with this approach is that it mistakenly treats a purely chronological 
relation as a causal one presenting ‘history as both punctual and final’.118 He 
holds that Bürger takes the historical avant-garde’s rhetoric ‘at its own word’ 
and misleadingly presupposes that ‘a work of art, a shift in aesthetics, happens 
all at once, entirely significant in its moment of appearance, and […] once and 
for all, so that any elaboration can only be a rehearsal’.119 As a result, through 
a Bürgerian lens, the historical avant-garde is presented as ‘pure origin’ and 
the neo-avant-garde as ‘riven repetition’ that not only annihilates the former’s 
critique but also inverts it ‘into an affirmation of autonomous art’.120 The 
historical avant-garde is bestowed with ‘pristine authenticity’ and expectations 
                                                          
116 Ibid., 234. 
117 Ibid., 9. 
118 Ibid., 10 [emphasis in original]. 
119 Ibid., 10. 
120 Ibid., 10-11. 
62 
 
of ‘magical effectivity’ culminating to a ‘heroic failure’ that deems ‘farcical’ 
anything subsequent to it.121 Foster maintains that even though Bürger’s 
viewpoint is trying to be ‘critical’ it is actually ‘mythical’: ‘It first constructs the 
contemporary as posthistorical, a simulacral world of failed repetitions and 
pathetic pastiches, and then condemns it as such from a mythical point of 
critical escape beyond it all’.122 
Foster’s critique goes even further to question Bürger’s main thesis regarding 
the institution of art and the avant-garde’s attack on its autonomy with a view 
to ‘reconnect art and life’.123 Foster maintains that the opposition between art 
and life is too simplistic as it does not acknowledge the complexities of neither 
art nor life, since art is automatically granted (a disputable and otherwise 
unconfirmed) autonomy while life is conceived ‘not only as remote but also as 
immediate, as if it were simply there to rush in like so much air once the 
hermetic seal of convention is broken’.124 Furthermore, according to Foster, in 
such a simplistic perspective the avant-garde’s failure is by definition 
inevitable. Foster agrees that the historical avant-garde in a sense critiques 
the institution of art but to him such a critique does not only amount to pure 
‘transgression’, ‘rupture and revolution’.125 Instead, he suggests that the avant-
garde is also ‘mimetic’ in its intention to mock, ‘utopian’ in its indication of ‘what 
cannot be […] as a critique of what is’, ‘contextual’ and ‘performative’ in that it 
was always situated within specific socio-political and geographical contexts 
and set against specific ‘languages, institutions and structures of meaning’.126 
Thus, Foster maintains that artists like Duchamp did not actually try to negate 
art nor reconcile it with life; their intent was instead a ‘perpetual testing of the 
conventions of both’.127 Such a thesis problematises the premises of Bürger’s 
theory of sublation as applied to the duality of (the institution of) art and life. 
Understanding the intent of the avant-garde as a more ambiguous and multi-
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faceted gestural complex than the sublation of the institution of art goes hand 
in hand with the shakiness or the ambivalence of Bürger’s idea of the institution 
of art as a totality, constructed ideologically as autonomous in relation to real, 
everyday life.  
Ferenc Fehér, another critic of Bürger in the 1980s, has argued against Bürger 
that art exceeds the institution in its sociological sense. Fehér points out that 
institutionalisation takes place in society as a form of rationalisation while art 
is ‘exposed to the all-embracing irrationality of our world.’128 In light of an (albeit 
reductive) understanding of the institutional as the rational, one begins to 
wonder whether the concept of the institution can fully do justice to the social 
function of art in bourgeois society. While Fehér’s argument is perhaps too 
weak to annihilate Bürger’s conception of art as institutionalised, it does make 
Bürger’s formulation seem too deterministic. Foster’s view of the Bürgerian 
formulation of the ‘art and life’ question as too simplistic is plausible. 
Interestingly, in his recent response to Foster’s critique, Bürger does not 
address Foster’s criticism of the simplicity of this duality. How actually or 
ideologically autonomous is art and how separate from it is life? In relation to 
the post-avant-garde era, Marcuse’s concept of affirmation does resonate 
today but perhaps in different terms and it is doubtful whether it applies to a 
fully distinct and separate realm that amounts to the ‘institution of art’. A large 
part of what is dominantly considered art today, (as well as intellect and labour 
that would definitely fall within art’s institutional brackets, such as artistic 
discourse or non-profit art management and organisation), openly affect actual 
everyday life and do not pretend to be free from a means-end rationality. 
Numerous examples could attest to this; from activist and socially engaged art 
to pedagogical art practice and art in public spaces. Importantly, such 
examples would not necessarily derive from what Bürger would consider 
culture industry or pulp literature. Furthermore, even if art’s autonomy is 
granted (at least in terms of ideology) an affirmation, are we right to equate the 
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institution of art in bourgeois society with this autonomy, as if the latter were 
the single defining aspect? Ultimately, is the equivalence between the 
propositions that art is ‘institutionalised’ as autonomous and that it is 
‘ideologically constructed’ as autonomous enough to cover all the definitional 
aspects of institution?  
The disagreement among authors on the work and intent of the avant-garde 
points to the necessity for closer examination of the various uses of the 
institution and its definitions. Foster discusses Aleksandr Rodchenko’s 
monochrome paintings in 1921 to argue that the historical avant-garde 
negated a specific conventionality of artistic media rather than the art institution 
as such. For Foster, Rodchenko did not bring about the end of painting but 
simply showed that painting ‘could be delimited to primary colours on discrete 
canvases in his artistic-political context with its specific permissions and 
pressures’.129 Foster makes a similar argument regarding the readymade 
Fountain (1917) by suggesting that the readymade reveals the ‘conventional 
limits of art in a particular time and place’ while ‘the institution of art is not much 
defined’.130 Thus, the two artistic gestures (monochromes and readymades) 
should be seen as performative and declarative, as they indicate ‘nothing 
explicit’ about the institution of art.131 Foster suggests that even though 
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convention and institution are related, they are not ‘identical’.132 As he puts it, 
‘the institution of art may enframe 
aesthetic conventions, but it does 
not constitute them.’133 Based on 
this observation, Foster claims that 
the historical avant-garde dealt 
with the conventional, through a 
‘nihilistic’ and ‘anarchistic’ attack to 
the ‘conventions of the traditional 
mediums’, while the neo-avant-
garde dealt with the institutional, in 
a ‘creative analysis at once specific 
and deconstructive’.134 This is a 
clear point of divergence with 
Bürger, especially regarding 
Foster’s belief that it is the neo-
avant-garde and not the historical 
one that first grasps the institution 
of art as such.135  
However, there is also a point of 
convergence between the two 
authors. Bürger regards the post-
avant-garde condition as situated 
in an era when the avant-garde 
‘manifestations’ have been 
recognised by the ‘art institution 
[…] as milestones in the 
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development of art in modernity’.136 Similarly, according to Foster, the first neo-
avant-garde in the 1950s turns the historical one into an institution by repeating 
it hysterically. Foster presents this phase of ‘becoming-institutional’ of the 
avant-garde in Freudian terms of ‘repetition’, which he ultimately thinks of as 
‘resistance’.137 However, Bürger has counterargued – regarding all post-avant-
garde art – that it was not an ‘unconscious compulsion’ (and therefore 
examinable through the lens of a historical psychoanalysis) but rather a 
‘conscious resumption within a different context’.138 Moreover, he has 
countered a large part of Foster’s critique, including the latter’s allegation about 
the former’s mythical viewpoint, by somewhat paradoxically arguing that his 
three-stage evolutionary analysis that culminates with the avant-garde is 
indeed a historical account from an end point. Bürger claims that even though 
such account is indeed a ‘construction’, the ‘narrator/historian’ of an event 
knows the event’s ‘future’ and can therefore ‘present a contingent sequence of 
events as a "logical" development’.139 What Bürger leaves unnoticed is that 
Foster’s post-structuralist reading does not actually suggest that the neo-
avant-garde artists were themselves acting unconsciously. Rather, Foster’s 
argument suggests that he treats history as a subject through the prism of 
psychoanalysis in a spirit of critiquing Bürger’s mythical-disguised-as-factual 
historical construction of the historical avant-garde as origin. In Foster’s 
account, the relations between historical and neo-avant-garde phases are not 
posited as punctual and final chronological periods but as complex and fluid 
relations of repressions, repetitions and resistances.140  
Regardless of this discrepancy however, the approaches of both authors as 
well as their clash allow for a navigation into the ontological questions of the 
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institution. What is important at this stage is that Foster refers to a type of 
institutionalisation of the historical avant-garde and thereby indicates a 
definitional understanding of institutionalisation as repetitional canonisation. 
However, is repetitional canonisation an exhaustive meaning for 
institutionalisation? If it is granted that the institution as a category exceeds the 
norm and the convention, the institution’s relation(s) to power requires a closer 
examination. In constructing their respective arguments regarding art and the 
avant-garde, Bürger and Foster betray some vagueness around the concepts 
of institution, institutionalisation, norm and convention, especially in relation to 
a more contemporary discourse around art and its institution(s) as well as the 
current socio-political understandings of such institution(s). Foster’s account 
of the late 1990s leaves us with what he perceives as a neo-avant-garde that 
has moved from ‘grand oppositions’ to ‘subtle displacements.’141 This might be 
the case in comparison to the historical avant-garde, but how can we describe 
the theoretical and art historical landscape taking into account the legacy of 
Institutional Critique? Before embarking on political conceptualisations of the 
institution, it is worth examining a widely read essay by the prominent feminist 
artist Andrea Fraser who has notably engaged with the artistic tradition of 
Institutional Critique. Published in Artforum in 2005, Fraser’s ‘From the Critique 
of Institutions to an Institution of Critique’ has been insightful in its articulation 
of some of the most pressing matters of the art institution in the early 21st 
century.  
The relevance of the inside/outside question of the 
institution 
Fraser’s essay is published at a time when art institutions (as spaces and even 
projects) as well as the discourse on them already abound on a global scale 
to an historically unprecedented extent. At the same time, Institutional Critique 
has not only been legitimised by art institutions but is invited by them. Aware 
of this context, Fraser advances a few strong but plausible claims. First, in an 
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update of the ‘anything goes’ status of art which placed the emphasis on what 
could potentially be art, she argues that in actual terms art is wherever, 
whenever, whatever and in whomever art is thought of as being there: ‘Art is 
art when it exists for discourses and practices that recognize it as art, value 
and evaluate it as art, and consume it as art, whether as object, gesture, 
representation, or only idea.’142 I would possibly add that art discourses and 
labour practices are nowadays more powerful than the strict enclosures that 
confer artistic ontological status, in that they do not even need nor care to 
validate something as art in order to include it in their own art 
discourse/practice/labour terms. Indeed, Fraser argues that what is ‘outside’ 
the institution ‘has no fixed, substantive characteristics’ but ‘is only what, at 
any given moment, does not exist as an object of artistic discourses and 
practices’.143 Furthermore, she asserts that ‘the institution is inside of us, and 
we can't get outside of ourselves’ and ‘every time we speak of the "institution" 
as other than "us," we disavow our role in the creation and perpetuation of its 
conditions.’144 By ‘us’ she means ‘artists, critics, curators, art historians, 
dealers, collectors, or museum visitors’.145 She continues: 
It's not a question of inside or outside, or the number and scale 
of various organized sites for the production, presentation, and 
distribution of art. It's not a question of being against the 
institution: we are the institution. It's a question of what kind of 
institution we are, what kind of values we institutionalize, what 
forms of practice we reward, and what kinds of rewards we aspire 
to. Because the institution of art is internalized, embodied, and 
performed by individuals, these are the questions that 
institutional critique demands we ask, above all, of ourselves.146  
Fraser’s argument aims to reject a commonly held misconception in the 
discourse of institutional critique according to which artists critiqued art 
institutions from a supposed outside/uncriticisable position or point of view and 
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aimed at destroying the institution of art. Her view of Haacke’s legacy is 
illuminating:  
It may be Haacke, above all, who evokes characterizations of the 
institutional critic as an heroic challenger, fearlessly speaking 
truth to power – and justifiably so, as his work has been subject 
to vandalism, censorship, and parliamentary showdowns. 
However, anyone familiar with his work should recognize that, 
far from trying to tear down the museum, Haacke's project has 
been an attempt to defend the institution of art from 
instrumentalization by political and economic interests.147 
What does this tell us of the institution of art and its definition? Even though, 
Fraser’s viewpoint is openly influenced by the Bürgerian perspective, there is 
a distinct divergence from Bürger’s line of argumentation – a divergence that 
moves on a seemingly contradictory pattern. First, Fraser holds that the 
institution of art today is absolutely ‘part of the “real world”’ and fully governed 
by market forces and therefore, the real condition of the art world is the all-
pervasive function of the (art) market which no position can realistically claim 
to evade.148 Indicatively, she refers to the art market, corporate finance and 
investment interests, ‘neoliberal economic policies’, ‘nominally “nonprofit” 
organizations like universities’ that ‘rely on cheap adjunct labor’ and ‘museums’ 
that implement ‘antiunion policies.’ 149 Secondly, echoing her aforementioned 
view in Haacke’s legacy, she still sees a potential for Institutional Critique – an 
evaluation that sets her against both Buchloh and Bürger:  
If, as Bürger put it, the self-criticism of the historical avantgarde 
intended ‘the abolition of autonomous art’ and its integration ‘into 
the praxis of life,’ it failed in both its aims and its strategies. 
However, the very institutionalization that marked this failure 
became the condition of institutional critique. Recognizing that 
failure and its consequences, institutional critique turned from the 
increasingly bad-faith efforts of neo-avant-gardes at dismantling 
or escaping the institution of art and aimed instead to defend the 
very institution that the institutionalization of the avant-garde's 
‘self-criticism’ had created the potential for: an institution of 
critique. And it may be this very institutionalization that allows 
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institutional critique to judge the institution of art against the 
critical claims of its legitimizing discourses, against its self-
representation as a site of resistance and contestation, and 
against its mythologies of radicality and symbolic revolution.150 
Despite Fraser’s seemingly defeatist articulation that there is no assumable 
position outside the completely market-ridden and all-encompassing institution 
of art, she refers to the capacity for self-critique as a potentiality inherited from 
the historical avant-garde. Relatedly, Fraser goes against Buchloh’s evaluation 
that accuses Institutional Critique of the 1960s and 1970s of failing to 
recognise the fatality of the purging of the aesthetic, sacrificing the last resort 
of critique towards capitalist logic. She suggests instead that ‘recognizing the 
partial and ideological character of artistic autonomy, Institutional Critique 
developed not as a further attack on that autonomy, but rather as a defense of 
art (and art institutions) against such exploitation [for economic and symbolic 
profit].’151 Crucially, the fact that Fraser understands such self-critique as one 
that permits the testing of the institution’s proclaimed criticality, resistance, 
mythologies of radicality and symbolic revolutions indicates a heralded clarity 
and transparency regarding the institution’s condition as different to the 
affirmative realm of critique towards the means-end rationality of everyday life. 
Fraser regards the institution of art as, on the one hand, thoroughly implicated 
in capital forces and, on the other, as preserving the potential for instances of 
critique that are inextricable from a broader institution of critique. Thus, for 
Fraser, there is indeed an emancipatory potential, but crucially, it would have 
to include an emancipation from ourselves, since ‘we’ are the institution.  
Raunig would strongly disagree with such an interpretation of Fraser’s 
account, which he has described as ‘an offensive self-historicization.’152 
Raunig casts Fraser’s take as defeatist and ‘self-obsessed’ in that it 
‘substantializes one’s own involvement in the institution and crowds out the 
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horizon of change from perception.’153 This all-encompassing quality of the 
institution of art suggests to Raunig that Fraser understands the institution as 
a distinct monolith of repressive power that could only be critiqued by 
outsiders, and since there is no outside to it, there can be no critique.154 I would 
contend that Raunig misguidedly interprets Fraser’s idea of the pervasiveness 
of the institution of art as an outright annihilation of any potential for critique. 
All the aforementioned instances that arguably preserve such potential aside, 
it seems that Raunig would read in a simplistic, one-dimensional and purely 
defeatist/self-victimising way Fraser’s fundamentally complex, ambiguous and 
archetypically impenetrable case of practice (Untitled, 2003), where she pre-
arranges and videotapes her sexual intercourse with a male art collector in 
exchange for money.155 Nonetheless, Raunig’s response that urges him to 
articulate the perceived impasse of Institutional Critique as the inevitable 
outcome of a defeatist self-critique, coincides with the point of departure for his 
theorisation of institution as the ongoing ‘process of instituting’.156 Raunig 
rejects what he sees as  
the misconstrual of theoretical approaches from Foucault (the 
interpretation of his theory of power as a dead-end of a 
comprehensive dispositif of power allowing neither escape nor 
resistance) and [Pierre] Bourdieu (the hermetic interpretation of 
his field theory), in ways that reinforce what exists – what is 
established, arranged, striated and gridded – as the seemingly 
sole and immutable possible.157 
He advocates instead for ‘the differentiated construction of a non-dialectical 
way out of purely negating and affirming the institution.’158 As I discuss further 
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in Chapter 2, Raunig’s concept of the instituent attempts to assign itself within 
such construction.  
The art world 
Importantly, Fraser refers interchangeably to the institution of art and the art 
world. The term ‘artworld’ was coined by the American philosopher Arthur 
Danto in 1964: ‘To see something as art requires something the eyes cannot 
decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an 
artworld.’159 It is important to stress that Danto was not using the term to refer 
to a congregate of art institutions, experts, critics, artists and historians – a use 
that would approximate Fraser’s. He was rather referring to the artworld as an 
epistemological world that comprises (and permits the conceptual emergence 
of) art-relevant ‘predicates.’160 Such predicates have the ability to confer 
artistic ontology and have to do with the ‘is of artistic identification’ that 
essentially pertains to theory(-ies) of art: 
What in the end makes a difference between a Brillo box and a 
work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It 
is the theory that takes it up into the world of art, and keeps it 
from collapsing into the real object which it is (in a sense of is 
other than that of artistic identification).161  
Aiming at conceptual analysis through formal logic, Danto’s methodology is 
not so pertinent to a socio-historical account of the conceptual emergence, 
perseverance or prevalence of the various art-relevant predicates. 
Nonetheless, Danto does not fail to acknowledge that such emergence is fully 
embedded within a historical process. Referring to a hypothetical 
‘abstractionist’, Danto writes:  
[…] this artist has returned to the physicality of paint through an 
atmosphere compounded of artistic theories and the history of 
recent and remote painting, elements of which he is trying to 
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refine out of his own work; and as a consequence of this his work 
belongs in this atmosphere and is part of this history.162  
Relatedly, Danto considers the ‘fashion’-based accentuations of specific styles 
in works of art, for instance a hypothetical trend of ‘representational’ ones, to 
be a matter of ‘almost purely sociological interest’ outside the remit of his 
analysis.163 While asserting that ‘museums, connoisseurs, and others are 
makeweights in the Artworld,’ from his analytical and conceptual point of view 
all combinations of artistic styles are ‘legitimate’ insofar as they are art-
relevant.164  
However, is it a mere coincidence that Danto theorised the artworld as soon 
as Andy Warhol created an artwork as a Brillo box in 1964 and directly 
problematised the relationship between commodity and the art object? It 
should be noted that ‘Brillo Box (Soap Pads)’ is not actually a readymade as 
Warhol did not use an actual Brillo box but created one out of synthetic polymer 
paint and silkscreen ink on wood. Danto’s theorisation emerges at a time when 
the readymade has long shaken the ontological grounds of the art object at 
least in terms of the trivial, the obscene and the everyday object, but apparently 
it was the Brillo box that did it for Danto as opposed to any other thriving at the 
time art forms such as Land art or Minimalism that could have been alternative 
focal points. Danto’s theorisation is arguably inscribed within a lineage 
underscored by various historical parameters responsible for at least the timing 
of his analytical contribution to art theory. For instance, one of them might be 
the pervasiveness of consumerism in the 1960s and the ensuing prominence 
of the shock value that pertains to the fetishisation – or conversely, the critical 
annihilation – of the commodity through its replication within art. All in all, 
Danto’s seemingly transhistorical and analytical definition of the artworld is 
more engrained with art history and particularly with the history of art theory 
than what he is having it to be.  
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What could indirectly attest to this is the widespread recontextualisation or 
extension of Danto’s definition of the artworld to centrally include the people 
involved in art institutions, from connoisseurs and artists to collectors, 
managers, curators and educators, with regard to their professional 
conventions and norms as well as their lifestyle. Fraser’s use of the artworld 
begins from this stretched definition, even though her assertion that art is art 
when it exists for discourses and practices that recognise it as art is quite akin 
to Danto’s view. Fraser refutes perhaps inadvertently Danto’s clear-cut 
distinction between his focus on the artworld as the atmosphere of theories 
around art-relevant ontological predicates and the sociologically-grounded 
trends and fashions among such predicates. Or rather, she might be bearing 
witness to the heightened importance of the latter as the struggle for visibility 
and the simultaneous depreciation of the former as an analytic and ontological 
realisation. At a time when it has been long known that anything can be art as 
long as it is seen as such by an art-relevant discourse, the axis of 
visibility/invisibility outweighs issues of ontology. Thus, Fraser would be 
reaffirming the significance of Buchloh’s specular regime, while also stressing 
its pertinence to a socially-determined art-relevant discourse that 
acknowledges, gatekeeps, authorises, validates, critiques or makes the art, 
understood as economies and cultures of the visible, the sensible and the 
knowable.  
Transitional remarks / Outro 
What begins to become clear is that the institutional question is one of power, 
discourse, validation and visibility. Alongside conventionality and 
normalisation or legal and economic frameworks, institutional issues emerge 
as crucially relevant to issues of subjectivity as well as psychoanalysis. Fraser, 
Foster and, as I will further discuss, Raunig too, uphold the imbrication of the 
institution with the self or the subject. Furthermore, Buchloh’s denoted 
conundrum whereby the conditions of the spectacle ultimately prevail over the 
aesthetic sphere should be examined anew, in a broader sense of an epochal 
subjectivity that has internalised the conditions of the spectacle. The ethereal 




pervasiveness of this internalisation is graphically presented by Deleuze in 
Postscript on the Societies of Control: ‘If the most idiotic game shows are so 
successful, it’s because they express the corporate situation with great 
precision.’165 Later in the same text, Deleuze writes: ‘Can we already grasp the 
rough outlines of these coming forms, capable of threatening the joys of 
marketing? Many young people strangely boast of being “motivated”; they re-
request apprenticeships and permanent training.’166 Dardot and Laval’s idea 
on the subjective subsumption of work by capital to the most intimate extremes 
resonates fully with Deleuze’s remarks, which, by pointing towards resistance 
that has to threaten the joys of marketing, affirm the proximity of a 
psychological urgency. Apart from Foster who draws explicitly on the 
psychoanalytic schema of deferred action, Bürger and Marcuse’s analyses 
more or less covertly point to themes of the psyche too, evidenced in 
discussions of an imaginary or utopian sphere where joy and humane values 
are fulfilled and interpretations of the relation between culture and soul. The 
question of the psychoanalytic pertinence needs to be further addressed in the 
context of a rearticulated conception of reality, beyond the shaky distinction of 
real life praxis and imagination.  
The vast divergence of art historical/theoretical readings within the discourse 
on art and the institution is conducive to a salient obscurity around the 
institution’s ontology. Arguably, unexamined questions and definitional gaps in 
relation to the function of the process of institution persist, also in terms of the 
historical period of the contemporary. In addition to these ambiguities, the 
concept of institution (as process) is typically used in the sense of 
institutionalisation that denotes crystallisation, establishment, structuring, 
officialising or other form of closure, that often ignores questions such as who 
performs or enacts the process of institution (a sovereignty, a subjectivity, 
singularities or other agency) and which are the various corresponding 
modalities. Such gaps inform some of the questions addressed in Chapter 2, 
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which seeks to examine whether and how a theory of institution can 
accommodate more democratic forms – beyond the epistemological and 
ontological oligopolies or monopolies of alienation and affirmation sustained 

























2. Instituent Praxis: Elaborations on Power, 




This chapter aims at exploring definitions of institution (as the process of 
instituting) prior to or independently of its association with art. Athena 
Athanasiou has advocated for a performative politics of the institution that aims 
at ‘instituting differently’, an articulation that echoes Jacques Derrida’s ideas 
on the active liminality between possibility and impossibility.1 Athanasiou 
posits the particularity of the institution ‘as an interminably aporetic call for 
another politics that simultaneously performs and resists the institution.’2 Even 
though she grounds her argument on a politics of ‘being-in-common’ situated 
‘beyond unity and closure’ and mobilises the process of institution towards its 
creative function and a radical futurity, there is little analysis as to what is 
theoretically and historically irreducible about this process.3 Athanasiou 
identifies an ‘irreducible ambivalence’ in the widespread dependence on and 
need for ‘institutional support for survival and even more-than-survival,’ and 
the simultaneous exposure of ‘lives to structural violence, unequal distribution 
of resources and affects, normalization, and disposability’ that perpetuate 
‘intersecting class, citizenship, racialized, and heteronormative privileges.’4 
However, whether the institution exists in order to offer care and support or to 
oppress and perpetuate violence and inequality will always seem like an 
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irreducible ontological ambivalence as long as institution (as process) is not 
defined in its ontological emergence. In this regard, more useful questions 
would revolve around whether and how the point of emergence of institution 
can catalyse shifts of status quo, in terms of multiple power relations contexts 
such as caring and supportive, oppressive and authoritative or, most 
commonly, contexts that might be caring but also exclusive or gradually turning 
into non-caring and oppressive. Such emergence also has to be 
contextualised in historical terms. 
 
Thus, a key research aim would be to locate and examine theorisations that 
pay adequate tribute to the modality of the emergence of institution and subvert 
the prevalence of focus on its reproduction/continuation. Raunig and Stefan 
Nowotny have proposed an understanding of ‘monstrosity’ as the conceptual 
umbrella that can at times accommodate the ‘non-classifiable disruptions 
between movement and institution.’5 However, this formulation already betrays 
a conceptualisation of institution as different to movement. This is attested by 
the two authors’s use of terms such as ‘new institutionality’ or ‘instituting’ to 
differentiate from institution as something by definition inert: ‘If the moment and 
mode of instituting are in the foreground for this new institutionality, […] it 
remains no less important to avoid the permanent closure of (in) the institution 
and to prevent the persistence of the new from coming at the expense of the 
capacity for renewal.’ Despite the acuteness of this observation regarding the 
empirically oft-encountered elimination of the capacity for renewal by the 
persistence of the new, the authors are terminologically distancing institution 
from its relationship to the new and a priori cast it as agent of pure inertia. At 
the same time, they define instituting as an ‘event’ that both ‘breaks with the 
state apparatus’ and ‘requires duration, persistence, recurrence’ synonymous 
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to the quality of the ‘instituent’, or that which institutes. However, which is the 
precise relation of institution to the new and do we really need the term 
instituting if it denotes the process of institution? How can a new institution 
emerge and how can we have – more broadly – new institution? Even though 
such examination should indeed underline the importance of the predicate of 
the instituent, the (terminological) disassociation of the latter from institution 
should arguably be interrogated. Thus, without losing sight of the question of 
the possibility of more democratic institutional forms, it is arguably urgent to 
rethink the quality of the instituent in a discussion of thus far underexamined 
issues pertaining to the emergence of institution, its relation to subjectivity, its 
pertinence to history, its alignment with institutional discourse and its precise 
association with (any form of) practice.  
‘What is an Institution?’6 – what can be gained from an 
analytic attempt of a definition  
In his essay featuring in both an economics journal and an art-related edited 
volume, John Searle has attempted to produce a typology for the definition of 
the institution and 'institutional facts' in order to analytically determine the 
operating mechanisms particular to 'social and institutional reality, including 
economic reality', differentiating such reality from 'a universe consisting 
entirely of physical particles in fields of force'.7 Institutional facts involve the 
assignment of 'status functions' and are attached to constitutive systems of 
rules: 
An institution is any collectively accepted system of rules 
(procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional 
facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C 
[status function] where an object, person, or state of affairs and 
lower and lower X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such 
that the new status enables the person or object to perform 
functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical 
structure but requires as a necessary condition the assignment 
of the status. The creation of institutional fact is, thus, the 
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collective assignment of status function. The typical point of the 
creation of institutional facts by assigning status function is to 
create deontic powers.8 
According to Searle, what he calls 'deontology' as well as language and 
symbolism are essential to a reality consisting of institutional facts. He 
understands deontology or deontic powers as particular kinds of 'power 
relationships' that are permeated by 'rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, 
permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications.'9 Such 
relationships include from the institutions of 'government' and 'contractual 
relationships' to those of friendship or kinship, since all of them are 
characterised by 'rights, duties and obligations.'10 Searle considers such power 
relations to create 'desire-independent reasons for action' in the sense that the 
realm of deontology precedes desire-based reasons for action associated with 
such power relationships: 'the possibility of having desires and satisfying them 
within these institutional structures – for example, the desire to get rich, to 
become president, to get a Ph.D., to get tenure – all presuppose that there is 
a recognition of the deontic relationships.'11 What Searle leaves unexamined 
and should be key as regards the institutional question is whether the same 
holds true for the process of the emergence of such institutional structures. In 
other words, is the emergence of institutional structures desire-independent 
and – more broadly – is it as fact-based or strictly 'deontology'-based as Searle 
has it? It is doubtful that the emergence of deontology by default precedes 
desire-dependent reasons for action, or, in other words, that deontology is not 
produced precisely in order to legitimise desire or other irreducibly 
psychological motive. Moreover, all these desires that Searle mentions are 
clearly based on a capitalist universe, or at least one where personal success 
honours the property-ownership regimes. They are in no way neutral, 
transhistorical, general. I will endeavour to address some of these tensions in 
following sections.  
                                                          
8 Ibid., 50 [emphasis in original]. 
9 Ibid., 34. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 35. 




Searle's analysis is certainly valuable in that it emphasises the importance of 
power relations within the core of institutional structures and in that it points to 
the centrality of a broad realm of right and collectively accepted systems of 
rules. He also regards language as the 'fundamental social institution' from 
which all other institutions are able to arise; language can exist without other 
institutions such as 'money, property, government, or marriage' but the reverse 
is, for him, impossible.12 This is a valuable entry point to the importance of 
signification, even though, arguably, the predominance of language or 
signification within the epistemological assemblage of institution is to an extent 
contestable and will be further nuanced. Searle stresses that the 
representational function of language or symbolism makes the assignment of 
status functions possible: 'A status function must be represented as existing in 
order to exist at all, and language or symbolism of some kind provides the 
means of representation.'13 Despite such positivist use of the concept of 
representation in order to refer to communicatory and linguistic symbolism, 
Searle 's viewpoint acutely acknowledges language as a fundamental social 
institution. Moreover, he makes a few analytical observations that introduce us 
into some important intricacies of the concept of the institution. 
In Searle’s theory, we can observe a distinction between collective and official 
recognition of status functions, whereby official recognition would derive from 
an official ‘agency’ that is itself collectively recognised and can typically issue 
‘status indicators’.14 He maintains that collective recognition of status functions 
is enough to generate deontic powers. Thus, the fact that a person is 
someone’s friend is an ‘institutional fact’ since it ‘carries collectively recognized 
obligations, rights, and responsibilities’.15 Obviously, there is no official 
recognition of friendship by any official agency, even though this might be 
harder to discern or assert nowadays given the nature of contemporary social 
networking which has created an abundance of personal ‘status indicators’, to 
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borrow Searle’s term, such as acceptances of friend requests or statements of 
interpersonal favouring through ‘likes’, albeit social networks hardly bear an 
official agency that can certify the institutional fact of friendship. It is doubtful 
whether the friendship status, as indicated by social networks status indicators 
could be seen as being collectively recognised beyond the algorithmic realm 
of the social network and one can only speculate about the ‘certifying’ role and 
importance of such a realm in the near future. 
A relevant distinction is the one that Searle draws between ‘formal and 
informal’16 institutional structures; ‘there is a gradual transition from informal 
but accepted assignments of status functions, to full blown established 
institutions with codified constitutive rules, but in both cases the crucial 
element of deontology is present’.17 This seems to be a distinction of degree 
and not quality as he recognises deontology also in informal status functions 
in friendship and even in promises. Interestingly, Searle registers the 
distinction between collective versus official recognition through an institution 
that one would expect – at least from a western perspective – to be full-blown, 
well-established and officially recognised and certified, i.e. housing property. 
Searle stresses that in certain countries, such as Egypt, there is often no status 
indicator for property and therefore no official recognition.18 Property then can 
neither be taxed nor be used as capital, even though, in the Egyptian society, 
it is collectively recognised as property belonging to owners (whom Searle 
describes as ‘squatters, in the sense that they do not legally own the property’) 
and continues to ‘generate deontic powers.’19 In short, Searle suggests that 
undocumented and officially unrecognised property in Egypt lacks ‘full deontic 
powers’ since some of them would be impeded by the lack of official evidence 
that would certify the property.20  
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 Another important distinction that Searle makes is the one between 
‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ rules. Institutional facts and institutions derive 
from constitutive rules – those that constitute the very institution – and not 
simply regulative ones.21 In this sense, the rules of chess are constitutive of 
the chess as without them there can be no chess, while the rules of driving are 
regulative since driving can exist without them.22 This leads us to a very 
important conclusion. Institutions can be constituted by rules, without 
necessarily being attached to existing law or official regulations. Rather, they 
simply require collective recognition of assigned status functions.  
Would Searle regard art as an institution? The answer to this question can only 
be approximated since Searle regards ‘science, religion or education’ as 
‘massive forms of human practices’ that ‘do not as such carry a deontology.’23 
In a close reading of his account, we could answer the question both 
affirmatively and negatively; affirmatively, if we decide to use the word 
institution to designate massive forms of practices such as science or religion 
which include a plurality of sub-institutions and negatively, if we decide not to. 
Art is too broad (it extends from any type of visual and aural culture to actual 
life, knowledge and concepts, discourse, activism, direction, organisation of 
action) and too diverse in its deontology. Art’s deontic powers would be too 
indeterminate to be exhaustible in one institution constituted by constitutive 
rules that determine its status functions. Even if, per Bürger, we accept art’s 
autonomy (from the market logic) as its constitutive rule and deontology in 
bourgeois society, a collective acceptance of this condition remains doubtful – 
at least in the current form of late capitalist society. Equally, even though 
Foster and Buchloh’s respective accounts point towards issues of power and 
language, conventionality and canonisation, it is impossible to consider these 
accounts as producing (a) unanimous deontology(-ies) around the category of 
art. This much is clear: art is definitely not one institution. Affirmation does not 
apply univocally to all art nor to the institution of art. Art’s autonomy involves 
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more complexity than its idea of an institutionalised affirmative sphere. How 
then does art pertain to institutions? Even though it accentuates the crucial 
aspect of deontology, Searle’s positivist understanding of the institution merely 
hints at the political ontology that needs to be examined if conclusions that 
take into account art’s peculiarities are to be drawn. 
‘Instituent praxis’ and ‘instituent practices’: The context 
For the purposes of this research, the most recent and timely theoretical 
reconfiguration that centrally employs and/or develops the notion of the 
institution in a sustained and thorough social and political theory can be found 
in the co-authored work of Dardot and Laval. Another earlier configuration is 
traceable in the work of Raunig. Even though the latter’s work has featured 
prominently in art-institutional/curatorial discourse, the French duo’s thought 
that should arguably become focal, as it offers a more theoretically coherent 
and insightful political understanding of the institutional. Dardot and Laval 
introduce the concept of ‘praxis instituante’, which has been translated in 
English as ‘instituent praxis’, while Raunig uses the concept of ‘instituting’ (as 
process) or ‘instituent practice,’ as corresponding to ‘instituent practices.’24 
Raunig’s ‘practice’ refers (interchangeably) to instituting as process and 
‘practices’ to specific instances of instituting. It is in the theorisation of 
instituting as ‘self-instituting’ where Raunig grounds his political argument.25 
On the other hand, Dardot and Laval elaborate on the notion of praxis and its 
theoretical implications in such a way that their idea of the instituent can only 
be articulated together with their notion of praxis. 
Before my analysis of the two closely related but ultimately distinct theoretical 
articulations, it is necessary to address their respective theoretical 
backgrounds and contexts which bear both differences and similarities. 
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Importantly, both approaches relate to the political idea of ‘the common’ – 
increasingly present in political articulations that challenge the ‘normality’ of 
capitalism but so far underrepresented in art theory, including that addressing 
the art institution. Both articulations draw on autonomist Marxism; Dardot and 
Laval critique Hardt and Negri while Raunig is more accommodating to the 
concept of constituent power. Raunig’s methodology and terminology are also 
heavily influenced by post-structuralist thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze and 
Guattari. His writing is thus more poetic and metaphorical than Dardot and 
Laval’s, who also draw on Guattari’s work on institutional psychoanalysis. 
Despite Dardot and Laval’s proposition that the political principle of the 
common has to be instituted, they do not use the concept of instituent praxis 
as merely a methodological tool subservient to the desired implementation of 
the common; rather, they spend a significant part of their analysis in Common: 
on Revolution in the 21st Century to originally define and elaborate on it as a 
concept in itself. It is worth noting that the present thesis progresses in reverse 
in that it revisits the concept of institution and its possible expanded function 
in contemporary social realities, such as the art world, while maintaining the 
hypothesis of the desire for the common as political background and 
positionality.  
‘Instituent praxis’ and ‘instituent practices’: The 
‘constituent’ 
Raunig attempts a critique of power through valorising self-organisation and 
advocating for a politics of autonomy. He denounces what he sees as the 
defeatism of later Institutional Critique (mainly in Fraser’s writings) by 
contending that what he calls instituent practices neither daydream of power-
free spaces nor retreat into defeatist self-critique. This caveat forms a lucid 
and necessary framework that could recontextualise the institution away from 
stagnancy and dead-end duality: 
What is at stake is specifically not the institution as an 
unchanging structure and state apparatus, as a mere element of 
a dominant repressive system. If, instead, institutions are 
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grasped as processes, then the problem goes beyond the terrain 
of the critique of the state and capitalism, for social movements 
and revolutionary machines cannot dispense with institutions, 
nor are they immune to the occurrence of structuralization, 
rigidification and institutionalization.26 
In other words, for Raunig, on the one hand, instituting involves an 
insurrectional act or, more broadly, a break from a given dominant institutional 
regime and postulates a new institutional arrangement. On the other hand, 
instituting acknowledges the possibility for structuralisation/rigidification and 
constantly strives against it. Once the emphasis is placed on the process rather 
than the institution, it becomes clear that instituting occurs also in practices 
which are not traditionally defined as institutions. Set on the tension between 
artistic intervention and activism, Park Fiction is an example that Raunig refers 
to. He describes it as a semi-fictional park initiated in the early 1990s in 
Hamburg by some local social groups, initially to prevent an urban 
development plan. With reference to Park Fiction Raunig writes: 
[…] a stronger participation in instituting can be recognized in the 
pluralization of the instituting event: especially the concatenation 
of so many ongoing and diversely composed instituting events 
hinders an authoritarian mode of instituting and simultaneously 
counters the closure of/in the institution Park Fiction. The various 
arrangements of self-organization promote broad participation in 
instituting, because they newly compose themselves as a 
constituent power again and again, always tying into new local 
and global struggles.27 
Raunig does not fail to observe that artistic practice and instituting processes 
are equally enmeshed in mechanisms of power. However, what specifically 
makes such processes instituent remains to an extent random, or at least 
directly dependent on the specificity of practices and whether they combine a 
dissident rejection of a status quo of power relations with a self-organised 
alternative, whereby ‘desire’ is collectively produced and learnt.28 Raunig’s 
latent but promising tracing of the Guattarian link between the instituent and 
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the production of desire – a link that I discuss further in subsequent sections – 
fails to tie into a conceptualisation of a collective subjectivity at the heart of the 
instituent. Arguably, Raunig makes the ungrounded assumption that the 
plurality – or diversity – of desire in the instituting events comprising the main 
instituting event will automatically hinder an authoritarian mode of instituting, 
as if authoritarianism only arises in homogenous social schemata with a 
common desire and devoid of difference or otherness. The main problem, 
however, is that he does not account for a conceptually necessary or valid link 
that ties the plurality and diversity of a practice to its autonomy and self-
determination – other than his resort to the constituent. Relatedly, his idea that 
a continuous self-composition and reconfiguration of a practice as constituent 
power would promote broad participation in instituting amounts to suggesting 
that self-organised struggles that continuously relate to other such struggles 
prevent their practice from turning into a constitution. Before proceeding with 
the definition of the instituent, what it means for a practice not to turn into a 
constitution and remain in the realm of constituent power needs to be 
addressed.  
Hardt and Negri have attempted to rethink constituent power away from its 
traditional philosophical conception as the constituent assembly that confers 
power to a constitution as sovereign power, in the context of major republic-
forming revolutions such as the American and the French.29 They have 
suggested that the constituent should be understood in absolute terms, as 
preceding and exceeding constituted power (constitution) and therefore as 
able not to become a sovereign power, insofar as power is not conferred.30 I 
return to this point through its critique by Dardot and Laval. What is of 
immediate interest is the way this proposition ties in with institutions and the 
institutional process. Hardt and Negri regard institutions as composed and 
‘continually transformed’ by ‘singularities’, instead of ‘individuals’ or 
‘identities’.31 Singularities are conceived by Hardt and Negri as ‘always already 
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multiple’ and ‘constantly engaged in a process of transformation.’32 
Singularities pertain to the institutional process by being dissonant towards ‘the 
ruling power’ and often by being ‘in conflict with one another.’33 Thus, Hardt 
and Negri consider conflict to be the basis of institutions and they regard the 
latter as ‘open-ended in that they are continually transformed by the 
singularities that compose them.’34 At the same time, the authors think of the 
consolidation of ‘collective habits, practices and capacities that designate a 
form of life’ as a key attribute of institutions.35 Evidently, the authors are trying 
to attach the institutional process to the sustaining of rupture, the consolidation 
of new forms of life together with the permanent caveat of open-endedness of 
the constant transformation of the participating singularities. In this rhetoric, 
however, the defining capacities of the institution ultimately appear to be 
consolidation and perpetuation, rather than transformation. For, in close 
analysis, it is the singularities or even constituent power instead of the 
institutional process that primarily carry the dissonant, revolting or 
transformative aspects. In fact, Hardt and Negri argue that it is due to the 
institutional process that singularities ‘achieve some consistency in their 
interactions and behaviors, creating in this way a form of life,’ even if these are 
not ‘fixed in identity.’36 Furthermore, in trying to elucidate how institutions form 
a constituent power Hardt and Negri write: 
Institutional norms and obligations are established in regular 
interactions but are continually open to a process of evolution. 
The singularities that compose the multitude do not transfer their 
rights or powers, and thus they prohibit the formation of a 
sovereign power, but in their mutual encounters each becomes 
more powerful. The institutional process therefore provides a 
mechanism of protection (but with no guarantees) against the 
two primary dangers facing the multitude: externally, the 
repression of the ruling power, and internally, the destructive 
conflicts among singularities within the multitude.37 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 358. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 357. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 358 [emphasis added]. 
37 Ibid., 359. 




Arguably, even though the authors define institutions as based on social 
conflict and the institutional process as involving a caveat of self-rupture, it 
never becomes quite clear how these exceed the function of constituent power, 
other than occasionally simply serving it in their capacity to provide the 
continuity aspects (for instance, in establishing norms and obligations). Such 
capacity, however, would be no different to the most traditional definitions of 
institution that examine it as mere reproduction of pre-existing structures. It 
seems that for Hardt and Negri institutions are conceptually there in order to 
constantly reflect the need for singularities to transform – a relation that casts 
the definition of the institution as fully representational despite the authors’ 
broader anti-representational advocations. Even though Hardt and Negri 
contribute to a valid definition of institution by relating it to insurrection and 
directly entangling it with social conflict and revolutionary success, they still 
prioritise ‘constituent governance’ in ‘juridical, constitutional and governmental’ 
terms, in their recognition that the ‘revolution must be governed’ and cannot be 
fully spontaneous.38 At the same time, it is nowhere made clear how the 
institutional process itself breaks from the reproduction or consolidation of 
norms and collective habits, apart from instances that are ultimately attributed 
to the function of singularities or constituent power. 
Regarding the relation between the instituent and the constituent, in their 
introduction to a revised edition on instituent practices (2016), Raunig and 
Nowotny argue against the prioritisation of the question of ‘constituent 
processes’ over that of instituting and suggest that ‘instituent practice and 
constituent power mutually presuppose one another.’39 For instance, they 
write:  
Constituent power here combines with the practices of all the 
solidarity initiatives and networks which, in the midst of 
government restrictions, racist policies, and deepening social 
fault lines, have not allowed themselves to become misled about 
the fact that no shared future is available without instituting new 
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forms of social interaction – and that no future will ever be 
available at all if not as a shared future.40 
Are the authors ultimately associating the constituent with power and the 
instituent with practice(s)? Can there be instituent power? Even though Raunig 
theorises an instituent process, he does not elaborate on instituent power. The 
instituent seems to pertain to a practice that would institute new forms of social 
interaction, while it would be guided and permeated by constituent power. This 
is somewhat inconsistent to Raunig and Nowotny’s assertion that both the 
constituent and the instituent should pertain not only to the purely juridico-
political realm but also to the social.41 Thus, even though they suggest that the 
question of instituting should not be treated as secondary to the one 
concerning constituent processes, the instituting process instigates forms of 
social interaction that (hopelessly) seek not to rigidify, while all the (micro-
)political issues are left to the constituent. Meanwhile, very little is said about 
what constitutes the institution of new forms of social interaction. As I shall 
further discuss, Raunig’s idea of the instituting process as embodying a 
resistance to structuralisation through pluralising might be the instance that 
mostly approximates Dardot and Laval’s understanding of the instituent. 
However, Raunig’s insistence on a central – albeit ambivalent and frail – 
association between the notion of the instituent and the concept of constituent 
power (as articulated by Hardt and Negri) prevents him from fully articulating 
the particularities of the concept of the instituent.  
Dardot and Laval’s critique of Hardt and Negri 
Dardot and Laval consider Hardt and Negri’s conceptual endeavour of a non-
sovereign constituent to be problematic due to the dubiousness of its claimed 
condition of subjectivity as ‘constituent process’ and ‘constituent decisions’ 
directly attributed to social movements.42 The French authors maintain that 
Hardt and Negri’s concept of constituent power loses its distinctness as it is 
                                                          
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Declaration (New York: Argo, 2012), 51-56, quoted in Dardot 
and Laval, Commun, 395. 




inextricably embedded in social struggles, defined by Hardt and Negri as 
constituent.43 Dardot and Laval consider such struggles fundamentally diverse 
to the extent that it is misleading to homogenously attach a theoretical concept 
such as the constituent to them.44 Furthermore, the two authors accurately 
critique Hardt and Negri for failing to describe how the constituent would lead 
to the transformation of new forms of life into collective habits.45 This is a 
critique that could be applied to Raunig who also fails to elucidate the relation 
between the constituent and the instituent as concepts, apart (presumably) 
from implying that the former is about power and the latter about practice, 
which is, arguably, a theoretically unsustained differentiation. Dardot and Laval 
go as far as suggesting that the concept of the constituent could be altogether 
abandoned, considering that it derives from a philosophical tradition which has 
theorised ‘revolutions that mainly aimed at producing new political 
constitutions’.46 In any case, they suggest that any distinction between the 
constituent and the instituent should not perpetuate the misconception that the 
former is solely a political concept while the latter a sociological one.47  
Dardot and Laval’s initial remarks on the instituent 
Dardot and Laval argue that the production of a common law or a law of the 
common (‘droit du commun’) cannot be conceived ‘only in terms of customary 
law (‘droit coutumier’)’.48 The two authors maintain that even though custom 
can produce law, ‘such production is fundamentally determined by the 
unconscious transmission of ancient rules.’49 Therefore, according to these 
authors, it is incapable of instituting the ‘unappropriable’ as what should not be 
appropriated, as doing so would require a conscious instituent act.50 Dardot 
and Laval’s broader political aim is to conceive and theorise the ‘creation of 
                                                          










new rights of use that will limit private property, through the recognition of 
inappropriability as social norm.’51 Even though I will not discuss the potential 
function of new use rights that would limit property, I will examine the general 
conceptual pattern on which Dardot and Laval ground such function. According 
to them, seeking to directly establish new customs as ways of acting and doing 
would be somewhat absurd since customs cannot be ‘decreed’.52 The authors 
aim instead to define the type of practice that would lead to the ‘invention of 
rules of law that are likely to become customs in the long-term.’53 Thus, the 
authors endeavour to discuss the collective practice through which people can 
produce (‘peuvent produire’) rules of law, independently of the existing ones 
and – if necessary – against them.54 
The key starting point for Dardot and Laval is to definitionally uphold ‘institution 
as an act of instituting’ (‘l’institution en tant qu’ acte d’ instituer’).55 It should be 
noted at this point that in French, unlike English, the meaning of institution as 
the act of instituting is more prominent comparing to its definition as singular 
establishment, since the word establishment (etablissement) is used more 
extensively for such singular institutions. Nonetheless, Dardot and Laval point 
out that (even in French) as soon as the linguistic passage from verb to noun 
(from ‘to institute’ to ‘institution’) is made, what is predominantly retained is the 
result of the act rather than the act itself: ‘what is thus signified is the system 
of rules that govern a collectivity rather than the act of legislating, the social 
grouping whose cohesion is secured from a constraining power rather than the 
act of transmitting or conferring such power’.56 The authors acutely observe 
that such reduction cannot sufficiently be addressed through the more 
processual concept denoted by the noun ‘institutionalisation’ as the latter 
mainly indicates the officialisation of what already exists by endowing an 
implicit rule with the ‘fixity’ of the explicit.57 As Dardot and Laval note, 
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institutionalisation stipulates an ‘ex post facto’ recognition rather than a 
creative activity that would produce something anew.58 The two authors seek 
however to go beyond this preliminary terminological analysis, which, as they 
argue, merely situates the problematics of the relation between an act and its 
result into the ‘nature of the act itself, regardless of whether the act is 
understood as the officialisation of the already existing or the production of the 
entirely new.’59 Thus, with a view to examining such problematics, the authors 
turn to the concept of creation in terms of the imaginary, as defined by 
Castoriadis.  
The imaginary and the social-historical 
Before elaborating on their thesis on creation and the social-historical, Dardot 
and Laval present critically the ‘sociological reduction of institution to the 
instituted’60 summarisable in Paul Fauconnet and Marcel Mauss’s approach, 
according to which, historical shifts ‘from everyday fashion variations to 
political or ethical revolutions are always, and in variable degrees, 
modifications of existing institutions.’61 Dardot and Laval reject such an 
approach by firmly advancing that ‘history is the element of the radically new’.62 
The authors examine this thesis largely through Castoriadis’s theory, which 
they see as overcoming the traditional reduction of the institution to the 
instituted and asserting the ‘primacy of the instituent over the instituted’ in the 
formulation that ‘the instituted is always the result of instituent power as power 
of creation.’63 For Castoriadis, ‘creation, just as much as alienation, 
presupposes the capacity to grant oneself what is not (what is not given in 
perception, or what is not given in the symbolic links of previously constituted 
rational thought).’64 Dardot and Laval draw from Castoriadis’s distinction 
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between the imaginary, as the capacity to represent something 
circumstantially absent yet generally existing within perception (‘reproductive 
imaginary’), and the ‘radical imaginary’ as the capacity to make be what has 
not yet been – a relation or a thing that has not previously existed in perception 
or otherwise.65 Castoriadis argues that the radical imaginary is 'before the 
distinction between "real" and "fictitious'''; 'it is because radical imagination 
exists that "reality" exists for us – exists tout court and exists as it exists.'66 
Thus, Castoriadis foreshadows the pertinence of the real/artificial which I 
discuss later in a Guattarian framework. All in all, Dardot and Laval argue that 
‘the institution should not be regarded primarily as the instituted but as the 
instituent that gives rise to the instituted which will in turn be subverted by the 
radically new.’67 The ‘instituent moment’ is revealing of a ‘specific human 
capacity that consists in creating from nothing an entirely original signification’ 
pertaining to what Castoriadis calls the ‘imaginary’: ‘representation not as 
image of [something] but as radically new form.’68  
Dardot and Laval refer to the two dimensions found in Castoriadis’s imaginary, 
the instituted and instituent, the former designating already established 
‘significations and institutions’ and the latter ‘the very source from which new 
significations and institutions emerge in the course of history.’69 Castoriadis 
considers the ‘social-historical’ as essentially including the ‘non-causal’ which, 
in turn,  
appears as behaviour that is not merely 'unpredictable' but 
creative (on the level of individuals, groups, classes or entire 
societies). It appears not as a simple deviation in relation to an 
existing type but as the positing of a new type of behaviour, as 
the institution of a new social rule, as the invention of a new 
object or a new form – in short, as an emergence or a production 
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which cannot be deduced on the basis of a previous situation, as 
a conclusion that goes beyond the premises or as the positing of 
new premises.70 
The instituent is thus theorised as the social or historical creation of 
signification/meaning that is made possible through the radical imaginary 
which, unlike what traditional sociological approaches had it, does not 
designate a modification of the already instituted but a truly new creation from 
nothing (ex nihilo) – yet ‘not in nihilo or cum nihilo’.71 Following Castoriadis, 
Dardot and Laval regard such creation as conditioned by determined and 
already given aspects and situated in particular given contexts, without being 
caused or determined by them. In fact, Dardot and Laval go further than 
Castoriadis in arguing that there is no strictly-speaking ‘ex nihilo’ creation as it 
would amount to the archetypal theological one.72 Rather, they advocate that 
all creation comes from something or arises from given conditions (‘ex aliquo’) 
which however do not cause the creation (‘sine causa’).73 A caused creation 
would be an oxymoron and an unconditioned creation would be impossible. In 
this respect, Dardot and Laval consider ‘cum’ (with) as more appropriate to ‘ex’ 
in describing the relation of the creative act to its conditions.74 In short, creation 
is always conditioned by given or preexisting conditions but is not determined 
by them in a necessary cause-effect relation.  
The two most important insights that Dardot and Laval’s theorisation of 
Castoriadis’s workings of creation as the field proper to the social-historical 
operating through the instituent or radical imaginary are, firstly, that the 
instituent is essentially about signification or creation of meaning and secondly, 
that such signification is irreducibly non-causal and conditioned by determined 
preexisting conditions. There are still however numerous questions to be 
addressed, such as whether or not this is a conscious creation – which would 
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also lead to the question of power – and whether or how subjectivity relates to 
it.  
The binary of constituent and instituent power and 
subjectivity 
Dardot and Laval draw from Castoriadis’s distinction between ‘explicit’ and 
‘implicit power’.75 Explicit power is judicial and governmental power understood 
broadly as pertinent to any instance in society that involves ‘the instances or 
authorities capable, explicitly and effectively, of issuing sanctionable 
injunctions.’ 76 Such instances or authorities pertain to ‘jurisdictions (dikê) and 
decisions (telos)’ and have always been present in all forms of society and 
exercised by social entities such as tribes and warriors to the people and the 
state.77 Importantly, Dardot and Laval regard constituent power as a form of 
explicit power and suggest that it has been largely granted priority within 
philosophical traditions that have dealt with political questions around 
constitution and its relation to revolution, the State and sovereignty.78 The 
authors trace the downgrading of the instituent in such traditions with an 
emphasis on Jean-Paul Sartre, who allegedly condemns the instituent by 
attaching it to the birth of sovereignty in the realm of the social, and Hardt and 
Negri who, as I have already discussed, prioritise the constituent over the 
instituent – albeit exhausting the former in social struggles and thereby 
stripping it of its theoretical meaning.79 Dardot and Laval also unsettle the 
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concept of ‘self-determination’ (‘autoposition’) when it is presented as cut off 
from the already instituted social realm; self-determination promotes then the 
problematic ‘mythological figure of a […] legislator’ who ‘institutes a people’ by 
endowing it with an ‘appropriated constitution,’ as well as the a-historical myth 
of the collective act of determining one’s own constitutional rules in a supposed 
moment of pure origin or as a collective agency that creates itself ‘ex nihilo’.80 
Instead, through Castoriadis’s thinking, the two authors assert the primacy of 
instituent power over constituent and legislative power: ‘the true creative power 
is not legislative power […] nor constituent power […] but the power to institute 
imaginary significations […]’.81 Castoriadis writes: 
Before any explicit power and, even more, before any 
"domination," the institution of society wields over the individuals 
it produces a radical ground-power. This ground-power, or 
primordial power, as manifestation of the instituting power of the 
radical imaginary, is not locatable. It is never the power of an 
individual or of a nameable instance. It is carried out by the 
instituted society, but in the background stands the instituting 
society […].82 
Dardot and Laval concur with Castoriadis’s definition of instituent power as 
ground-power (‘infrapouvoir’) in the sense that it pertains to the instituent 
imaginary as creation of social significations and cannot – unlike a constitution 
– be monopolised by any particular location or form.83 Dardot and Laval 
maintain that the instituent is fundamentally historical as the power of the 
social-historical field and always arises from the already instituted; instituent 
power pertains to ‘the historical thickness of an already instituted society as 
the condition that allows citizens to assemble and decide on functional rules of 
political institutions’.84 As the power of the social-historical realm itself, 
instituent power has no ‘subjects-authors’ (‘sujets-auteurs’) and derives from 
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an ‘anonymous collective’ (‘collectif anonyme’).85 Equally, for Castoriadis, 
everyone could be an ‘author’ of instituent power: ‘to the degree that this power 
can be participated in, it is participated in by all. Everybody is, potentially, a 
coauthor of the evolution of language, of the family, of customs, and so on.’86 
Importantly, Castoriadis stresses that ‘language, family, mores, "ideas," "art," 
a host of social activities as well as their evolution are beyond the scope of 
legislation in their essential part.’87 Dardot and Laval affirm that, in 
Castoriadis’s thought, neither legislative power nor constituent power are 
properly creative: the former as merely a ‘constituted power’ and the latter as 
endowing ‘legislative and executive power with their respective place in the 
constitution’ fall short of the creative power of instituting imaginary 
significations.88 Therefore, instituent power is seen as distinct from constituent 
power in that, as social-historical creation of an anonymous collective, 
instituent power is outside – or ‘below’ (‘en deçà’) – of all will and 
consciousness.89 Radical instituting ground-power is essentially conceived by 
Castoriadis as unconscious, since such is the modality of the radical 
imaginary. This is an important caveat given that, as we will see, Dardot and 
Laval postulate their concept of instituent praxis as a ‘co-institution of rules’.90 
However, Dardot and Laval will develop their conception of instituent praxis 
based on a number of issues and critiques that they raise on this specific 
thread of Castoriadis’s thinking. They question the rationale that since 
instituent power cannot be attributed to one or multiple subjects-authors and 
since ‘the social-historical immensely transcends any "intersubjectivity"’, there 
should be an automatic attribution to an anonymous collective.91 They argue 
that the formulation that instituent power does not bear any subject in particular 
should not necessarily amount to the assumption that it is the power of ‘outis, 
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of Nobody.’92 They observe that Castoriadis does not elucidate the 
participation of individuals in instituent power, even though he has theorised 
the individual psyche as directly associated with radical or unconscious 
imagination, which differs from the radical imaginary.93 For Dardot and Laval, 
individual psyche as conceived by Castoriadis remains fundamentally a-
social.94 Their rationale is that the two instances of the radical imaginary, i.e. 
radical imagination (individual psyche) and the social imaginary (social-
historical realm), are not only irreducibly heterogenous but the individual is 
seen as simply internalising social significations.95 As Dardot and Laval point 
out, since Castoriadis regards radical imagination and the social imaginary as 
fundamentally heterogenous and the individual as simply internalising social 
significations, it becomes difficult to conceive the exercise of instituent power 
on behalf of the individual beyond the perpetuation of customs or rather 
beyond the reduction of ‘the appearance of new customs to an imperceptible 
modification of old ones’.96 All in all, they suggest that Castoriadis’s ground-
power is participatory to such an extent that prevents or voids participation and 
‘its workings tend to be taken for the unconscious transmission/modification of 
traditions and customs.’97 Therefore, even though – like Castoriadis – Dardot 
and Laval regard instituent power as the ‘collective work of everyone’ (‘l’ 
oeuvre collective de tous’), they advocate that the instituent does not by 
definition entail the absence of subjectivity nor need remain at the level of the 
unconscious. Indeed, they seek to reconcile institution as the (unconscious) 
creation of new significations with an ‘activity conscious of itself, not as a whole 
but as part of a whole’.98 For this reason they depart from instituent power in 
order to address the concept of instituent praxis.  
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Conscious self-institution and praxis  
Castoriadis distinguishes between politics (‘la politique’) and the political (‘le 
politique’) associating the former with implicit or instituent power and the latter 
with explicit power. For Castoriadis, even though politics essentially derives 
from instituent power as ground-power, it amounts to the making-explicit of 
such power, not as constituent/explicit power but as the conscious and 
deliberate collective activity of the institution of society: 
Politics, such as it was created by the Greeks, amounts to the 
explicit putting into question of the established institution of 
society. This presupposes that at least important parts of this 
institution had nothing ‘sacred’ or ‘natural’ about them, but rather 
that they represented nomos. The democratic movement […] is 
not confined to the struggle around explicit power, it aims 
potentially at the overall reinstitution of society, and this is 
materialized through the creation of philosophy. Greek thought 
[…] amounts ipso facto to the putting into question of the most 
important dimension of the institution of society: the 
representations and the norms of the tribe, and the very notion 
of truth.99 
Therefore, politics is directly entangled with the ‘lucid’ realisation that an 
instituted society can be put into question by its politically active participants 
and the ‘deliberate’ reflection on how the nomos, the representations and 
norms of the tribe could be reinstituted.100 What of the participation of the 
participants? Castoriadis suggests that what was radical about the 'political 
creation of the Greeks' was formalising a part of instituting power (both in the 
sense of legislation and 'private law') but also making that part institutionally 
'open to participation,' in the sense that all members of the 'body politic' could 
participate equally in determining 'legislation', 'jurisdiction' and 'government'.101 
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Thus, importantly, for Castoriadis politics coincides with autonomy defined as 
‘the unlimited self-questioning about the law and its foundations as well as the 
capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do and to institute (therefore 
also, to say).’102  
Furthermore, the social-historical pertains directly to the emergence of politics 
as historical movement: ‘The creation of democracy and philosophy is truly the 
creation of historical movement in the strong sense-a movement which, in this 
phase, deploys itself from the eighth to the fifth century, and is in fact brought 
to an end with the defeat of Athens in 404[BC].’103 However, the conscious 
type of activity found in politics and aiming at autonomy is ultimately distinct in 
Castoriadis from institution as the social-historical creation of new 
significations. Rather, such conscious activity would pertain to what he defines 
as ‘praxis’ or, in other words, ‘that doing in which the other or others are 
intended as autonomous beings considered as the essential agents of the 
development of their own autonomy.’104 And as Dardot and Laval accurately 
observe, in Castoriadis, praxis is by definition emancipatory whereas 
institution-creation could in fact be alienating: ‘If all authentic praxis carries 
institution-creation in its conscious expression, and thereby participates in it, 
institution-creation does not necessarily relate to praxis.’105 Dardot and Laval’s 
concept of instituent praxis begins at the critique of the duality that they locate 
within Castoriadis’s thought:  
[…] on the one hand, the activity of the anonymous collective that 
aims at nothing since it escapes the grip of consciousness yet 
creates imaginary significations (institution); on the other hand, 
a conscious activity that aims at and presupposes autonomy but 
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cannot decide on its own the destruction of ancient imaginary 
significations and their replacement with new ones (praxis).106 
Dardot and Laval conceive of instituent praxis in order to theorise autonomy 
as directly entangled in the very process of institution/creation and, in order to 
do so, they redefine praxis as implicating the self-producing of collective 
subjects. This redefinition draws on Marx’s conception of praxis, which they 
see as involving the ‘self-production of its own subject by the self-
transformation of the actor in and through the very action.’107 Dardot and Laval 
consider Marx’s conception of praxis to approximate Castoriadis’s conception 
of psychoanalysis as pertaining to both ‘poiesis’ and praxis: the psychoanalytic 
work (‘oeuvre (ergon)’) coincides with the self-transformation of the activity’s 
agent.108 However, Dardot and Laval maintain that Castoriadis’s conception of 
praxis in relation to politics strictly involves human autonomy as the end of the 
praxis, while in Marx, whether praxis has an emancipatory cause is irrelevant, 
as long as the self-production of its subject is involved.109 Marx distinguishes 
emancipatory praxis from non-emancipatory praxis in that only the former 
makes a clean break with tradition and the past.110 Dardot and Laval counter-
argue that no praxis can actually make a clean break with tradition and the 
past and that emancipatory praxis cannot form an exception.111 Therefore, for 
them, emancipatory praxis needs to be defined in line with the creation of the 
new in their conception of social-historical creation/institution (i.e. the new is 
not created ex nihilo but ex aliquo; conditioned but not caused by the past). 
Castoriadis, in turn, views all praxis as emancipatory praxis that always aims 
at autonomy and consciously makes explicit a part of society’s instituent 
power.112 Dardot and Laval’s instituent praxis develops Castoriadis’s idea of 
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the over-and-above, as it were, self-conscious making-explicit of 
institution/creation of (a) society – the latter merely denoting a generic 
anonymous collective – into a praxis of a collective subject in the making, 
produced in and through the act of creating new imaginary significations in the 
form of rules.113 Their definition of instituent praxis goes beyond the making 
explicit of instituent/implicit power. Although instituent praxis tends towards 
Castoriadis’s definition of politics, it ultimately diverts from such a definition in 
a subtle yet deliberate distancing from power and a redefinition of praxis that 
largely accommodates their proposition on subjectivity (i.e. the self-production 
of the agents through the action itself). 
Instituent praxis: Historicity, subjectivity and the invention 
of rules 
Instituent praxis as conceived by Dardot and Laval eludes the binary of 
instituent and constituent power. Unlike instituent or implicit power, instituent 
praxis does not arise from an anonymous collective and pertains to the explicit 
insofar as it is conscious.114 Yet, unlike constituent and explicit power that 
legitimises a subject of sovereign will, instituent praxis continuously produces 
its own proper subject.115 According to Dardot and Laval, the exercise of 
constituent power is punctual and requires a presupposed subject, whereas 
instituent praxis can do away with a preexisting subject and produces its own 
proper one, which is constantly altered and renewed beyond the initial creative 
act.116 Instituent praxis ‘is self-production of a collective subject in and through 
the continuous co-production of rules of law.’117 In order to further analyse the 
specifics of such an articulation, I will first focus on the continuous co-
production of rules of law, then discuss the self-production of a collective 
subject and finally, return to the rules of law, without losing sight of all the 
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elements’ inextricability in working in tandem and synthesising instituent 
praxis. 
In line with their initial concern to address the type of praxis that would 
implicate the invention of rules of law and their capacity to become customs in 
the long-term, Dardot and Laval argue that emancipatory praxis is essentially 
instituent praxis conceived as ‘conscious activity of institution’ or ‘co-institution 
of rules’.118 Specifically, Dardot and Laval maintain that instituting consists 
primarily in introducing rules of law, albeit not in the sense of officialising 
already existing unofficial rules, nor however creating them ex nihilo.119 They 
insist that instituent praxis, albeit creation of the new, does not and cannot 
come from nothing, but always arises from and takes place within already 
given conditions. Thus, Dardot and Laval identify two functions of the concept 
of instituent praxis, in terms of its temporality and the way it relates to historicity 
('historicité'). The first function is to accentuate 'the creation of a new institution' 
as the institution of 'new rules of law'.120  
While instituent praxis presupposes an ‘out of’, which amounts to the already 
instituted and functions as a heavily conditioning heritage, it also establishes 
new rules that retrospectively assign such heritage with a meaning it couldn’t 
have had before.121 The second function of instituent praxis ‘is to reveal the 
absolute necessity for a continued instituent activity beyond the inaugural 
act.’122 Dardot and Laval assert that ‘once in place, the instituted tends to 
autonomise itself from the act that put it in place by virtue of an intrinsic inertia 
against which it has to continuously struggle.’123  Thus, instituent praxis 
establishes a new system of rules which it constantly tries to relaunch so as to 
prevent the instituent from being fixed to the instituted: ‘instituent praxis 
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anticipates consciously and from the start the necessity to modify and reinvent 
the instituted which is posited precisely so that it persists and endures.’124  
In Dardot and Laval’s conception of instituent praxis, this function of historicity 
is inextricable from the function of subjectivity. Referring to instituent praxis, 
they suggest that 
it always arises out of something, it is always to be accomplished 
in situ, ‘within’ and ‘out of’ given conditions that it has not 
produced and yet, at the same time, it brings about new 
conditions and thereby accomplishes a true ‘subjectivation’ by 
producing new subjects through the self-alteration of the 
actors.125 
Thus, the production of new subjects through the self-alteration of the actors 
becomes possible in and through the bringing about of new conditions within 
and out of given ones; the function of historicity becomes a common 
denominator for the emergence of new conditions in terms of praxis and the 
concurrent subjectivation.   
Dardot and Laval associate such subjectivation with the ‘emergence of a 
collective subject’ founded on transversality. Guattari articulates his ideas on 
transversality in relation to institutional psychoanalysis or ‘institutional 
therapeutics’ and in this context he draws a distinction between independent 
(or 'subject') groups and 'dependent' groups.126 The former are groups that 
attempt to determine their own behavioural patterns and invent their own 
means of understanding their aims, while the latter are unable to consider their 
own perspective and end up automatically adapting to copied structuring.127 
Transversality is a quality found in groups that tend towards the independent 
type and pertains to the interstices of verticality as hierarchy and horizontality 
as impromptu, instant spontaneity.128 According to Guattari, transversality can 
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be put into practice when different levels of a hierarchy fully communicate with 
one another and importantly, when the communication process reflects and 
involves 'different meanings' – understood as discordant meanings.129  
Transversality and the independent/dependent parameter also relate to the 
group’s preservation. Guattari holds that subject groups can be in a 'position 
of having to bring about their own death' while dependent groups are 
subjugated to 'mechanisms of self-preservation' and survive what they 
perceive as 'external', 'rejecting all possibility of the dialectical enrichment that 
arises from the group's otherness.'130 
In this context, Guattari – perhaps unlike Castoriadis – begins to elucidate the 
participation of the individual in the formation of imaginary significations. 
Referring to group phantasy that operates through symbolic imagery, Guattari 
suggests that 
 individual phantasizing never respects the particular nature of 
this symbolic plane of group phantasy. On the contrary, it tries to 
absorb it, and to overlay it with particular imaginings that are 
“naturally” to be found in the various roles that could be 
structured by using the signifiers circulated by the collective.131 
Guattari holds that the individual imaginary that overlays collective signifiers 
irrespectively of the group phantasy can be responsible for the crystallisation 
and rigidification of the group's structure and prevent potential dialogue with 
anything that could lead to a self-questioning of the group's established 
rules.132 In other words, it makes it possible for the group to relapse into being 
dependent. However, Guattari argues that transversality can catalyse an 
emergent subjectivity that is located in between the collective and the 
individual. Transversality initiates an 'analytic process' by which the individual 
can 'use the group as a mirror'; unless the group is 'alienated' and submitted 
to a distorted self-image, the group can operate as a 'signifying chain' that 
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presents to the individual his/her self-image beyond his/her neurosis or 
psychosis.133   
Dardot and Laval return to this Guattarian legacy which ‘introduces the 
dimension of the unconscious into the group and the dimension of the 
collective into subjectivity’.134 They redress the ‘institutional question’ of ‘how 
to prevent the institution from becoming rigid and closing off in itself’ taking into 
account the function of the death instinct that Guattari refers to in relation to 
the subject-group.135 In other words, Dardot and Laval underline that, in such 
terms, the possibility of the structuralisation and closure of the group or the 
institution can be a corollary of subjectivation and thus an inherent 
characteristic of the group, as opposed to always deriving from factors external 
to the group.136 Through Guattari’s ideas on institutional psychotherapy, 
Dardot and Laval stress the importance of ‘the requirement of differentiation 
and heterogeneity that could accommodate each singularity within the 
collective’s interior’ in tackling the possibility of rigidification and the institution’s 
sclerosis.137 Furthermore, Dardot and Laval draw on Guattari’s distinction 
between ‘groups that receive their law from the outside and groups that claim 
to be based on the assumption of an internal law’ in order to rearticulate the 
institutional question in relation to both language and psychoanalysis 
respectively.138 Regarding the opposition between ‘enunciation’ and language 
as ‘code’, they assert that the dependent or ‘subjugated’ group is ‘petrified 
within language as code[;] it is no longer capable of making a new enunciation 
and it is condemned to repeat the already enunciated.’139 In this light, they 
reframe the institutional question by asking ‘how can a certain structure allow 
a group to make an enunciation capable of disturbing the order of the code 
and at the same time help the group disalienate from the code.’140 In such 
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terms, ‘code’ is understood as the (internal) law of the group, revealing the 
intricate relation between the creation of new significations and rules. In 
psychoanalytic terms, the group’s phantasy or its distorted imagery which is 
‘recounted in an officialised and stereotypical history’ functions as the code 
and thus, ‘the group’s relation to its unconscious’ becomes precisely ‘what can 
help the group escape its own self-closure.’141 Therefore, Dardot and Laval’s 
understanding of transversality as the dimension that allows ‘the group to seize 
the meaning [“sens”] of its praxis and subjectivities to engage in an effective 
transformation’ becomes crucial in addressing the institutional question: ‘the 
collective always has to be related to a praxis through which it can make of 
itself what it is.’142 Importantly, Dardot and Laval’s instituent praxis is conceived 
as a ‘transversal praxis’, through which ‘the enunciation that prevents the 
institution’s self-closure’ can be made.143  
We might thus begin to grasp how the self-production of a collective subject 
takes place essentially in and through the continuous and defined by historicity 
co-production of rules of law, in the sense of the internal law of a subject-group. 
Dardot and Laval side with an alternative definition of institutionalisation that 
they find in the writings of psychoanalyst Jean Oury.144 In their interpretation 
of Oury’s definition, institutionalisation appears as ‘neither the creation of new 
institutions by law – as in [Chaïm] Perelman – nor the officialisation of what 
already unofficially exists as unrecognised, but [as] the permanent reinvention 
of the institution through which the group that created [the institution] can 
counter its own inertia.’145 The rules of law or ‘collective rules’ that instituent 
praxis puts forth are not as rigid as ‘“laws” or “codes”’ and thus, their 
‘permanent reinvention becomes possible in advance.’146 Collective rules are 
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not primarily meant to become official law. Dardot and Laval insist that ‘the 
space open for instituent praxis is situated beyond [or below] state 
legislation.’147 Collective rules are created in and through subjectivation – the 
group’s countering of its own inertia.  
Instituent praxis does not only consist in reforming already existing rules; their 
reinvention implies that the rules bring about new social significations. 
Referring to the ‘recuperations’ or occupations of Brukman and Global 
factories in Argentina (2003 and 2004 respectively) Dardot and Laval maintain 
that the workers-led organisation of work (either through equality of wages and 
direct participation of all workers in the decision-making process, as in the 
Brukman case, or the hierarchical and representational decision-making 
amongst workers in the Global case) faced difficulties that related to the 
organisational heritage that was inevitably carried on by the workforce 
unconsciously or as a reaction against new conditions.148 Specifically, Dardot 
and Laval argue that the new (interior) dynamics of power inequality that both 
cooperative structures entailed – largely due to broader social uncertainty – 
resulted in the intensification of ‘self-sacrifice by task’ whereby the 
perpetuation of the previous culture of ‘fast production’ can be interpreted as 
a reaction to the new conditions.149 According to Dardot and Laval, these 
examples demonstrate that ‘instituent praxis always faces the risk of failing to 
promote new social significations.’150  
In order to understand what such a promotion would amount to in relation to 
instituent praxis it is essential to return to the notion of historicity and the 
necessity of its function within Dardot and Laval’s conceptual construction. 
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Against the backdrop of their initial research question regarding the type of 
praxis that can invent rules of law capable of becoming long-term customs, 
Dardot and Laval consider the relationship between the emergence of new 
significations and rules of use in language.151  
What they seek to explore conceptually is the paradigmatic – and potentially 
extendable to the rest of the ‘social-historical’ realm – quality of language 
through which significations emerge in a self/subject-transformative process 
not as combinations of already existing significations, but as radically new.152 
To this end, they consider and ultimately discard a Wittgensteinian method of 
analysis that makes an analogy between rules of linguistic use and rules in 
play.153 Through an association with play, this analogy would aim to undermine 
the reduction of language to mere calculation, reverberating with the 
aforementioned opposition between enunciation and language as code.154 
However, Dardot and Laval maintain that such analogy oftentimes casts all 
normativity to meaningful/significative linguistic use and assumes that such 
use amounts in essence to ‘indefinitely revisable’ rules (as the case would be 
in play).155 Dardot and Laval’s remark arguably implies that linguistic 
normativity should not be seen as one and the same with linguistic use that 
carries meaning, as though meaningless/senseless linguistic use were by 
definition non-normative (it is not) and as if meaningful linguistic use were a 
positivist, always canon-affirming and thereby ahistorical set of rules. Such 
misconception would exclude the possibility of precisely what Dardot and Laval 
are researching, i.e. the potential for conscious invention of rules that makes 
new significations emerge (through variations of use). 
The authors examine further the pertinence of rules in play to the relationship 
between organisations and institutions, in line with their concern to understand 
the emergence of new significations within the broad realm of the social-
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historical. They identify three overarching institutional/economic approaches. 
The approach of the institutional economy of ‘the Commons’ – adopted, among 
others, by Bernard Chavance – equates institution and organisation; an 
institution amounts to any organised social structure including its 
corresponding rules.156 This approach includes all sorts of social formations 
from the family and the corporation to trade associations and the State.157 A 
second approach that Dardot and Laval identify and attribute to economists 
Douglas C. North and Leonid Hurwizc assimilates the organisations with 
‘players’ and the institutions with the ‘rules’ of the game.158 Finally, the third 
approach credited by Chavance to economists such as Masahiko Aoki, Avner 
Greif, Andrew Schotter and Robert DeYoung regards the institution as an 
equitably-balanced ‘self-sustained system of beliefs that the players share 
about how the game is played.’159 Dardot and Laval consider all three 
approaches to be valuable in that they ‘denaturalise the market and the 
corporation’ by revealing them as ‘institutions of capitalism.’160 At the same 
time, they find the analogy with the game and its rules problematic, in its failure 
to elucidate the ‘creation of institutions.’161 Taking their cue from Chavance, 
they argue that this analogy takes the initial rules of the game for granted 
without considering them in relation to their previous institutional history, as if 
they were ‘purely technical’ and ahistorical.162 
It is particularly interesting to note the grounds on which Dardot and Laval 
consider the approach of the Commons to be inadequate, as far as the 
invention of rules of conduct of organisations or institutions is concerned. The 
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authors argue that the method employed by the institutional economy of the 
Commons replaces a ‘natural selection’ of rules with an ‘artificial’163 one in 
order to overcome the aforementioned problem of the Common Law whereby 
custom is ‘the productive source’ of law.164 Dardot and Laval consider such 
approach to be valuable in that it is grounded neither on spontaneous invention 
of rules nor on always-retrospective recognition, since it amounts to the 
‘selection/formalisation’ of ‘certain customs upon occasions of arbitrage of 
conflicting interests.’165 However, Dardot and Laval assert that, ultimately, it 
fails to escape its grounding on custom and thus remains caught up in the 
aforementioned problem.166 By contrast, their concept of instituent praxis is not 
grounded on custom: it emphasises artificiality over spontaneity or 
naturalness. What is more, as opposed to the aforementioned approaches of 
rules in play, such artificiality is not ahistorical; it takes into account the 
historicity which is found in the production of (the unconscious of) a subjectivity 
in the making. 
Instituent praxis is artificial 
The artificiality of instituent praxis should be strongly emphasised but also 
further elucidated and developed in terms of its connection to the Guattarian 
conceptual legacy of transversality, the production of subjectivity and 
‘autopoiesis’ (self-creation) in terms of (and as I will show, beyond) 
signification.167 Through this connection it becomes possible to navigate 
through and map more fruitfully threads and constellations within an expanded 
field of practices pertaining to diverse social entities such as art 
institutions/organisations, managerial practices, forms of labour, curatorial 
strategies, subjectivity-shaping technological or other machines of 
communication and their points of interrelation or conflict.  
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As Andrew Goffey has observed, Guattari’s psychoanalysis sought to gear the 
relation of the ‘real’ away from the ‘impossible’ and toward the ‘artificial’.168 
Goffey argues that Guattari’s conception of the real as the artificial is not a 
negative proclamation pointed at structural edifices. Rather, it situates the real 
within experimentation and points to the artificial quality of the phantasm of the 
unconscious and historicity qua creation and subjective transformation.169 This 
understanding of the real-as-artificial and the association of its plasticity with 
the subject group or, in Goffey’s words, ‘the unconscious that in the institution 
effects ongoing generative movement of transversality through which 
subjectivity is transformed’ could not be more in line with the operative 
mechanisms of instituent praxis in terms of subjectivity in its own making.170 
Guattari’s artificiality refers to ‘the creative character of the production of 
subjectivity’ and the suggested ‘Unconscious’ is a post-structuralist one, in that 
it goes beyond ‘structure and language’ and is made of multiple and diverse 
components in a process of autopoiesis – a ‘reappropriation […] of the means 
of production of subjectivity.’171 Guattari advocates for a ‘co-management’ of 
this autopoietic process which is an urge that despite its ambiguous 
terminological indications aims at opposing ‘attitudes of authority’ in 
psychoanalysis, from unifying schemata dominated by ‘cut, lack or suture’172 
to objective/scientific models.173 
From new significations to the ‘machinic assemblage of 
enunciation’174 
In promoting the creation of new significations, we need to also problematise 
the epistemology and internal power relations of signification itself and further 
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examine the fluid architecture and economics of the artificiality of 
subjectivation that are arguably focal to the current historical moment. I would 
suggest that Dardot and Laval’s conception of creation of significations as 
entirely new (albeit cum and ex aliquo) should be further expanded through 
the Guattarian system of enunciation that point toward the multiple creative 
and autopoietic registers among signifying as well as ‘a-signifying’ elements.175 
Guattari warns of the reduction of the ‘a-signifying economy of language’ to 
the ‘linguistic, significational’ one while suggesting that the production of 
subjectivity entails ‘a-signifying semiological dimensions that trigger 
informational sign machines, and that function in parallel or independently of 
the fact that they produce and convey significations and denotations, and thus 
escape from strictly linguistic axiomatics.’176 Guattari is essentially rejecting 
what he sees as the ‘structuralist’ enforcement of a relationship of dependence 
between the realm of the ‘psyche’ and the ‘linguistic signifier’, whereby the 
latter is always granted with ‘primacy’ over the former.177 He renounces 
Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis in that it reduces psychoanalytic events to 
the function of the structuralist signifier, which thereby overdetermines the self-
creative ontological modalities within such events: ‘The structure, here, 
precedes and envelops the machine in an operation that strips it of all its 
autopoietic and creative characteristics. The symbolic order weighs down like 
a deterministic lead cape, like a deathly fate, on the possible bifurcations of 
incorporeal Universes.’178 Referring to the ‘Lacanian signifier,’ Guattari writes: 
‘Its fundamental linearity, inherited from Saussurian structuralism, does not 
allow it to apprehend the pathic, non discursive, autopoietic character of partial 
nuclei of enunciation.’179 Guattari here refers to the Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
linguistic and semiotic tradition of structuralism which he sees as entirely active 
in Lacan’s psychoanalysis: ‘Structuralists have been content to erect the 
Signifier as a category unifying all expressive economies: language, the icon, 
                                                          
175 Ibid., 36. 
176 Ibid., 4-5. 
177 Ibid., 5. 
178 Ibid., 74. Also see Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 
1977), 103-4. 
179 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 72.  




gesture, urbanism or the cinema, etc.’180 For Guattari, ‘the structuralist signifier 
is always synonymous with linear discursivity’ and it is the predominance of 
such linearity that he problematises and complicates.  
He posits in particular a ‘schizoanalytical perspective’ whereby ‘forms of 
semiological, semiotic and coded linearity’ are further diversified and thus the 
aforementioned binary relationship of dependence can be seen as 
overthrown.181 For instance, in a merely indicative assemblage of diverse 
registers of linearity, Guattari refers to  
the semiological linearity of the structural signifier which imposes 
itself despotically over all the other modes of semiotisation, 
expropriates them and even tends to make them disappear 
within the framework of a communicational economy dominated 
by informatics (please note: informatics in its current state [1993], 
since this state of things is in no way definitive) 
as well as ‘the superlinearity of a-signifying substances of expression, where 
the signifier loses its despotism’ such as the ‘dynamic polymorphism’ of 
‘hypertexts.’182 Guattari understands ‘a-signifying semiotics’ as ‘figures of 
expression that might be qualified as "non-human" (such as equations and 
plans which enunciate the machine and make it act in a diagrammatic capacity 
on technical and experimental apparatuses)’ independently ‘of the quantity of 
significations they convey.’183 This is where Guattari grounds his concept of 
the ‘a-signifying semiotic machine’, examples of which are the ‘credit card 
number’ as much as ‘the pentatonic musical refrain’, since apart from 
producing significations, both semiotic machines ‘activate the “bringing into 
being” of ontological Universes’ and thus work against the reduction of 
‘ontological polyvocality’184 by the structuralist signifier.185 Guattari suggests 
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that the credit card number is a sequence of semiotic parts but also an activator 
of ‘material machinic processes’ as soon as it interacts with technological 
machines.186 Relatedly, the pentatonic refrain ‘catalyses the Debussyst 
constellation of multiple Universes’ including the ‘Wagnerian Universe 
surrounding Parsifal,’ the ‘Universe of Gregorian chant,’ the work of Chopin, 
the ‘Javanese music Debussy discovered at the Universal Exposition of 1889’ 
and ‘the world of Manet and Mallarme, which is associated with Debussy's stay 
at the Villa Medicis.’187  
In order to better grasp the concept of the a-signifying semiotic machine we 
need to approach it through its direct relation to machinic or ‘partial 
subjectivity.’188 Through the latter concept Guattari develops his previous ideas 
on the subject-group into a version of subjectivity which is ‘pre-personal, 
polyphonic, collective and machinic.’189 This concept of subjectivity expands 
Dardot and Laval’s Guattarian register of collective subjectivity in relation to 
instituent praxis. Partial subjectivity is collective, not only in pertaining to social 
groups or entities, but also in its association with the pre-personal or the 
‘pathic’ – as the trans-subjective empathy frequently encountered in ‘infancy 
and psychosis’ and situated before the ‘discursive, subject-object relation’.190 
Guattari also connects the production of partial subjectivity with a non-human 
aspect in terms of ‘the large-scale social machines of language and the mass 
media – which cannot be described as human.’191 Such conception of 
subjectivity is inextricable from its machinic element, which denotes 
subjectivity’s positioning ‘before and alongside the subject-object relation’, its 
‘collective character’, the multiplicity and diversity of its components that 
include ‘incorporeal dimensions.’192 Crucially, Guattari does not equate the 
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machinic element with the technological or the technical nor does he use it to 
merely make a social metaphor: ‘We should bear in mind that there is a 
machinic essence which will incarnate itself in a technical machine, and 
equally in the social and cognitive environment connected to this machine – 
social groups are also machines, the body is a machine, there are scientific, 
theoretical and information machines.’193 Hence, he refers to ‘abstract 
machines’ or ‘machinic assemblages’ that not only consist of ‘heterogeneous 
components’ but also ‘heterogenise’ these components ‘beyond any unifying 
trait and according to a principle of irreversibility, singularity and necessity.’194 
Some indicative components include matter and energy, ‘semiotic, 
diagrammatic and algorithmic components’, ‘individual and collective mental 
representations and information’ as well as ‘investments of desiring machines 
producing a subjectivity adjacent to these components.’195 The abstract quality 
of the machinic assemblage is essentially a transversal one in the sense of 
involving heterogeneous components without ‘any notion of bond passage or 
anastomosis’ or of a ‘generic or species’ relation.’196 Thus, the diverse 
machinic components maintain their diversity even though they remain parts 
of the same machine and without necessarily being reducible to a commonality 
based on a species relation or other form of generic relation.  
More broadly, the two key notions that run through the Guattarian conceptual 
framework of machinic assemblages and partial subjectivity are autopoiesis 
and ‘heterogenesis’.197 Machinic assemblages are essentially autopoietic and 
heterogenetic. Autopoiesis as a term expands the notion of self-creation and 
production of subjectivity into the terrains of the a-signifying and the machinic 
in accordance with the aforementioned traits of partial subjectivity. 
Heterogenesis brings into play alterity and ‘alterification’ in the sense of, first, 
the disruption of the structuralist relation of the representational signifier as 
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attached to particular types of subjects and second, unlimited incorporeal 
‘Universes of virtuality’ or ‘ontogenetic’ Universes.198 These ‘constellations of 
Universes’ are not ‘Universals’: ‘The fact that they are tied into singular 
existential Territories effectively confers upon them a power of heterogenesis, 
that is, of opening onto singularising, irreversible processes of necessary 
differentiation.’199 Guattari suggests that ‘[m]achinic interfaces are 
heterogenetic; they summon the alterity of the points of view we might have 
on them and, as a consequence, on the systems of metamodelisation which 
allow us to account, in one way or another, for the fundamentally inaccessible 
character of their autopoietic nuclei.’200 Thus, machinic heterogenesis pertains 
to the infinite generating of diverse and multiple ontology and virtuality that 
approximates an accounting for the inaccessibility of machinic autopoiesis, an 
inaccessibility that becomes evident if the machinic assemblage is thought of 
as proto-subjective, incorporeal, virtual, and – for that matter – autopoietic, 
rather than a (purely) technical or technological structure that executes orders. 
For Guattari, even a wall constitutes a ‘proto-machine’ that manifests ‘virtual 
polarities, an inside and outside, an above and below, a right and left ...’, 
contrary, however, to ‘a heap of stones’ which interestingly is not a machinic 
assemblage.201 
It is in this context that Guattari’s focus on enunciation must be examined. For 
Guattari, ‘concrete and abstract’202 machines possess a ‘singular power of 
enunciation’.203 Machinic assemblages are essentially enunciative. 
Enunciation pertains to the a-signifying as it does not concern itself with 
signification, but also goes beyond semiotics. It nods to ‘the emergence of a 
logic of non-discursive intensities’ and the ‘pathic incorporation-agglomeration’ 
of the pre-personal, polyphonic, collective and machinic elements of partial 
subjectivity.204 Guattari emphasises enunciation in order to shift the focus from 
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‘human individuation’ and reject universalising psychoanalytic models.205 
Instead of the traditional conception of the subject ‘as the ultimate essence of 
individuation’ and ‘as a pure, empty, prereflexive apprehension of the world,’ 
Guattari’s conception of subjectivity aims at focusing on ‘the founding instance 
of intentionality’ by starting from ‘the middle’ of the subject-object relation and 
‘foregrounding the expressive instance.’206 This different departure point is 
inextricable from Guattari’s postulation of reversibility between the categories 
of ‘Content’ and ‘Expression’, which have traditionally been opposed in a 
sacrosanct polarity, since ‘[c]ontent participates in subjectivity by giving 
consistency to the ontological quality of Expression.’207 Guattari rejects this 
polarity and places the focus on enunciation in an effort to promote and expand 
the ‘substance of Expression’ from ‘semiology and semiotics’ to ‘extra-
linguistic, non-human, biological, technological, aesthetic’ fields.208  
In this context, Guattari identifies a process by which enunciation appropriates 
aesthetic form through ‘the autonomisation of cognitive or ethical content and 
the realisation of this content in an aesthetic object.’209 This process is also 
encountered in the ‘transference of subjectivation’ between the creator and the 
consumer of a work of art (a transference that elaborates further on the avant-
garde workings mentioned in Chapter 1); ‘aesthetic form’ is employed in such 
a way that renders the ‘expressive material’ ‘formally creative’ while the work’s 
content breaks from its usual cognitive and aesthetic ‘connotations’ and forces 
the creator almost telepathically into producing a ‘mode of aesthetic 
enunciation.’210  
Considering this in relation to the readymade, a different reading of the 
Duchampian avant-garde might be attempted, one that takes the subversion 
of artistic authorship one step further than the mere postulation of art 
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production as something that could be or is pursued by anyone. As per Foster, 
the readymade could be seen as carrying multiple other functions than 
Duchamp’s allegedly pre-determined intention to sublate art and life. A 
Guattarian interpretation would hold that artistic authorship should be seen in 
the context of a partial subjectivity whereby the expressive instance is being 
foregrounded in a framework of enunciation. This reading would also go 
beyond the generalising and simplifying Bürgerian account according to which 
the work’s (social and political pre-destined by the author) content is being 
neutralised by being accepted as a work of art, as if the content could suddenly 
do away with its aesthetic connotations and as if its aesthetic connotations can 
simply be imposed on it externally. The anti-aesthetic intention does away with 
aesthetics as much as the duality of content and expression remains a clean-
cut antithesis. Rather, the work of art is inscribed in a complex system of 
multiple subjectivations that go well beyond the (intention of) the author: they 
involve the creation of form by the material and are able to bring about new 
modes of aesthetic enunciation attached to a framework of machinic 
enunciative assemblages of partial subjectivity. Referring to the a-signifying 
semiotic machine of the pentatonic musical refrain and the Universes 
generated by it, Guattari claims that ‘there is no bi-univocal correspondence 
between linear signifying links or archi-writing, depending on the author, and 
this multireferential, multidimensional machinic catalysis.’211 Thus, the 
conceptual grid comprising the creation of new significations, aesthetic objects 
and artistic authorship as human individuation could be rethought within a 
machinic, a-signifying context through the overriding concept of enunciation 
that pertains to machinic assemblages, pathic and partial subjectivity.  
Transitional remarks/ Outro 
In this chapter, I have suggested that what is particular about the institution 
has to do with deontic powers as power relations, rights, obligations and 
collectively accepted systems of rules, which do not necessarily relate with 
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official regulation: they can be constitutive rather than regulative. I have 
asserted that this definition needs to be politically and historically 
contextualised and I have proposed instituent praxis as reflecting the political 
ontology of institution in a more theoretically sustained fashion than previous 
articulations. The relation of Raunig’s instituent practices to constituent power 
remains ambivalent and seems to prioritise such power over the concept of 
the instituent in terms of aspects of subjectivity. I have argued that Hardt and 
Negri’s theory of constituent power that always strives not to become 
sovereign power as constituted power understands institutions predominantly 
as arbiters of continuity, normality and representation rather than conflictual or 
creative processes. The latter aspects are assigned to singularities and their 
instantiations of constituent power. I have concurred with Dardot and Laval’s 
skepticism towards the necessity and efficiency of the concept of constituent 
power, not least as it tends to exhaust itself in particular heterogeneous 
practices while remaining caught up in the political and philosophical tradition 
of constitutions.  
Instituent praxis differs from constituent/explicit power in that it does not seek 
to legitimise a sovereign will (against the will of a ruling power). Instituent praxis 
produces its own proper, non-pre-existing subject in and through the creation 
of new significations that aspire to become constitutive rules rather than or 
before official legislation. Instituent praxis differs from instituent power (or 
ground-power) in that it is a conscious praxis which involves subjectivity, even 
if the unconscious is active and present. Historicity and subjectivity are 
imbricated in the creation of the new, which is conditioned by the past but not 
caused by it. This relation in its pertinence to the production of subjectivity and 
signification is expanded in a Guattarian framework of machinic assemblages 
of enunciation. Subjectivity is understood as machinic, pre-personal, 
nonhuman, pathic and collective and enunciation crucially involves 
asignification. 
In their attempt to draw on Guattari’s early psychoanalytical writings where the 
institutional register is relatively more present than his later writings, Dardot 
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and Laval do not go beyond the subject-group as the terminological vehicle for 
the transformation of subjectivity. However, in a context that aims at gearing 
this discussion toward an expanded field of sensible and legible forms – from 
all sorts of media and platforms to all sorts of creative, cultural and discursive 
forms of production, organisation and distribution, Guattari’s ‘enunciative 
assemblages’ that crucially include ‘machinic’ ones are arguably more 
pertinent. In other words, the operative mechanisms of subject-groups in terms 
of transformation of subjectivity could be thought of as directly transferable to 
enunciative assemblages. My aim here is to suggest that the perimeter for the 
appropriate terrains for transforming subjectivities and thus instituent praxis 
extends along not only rational or normative human discursive or social 
constructions but also what Sven Lütticken has called ‘proto-legible’ elements 
or signs (such as data).212 This involves both human language as enunciation 
and language as code as well as algorithmic language, code and adjacent 
infrastructure (such as software). Lütticken has theorised the visible in its 
distinction from the visual and as pertaining to the ‘proto-legible,’ ‘the world of 
the cliché,’ ‘iconology’, ‘semiotics,’ and ‘the code.’ I examine such aspects 
further in Chapters 3 and 6. 
The Guattarian framework permits a theorisation of such terrains in their 
conjunction with ‘ethico-aesthetic’ axes despite their distinct disciplinary 
epistemological frameworks (e.g. discursive, linguistic, aesthetic, 
administrative, engineering/programming, financial).213 Goffey has aptly read 
the core of this relation in Guattari: 
This framing of the institution as a sort of modelling clay is an 
idea that has strong aesthetic resonances. It is perhaps as much 
in terms of Guattari’s thinking about the institution, as in the 
context of any reference to contemporary art, that Guattari’s later 
invocation of an ‘ethico-aesthetic paradigm’ should be 
understood.214 
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I want to suggest that while Guattari theorises the artificial and creative 
subjectivation and relates it to desire-production, instituent praxis complicates 
such artificiality by understanding it in conjunction with the parameter of the 
co-production of rules of law as new significations. To this end, the aspect of 
instituent praxis that pertains to the invention of rules of law should in turn be 
examined in its porosity with various axes such as the signifying/a-signifying, 
the non-discursive, the pre-verbal/pre-personal, the non-human, the proto-
subjective and the machinic. Only then will we be able to trace the intricate and 
diverse reach of the potential of instituent praxis relating to the transversal 
remit of the production of subjectivity. This methodological decision aims at 
employing the Guattarian legacy against the purely positivist or scientific echo 
that might be sensed in the proposition of the creation of new significations as 
co-production of rules of law. In other words, the aim of this proposition is not 
– or should not – be something that can be resolved in a meeting or concluded 
by a research project. The recent introduction of the GDPR legal framework 
reveals that a positivist/liberal approach addressing the issue of consent to the 
various uses of personal data by private corporations and by introducing the 
option to opt out is ultimately almost inconsequential to the appropriation of the 
pathic and the a-signifying aspects of subjectivity.  
What Guattari might have not been able to fully historicise in the beginning of 
the 1990s is the imperceptible, perhaps unconscious but certainly thorough 
austerity through which the potential of collective subjectivity and desire-
production, especially in its most pathic, machinic and heterogeneous 
enunciative instances, has been channeled by the twenty-first century global 
monopolies of information technology and infotainment. In an era when the 
emergence of technological networks that would allow a peer-to-peer and from 
the bottom production and dissemination of information and indeed knowledge 
still loomed plausible, speculation on the aftermath of global mass media 
would reasonably point towards a redistribution of the means of the production 
of subjectivity, one that would enhance rather than weaken autopoiesis and 
heterogenesis. However, the terms and conditions of the creation of new 
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significations and artificiality are currently entirely managed if not created by 
private/corporate power-asymmetrical algorithmic structures whose precise 
workings remain largely in obscurity but their overarching workings are profit-
driven. Arguably, this monopolisation of artificiality, a-signifying semiotics and 
enunciative assemblages of desire-production indicates that subjectivity is not 
simply overshadowed by the structuralist/capitalist ‘Signifier’ as Guattari would 
suggest.215 Guattari has posed the key question: 
How does this machinic heterogenesis, which differentiates each 
colour of being – which makes, for example, from the plane of 
consistency of a philosophical concept a world quite different 
from the plane of reference of the scientific function or the plane 
of aesthetic composition – end up being reduced to the 
capitalistic homogenesis of generalised equivalence, which 
leads to all values being valued by the same thing, all 
appropriative territories being related to the same economic 
instrument of power, and all existential riches succumbing to 
clutches of exchange value?216  
The a-signifying realm of subjectivity is currently trapped in a paradoxical 
condition which exacerbates what Guattari might have thought of as the 
complex and systematic obfuscation of a-signifying ontogenetic instances. 
Arguably, such condition silently promotes the significance and hyperactivity 
of the a-signifying and the pathic while having entirely eroded the core 
mechanisms of autopoiesis and heterogenesis. 
Put differently, the means of reappropriating the production of subjectivity are 
now on offer but their high level of pre-standardisation precludes the essential 
heterogenetic operations of ‘alterity’ or ‘alterification’ from the subjectivation 
process by only allowing them as exclusive marketable services. The 
ontologically creative mechanisms of heterogenesis are precluded; creation or 
artificiality operate within – but predominantly for – the homogenising 
equivalence of private profit and property, even as they accommodate 
difference and heterogeneity. Instituent praxis then would understand that 
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there is no inherent unappropriability amid heterogeneous ontological planes, 
given precisely the severe limitation of heterogenetic ontology. The challenge 
for such praxis would be to claim the institution of unappropriability from 
homogenising forces. The employment of the Guattarian legacy in order to not 
only apprehend instituent praxis but also to differentiate it from positivist 
scientific approaches does not constitute any form of resolution to the current 
conundrum of artificiality. A preliminary intention is to analyse its economics 
(i.e. its distributive conditions) that might perhaps allow for speculation on 
potential alternatives. Chapter 3 charts possible coordinates within such 
























































3. The ‘Back Office’ of the Instituent: Infrastructure, 
Desiring Machines and the Economics of Artificiality 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the spectrum of strategies and practices where 
instituent praxis could begin to unfold focusing on a variety of areas, starting 
from art-institutional ones. The analysis will delve into theoretical propositions 
and tensions that have been lingering in the art-related bibliographical 
constituency of the instituent and, aware of such tensions, it will test out 
theoretical reconciliations within extended fields of practice. I turn to the logic 
of the instituent in its relation to (institutional) exit, relations in the workplace, 
management and organisation, filtered through subjectivity and creation. I also 
attempt some connections between the conceptual remit of instituent praxis 
and some of the urgencies of today’s techno-capitalism – for instance, through 
the constitutive relation between desire and code, the channelling or the 
management of visibility and alternative takes on infrastructure in order to 
examine and speculate on an economics of artificiality.  
Reclaiming existing institutions /Re-thinking exit 
In the discourse that intersects art and the institution, there have been some 
critics who, while speaking from relatively diverse positions, have assertively 
argued against abandoning or withdrawing from existing institutions and 
strongly urged towards some form of ‘reclaiming’ extant structures. Mouffe 
schematically associates the post-Operaist tradition of thought with the political 
concept of ‘exodus’ as a clear standpoint of ‘withdrawal’ from existing 
institutions such as the State and state-relevant institutions, such as parties 
and trade unions.1 From this perspective, as Mouffe argues, ‘power organized 
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around the Nation State and representative democracy’ has become 
‘irrelevant’ to the political currency of the post-Fordist, advanced capitalist era 
whereby all the political potential is to be found in the ‘immaterial labour’ aiming 
at ‘the production of new subjectivities and the elaboration of new worlds that 
would create the conditions for the self-organization of the multitude’.2 The 
multitude’s common denominator would be the ‘general intellect’ which 
translates into ‘perception, language, memory and feelings’ and pervades 
‘contemporary production’.3 For its self-organisation and in order to achieve 
forms of more immediate democracy, the multitude would have to free itself 
from ‘all forms of belonging’ by getting rid of ‘institutional attachments’.4 In the 
context of art and culture, Mouffe identifies the ‘exodus’ viewpoint with a 
‘strategy of withdrawal’ from museums and artistic institutions.5 Her counter-
argument is an ‘engagement with institutions’ based on her general view that 
‘every order is the expression of a particular structure of power relations’ and 
that ‘what is at a given moment accepted as the “natural order” is always the 
result of sedimented hegemonic practices’.6 For Mouffe, no literal or symbolic 
space or institution is exempt from the sedimentation of a hegemonic order 
and therefore, the potential for ‘counter-hegemonic practices’ could and should 
be pursued within all institutions – including traditional ones such as the State 
or the museum: ‘instead of celebrating the destruction of all institutions as a 
move towards liberation, the task for radical politics is to engage with them, 
developing their progressive potential and converting them into sites of 
opposition to the neoliberal market hegemony.’7 
It should be noted, however, that Mouffe is not arguing for a purely institutional 
politics as she asserts that ‘agonistic spaces’, the spaces where the counter-
hegemonic struggle can take place, ‘can emerge both inside and outside 
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institutions.’8 Despite what a dichotomy between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of 
institutions might at first glance suggest, Mouffe’s theory places the institution 
at an abstract and contingent level. She acknowledges that ‘society is always 
politically instituted and what is called “the social” is the realm of sedimented 
political practices, practices that conceal the originary acts of their contingent 
political institution’.9 Beyond the specificity of an art space or a stagnant set of 
relations such as the State, institution here is clearly understood as the process 
that institutes politically. However, Mouffe does not touch upon the creation or 
initiation of such a process. The concept of ‘agonistics’ – the strong point of 
her theory – that rests upon her thesis that ‘things could always have been 
otherwise and every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities’ 
does not elucidate the birth of new or ‘other’ possibilities.10 The assertion of 
the conflictual and the need for counter-struggles does not reveal much about 
whether the ‘counter’-options already exist (even marginally) at a given 
moment or have to be created anew. Importantly, the way such a creation 
comes about and pertains to an institutional contingency remains a blank spot 
within Mouffe’s account. This lack in Mouffe’s theory (as well as other theories 
that argue for engagement with existing institutions) is what has necessitated 
the examination of theories of ‘instituting’ which tend to accentuate exodus or 
withdrawal as crucial to instituting anew in the greatest distance possible from 
existing institutional conditions. However, these come with shortcomings too 
as they often equate exodus or withdrawal with de-institutionalisation-in-action 
whereas for autonomist theorists, such as Paolo Virno, exodus (or exit) is 
formulated as a political concept that aspires to transgress dialectical 
schemata or oppositional dead-end binaries.11 Therefore, at least in terms of 
strategy, Mouffe’s theory is valuable in that it sees a relatively broader 
perimeter whereby the political potential of the institution could (also, 
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potentially) be acted out; a perimeter that encompasses spaces both inside 
and outside specific institutions.  
Another critic who sides with the non-
abandonment of existing institution(s) 
through a multiplicity of micro-arguments 
is Mark Fisher. Fisher’s general thesis is 
that the Left should aspire to be 
hegemonic and be in a position to 
‘manage and control things’, as opposed 
to being a permanent opposition to ‘neo-
liberalism’.12 In this respect, he rejects 
what he calls ‘neo-anarchism’, the political 
tendency that claims the downfall of 
political parties and trade unions while it 
embraces ‘the self-organising and 
horizontal dynamics of the network 
against what it characterises as 
oppressive (and obsolete) hierarchical 
structures’.13 Neo-anarchism is associated with ‘direct action’ or, in other 
words, tactics, such as the symbolic destruction of property, awkwardly caught 
up in-between ‘protest’, that ‘presupposes a big Other, a commanding 
authority, who can hear the protest and respond to its demands’ and 
‘prefiguration’, that ‘is supposed to do away with authority, to abandon 
demands, and immediately enact a new set of social relations’.14  
Fisher seems not only skeptical towards such ambivalent action but also 
towards the politics of prefiguration in general. For Fisher, prefiguration entails 
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anticipation of ‘future forms of (post-hierarchical) political organization’ beyond 
the State and mass media.15 Such politics involve a ‘contagious withdrawal 
from the structures of the State, capital and the media, which will spread 
through lateral networks,’ and each movement-bearer of such politics would 
need to ‘constitute itself as an immediately effective collectivity’.16 Against such 
a perspective and the historical inefficacy of ‘immediacy, spontaneity and 
authentic experience’, Fisher suggests shifting the focus towards ‘the (virtual 
and actual) infrastructures necessary for sustained social transformation’.17 He 
asserts that ‘systemic change necessarily entails action at a distance, since it 
requires shifts in economic organization, hegemony, ideology, infrastructure, 
as well as the practices of everyday life’.18 Therefore, ‘indirect action’ is crucial 
for Fisher, given that capitalism is only experienced indirectly and abstractly.19 
Indirect action targeting ‘the hegemonic and ideological infrastructures that 
frame what is experienced as reality’ is, according to Fisher, what an anti-
capitalist Left should be aiming at.20 He also argues that although 
authoritarianism should be opposed, it should not be misinterpreted as 
authority, which is necessary for the Left to achieve systemic change.21 For 
him, withdrawal has merely operated preemptively to the Left’s defeat.22  
In such context, Fisher has suggested that we should operate ‘with and 
against’ existing neo-liberal institutions, positing even that ‘the space for the 
Left is […] especially art institutions’ as ‘this is where new ideas on the Left get 
circulated’.23 He has urged workers of neo-liberal art institutions to abandon 
self-loathing or complacency and actively engage in transforming them.24 
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Relatedly, he has noted that (in a UK context) ‘clearly nothing has replaced 
what trade unions once did in terms of positing the workplace as a terrain of 
struggle’.25 This is essentially a double prompt towards the direct re-
politicisation of the workplace and the ‘transformation of older bodies such as 
trade unions’.26 The re-politicisation of the workplace could arguably amount 
to a reframing of work issues as political in a reminder that politics exists within 
work and not simply in designated public (or domestic) spaces, online or offline 
media and spaces of political representation. At the same time, it could be 
understood as a nod to widespread feminist, post-Operaist and other 
viewpoints that recognise the workplace as extending into unpaid work at 
home (for example, domestic or care labour) and the internet (use of social 
media). Such reframing of work issues should be tactical and register 
vernacular, discursive and official terms, so that it can act against the 
personified and individualistic and hierarchical treatment of political issues 
within work. In other words, only through the realisation that individual workers’ 
issues could and should be commonly addressed and are therefore political 
could the re-politicisation of the workplace begin to take place against all forms 
of subsumption.  
In relation to Fisher’s suggested transformation of trade unions, new visions 
and strategic thinking would be required and, to this end, proposals are 
traceable within art production. For instance, artist and designer Tee Byford’s 
project The Social Mining Union explicitly aims at formulating a new imaginary 
around unions through his artistic mining within the infrastructure of Glencore 
– a multinational commodity trading and mining company.27 His preoccupation 
with Glencore permits him to address the shifts from the type of labour 
communities that developed in the paternalist and place-based context of 
industrial-era large-scale companies to the current state of unions within global 
capitalism. In Régine Debatty’s blog ‘we-make-money-not-art.com’ Byford 
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claims that unions in the mining industry are currently weakened and lacking 
a sense of community. His practice experiments with symbolic action which 
could arguably be plausibly incorporated in a re-imagined union action. Byford 
exchanged found scrap metal material at South London scrapyards for money 
with which he bought one Glencore share. In May 2014, he managed to 
infiltrate Glencore’s annual general meeting in Switzerland disguising himself 
as a major shareholder and raising the issue of fairer social and environmental 
policies in a Questions and Answers session. Through his practice, he 
proposed an alternative mapping of production [fig.1], which considers the 
cultural and financial value of the share as well as the cycle of use and waste 
in ways that might open up possibilities for the recalibration of existing 
structures of labour organisation and unionisation within the industry. 
Far from discarding the tactical assets of ‘neoliberal managerialism’, Fisher 
promotes the combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘decentralized’ approaches in and 
through the ‘invention of new kinds of institutions’ as well as the transformation 
of existing ones.28 In other words, vibrant and horizontal modes of protest such 
as Occupy (that aim at public realms and spaces as free from hierarchy) need 
to act in alignment with and ultimately renew political action in and through the 
broadly-defined workplace. Such propositions assert the potential of a 
strategic combination between the reclaiming of existing institutional 
structures, their transformation and the invention of new ones. To what extent 
is this merely reformist, pro-establishment or, simply put, too traditionally 
institutional? I would argue that in practice and in terms of the institution, 
Mouffe and Fisher do not have to constitute an opposite front to the autonomist 
one – the two fronts being very schematically and reductively assumed here 
only for the purposes of this particular argument. Considering the 
aforementioned clarification in relation to the concept of exodus, it could be 
argued that Virno would not suggest a pure withdrawal from all existing 
institutions. This is not simply due to the implausibility of such suggestion, but 
                                                          
28 Fisher, ‘Indirect Action,’ 111, 113. 
134 
 
also because, according to him, the concept of exodus or ‘exit’ has a specific 
function: 
[I]t modifies the context within which a problem has arisen, rather 
than facing this problem by opting for one or the other of the 
provided alternatives. In short, exit consists of unrestrained 
invention which alters the rules of the game and throws the 
adversary completely off balance.29  
In this respect, exodus or exit would not seem so different to the 
transformational reclaiming and the simultaneous invention of the new that 
Fisher ultimately suggests, at least insofar as the institution is concerned. It 
should be noted that Hardt and Negri’s post-operaist approach falls short of 
such transformational conception. This is because even though they regard 
institutions as involving conflict, the institutional function is ultimately 
safeguarding the perpetuation and protection of norms and obligations. 
Mouffe has elaborated on the practical application of her theoretical 
propositions in the context of art institutions. Specifically, she refers to the 
examples of the Museu d’ Art Contemporani de Barcelona (MACBA) as well 
as ‘L’ Internationale’, a ‘confederation’ of seven European art institutions that 
includes MACBA , Moderna Galerija in Slovenia, Muzeum Sztuki Nowoczesnej 
w Warszawie in Poland, Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía 
(MNCARS) in Spain, the Van Abbemuseum in the Netherlands, the Museum 
van Hedendaagse Kunst Antwerpen (MuHKA) in Belgium and SALT in Turkey. 
In relation to MACBA, she argues that from 2000 to 2008 under the direction 
of Manuel Borja-Villel the museum countered dominant cultural narratives and 
practices and aligned itself with ‘new social movements’.30 Mouffe stresses the 
fact that the museum developed ‘projects of critical pedagogy’ which upheld 
the ‘educational role’ of the institution and its significance ‘as a constituent part 
of the public sphere’.31 She also mentions specific parts of the programming 
that were based on the collaboration of ‘artist collectives and social 
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movements’, brought to the forefront marginal cultural facets of modernity, 
experimented with new and process-based exhibition formats and interacted 
with the city or other social forces.32 Mouffe also praises the long-term 
collaboration between the art institutions that take part in L’Internationale 
network, which promotes the sharing of resources, ‘collections and archives’ 
towards challenging ‘dominant narratives in the art world’ and building ‘new 
plural’ ones.33  
Indeed, MACBA experiments with its role as an institution largely through a 
participatory or community-conscious programming that welcomes and 
encourages political debate while it challenges dominant (art)institutional 
formats. Its incorporation of critical pedagogy testifies both to the broadening 
of its function as an institution and the challenging of hegemonic knowledge 
structures. Jorge Ribalta has referred to pedagogically and socially responsive 
institutional experimentation at MACBA in the period 2000-2008 as ‘New 
Institutionality.’34 L’Internationale’s goal and vision reflects a similar contesting 
of dominant institutional patterns in the art world whereby the most powerful 
players are private galleries and collectors, auction houses or at best mega-
institutions such as the Tate (nominally a public institution as it is privately 
funded by 70%).35 The confederation’s mission suggests that ‘art and its 
institutions have the power to question and challenge their own specific 
systems, as well as the formal structures of institutions in general, and to be 
an appropriate platform for the discussion of a renewed social contract.’36 One 
of the main research threads of L’Internationale’s research platform is 
dedicated to ‘Alter Institutionality’ that aims at rethinking institutions.37 It is also 
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worth noting that the confederation’s name refers to the homonymous left-wing 
anthem adopted by the Second International (1889-1916) and associated with 
the historical workers’ movements of Internationals. Such activity by art 
institutions is valuable in terms of experimentation with institutional form. It is 
further discussed in subsequent chapters in relation to case studies that 
arguably complicate further the typical understandings of the art institution as 
such. Yet, it is important to note that Mouffe’s (and Fisher’s) theoretical 
propositions are extendable to a broader terrain than the programming or 
curatorial decision-making of art institutions. In fact, it is vital that the 
countering of dominant neoliberal art-world narratives be not confined to these 
fields but extend into the institution’s labour conditions which, in turn, reflect its 
organisational process in terms of management. As Andrea Phillips notes 
insightfully, the ‘front’ of the institution needs to meet the ‘back’ of the institution 
in order to tackle the schizoid, albeit pervasive, situation whereby even the 
most left-leaning (in terms of programming and espoused discourse) art 
institutions are run on precarious and oppressive work conditions.38 In order to 
dissolve the practical incompatibilities between occupying and unionising and 
aim at strategies that preserve the strengths of both, it is worth exploring 
whether or how instituent praxis could be associated with a mapping that goes 
beyond the fixation on the impossibility of a non-hierarchical utopia. Such 
praxis would preserve the democratic mode as a claim to the nemein that 
founds but also invents the communal nomos, through autopoiesis and 
heterogenesis. This would be an exploration that seeks the instituent both 
within and beyond the specific institutions, organisational entities and cultural 
practices that fall within the examined terrain.  
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The back office: points of encounter between labour, 
management, creation and subjectivity 
The preoccupation with art institutions in political-theoretical propositions such 
as Mouffe’s and Fisher’s reveals the urgency to consider the entanglements 
between management, labour and the institution. This becomes more evident 
in light of research into the topic of management as well as aspects of 
infrastructure within a curatorial and visual culture context. The need to 
examine the role of management and its relation to labour within art institutions 
has been strongly argued by Andrea Phillips who suggests that the various 
‘managerial and administrative structures […] imbricate certain politics within 
the ways we work together’.39 Unlike political discourse in the context of art 
institutions that would consider managerial or administrative issues either of a 
secondary nature or tools in the service of the bureaucracy of neoliberalism, 
Phillips suggests that these are key areas that should be reclaimed and 
regarded at least as equally important as the content – or, I would add, the 
format – of exhibitions and other programming: 
[…] What I am interested in is the managerial and organisational 
change that embeds political equality within an institution itself. 
This necessitates a more humble and administrative turn / 
approach in which the aesthetic is placed on lateral terms with 
the more mundane opening up of facilities and capacities, for 
example the negotiation of equality of pay, freedom of speech, 
of market transparency within the institution’s workforce itself 
and towards its public.40 
Phillips is, crucially, suggesting that such a shift within art institutions could be 
exported to all kinds of institutions since the (managerial) processes of 
neoliberalism are ‘absolutely resonant within all civic institutions’.41 Therefore, 
the potential she identifies within a ‘managerial repurposing of the art institution 
as a form of very publicly proposing an alternative to capitalisation’ also rests 
upon a paradigmatic function that the art institution could perform within a 
                                                          





broader socio-economic terrain of institutions.42 This is arguably a thoroughly 
radical suggestion since, for the most part, artistic labour has been hugely 
undervalued in that, traditionally, it has been relatively more susceptible to 
unpaid work, minute unionisation, unequal, undemocratic, authoritative and 
hierarchical relations in the workplace.  
Initiatives, mostly in the form of collectives, in (or on the fringes of) the art world 
that have attempted to collectivise their artistic labour testify to the 
particularities of the field. Some indicative UK-based examples are the (art) 
activist groups Carrotworkers and Future Interns, a network of interns, artists 
and students organising against unpaid internships and work precarity. The 
former group expanded into Precarious Workers Brigade (since 2010), in a 
shift that, according to participator Susan Kelly, sought to go beyond the 
exceptionality of artistic labour.43 The international platform Artleaks adopts 
various methods to expose and denounce unpaid work in official art institutions 
and adjacent narratives of self-realisation through voluntary creative work.44 
Issues around cultural labour are centrally addressed by the Free/Slow 
University of Warsaw, which I discuss further in Chapter 4. All in all, this type 
of activism takes the form of performance art or playful/mocking institutional 
intervention, as well as hands-on sharing of (practical) knowledge, archiving 
and tool-devising against forms of exploitation. When the work of such groups 
maintains an ambivalence between performance or symbolism and 
pragmatism or actuality has a significant function which I discuss further in 
Chapter 6. In terms of their pragmatic or practical concerns, even though of 
course affiliations exist between such groups, wider synergies across multiple 
contemporary labour forces and of the scale (once) achieved by traditional 
trade unions are yet to be accomplished. The US-based union United 
Autoworkers Local 2110 that deals with a wide vocational spectrum including 
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artistic labour – famously involving workers of the Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA) in New York – would perhaps constitute a remarkable example of 
synergy:  
We represent teachers, secretaries, administrators, editors, 
computer operators, librarians, museum curators, typesetters 
and graphic artists, among many others. Our union has taken a 
lead in organizing women and workers in non-profits who have 
never been organized before. […] We have the experience 
necessary to organize and negotiate for ‘white collar’ workers.45 
What the work of Local 2110 reveals is the need for labour issues to be 
rethought taking into account the pervasive presence of managerialism in the 
spatiotemporal interstices of the workplace, life and politics. It is at least dated 
– if not irrational – to exclude managers from a class or similar type of 
congregate of wage workers, whether by managers we mean account 
managers, junior assistants, store managers, art directors or social media 
users or even the figure of the artist as administrator, as per Buchloh’s 
aesthetics of administration (discussed in Chapter 1). Importantly, this is not 
meant to neither neglect so-called blue-collar work nor undermine the issues 
pertaining to this type of work. The exclusion of blue-collar work from 
theoretical redefinitions of the labour class in the post-industrial era has been 
convincingly refuted by Virno: 
In the universe of the ‘many’, there is no longer room for blue 
collar workers, all of them equal, who make up a unified body 
among them, a body which is not very sensitive to the 
kaleidoscope of the ‘difference’ among them. This is a foolish 
way of thinking […] Neither in Marx, nor in the opinion of any 
serious person, is labor class equated with certain habits, with 
certain usages and customs, etc. The labor class is a theoretical 
concept, not a snap-shot photograph kept as a souvenir: it 
signifies the subject which produces relative and absolute 
surplus value.46 
                                                          
45 ‘What Is Local 2110?,’ UAW Local 2110: A Union for Technical, Office, and Professional Workers, 
accessed February 2, 2017, http://www.2110uaw.org/. 
46 Virno, Grammar, 44-45. 
140 
 
Nonetheless, aspects such as the degrees of automatism, repetitiveness, 
intellectual or manual input, specific internal organisational hierarchies, 
flexibility, creativity and authorship arguably nuance and potentially segment 
the different conceptions of the labour class and consequently affect its self-
organisation. Therefore, such aspects should be taken into account when 
addressing labour in its close relation to managerial structures in the 
workplace, within and beyond the function of unions and ultimately within the 
theoretical framework of the institution. As I have already hinted, such an 
examination would side with an inward turn into – as opposed to a withdrawal 
from – (institutional) structures while promoting an interdisciplinary outreach 
that intends to identify affinities and common grounds, collectivise anew and 
hopefully, co-produce significations around what should be just. What we 
might thus begin to discern is the plausibility of instituent moments within 
strategies that could be seen as introvert in relation to specific (institutional) 
structures. Even if the instituent does begin with a withdrawal from a specific 
institution, it institutes something radically new and thereby potentially 
transforms the initial institution. Instituent praxis does not have to correspond 
to specific institutions, such as an art institution or the institution of marriage, 
as it operates at the political level of subjectivity and deontology. Yet, it can be 
associated with specific structures, such as the work of unions, art activist 
projects, strategies of the Left, art institutions, non-governmental organisations 
or non-profit associations.  
In his essay ‘Accelerate Management’ (2017), Fisher comments insightfully on 
the relationship between management and labour in the neoliberal era and its 
political implications. He argues that the ‘managerialist imperatives’ currently 
enabled by digital technologies of communication have entered 
‘consciousness and time’ to an unprecedented extent.47 For instance, working 
through smartphones in physical isolation diminishes the fertile ground for 
‘solidarity with others’ and shifting the form of tasks from physical to digital 
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often leads to a ‘feeling of inundation.’48 Work on (small) screens combined 
with ceaseless overflow of demands and information deprive the worker of any 
‘sense of overview’ or ‘control.’49 Due to such conditions, problems of anxiety 
and distraction are very prominent.50 Minimised job security and multiplied 
working hours only serve to decrease workers’ efficiency and productivity.51 
Fisher suggests that such managerialist conditions have come to appear as 
natural to the extent that any ‘objection’ to them is deemed ‘nostalgic.’52 At the 
same time, he argues, despite the proclaimed merits of flexibility and market 
relations over statist bureaucracy, neoliberalism has brought neither 
sustainable economic efficiency nor actual ‘individual freedom,’ since workers 
remain ‘subjugated’ and isolated within the aforementioned conditions.53 
However, Fisher stresses that management is not inherently part of this 
problematic situation that should be rather attributed to management’s 
neoliberal ‘takeover’ as managerialism or ‘new managerialism’.54 In fact, Fisher 
contends that a ‘communist society’ is essentially a ‘managed’ one and that 
we should ‘reclaim management as a fundamental communist and socialist 
value.’55 In more practical terms, Fisher suggests that ‘the role of the manager’ 
needs to be re-imagined as someone who would ‘protect us from overwork’ 
and would ‘see their role as providing us with a space to think.’56 He also 
mentions the figures of Brian Epsteins and Tony Wilson who are iconic cultural 
managers that discovered, promoted and worked closely with important artists 
of the 20th century as alternative benchmarks to profit-pursuing figures.57 In 
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conjunction with his aforementioned proposition that the Left needs to be able 
to manage and control, it could be argued that Fisher’s call to an alternative 
understanding of management that expands from the workplace to the direct 
political field comes from a politically valuable and strategically radical 
perspective.  
Phillips suggests an investigation into managerial relations in order to move 
towards political equality organisationally through the workplace. She also 
claims that desired shifts in the labour conditions and relations of art institutions 
where she would locate her own activity could then spread in a paradigmatic 
way to other institutions. Fisher proposes to actively re-imagine such 
management relations across the board – from (creative) labour to the political 
activity of the Left. More precisely, he emphasises the need for more 
management in the political action of the Left and a different type of 
managerialism in the (neoliberal) workplace. Phillips’s urge is validly 
straightforward in upholding the workplace as a starting point and valuable in 
its mindfulness of implicated power relations. Fisher’s proposed scope for a 
re-imagined application of management is strategically acute and should 
arguably be pursued. Fisher’s account, however, leaves us with an 
unanswered question: whether the managerial strategy that the Left should 
employ is of the same kind as the re-imagined role of the (formerly) neoliberal 
manager.  
Fisher’s desire to revive the Left’s historical ambition to ‘construct a managed 
society’ is not simply against the alternative of neo-anarchism and the 
awkward and sporadic direct action of the Left such as temporary autonomous 
zones.58 Rather, it is a forceful projection of robust rationality onto the 
managerial modality of communism against the chaos or (perceived) 
randomness that permeates capitalism. Referring to the fiction novel Red 
Plenty (Francis Spufford, 2010) which borrows from the historical moment of 
the post-Stalinist USSR, Fisher writes: ‘The good things produced by 
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capitalism arise in a haphazard fashion, whereas under communism, they will 
be delivered in a designed and managed – a rationally-coordinated – way.’59 
Does this rationally-coordinated way then amount to the same type of 
management towards which the re-imagined manager should be moving 
through allowing space for thought and preventing overwork? A superficial 
reading would suggest that the two aspects of management are incompatible 
in that they reflect the myths of the leftist and the neoliberal, the former being 
idle and too abstract to achieve concrete change while the latter is the doer 
and achiever that needs to stop being a workaholic and think more abstractly 
and in collective terms. This reading would be highly contestable as first and 
foremost, a line of management that would combine the two aspects is indeed 
plausible and employed to varying extents both in the neoliberal workplace 
(mainly through developed schemes of human relations in corporate 
environments that cater for the life-work balance and the emotional well-being 
of the workers) as well as within leftist institutional spaces of political action 
consciously aiming at a non-oppressive work ethos and worker-satisfactory 
conditions. Even though Fisher might be insinuating a desirable future that is 
rationally designed and coordinated, while the mode of working towards it 
and/or in it is one that accommodates deep thinking as well as idling away, he 
does not outline a potential combination of these two aspects of the vision in a 
single strategy. This seems fairly logical since, on the one hand, he is 
commenting on the strategies of the Left, which – in contrast to the 
communism-in-action vision – can arguably be haphazard and chaotic, and, 
on the other hand, he is trying to distance the neo-liberal manager from the 
regime of the ‘simulation of productivity.’ However, his interest in the potentially 
diverse ways in which management could intimate a non-neoliberal horizon 
fuels the possibility for combinatory forms between the two aspects of 
management on a strategic or tactical level.  
Such re-imagined managerial relations – including art-institutional ones – as 
paradigmatic are yet to be confirmed empirically. Documenta 14 (2017) is a 




recent art-institutional example of mismanagement that amplifies the 
hierarchies among directorial boards, funding bodies and high-ranking 
curatorial staff. By underestimating unforeseen expenses and not sacrificing 
programming decisions over financial risks, the exhibition ended up with a 
budget shortfall of 7,6 million euros, financed through loans by the city of 
Kassel and the State of Hesse (the shareholders of the non-profit company of 
Documenta).60 The curatorial team argued that the initial budget was already 
too low to accommodate a second location for the exhibition and its extended 
duration, to which the company responded by agreeing to consider a different 
budget allocation for next editions and new budget control mechanisms. All the 
while, Documenta 14 attempted to articulate a curatorial critique to its own 
institutional past and challenge the dominant political dynamics in the German-
Greek relations within a European and global context, as discussed in the 
Introduction. It also developed and implemented arguably one of the most 
interesting, extensive and thoroughly grass-roots public programming in the 
history of the institution (‘the Parliament of Bodies’, run by Paul Preciado). This 
long-term endeavour was deeply embedded in the local Athenian community 
and generated action and discourse around locally underdiscussed issues, 
such as xenophobia, gendered realities and trans emancipation and 
alternative self-organised digital economies, bringing them also in touch with 
global discourses and artistic practice.61 The imprint of this programme that 
connected thoroughly global forces with local potentialities drew little attention 
in the (global) media comparing to overarching narratives around neo-colonial 
art washing or scandal-mongering accusations of misspending and 
disorganisation. Even though there is no evidence to suggest that the budget 
shortfalls were in any way connected specifically to the public programme, (on 
the contrary, they seemed to emerge closer to the exhibition), in hypothetical 
terms of theory, Fisher’s account might be seen as attributing the shortfalls to 
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the hopeless politics of grass-roots direct action. However, the latter does not 
have to be severed from a well-managed and more established institutional 
setting, at least in the context of a large-scale public programme at the 
intersection of art and activism. Ironically enough, the accusations of neo-
colonialism towards Documenta 14 could be seen as enhanced – if not 
sparked – by the deteriorated realpolitik context of Greece during the 
exhibition’s preparation years; a context considerably attributable to 
mismanagement on the part of the Greek radical left government.62 
In any event, I would argue that the tactical combination of managerial aspects 
that Fisher places in a single strategy need not remain within the parameters 
of technical knowhow but be reinstated into a politico-managerial discussion 
conducive to elucidating matters of the institution. How should we interpret 
politically and theoretically the potential of the combination of rational co-
ordination with the caveats of idleness and deep thought as the tactics that 
would sustainably make ‘good things’ happen? What arguably resonates in 
such a potential is the need for desired emancipatory forces to be designed, 
planned, and instituted. Such a potential might actually be pointing towards 
instituent praxis, in that notions of creation and subjectivity have to be taken 
into account.  
Artist Andrea Francke together with administrator and researcher Ross Jardine 
have further problematised the relation between labour and management by 
introducing the perspective of the administrator as subject. Francke and 
Jardine focus on similar issues to the ones raised by Fisher but place emphasis 
on the effects of administrative labour to the worker as subject. They argue 
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that administrative work is largely perceived (mostly by non-administrators) as 
bureaucratic, repetitive and tedious tasks that are or could be executed 
automatically merely by aligning to institutional standardisation.63 However, 
they maintain that even though such tasks are based on digitally automated 
systems, templates and platforms that support other types of work, 
administrative labour entails creative input too which is largely obfuscated.64 In 
fact, they contend that even though current copyright law recognises 
authorship in the creation of new documents or forms, this authorship is mostly 
ignored as part of clerical work while corporations legally hold copyright 
ownership of the workers’ intellectual product.65 Thus, administrative work 
should be equally authored and credited as any other type of authored labour: 
Organisational policies and guidelines make it easier to replace 
workers who are reduced to cogs in the machine rather than 
function as individuals with valued knowledge. […] 
Administrative systems are put in place to pretend that these 
documents [forms to be completed] are generated through 
automated technical procedures that erase any trace of humanity 
or responsibility from them. Documents, forms and templates are 
constructed on top of each other, each time by a different 
unnamed worker. Absent from the document is a signature, 
responsibility but also credit.66  
They argue that such obfuscation of creative input and the obstruction of 
authorship results in the workers ‘de-subjectification’.67 It should be noted 
however that this is not a plea to expand authorship in terms of copyright to be 
commercially exploited. Rather, Francke and Jardine are proposing the 
recognition and validation of the creative input of the workers:  
Denying authorship (in the sense of denying the subjectivity 
expressed in the construction of a form or Excel spread sheet, 
not in the copyright transforming it into an asset) is, in itself, a 
process of de-subjectification. It creates a hierarchy of work and 
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labour, categorising the administrator as maintainer instead of a 
creator.68  
Francke and Jardine stress that the denial of authorship is not only a result of 
technological tools and neoliberal policies. It is also attributed to the hierarchy 
that is created when residual mass of labour stagnates around heroic 
individuals or ‘deserving subjects’ affirming their authored work narrative: 
‘Hero narratives need to make the support structures around the individual 
invisible and unnamed in order to construct the myth of meritocracy, talent and 
authorship – i.e. the deserving subject.’69 Francke and Jardine regard the 
figure of the ‘creator’ or the ‘deserving subject’ as occupying ‘specialised’ roles 
such as those of the ‘academic, teacher or artist’ and being perceived as 
possessing both ‘natural talent and academic validation.’ This way of 
understanding and distributing authorship, they suggest, allows the subject-
creator or ‘hero/author’ to use ‘his’ privately-owned authorship to enter the 
‘public sphere’ while ‘the mass of unnamed administrators […] are themselves 
unable to do the same.’70 In other words, the workers whose authorship is 
being ignored cannot fulfil their political potential in the sense of their work 
being visible within a public sphere. The ‘administrative subject’ is not 
recognised ‘as a full individual’ and is excluded ‘from the public sphere’.71 
Fulfilling one’s political potential becomes a privilege of deserving subjects 
who can make their ‘private ownership/authorship’ visible in a public sphere.72 
Thus, the administrator’s work becomes the hidden infrastructure that only 
comes to light when it is faulty or absent.73  
In this respect, the authors draw parallels between administrative and 
‘domestic’ or ‘reproductive’ labour, which they define as ‘the work performed 
in the private sphere that reproduces the labour power required for capitalism 
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to survive.’74 They use the example of the white male creative subject who – 
when working at home – is oblivious to the facilitation he is offered by domestic 
workers until his work is obstructed by what he understands as nuisances, 
such as children crying, dinner not being served on time, or someone 
rearranging his paperwork in order to clean.75 Thus, the authors maintain that, 
in a manner similar to administrative labour, domestic labour becomes the 
unrecognised and hidden infrastructure that serves the deserving subject. 
Francke and Jardine also refer to Justice for Domestic Workers (J4DW), an 
association of migrant domestic workers that paradigmatically illuminates 
exclusion from the ‘sphere of public discourse and policymaking’.76 The 
workers’ visa status and ‘processes at immigration control,’ including the 
workers’ passports having to be ‘in the possession of employers,’ forces the 
workers’ full dependence on their employers.77 At the same time, such workers 
are typically required to love the family-employer as if it was their own, while 
‘they should not expect to be loved back.’78 Conversely, if the family-employer 
treats the workers as family members, the workers lose their entitlement to 
minimum wage.79 Hence, their status as workers prevents their recognition as 
subjects and perpetuates their invisibility:  
just like the administrator the worker is an infrastructural object 
that should not be visible. […] A sick domestic worker is a bump 
on the household’s path, unable to undertake the tasks they have 
been (sub)contracted to perform in order to liberate other 
individuals to pursue more important, more subjectifying paths.80 
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Administrative and domestic labour are then socially structured in such a way 
that the status of the workers deprives them of their status as subjects insofar 
as they become the invisible infrastructure at the service of deserving subjects.  
Even though Francke and Jardine’s approach is valuable in its revealing of 
hidden hierarchies and establishing affinities between specific forms of labour, 
it becomes problematic if one tries to generalise this perspective into broader 
conclusions about management and labour through the politics of the 
instituent. Francke and Jardine’s approach seems to be focused on 
administrators who are ranking relatively low within institutional hierarchies 
who perform supportive tasks for the visibly creative labour. However, 
administrators do not only include workers whose labour is unauthored and 
unrecognised, especially if one considers the vital status of strategic 
administration within corporations, its centrality as business practice and as 
core profit activity. Business administration has also been established as a 
disciplinary field within higher education and academic research since the end 
of the nineteenth century. The importance of Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) degrees as high-priced training investments among 
future corporate executives aiming at senior positions is a case in point. 
Furthermore, the visible creativity not only of visionary managerially pioneering 
figures such as Steve Jobs, the mastermind behind Apple Inc., but also the 
incubation sector of product ideas that would fuel the start-up companies of 
the near future denotes the inextricability of managerial and marketing 
knowledge and work from a sphere that comprises deserving subjects. In 
Chapter 4, I discuss further the relation between the public sphere and the 
market.  
Should managerial work relations then be examined solely from the point of 
view of workers in administrative support (as opposed to management in 
general) given the extent to which managerialism has infiltrated everyday tasks 
and the diversity of forms of labour that it permeates and shapes? As the 
accounts of Fisher, Phillips and Buchloh would indicate, management is 
multifacetedly related to creative labour. The hierarchy of administrative labour 
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at the service of creative labour while the creativity of the former remains 
unauthored and unrecognised is but one version of such a relation. 
Moreover, even though the hierarchy created between unauthored and 
authored work should be addressed, I would argue that the focus on turning 
the unauthored work into authored should be accompanied by a focus on the 
equally shifting social status of the authored work. Even though Francke and 
Jardine are critical towards the private-ownership type of authorship, they do 
not examine what is perhaps a different kind of de-subjectification of authored 
work within a broad hierarchical and disciplinary spectrum, in the form of 
technological automation, standardisation and micro-managerial 
systematisation. The authors’ viewpoint seems valid when applied to the 
relation between creative or intellectual work and administrative or domestic 
work. Their argument, however, lacks generalisability when the administrator 
is the deserving subject – whether in the case of the creative or intellectual 
worker within a neoliberal art or other institution, or the high-ranking executive 
specialising in corporate strategy. Conversely, the authors’ viewpoint also 
fades when the creative subject does not acquire the status of the deserving 
subject at all, as, for instance, perspectives on the gendered status of women 
artists within art historical discourses would suggest. I would argue that 
Francke and Jardine’s approach should be extended to include the relation of 
bureaucratic infrastructure and technological standardisation to a far broader 
spectrum of labour positions and relations than the administrator who supports 
or facilitates creative labour.  
Finally, the authors’ perspective on de-subjectification by way of not accessing 
the public sphere through authorship presupposes a definition of the subject 
in terms that should arguably be contested. The two authors largely ground 
their thesis on Hannah Arendt’s understanding of politics (or action) as enacted 
in a public sphere historically accessible through ownership of private property 
and separate from the sphere of labour, which amounts to the necessary work 




that maintains action.81 I would argue that the two spheres are no longer 
separate and both visibility and invisibility coexist within the two, even if there 
are specific types of labour that remain invisible.82 Excluding the case of the 
migrant domestic workers who are indeed deprived of fundamental political 
agency, I would contend that the formulation that administrators are being de-
subjectified while creative workers – the deserving subjects – can be fulfilled 
as subjects needs to be further nuanced. The introduction and recognition of 
authorship within administrative creative product such as forms, documents 
and templates would not necessarily challenge the contemporary structures of 
subjectivity, especially if these are understood in the context of the visible 
hero/author versus the invisible infrastructure. The latter binary formulation 
would disregard the instituent or at least self-determining potential that could 
be found in invisibility during an era of overabundance of imagery, voluntary 
self-exposure and over-surveillance. Relatedly, Larne Abse Gogarty and Ellen 
Feiss have stressed the issue of ‘digital privacy’ and its possible associations 
with ‘the interrelated systems of welfare and prison,’ wherein ‘low-income 
women [are] monitored by State surveillance practices advanced by 
innovations in IT and telecommunications.’83 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the 
attempt to increase the realm of recognised individual authorship at the 
expense of procedural standardisation would forestall the possibility that 
authored and creative human work in aggregate terms would be nonetheless 
depreciated. Arguably, however, the terms of such potential depreciation 
should be examined from the perspective of technopolitical creation and with 
regard to the possibility of instituent praxis, rather than a merely technophobic 
or technologically determinist prism.  
In order to proceed with such examination while remaining in proximity to the 
art institutional realm it is useful to return to the back office of the institution 
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and consider some perhaps interrelated ways in which invisibility has been 
operative in the art world. The project Opacity (2005) curated by Nina 
Möntmann has explicitly thematised the tension between demands for 
transparency on the part of ‘powerful institutions’ and the simultaneous 
demand for opacity in the context of ‘smaller institutions or groups’ that permits 
experimentation with ‘new forms of collaboration’ and ‘an alternative agenda 
for art institutional work.’84 This is predominantly a tactical invisibility that would 
be employed against oppressive or limiting requirements of public or private 
funding bodies and potentially mass entertainment expectations or standards. 
The project included art practice that explored the theme of opacity in other 
ways, such as Kajsa Dahlberg‘s video 20 Minutes (Female Fist), which 
addressed a lesbian separatist perspective as well as the refusal to be 
‘represented or defined’ in identity-based terms.  
Another, more inadvertent invisibility could be associated with what Morgan 
Quaintance has referred to as the ‘UK art world’s performance of progression’ 
and its simultaneous underlying ‘complicity’ with the sustenance of strategic 
alliances between profit-making art institutions, the management of public 
resources and corporate sponsorship, which are structurally vested in 
preserving the status quo and, by extension, the homogeneity of the art 
world.85 The UK art world’s performed progression claims to be aiming at the 
‘radical alteration of the field’ and its inequalities. However, Quaintance notes 
that, while the art world often espouses and promotes the spectacularisation 
of unjustly marginalised or underrepresented subjects, in demographic terms, 
the traditionally excluded ‘people of colour, women and the working class’ are 
only marginally more included, and at the expense of a ‘subtle process of 
enculturation’ which often amounts to a ‘relinquishment of power.’ Quaintance 
employs examples from established large-scale art institutions in the UK and 
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financial data of a number of companies to support his argument and I will not 
delve into these specifics. However, it is important to note that his institutionally 
critical account is targeted towards an invisible infrastructure, not dissimilarly 
to earlier forms of Institutional Critique, but in stressing a more blatant 
antinomy heightened by the performance of progression. Moreover, 
Quaintance’s urge for withdrawal is primarily one of labour and not quite the 
vague abandonment of undesired institutional structures for non-institutional 
ones:  
By simply withdrawing their affective labour, their cultural and 
symbolic capital, their work from circulation within exploitative 
inter-institutional networks, artists and arts professionals could 
[…] finally torch the tired myth that moral or political compromise 
is always, at some level, the fundamental structural inevitability 
of creative practice. 
Such withdrawal would not of course be literally simple and would require more 
than the unionisation of the field and perhaps more than a re-imagined 
expansion of unionisation itself (as per Fisher). This tension has been 
thematised by Maria Eichhorn’s art project 5 weeks, 25 days, 175 hours at 
Chisenhale Gallery in 2016. The project demarcated a specific time frame for 
the gallery to halt its exhibition activity and remain closed. All staff was 
essentially on (paid) leave and all emails in the gallery inbox received 
automated replies and were automatically deleted. At the start of this period, 
there was a symposium (with an entrance fee) that featured talks by 
theorists/art-historians/curators who had also contributed essays in the online 
publication that was made specifically for the project.86 Stewart Martin has 
suggested that the ‘closed gallery’ in this context becomes a ‘riposte to the 
unwaged labour saturating the artworld and the world outside, a plea for this 
labour to be valued,’ as much as a ‘more radical plea for the value of not 
labouring and the waging of producing nothing.’87 Undoubtedly, there are 
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questions even at the level of the symbolic function of this artwork regarding 
the reproduction of hierarchies between wage labour and volunteering work 
(which Chisenhale involves occasionally for events) as well as employment on 
zero-hour contracts or on a freelance basis (for instance, technicians), 
especially considering that payment was sustained only for the eight members 
of staff who were permanently contracted.88 Martin incisively suggests that the 
‘spell of wage remains binding’ and ‘that the gallery is not turned into an 
autonomous workplace, but an automated one.’89 As Martin implies, such 
automation is merely hinted at by the technologically automated functions that 
sustain some operation in the gallery; more to the point is the wage condition 
that does not turn the gallery into ‘common property but common 
expropriation.’90 Josefine Wikström has observed that ‘the financial base of the 
exhibition is [...] still highly productive,’ since ‘the private funders that 
Chisenhale depends on – among them, the multi-national media corporation 
Bloomberg and Frieze Art Fair – are not affected by the gallery shutdown.’91 
Algorithmic institutions and big data monopolies 
Scholar of Strategic Management Education Stefano Harney has used the 
term ‘algorithmic institutions’ to describe the advent of what he calls ‘logistical 
capitalism’ which heralds the pervasiveness of algorithmic decision-making at 
the core of strategising and policy planning from strictly business to all public 
and private institutions.92 Harney argues that all bureaucracy today is ‘privately 
administered’ irrespectively of whether it is funded privately or publicly and it 
is ‘run by’ algorithmic tools.93 Such tools are programmed to be aligned with 
                                                          
88 Claire Voon, ‘For Its Newest Exhibition, a Gallery Is Closed for a Month,’ Hyperallergic, May 5, 
2016, accessed July 11, 2017, https://hyperallergic.com/294353/for-its-newest-exhibition-a-gallery-
is-closed-for-a-month/. 
89 Martin, ‘Gallery Closed,’ 58. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Josefine Wilkström, ’A Not Radical Enough Gesture,’ Kunstkritikk, May 26, 2016, accessed July 11, 
2017, https://kunstkritikk.com/a-not-radical-enough-gesture/. 
92 Stefano Harney, ‘The New Rules of Algorithmic Institutions,’ in Former West: Art and the 
Contemporary after 1989, ed. Maria Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh (Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele 
kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 453. 
93 Harney, ‘Algorithmic Institutions,’ 448 [emphasis in original]. 




‘good business climate’ and the constant generation of new markets through 
privatisation: ‘Algorithms never rest. They evolve to create more intense and 
extensive markets.’94 Harney suggests that privatisation has largely gained 
ethical legitimacy through its proclaimed eradication of corruption and power 
hierarchies or pathologies traditionally associated with State bureaucracy.95 
Even though, he argues, government services would theoretically ‘benefit from 
competition as if there were a market’, the reality of privatising a government 
service can be very different since it is initially there so that it is accessible by 
everyone.96 Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages in the quality of 
service or its accessibility, Harney contends that privately administered 
services or the ‘private bureaucrats’ or ‘administrators’ have come to serve an 
algorithmic logic which is only interested in turning ‘publics’ into ‘markets’ and 
expanding them.97  
Producing markets means producing more forms of monopoly 
over more aspects of the production of life, or to put it in more 
traditional critical language, the expansion and intensification of 
social production for private gain. Privatisation uses the 
algorithm to generate monopoly power in a world where some 
are said to be in need of market discipline, incentives, or 
entrepreneurship, and others are ready to give it to them.98 
Harney suggests that institutions are no longer run according to rules that 
reflect their own logic as institutions. Rather, ‘the rules now are algorithmic’ 
which means that it is algorithms that make the rules by which either ‘nominally 
public’ or private institutions are run.99 Thus, even though there is still human 
leadership, actual ‘authority’ lies with the algorithm that always echoes the 
pervasive privately administered logic of ‘the accumulation of bodies and 
things for surplus profit and monopoly’.100 Harney also argues that we are 
privatising ‘ourselves’ too by adjusting ourselves so as to ‘serve’ the algorithm 
                                                          
94 Ibid., 449-50. 
95 Ibid., 448. 
96 Ibid., 449. 
97 Ibid., 449-50. 
98 Ibid., 450. 
99 Ibid., 453, 456. 
100 Ibid., 456. 
156 
 
rather than the other way around and we feel the ‘compulsion to privatize any 
person or thing refusing improvement, resisting the algorithm.’101 Harney 
asserts that ‘many of us become the private bureaucrats’ in that ‘we administer 
the privatization.’ Even though he does not disclose who ‘we’ are, the fact that 
his essay is written for the Former West research project does not at the very 
least exclude the possibility that he is referring to an art-related audience.102 
After elaborating on the privatisation of ‘ourselves,’ Harney proceeds by 
focusing on the exemplary category of a ‘museum of contemporary art in a 
European capital.’ He considers this category suggestive of his broader thesis 
regarding the algorithmic institutions and the privatisation of the self through 
them.103 He describes the gradual process of the non-specific museum’s shift 
into a fully privately administered institution: from the initial realisation that it 
needs to keep up with the contemporary reality of marketed cultural services 
to the core restructuring of its management staff and employment of advisory 
private company KPMG.104 Run on an algorithmically-based ‘enterprise 
planning system,’ the art institution outsources activities, such as its café, and 
begins to manage and invest its property assets.105 The museum can now 
access loans in order to extend its infrastructure, such as a ‘new education 
and outreach wing including a members’ private rooftop lounge [that] will also 
attract corporate funding and gifts from private donors, with consultants hired 
to shape a culture of giving – consultants recommended by KPMG.’106 The 
algorithm brings efficiency and helps the art institution fundraise and manage 
its assets to the extent that 40 percent decrease on its government/public 
funding does not affect it financially.107 Due to such shifts some workers have 
been sacked or pressured into early retirement.108 Workers have also had to 
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adjust to the new administrative/managerial mentality and ethos of work 
assessment with a huge emphasis on self-assessment.109 
More broadly, what Harney describes as the privatisation of ourselves, our 
adjusting of ourselves to serve the algorithm while submitting to a monopolistic 
logic and economy becomes blatantly evident through what Nick Srnicek calls 
‘platform monopolies’ such as Facebook.110 Srnicek has coined the term 
‘platform capitalism’ to describe the centrality of the business model of the 
platform within today’s global capitalism.111 He defines the platform as the 
‘infrastructure that connects two or more groups and enables them to interact’ 
and considers companies such as Facebook, Google and Amazon to be run 
essentially as platforms.112 Each interaction on a platform is translatable into 
data – the raw material for algorithms.113 As Srnicek observes, the model of 
the platform does not only implicate ‘tech-sector’ companies: 
Uber is the most prominent example, turning the staid business 
of taxis into a trendy platform business. Siemens and GE, two 
powerhouses of the 20th century, are fighting it out to develop a 
cloud-based system for manufacturing. Monsanto and John 
Deere, two established agricultural companies, are trying to 
figure out how to incorporate platforms into farming and food 
production.114 
Srnicek also suggests that platform companies operate in a monopolistic logic 
not simply by precluding any direct competition, but also through relentlessly 
accumulating user data, rendering older major industry stakeholders such as 
newspaper or advertisement agencies and old department stores redundant, 
and absorbing smaller companies such as Instagram and Whatsapp.115 
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Referring to social media platform Facebook and its competitor Ello, which 
briefly tried to be Facebook’s ad-free alternative that would not sell user data 
to third parties nor require the user’s real names, Srnicek writes: 
Reaching a critical mass of users is what makes these 
businesses successful: the more users, the more useful to users 
– and the more entrenched – they become. Ello’s rapid downfall 
occurred because it never reached the critical mass of users 
required to prompt an exodus from Facebook – whose 
dominance means that even if you’re frustrated by its advertising 
and tracking of your data, it’s still likely to be your first choice 
because that’s where everyone is, and that’s the point of a social 
network.116 
Srnicek asserts that data are ‘the 21st century version of oil’ in terms of their 
current importance to the global economy.117 Heavy investment into Artificial 
Intelligence or ‘machine learning’ by the aforementioned companies testifies 
to the significance of extracting data in a circular pattern by which the increase 
of extracted data optimises machine learning and improved machine learning 
expands the extraction of data.118 The monopolist power that such companies 
maintain combined with the momentousness of data as an economic resource 
lead Srnicek to the daring proposition that Facebook, Google and Amazon 
should be nationalised. He regards these companies as fit for ‘public 
ownership’ along the lines of ‘natural monopolies like utilities and railways that 
enjoy huge economies of scale and serve the common good.’119 Srnicek also 
maintains that potential state efforts to regulate such companies would 
ultimately be insufficient if the aim is to take ‘back control over the internet and 
our digital infrastructure, instead of allowing them to be run in the pursuit of 
profit and power.’120  
Srnicek’s proposition resonates with Fisher’s urge for the Left to manage and 
control things as well as Mouffe’s call to not abandon state institutions. On the 
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other hand, Harney has warned of the privately administered logic that has 
infiltrated through the algorithm deep within public administration and 
bureaucracy too. It is indeed hard to imagine such companies striped of their 
privately administered logic due to their nationalisation. I would argue that the 
nationalisation of such companies would de facto constitute a step towards the 
‘common good’ or at least a step away from the ‘pursuit of profit and power’ 
due to the sheer economic fact of their public ownership. However, much like 
the nominally public art institutions, such ownership might no longer 
necessarily entail their public character in the service itself and the monopolist 
nature of such a defining to subjectivity infrastructure would remain an issue. 
Has then the infrastructure once developed to serve the subject – or the post-
Fordist subject – come to define it and control it in a monopoly that precludes 
imagining alternative futures? How definitive is Harney’s assertion that 
authority now lies with the algorithm? Rather than formulate definite answers 
to such questions I will use them as a backdrop and reframe them in order to 
further examine the relationship between the subject and infrastructure and 
inevitably the institution.  
#Institution/ #Infrastructure/ #subjectivity+affect 
To this end, I will discuss the hypothesis that a focus on the instituent should 
be dropped in the prospect of the urgency of analysing material and immaterial, 
human and technological infrastructure and its significance. Cultural theorist 
Marina Vishmidt draws a distinction between Institutional Critique and 
Infrastructural Critique in the field of art and traces the premises of an alleged 
shift from the former to the latter.121 Even though in historiographical terms she 
considers the critique of infrastructures to have been part of the critique of 
institutions in art practice, she currently identifies an emphasis on the former 
aspect – the infrastructural.122 For Vishmidt, what has often been discussed in 
                                                          
121 Marina Vishmidt, ‘Between Not Everything and Not Nothing: Cuts Toward Infrastructural 
Critique,’ in Former West: Art and the Contemporary after 1989, ed. Maria Hlavajova and Simon 
Sheikh, 265-69 (Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016). 
122 Vishmidt, ‘Between Not Everything,’ 266-67. 
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art historical discourse as Institutional Critique operates by ‘defining and 
tracing boundaries of that which is legitimately subject to critique in terms of 
the implicated subject of knowledge’, whereas Infrastructural Critique 
‘highlights structural conditions for the possibility of critique and for its objects 
alike […] often at odds with institutional reckoning as a relevant sphere of 
activity.’123 Infrastructural Critique would then consist in  
[…] the engagement with the thoroughly intertwined objective 
(historical, socio-economic) and subjective (including affect and 
artistic subjectivization) conditions necessary for the institution 
and its critique to exist, reproduce themselves, and posit 
themselves as an immanent horizon as well as transcendental 
condition. These conditions include local and global labor 
markets, corporate power, property development, inasmuch as 
they manifest the structural violence of capitalism, racism, and 
gender, which is so often mediated by the reckless expansionism 
of art markets and spaces.124 
I would contest that Institutional Critique did not engage with such conditions, 
since so much of it has been self-reflexive and self-critical precisely to implicate 
the conditions that allow the critique to take place and conversely, so much of 
it went beyond demarcating what is legitimately subject to critique in terms of 
the subject of knowledge. I will elaborate on this thesis through art-practice 
examples that will lead me to a rearticulating of the relationship between 
institution and infrastructure and the corresponding pertinence of the subject. 
The first example is the work of the art group BMPT mentioned in Chapter 1. 
BMPT’s serialised mug shots for the Paris Biennale poster (1967) expose the 
visual, linguistic and cognitive conventions of language and institutional power 
as already implicated within economic investment. Buchloh’s very central 
thesis upholds the mimesis of the operating logic of late capitalism as a 
condition for the critique to be performed by conceptual art. Even in more 
recent artistic examples, such as Byford’s The Social Mining Union, where the 
artist operates more as an explorer (or a miner) than a critic into a given 
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infrastructure, I would argue that institutional power and its relation to 
subjectivity and regimes of knowledge are laterally implicated regardless of the 
artist’s intentions to critique or address them. Byford’s work significantly 
depends on documenting, archiving and showcasing how Glencore operates, 
from the perspective of a white male western art-school graduate who has 
mined into the company in order to confront older white male shareholders. 
Therefore, on one hand, following Vishmidt’s logic, his practice could indeed 
be seen as diverging from Institutional Critique’s usual suspects and corporate 
pranksters the YesMen, for instance.125 Byford’s practice gravitates more to 
researching and portraying the implicating infrastructure than deliberating a 
critical joke. This becomes clear in his documentation of the purchased 
Glencore share [fig 2] and the exchanged scrap metal [fig 3] as well as a short 
video compilation of Google maps satellite close-up shots of Glencore’s 
premises [fig 4]. On the other hand, Byford’s practice displays strong ties with 
the methodologies of Institutional Critique of the second half of the twentieth 
century. His consideration of the positionality of the implicated subjects of 
knowledge could be evidenced in his snapshot [fig 5], which depicts the 
shareholders engaging in discourse and is taken by the artist (himself) having 
infiltrated Glencore’s headquarters. More broadly, as I will further discuss in 
Chapter 6, mocking practices can and do operate at the level of infiltration and 
portrayal of implicated (institutional) infrastructures. 
Thus, art practice hints that critical approaches of institutions and infrastructure 
tend to refer to both the conditions for the critique as well as the implicated 
subject(s) of knowledge. I would argue – perhaps against Vishmidt’s 
observations – that categorising institutional and infrastructural critique 
separately as the former simply demarcating the (legitimate) area of critique 
and the implicated subject of knowledge and the latter delving deep into the 
critique’s underlying (objective) conditions would oversimplify the complexities 
of art practice and theoretical definitions alike. As far as the theoretical aspect 
                                                          
125 The YesMen are a US-based collective that has been active since 1996. Its practice involves 
humour and pranks often targeting corporate environments, figures and policies in order to draw 
attention to the corporate and neoliberal conditioning of society. 
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is concerned, Vishmidt understands infrastructure as a type of repetitive 
reproduction or ‘the material guarantee of a movement’s persistence in time, 
the durable pathways and affordances for development, crystallization, and 
reconfiguring.’126 This reproduction is simultaneously open to interruption and 
difference: 
This reproductive aspect of infrastructure, however, has to retain 
an openness to the ‘temporal cut,’ which undoes crystallizations 
and institutions in the attempt to realize the desires that were the 
initial impetus for their establishment, and which this 
establishment tends to block over time as they are subordinated 
to the survival of the institution. Infrastructure might be that which 
repeats, but this repetition is not without difference: it can 
monotonously produce the same differences (such as 
infrastructures that reproduce social inequalities), but it can also 
be a means of ensuring the reproduction of a wholly different 
form of social life over time.127 
Vishmidt’s understanding of the institution seems rather limiting here and the 
instituent moment is ignored or, at any rate, not associated with the ‘temporal 
cut’ and the moment when repetition breaks. Moreover, even though 
Vishmidt’s account regards desire as the initial impetus for infrastructure’s 
establishment, it does not adequately address how this impetus operates and 
the implication of subjectivity thereof. Her implication of the subject as the 
subjective branch of the necessary conditions for the critique to exist (the other 
branch being the objective) elaborated as affective and pertaining to artistic 
subjectivisation does not do justice to the affective, non-linear and 
asignificatory production of subjectivity that her terminology could be assumed 
to belie.  
By contrast, Irit Rogoff’s understanding of infrastructure outlines its connection 
to knowledge and its ‘affective surplus’ in a Guattarian take: 
The process by which knowledge assumes a-significatory forms 
is one that destabilises its relation to other fixed knowledges and 
acquired an affective surplus. And one of the things that I am 
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interested in is the possibility of thinking affective surplus in 
relation to infrastructure. […] When we in the West, or in the 
industrialized, technologized countries, congratulate ourselves 
on having an infrastructure—properly working institutions, 
systems of classification and categorization, archives and 
traditions and professional training for these, funding pathways, 
educational pathways, excellence criteria, impartial juries, and 
properly air conditioned auditoria with well-stocked cafes, etc.—
we forget the degree to which these have become protocols that 
bind and confine us in their demand to be conserved or 
conversely, in their demand to be resisted. […] What if however, 
the concept of infrastructure was thought against the grain of 
inclusion, enablement and achievement and became the site of 
a critical investigation of the frictions that take place between 
expression and organisation.128  
Rogoff understanding of infrastructure should be seen as distinct from 
Vishmidt’s pattern of reproduction and (material) crystallisation interrupted by 
temporal cuts. Such pattern would resonate with, rather than dislocate, the 
confinement enacted in the very dilemma of conserving or resisting protocols. 
Theorising infrastructure against the grain of inclusion, enablement and 
achievement would amount to destabilising its relation to fixed knowledge and 
moving towards what Rogoff calls ‘a-significatory’ forms that make room for 
the ‘affective surplus’. In other words, Rogoff is making an epistemological 
statement that seeks to diffuse the (initial) affective impetus into the entire 
concept and reality of infrastructure. This statement could be seen as 
challenging a focus on the reproduction of conditions (and their temporal 
interruption) registered either positively as enabling or antithetically as 
disabling and leaving no room for intervention in the artifice of the real. 
                                                          
128 Irit Rogoff, ‘Infrastructure’ (Keynote lecture at Former West: Documents, Constellations, 
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Furthermore, in allowing a critical navigation into the frictions between 
expression and organisation, infrastructure could become a site for the 
aforementioned complex entanglements between creative and administrative 
labour – rather than the exclusive site for managerial and administrative 
enablement. Seen in this light, infrastructure becomes a pertinent indexical 
category to all the aforementioned examples including art practices, strategies 
and tactics, trade unions, corporations and art institutions.  
Most importantly, placing knowledge as a-signification and affect at the core of 
the concept of infrastructure shrinks the gap between institution and 
infrastructure. Albeit different, the two concepts operate in parallel and in close 
proximity. What I have previously described as the inward moment of 
institution could be understood as infrastructure, either in the sense of 
reproduction and material guarantee with interruptions (Vishmidt) or affective 
surplus against enablement and achievement (Rogoff). In both 
understandings, the material guarantee of an enabling structure is regarded 
as the primary modality of infrastructure, regardless of its initial impetus or 
temporal interruption and despite any advocated contamination with a-
signification. I argue that institution (as the process of institution) exceeds both 
understandings of infrastructure, if it is granted that the focus is placed on the 
instituent moment as simultaneously one of affect and the co-production of 
rules – translating into both corporeal and incorporeal universes within 
assemblages. The co-existence of affect and rule-inventing in the same 
moment and without requiring the presence of the repetitive reproductive 
aspect is only locatable in instituent praxis, regardless of how infrastructure is 
conceived. Schematically put, the process of institution as instituent praxis 
includes and exceeds infrastructure through both the instituent moment (the 
creation of new significations/rules through affect) and the continuity/inertia of 
the already instituted. The latter does not simply reproduce, enable or affirm 
but, rather, constitutes the instituted that will condition instituent praxis. 




#Instituent / #code / #desiring_machines  
Where does this leave the predicament designated by Harney’s algorithmic 
institutions and the dystopia of big data monopolies? Rogoff has hinted that 
‘within infrastructure there is a kind of rubbing together of things that 
contaminate one another and can’t be separated easily into strands that can 
be named acceptable progressive practice and unacceptable regressive 
technocratic practice.’129 It is doubtful, however, that even an affective 
understanding of infrastructure would associate its conceptual core with issues 
of acceptability (moral or political) which would rather pertain to a neighbouring 
yet distinct discourse – the instituent. In this respect, Vishmidt’s observation 
that difference within infrastructure can be understood either as social 
inequality or, conversely, as different forms of social life – other than the 
dominant capitalist ones, is astute. Nonetheless, the pertinence of the 
instituent is neither quite judiciary nor legislative, since that would defy the very 
concept of the instituent as praxis and not power. In order to examine such 
pertinence, one must begin with the oppositional dichotomy between 
technocratic and human agency often translating as automated technological 
infrastructure versus subjective free will.  
Theorist Wendy Chun has commented on this dichotomy situating its epicentre 
on the ‘code as law as police’: 
Celebrations of an all-powerful user/agent – ‘you’ as the network, 
‘you’ as producer – counteract concerns over code as law as 
police by positing ‘you’ as the sovereign subject, ‘you’ as the 
decider. An agent, however, is one who does the actual labor, 
hence an agent as one who acts on behalf of another. On 
networks, the agent would seem to be technology rather than the 
users or programmers who authorize actions through their 
commands and clicks. Programmers and users are not creators 
of languages, nor the actual executors, but rather living sources 
who take credit for the action.130 
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Chun is alluding to the concentration of power – executive, legislative and 
juridical – that lies with the code when it functions as law and simultaneously 
as policing. While the code pretends to accommodate human agency through 
the permitted decision-making and choosing among various clicks and 
commands, the subject is stripped of agency since the actual labour is 
performed by technology. Various takes on techno-capitalism reinforce this 
critique. The danger is that techno-capitalism – following the steps of 
neoliberalism – seems the only possible horizon and is thereby naturalised. 
This standpoint, also bordering Harney’s algorithmic institutional reality, should 
direct us towards the centrality of law and rule-making in a horizon of 
algorithmic governance or code as law. Harney indeed sees potential in the 
realisation that humans need to reclaim rule-making from the algorithm.131 
However, despite the subjective/institutional internalisation of 
technological/algorithmic imperatives and the insight that economic and 
political decision-making has been unprecedently conferred to the algorithmic 
apparatus, the latter ultimately rests on and serves an (abstract and concrete) 
institutional system that is sustained, if not controlled, by human relations. As 
software engineer François Chollet has argued, dystopian scenarios about the 
‘singularisation’ of artificial intelligence and the takeover of technical machines 
that would infinitely sustain a profit-based administrative apparatus beyond 
any human agency are ‘pure fantasy.’132 He is concerned, however, about such 
apparatus having the capacity to use technical machines in a psychologically 
manipulative fashion to influence consumers’ behaviour as much as decidedly 
divert, condition and drive political change or action.133 
This line of thinking brings us back to instituent praxis, whose logic of 
artificiality and the making of transversal subjectivity through the production of 
new significations as rules begins to portray the disorientation and 
unworkability of issues when posed as hierarchies of dual competition: human-
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technology, human-machine or human-software. The quest for thought around 
the instituent could be insightful with regard to the conditions under which code 
as law operates not as police but as conscious co-institution of rules. Guattari 
was already in the 1960s exploring the conditions in which bureaucracy could 
function as institutional creativity away from individual oppression.134 Dardot 
and Laval have rearticulated the conceptual backdrop of this possibility in 
relation to the code in language and psychoanalysis, the subject group and 
instituent praxis. 
Rule-making, not as officially legislating but as coming up with the enunciation 
that makes the group consciously seize the meaning of its own praxis and 
relate anew with the internal code of its unconscious, precisely and crucially 
implicate the psychoanalytical angle that points to desire and its pathic, pre-
personal, proto-subjective and machinic configurations. This is in tandem with 
the conceptual constellation of instituent praxis pointing towards conscious re-
inventions away from spontaneity. What Dardot and Laval, examined in 
Chapter 2, refer to only implicitly through their employment of Guattarian 
transversality and their reconfigurations around the unconscious is desire. It is 
worth noting that, apart from his urges to reclaim management, Fisher has 
argued that a struggle that would imagine beyond a neoliberal reality needs to 
be libidinal and therefore rescue and re-channel desire which has been 
captured and monopolised by ‘Post-Fordist capitalism and neoliberalism’.135 At 
the same time, the agents of such desire should be seen in the conceptual 
framework of Guattari’s ‘desiring machines,’ rather than through ideologically 
constructed bourgeois conceptions of soul or as individual desiring that linearly 
responds to a pre-existing lack: 
For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is everything that exists before 
the opposition between subject and object, before representation 
and production. It's everything whereby the world and affects 
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constitute us outside of ourselves, in spite of ourselves. It's 
everything that overflows from us. That's why we define it as flow 
(flux). Within this context we were led to forge a new notion in 
order to specify in what way this kind of desire is not some sort 
of undifferentiated magma, and thereby dangerous, suspicious, 
or incestuous. So we speak of machines, of ‘desiring machines’, 
in order to indicate that there is as yet no question here of 
‘structure’, that is, of any subjective position, objective 
redundancy, or coordinates of reference. Machines arrange and 
connect flows. They do not recognize distinctions between 
persons, organs, material flows, and semiotic flows.136 
The contribution of instituent praxis amounts to upholding the importance of 
the complex that brings together desire and the invention of rules of law as 
new significations with the caveat of a-significatory and subjectivity-producing 
elements. The currency of what has been called political correctness from the 
realms of art production and culture industry to bureaucratic policy that 
constantly seeks to condition what should be allowed or what should be 
acceptable points to this importance. Even artistic or other creation that 
deliberately dissociates itself from an ethically correct framework is still 
implicated by negation within the aforementioned complex. The expanded 
practice of intellectual property law also points to this complex. The 
implementation of the GDPR framework on a European basis and broader 
legal and institutional battles within platform and data economy indicate that 
the channeling of legitimisation in the management of desire is the crux of 
today’s capitalism, but at the moment it remains subservient to profit-based 
incentives that created the dominant managerial templates in the first place 
and at the mercy of a belated institutional intervention that rests on the 
implementation of a liberal understanding of individual consent.137 Creation 
should be measured against the complex of instituent praxis and to the extent 
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that it goes beyond legal adjustments that remain within the neoliberal or even 





Fig. 1: Tee Byford, The Social Mining Union (untitled document #1), 2014, accessed 




Fig. 2: Tee Byford, The Social Mining Union (untitled document #2), 2014, accessed 
November 18, 2017, http://www.tearlach.co.uk/index.php/art-work/the-social-mining-union/.   
 
Fig. 3: Tee Byford, The Social Mining Union (untitled document #3), 2014, accessed 
November 18, 2017, http://www.tearlach.co.uk/index.php/art-work/the-social-mining-union/.   





Fig. 4: Tee Byford, The Social Mining Union (Glencore Mining Sites and Properties, video 
still), 2014, accessed November 18, 2017, http://www.tearlach.co.uk/index.php/art-work/the-
social-mining-union/.   
 
 
Fig. 5: Tee Byford, The Social Mining Union (untitled document #4), 2014, accessed 



























4. Instituent Praxis and Discursive Practices 
 
The discursive in context 
 
In the 1990s, the institutions and curatorial structures of the art world shifted 
towards a discursive and pedagogical function. By this, I mean to point towards 
the proliferation of participatory, educational and discursive events and formats 
such as symposia, publications, workshops, reading groups etc both as 
independent parts of art-institutional programming and in accompaniment of 
exhibitionary display structures. The emergence or at least the amplification 
and establishment of a discursive pedagogical paradigm was due to several 
factors, including the expansion (in size and scope) of the curatorial field per 
se as well as the proliferation and diversification of art institutions. The oft-cited 
‘educational turn’ is emblematic of this shift to the discursive, albeit not 
technically identical. Curating and the Educational Turn, Paul O’Neill and Mick 
Wilson pinpoint a shift whereby ‘discussions, talks, symposia, education 
programmes, debates and discursive practices’ are no longer mere 
supplements of exhibitions but ‘have become central to contemporary practice; 
they have now become the main event.’1  
The practices of the so-called ‘educational turn’ are often conflictive and 
substantially variable in form, content, and aspirations. They range from public 
engagement programming and education departments in museums or other 
public or private institutions to small-scale independent curatorial projects that 
adopt the educative process as their main methodology. Also prominent in the 
volume and in further recent bibliographies on art and pedagogy are self-
organized practices that aspire to activism—often in relation to legal 
frameworks for higher education such as the Bologna process, which is a 
                                                          
1 Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson, introduction to Curating and the Educational Turn, ed. Paul O’Neill and 
Mick Wilson (London: Open Editions, 2010), 12. O’Neill and Wilson differentiate between the 
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series of agreements between European countries aiming at comparability in 
the standards of higher education.2 O’Neill and Wilson consider the discursive 
element to be the most critical ‘line of analysis’ of the various 
educational/curatorial paths in or around the art world.3 The authors’ distinction 
between the educational and the discursive is sound at least at a practical 
level; not all education departments or educational programming within art 
institutions are necessarily predominantly discourse-based and not all aspects 
of art education rely on discursive formats. In this chapter, I will mainly refer to 
discursive practices and projects as well as the discursive-in-general which 
Simon Sheikh understands as a mode of addressing a public on behalf of an 
(art) institution and thus, in such context, it would always retain its relation to 
the educational and the pedagogical.4  
In previous chapters, discursivity has also been implicitly pertinent through the 
notions of signification and enunciation within the conceptual remit of instituent 
praxis. Even though Guattari aims at the theorisation of the enunciative as the 
non-discursive and the a-significational toward which Dardot and Laval’s 
instituent praxis could arguably be geared, I will attempt a strategic 
reconciliation of instituent praxis with discursivity in its Foucauldian vein, i.e. 
its enunciative vein. Such reconciliation consolidates the relation between 
Dardot and Laval’s definition of instituent praxis (i.e. the co-creation of new 
significations as rules of law) with its psychoanalytic and pathic element, albeit 
within the discursive. This relation also takes a critical distance from utopian 
notions of abolition of discourse. Foucault’s views are insightful. 
[D]iscourse is really only an activity, of writing in the first case, of 
reading in the second and exchange in the third. This exchange, 
this writing, this reading never involve anything but signs. 
Discourse thus nullifies itself, in reality, in placing itself at the 
disposal of the signifier.5  
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ed. Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson (London: Open Editions, 2010), 69.  
5 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972), 228. 




Foucault also comments incisively on the bipolarity – at least in western 
knowledge contexts – consisting in the ‘supremacy’ of discourse in general or 
‘logophilia’ and the lurking radical fear around it or ‘profound logophobia:’   
It is as though these taboos, these barriers, thresholds and limits 
were deliberately disposed in order, at least partly, to master and 
control the great proliferation of discourse, in such a way as to 
relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements; to organise 
its disorder so as to skate round its most uncontrollable aspects.6 
 
In order to analyse this fear, Foucault suggests a turn to three functions that 
would radically break from the ‘current thinking’ on discourse: ‘to question our 
will to truth; to restore to discourse its character as an event; to abolish the 
sovereignty of the signifier.’7 
Here, the notion of power in Foucault emerges as key, in its persistent 
governing and dispersed quality that extends to the very limits of discourse. 
Power regulates the regimes of truth and edifices of knowledge, which are 
seen as substantiated by signs, meaning and the governing relations that 
connect them. The sovereignty of the signifier describes and prescribes the 
power relation between signifier and signified, in that the former has primacy 
over the latter. The macro-scale of this condition takes the form of the 
‘supremacy’ of discourse, as the latter is placed ‘at the disposal of the signifier.’ 
For Foucault, questioning our will to truth, restoring discourse as an event and 
abolishing the sovereignty of the signifier would mean a shift in established 
and reigning power relations. It is important to note that this would be a shift in 
power rather than its abolition. Such a shift might, however, be closely related 
to a challenging of the insistence of power over the actually ‘uncontrollable’ 
potential of discourse, as aspects of the psyche would come to the fore and 
reveal themselves as irreducibly active in the discourse. In other words, as 
Foucault’s references to logophilia and logophobia might suggest, fear or 
desire cannot be absent from an assessment of the pervasiveness of power – 
whether in discourse or elsewhere. Yet, albeit challenged, power (in its fluidity) 
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cannot be extinct from the quest towards instituent praxis, which crucially 
merges the psyche and the production of subjectivity with decisions around 
what should be just. 
 
Therefore, even though Guattari’s thinking of the proto-subjective, pathic, 
machinic and a-significational seeks and points to non-discursive modes, the 
discursive as such or power cannot be eradicated from the production of 
speaking subjects. However, Foucault’s pertinence of power in discourse 
could be understood in a post-structural framework that seeks to thwart the 
sovereignty of the signifier. This relation fundamentally involves fear, ‘desire’ 
and the psyche, not least as they manifest in discursive ‘exclusion’ and 
‘prohibition’.8  
Once again, I will not seek to locate actualisations or implementations of 
instituent praxis; rather, I will speculate on mappings and articulations of 
potential terrains for instituent praxis. I will examine possible insights the theory 
of instituent praxis could offer in relation to the discursive conditions in the 
contemporary art world (and elsewhere). In this, I will problematise the 
reduction of the discursive to dialogical or communicational formats and 
models (without in the least diminishing the importance of such formats and 
models and without neglecting the theoretical permutations that dwell with the 
dialogical, agonistic or even public aspects of the discursive). My line of 
argument will instead gravitate toward an understanding of the discursive as 
the polyhedral site of enunciation including and extending beyond its 
interrelation with dialogical models. The discursive as a site is incisively 
discussed in a rigorous art-historical analysis of site-specificity from 1997 by 
Miwon Kwon who observes that ‘both the art work’s relationship to the actuality 
of a location (as site) and the social conditions of the institutional frame (as 
site) are subordinate to a discursively determined site that is delineated as a 
field of knowledge, intellectual exchange, or cultural debate.’9 For Kwon, 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 216. 
9 Miwon Kwon, ‘One Place After Another: Notes on Site Specificity,’ October 80 (Spring 1997): 92 
[emphasis in original]. 




‘discursively’ means ‘(inter)textually,’ a modality that resembles ‘the pattern of 
movement in electronic spaces of the Internet and cyberspace, which are […] 
structured to be experienced transitively.’10 In Chapter 1, following Fraser, 
Danto, Buchloh and Foster, I have suggested that it is art institutions and 
discourses rather than the art itself that validate art as art and demarcate an 
art world. What we begin to glimpse through Kwon’s elaboration on the 
intricacies between the discursive mode and the shaping of contemporary 
subjectivity is that they extend beyond the increased importance of discursivity 
as a constitutive force of the art world and dovetail with the contingent, 
transitive and artificial process and sense of transversal autopoiesis. 
It should also be noted that both the discursively constituted art world and the 
concept of the production of subjectivity contextualised through instituent 
praxis with its associations to signification and enunciation appear more akin 
to one another once the notion of the production of knowledge is considered. 
Directly associated with Rogoff’s notion of knowledge as affective and 
pertaining to a-significatory forms that I discuss in Chapter 3 is her proposition 
that the epistemological division between the discursive and the artistic field 
fully collapses and artistic practice is redefined as production of knowledge. 
Challenging the normative duality whereby, on the one hand, art practice is 
equated with the creation of object-based artworks and on the other, art theory 
is reduced to analytical or interpretive criticism, Rogoff argues that ‘instead of 
“criticism” being an act of judgement addressed to a clear cut object of 
criticism, we now recognise not just our own imbrication in the object or the 
cultural moment but also the performative nature of any action or stance we 
might be taking in relation to it.’11 Pertinent to this is her definition of the 
curatorial which she understands ‘not as a profession but as an organizing and 
assembling impulse, [that] opens up a set of possibilities, mediations perhaps, 
                                                          
10 Kwon, ‘One Place After Another,’ 95 [emphasis in original]. 
11  Irit Rogoff, ‘What is a Theorist,’ in The State of Art Criticism, ed. James Elkin and Michael Newman. 
(New York, London: Routledge, 2007), 97-98. The phrase ‘our own imbrication’ refers to the 
imbrication of whoever assumes the position of the critic.  
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to formulate subjects that may not be part of an agreed-upon canon of 
“subjects” worthy of investigation.’12 
In short, according to Rogoff, the product of art, curating, and art theory is 
knowledge. Rogoff’s recognition of thinning boundaries is astute and extends 
even beyond art, theory and curating as she suggests that ‘we are living out a 
complex entanglement of practices in which it is almost impossible to chart the 
boundaries between imagining, making, theorizing, questioning, displaying, 
being enthralled by, administrating, and translating.’13 Interestingly, the 
observable adhesive element is discursive, or rather, conversational: ‘The field 
we currently call art consists of the intersections between all these, and it takes 
the form of a huge conversation.’14  
Despite the advocation for and exploration of the affective, a-significational and 
non-discursive aspects of knowledge, power asymmetries in the art world and 
its educative institutional remit are far from eradicated. Yet, discursive 
practices in the realm of the curatorial have often been seen as contributing to 
such democratising efforts. As Tom Holert and Mick Wilson have noted, for 
some curators ‘critical perspectives on art’ have migrated ‘from the mere retinal 
to the epistemic’ and ‘from the aesthetic to the educational’.15 This shift 
resonates strongly with the practices of Institutional Critique and their artistic 
precursors that polemically uphold the centrality of the institutional in its 
relation to discourse, power and language, often at the expense of the 
perceptual and the specular. Viewpoints that hail discursive practices as 
democratising regard them as a counter-pole to the exhibition form which is 
usually associated with a finite, aesthetic and authorial result and thereby 
vulnerable to spectacularisation. Wilson has pointed to the paradoxical 
                                                          
12 Irit Rogoff, ‘Free.’ E-flux Journal, no.14 (2010), accessed September 05, 2015,  
http://www.e-flux.com/journal/free/. 
13 Irit Rogoff, ‘On Being Serious in the Art World,’ in Visual Cultures as Seriousness, by Gavin Butt and 
Irit  
Rogoff (London: Goldsmiths, University of London; Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013), 72. 
14 Rogoff, ‘On Being Serious,’ 72. 
15 Tom Holert and Mick Wilson, ‘Latent Essentialisms: An E-mail Exchange on Art, Research and 
Education,’ in Curating and the Educational Turn, ed. Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson (London: Open 
Editions, 2010), 322. 




annihilation or obfuscation of what is exhibited through repeated and 
spectacular display and suggested that the exhibition remains the ’dominant 
valorisation of art as art’.16 Angela Dimitrakaki has also made a related case 
of how the contemporary exhibition form undermines and obfuscates artistic 
labour.17 Elke Krasny identifies a ‘conversational mode’ through which 
knowledge has been produced in the curatorial realm since the 1980s.18 She 
argues that this mode has been circumventing the ‘prevailing exhibitionary 
imperative’ without of course overthrowing it. In pointing at the etymology of 
the word conversation that entails ‘turning and twisting’ with others, Krasny 
relates the conversational process with ‘transformational qualities’ as well as 
‘informal’ ones. In terms of curatorial practice, she associates the expansion 
of discursive practices with conversations performed directly to a public or 
conducted privately and later publicised. Krasny suggests that conversations 
conducted ‘in front of others rather than only with others’ relinquish ‘a certain 
degree of informality’ and turn ‘public’. However, Krasny does not ultimately 
distinguish between the discursive and the conversational and acknowledges 
that even the participants of a conversation can constitute a public.  
What could be deducted from these viewpoints is that discursive or 
conversational formats are often considered to allow for more direct 
participation, informality and transformation than the exhibition form. By 
inviting (informal) discursive interaction and allocating knowledge production 
to a diverse set of contributors/audience rather than to a single authorial figure 
(usually the artist or the curator of the exhibition), discursive practices could 
indeed be regarded as unsettling the common idea of the exhibition as object-
based or screen-based visual art arranged in space by the expert curator, 
                                                          
16 Mick Wilson (panel presentation at On a Par? A Colloquy on Enquiry, Working Together, and 
Curating, co-organised by Framework and Valand Academy, The Pearce Institute, Glasgow, 
September 30, 2016.) Instead of the dead-end dilemma of exhibition versus non-exhibition, Wilson 
suggests a turn to the ‘exhibitionable’: what can or cannot be exhibited or what shows differently.  
17 Angela Dimitrakaki, ‘Art, Globalisation and the Exhibition Form,’ Third Text 26, no. 3 (2012):317-19, 
accessed September 17, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1080/09528822.2012.679039.   
18 Elke Krasny, ‘The Conversational Turn in Curating or Let’s Twist and Talk,’ Open Space, no. 1 




whose expertise is to be passed on to the inexpert viewer, reproducing an 
authoritarian top-down pattern of knowledge-power. Mark Hutchinson paints a 
picture of curatorial work as administrative by definition and as such 
structurally necessitating expertise in order to justify its own function.19 Dave 
Beech also offers an account on cultural expertise discussing it through the 
Weberian managerialism that emerged at the end of the 19th century as the 
inevitable outcome of the rise of bureaucracy in all fields, that eventually 
included art, culture and entertainment. The main idea in Beech’s account is 
that Weberian rational bureaucracy by definition requires and has to rely on 
validated expertise as this is the only way to ensure that all parts of work or 
services – including culture and art – will be efficient, productive and properly 
conducted. Nonetheless, as I have hinted in Chapter 3, the Weberian form of 
expertise that rests upon a legal-rational validation and authority does not 
reflect adequately the figure of the arts or entertainment expert-as-facilitator 
encountered in post-Fordist economic and managerial models, whereby 
horizontal structures and decision-making, all-hierarchy-levels brainstorming, 
worker-participatory and creative design of work processes, self-evaluation, 
interdisciplinary perspectives and transferable skills are prominent if not 
dominant realities. What is more, discursive practices resonate strongly with 
both the figure of the expert-as-facilitator and many of the aforementioned 
post-Fordist managerial realities.  
It could be argued that at the very least the rise of the discursive terrain as 
largely independent of the exhibition challenges the historical monopoly of the 
exhibition form as the proper way of engaging with art. Whether the general 
idea of appropriateness or correctness in engaging with art is challenged 
remains to be discussed and depends on the different types of discursive 
practices. Furthermore, the expansion of discursive practices in the art world 
suggests that artistic discourse is now less confined within the barricaded 
clusters of expertise and power as they also tend to congregate in Universities 
                                                          
19 Mark Hutchinson, ‘Who’d Be a Curator?,’ catalogue essay for Outpost project, Edinburgh Festival, 
1994, accessed September 2, 2015, 
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and other art-historical and art-critical disciplinary formations including (non-
)academic art publications. Interestingly, the amplification of the discursive 
paradigm within curatorial environments has co-developed with shifts in art 
schools and higher education institutions that have sought to align themselves 
with such environments and experiment within the paradigm. However, such 
shifts showcasing the current artistic-curatorial-pedagogical compound as fully 
immersed in the art world should also be seen as aligned with a more extended 
history that dates back at least to the 1960s, if not in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Indicatively, Charles Esche, the founder of the pedagogic 
experimental project ‘Proto-academy’ (1998-2002) in Edinburgh College of Art, 
has attempted a loose twentieth-century genealogy of universities and art 
schools that questioned hierarchical teaching methods and adopted more 
experimental approaches in Europe and North America: 
Consider Kazimir Malevich’s art group UNOVIS in Vitebsk and 
the Institute of Artistic Culture, called INKhUK, in Moscow ; the 
Bauhaus in Weimar ; the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design 
in Halifax and CalArts in Los Angeles in the 1970s ; the Free 
International Universities of the 1970s and 1980s under the 
initiative of Joseph Beuys and Caroline Tisdall, among others ; 
and more recently Goldsmiths in London and Jaroslaw 
Kozlowski’s class at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw.20  
 
A digressive section on the project/institution 
 
The organisational form of the project has been widely theorised as a key 
structure of late capitalism’s precarious, mobile, flexible and service-based 
production. In their seminal work on The New Spirit of Capitalism, published in 
1999, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello outline the concept of the project as a 
‘short-lived’ ‘transitory form’ or endeavour whose participants seek to multiply 
                                                          
20 Charles Esche, ‘Start with a Table…,’ in Curating and the Educational Turn, ed. Paul O’Neill and 
Mick Wilson (London: Open Editions, 2010), 312. 
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their connections for further projects through networking.21 In her book Artificial 
Hells, the art historian Claire Bishop discusses the ‘art project’ using Boltanski 
and Chiapello’s definition. However, Bishop seems to have identified a 
somewhat different aspiration for the concept of the project in art projects since 
the 1990s. She argues that a ‘project in the sense I am identifying as crucial to 
art after 1989 aspires to replace the work of art as a finite object with an open-
ended, post-studio, research-based, social process, extending over time and 
mutable in form.’22 So even as the project may be inextricably linked with late 
capitalism, which perpetuates precarious labour, in the world of art it comes 
with radically democratizing effects. As Bishop observes, ‘[a]lthough the 
project is introduced as a term in the 1990s to describe a more embedded and 
socially/politically aware mode of artistic practice, it is equally a survival 
strategy for creative individuals under the uncertain labour conditions of 
neoliberalism.’23  
Bishop concurs with Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument that the (art) project’s 
success is unrelated to any ‘intrinsic value’ and that it is dependent on the 
generation of further projects through the participants’ connections.24 Thus, in 
order for workers in the creative industries to survive the precariousness of 
labour intensified by late capitalism, they have to operate in a project-based 
manner, which entails networking and constantly striving to make multiple 
connections. Given this set of circumstances, it could be argued that the 
project has become a hegemonic structure. Projects are increasingly seen as 
part of the (art) canon outside of which lies everything perceived to be uncool, 
boring, clueless, or naively ambitious. Being in-the-know regarding what is 
timely and relevant makes a good worker, and what is timely and relevant (i.e., 
the project) reinforces the precarious labour to which workers knowingly 
commit themselves. It could be argued, however, that the project has lost its 
                                                          
21 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, ‘The New Spirit of Capitalism,’ International Journal of Politics, 
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22 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 
2012), 215. 
23 Bishop, Artificial Hells, 216. 
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ubiquity as a structure—or, rather, that its ubiquity has long been so 
irreversible that mourning for a pre-project period seems futile. Instead, it 
would make more sense to examine the shifts brought about by the 
pervasiveness of the project in its entanglement with other organisational 
forms and, in particular, with institutions as bearers of nostalgia for stability and 
security.  
Raunig uses terms such as ‘non-institutions’ and ‘pseudo-institutions’ as well 
as the ‘project-based institution’ to discuss institutional assemblages of 
creative industries.25 According to him, these assemblages are ‘no longer 
structured in the form of huge media corporations, but mainly as micro-
enterprises of self-employed cultural entrepreneurs’ that ‘prove to be 
temporary, ephemeral, project based.’26 Moreover, as theorist Simon Sheikh 
observes, there is no small-scale, project-based, or ‘niche’ initiative that mega-
institutions like the Tate Modern cannot reproduce, imitate, or even invent 
under their brand name.27 Frustrating though this may be for small-scale 
radical endeavours, we need to be mindful of the way we perceive or construct 
institutional polarities or categories. Sheikh also suggests that in the early 21st 
century there is no such thing as a stable (art) institution, for even the Tate 
faces precariousness and financial instability, which lead to unsatisfying work 
contracts for its high-profile staff. I would add that even medium-scale, non-
profit institutions (for instance, in the UK) tend to receive mixed funding, and 
therefore it becomes difficult to categorise them as ‘public’ institutions because 
of the nature of their funding. Conversely, often commercially active and for-
profit institutions also attract public funding through non-profit sub-platforms. 
For instance, in 2014, the international art for-profit conglomerate/ institution 
Frieze (Frieze Events, Frieze Publishing and Frieze Art, owned by Denmark 
Street Limited) launched a non-profit venture or project (Frieze Public 
                                                          
25 Gerald Raunig, Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2013), 
100-01. 
26 Raunig, Factories of Knowledge, 101. 
27 Simon Sheikh, ‘Simon Sheikh explores the legacy of New Institutionalism’ (paper presented at the 
symposium Desire Lines: A Symposium on Experimental Institutional Formats, David Roberts Art 
Foundation, London, November 28–29, 2014). 
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Programmes) that is entitled to public funding internationally. According to 
Frieze co-founder Matthew Slotover, the venture has been ‘supported by EU 
Culture grants, private foundations, commercial sponsorship, and to a much 
lesser extent, the Arts Council of England.’28   
Projects and institutions co-depend and co-exist to such an extent that their 
temporal differences, such as duration and permanence, as well as their 
accessibility, stability, and security are no longer attributable to a project-
versus-institution axis. Perhaps in parallel with the general and global demise 
or increasing incapability of state structures to cater to public needs, it is no 
longer credible to argue that institutions (even public ones) are pillars of 
stability, job security, or permanence. At the same time, as I will further discuss 
in relation to the Former West research project, there can be projects that 
secure enough (public) funding to remunerate their contributors to a very 
satisfactory extent, albeit mostly as occasional participations, without being 
consumed by neoliberal forces or perishing into precarity. Their scale and 
duration of activity could easily place them in the category of institutions, if the 
distinction between projects and institutions had to be maintained. 
Therefore, the usual perception of the institutional terrain in the arts that 
distinguishes the small-scale, self-funded, DIY projects or initiatives from the 
medium- or large-scale public or private institutions is deeply problematic, for 
it attributes de facto radicality and precariousness to the first type and 
stagnancy and security to the second. Understanding projects as embedded 
within an institutional assemblage whereby institution is a process and not 
necessarily a stable, monolithic function, it becomes clear that precariousness 
is the general condition underpinning the current organisation of labour and, 
as such, it is encountered throughout the institutional spectrum. However, what 
remains crucial in this networked terrain is instituent praxis, for it would 
propose a breaking with hierarchical or stagnant power relations and 
established norms. Indeed, Sheikh concludes that issues of size and stability—
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or, I would add, permanence and duration—come second in relation to issues 
of ‘governmentality.’29 He maintains that all institutions and institution-making 
should be seen in terms of ‘modes of governance and not just as places that 
produce and represent artistic or theoretical positions or reach out to an 
audience.’30 The way institutions, projects or initiatives are governed should 
aim at being instituent, for instance, by breaking down stagnant hierarchies 
and democratising work processes. Work processes can range from 
exhibition-making or event-staging to what is considered tedious or managerial 
work. Thus, we might locate instituent moments either in terms of ground-
breaking collectives or through reforms in large-scale influential organisations.  
 
Four European university-projects 
 
In keeping with the category of the project-institution, in this section, I examine 
examples of university-projects, as a particular sub-category that engages with 
the institutional form of the university, the institution of Higher Education par 
excellence, around the globe since the modern era. The projects I will examine 
engage with processes and formats of knowledge production that cross artistic 
and general education. Their small-scale project-based organisational form is 
clearly juxtaposed to the large-scale, national or metropolitan and ideally 
universal character of the university, both as it has been produced since 
modernity and in its contemporary neoliberal iterations. This juxtaposition has 
an experimental and propositional character animated in a realm of activist, 
political and artistic practice. 
The four university-projects I discuss are the Copenhagen Free University 
(CFU) and the Anti-university of London (as a joint case study), Free/Slow 
University of Warsaw (F/SUW) and the Silent University. In the first part, I 
discuss the Copenhagen Free University (CFU) (active between 2001 and 
                                                          




2007) and trace its posterior sibling-project, the ongoing archive Antihistory 
(active since 2012) that focuses on the Anti-university of London (established 
in 1968). The CFU was founded by artists Henriette Heise and Jakob Jakobsen 
and aimed at operating within and exploring the ‘self-organised institutional 
framework of a free university.’31 The CFU sought to be affiliated with 
Situationism and referred to itself as a ‘self-institution’. The Free International 
Universities within the remit of work and legacy of Joseph Beuys largely 
promoted the unleashing of ‘democratic creativity’ and have had a relatively 
strong art-world resonance; Beuys founded the Free International University 
of Creativity and Interdisciplinary Research in his studio in 1973. Albeit present 
in the art world, the CFU could be seen as extending an earlier tradition of Free 
Universities that includes the Free University of New York and the Free 
University of Berkeley.32 These universities resonated with a general climate 
of political upheaval and emerged predominantly out of drop-out or ousted staff 
from recognised universities due to protest or political dissonance around 
issues of civil rights, free speech, socialism and war opposition in the 1960s.33  
The CFU upheld its independence from and rejection of state higher education 
and research structures and its opposition to a ‘corporate way of thinking’ that 
has been increasingly encountered in ‘formal universities.’ All the CFU 
meetings took place at the founding artists’ apartment and courses headlined 
‘Art and Economy, Radical History, Media Activism, Feminist Organisations, 
                                                          
31 The Free U Resistance Committee of June 18, 2011, ‘All Power to the Free Universities of the 
Future,’ Art and Education, July 4, 2011, accessed March 11, 2016, 
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'Trauma 1-11: Stories about the Free University in Copenhagen and the Surrounding Society in the 
Last Ten Years', (Roskilde, Museet for Samtidskunst, 2011) and was made in collaboration with CFU’s 
‘apprentices’ Emma Hedditch, Howard Slater and Anthony Davies. Also, the CFU had a discursive 
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and Refugee Subjectivity.’34 The structure, content and organisation of the 
courses were collectively designed by all project participants and the 
conversational process was emphasised over final outputs.35 In 2007, the CFU 
Committee decided to terminate the project as by then they thought of it as ‘too 
fixed’ in its identification with a particular ‘discourse relating to emancipatory 
education within academia and the art scene.’36 They embraced the merits of 
the temporary nature of their project as they did not permit its perceived fixity 
to persist and fully cement. They announced the closure in a victorious 
statement that credited the hitherto experimentations and explorations of the 
project as continuations of the broader institutional framework of free 
universities and as potential ‘hooks’ for future ones. In 2010, however, they 
were notified by the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Development 
of a new higher education law that bans the use of the word ‘university’ in 
names of institutions unless they are state-authorised and interdicts self-
organised and free (in the sense of anti-State or non-statutory) ‘universities’ 
throughout the country. The ministry was aware of CFU’s preceding closure, 
so this notification served as warning in case they ever decided to reopen. The 
ministry officials justified this decision claiming that it was to prevent the dismay 
of students. 
The year 2012 finds Jakobsen conducting archival work on the Anti-university 
of London, an experimental therapeutic/ educational initiative that was founded 
in 1968 by psychoanalysts and psychiatrists Joseph Berke, David Cooper, 
Leon Redler, Juliet Mitchell and Marxian economist Allen Krebs.37 The Anti-
university of London experimented with the idea of psychotherapy as part of 
learning in a context that attempted to be constantly self-reflective and 
challenging to its own operative structure. It was initially to be integrated with 
the ’anti-hospital‘ in Kingsley Hall (Bow, East London), an experimental 
                                                          
34 Jakob Jakobsen, ‘We Have Won!’ (presentation at the Creative Time Summit: Revolutions in Public 
Practice 2, the Cooper Union, New York, October 9, 2010), accessed March 14, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3QlXOf1Hzw. 
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36 Ibid. 
37 Jakob Jakobsen, ‘The Pedagogy of Negating the Institution,’ Mute, November 14, 2013, accessed 
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psychiatric community independent of official bodies and initiated in 1965 by a 
team of psychiatrists, many of whom would soon also be involved in the Anti-
university and included the prominent Scottish psychiatrist Ronald David 
Laing.38 In this anti-hospital practice, there was a desire to disconnect from the 
preexisting roles of doctor and patient.39 Many of the doctors had moved in 
Kingsley Hall in order to create a shared everyday with patients in a ’self-
organised therapeutic community.’40 Berke's propositions to develop the anti-
hospital into an anti-university incorporating the alternative educational format 
and mentality of the Free University of New York (FYNY) in which Berke had 
been involved fell through, as they were deemed too divergent from a primarily 
therapeutic orientation.41 In December 1967, Berke’s proposed initiative 
materialised in Shoreditch, East London, aided by friendly rent prices on behalf 
of the landlords, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, and a loan from the 
Institute of Phenomenological Studies.42 The courses were open to everyone 
and they were attended by audiences that ranged from residents of Kingsley 
Hall to students of  the London School of Economics. Topics covered political 
theory, social movements, art, literature and poetry, psychiatry and 
psychology, media and experimental drugs. Despite the impression of solid 
structure that a course catalogue might give, there was a strong sense of 
openness and urgency to participate in the process of collective self-reflection 
around aspects of curation of syllabus and organisation, which often aimed at 
disengaging from distinctions between students, teachers and administrators. 
Many people had begun living in the building, a development that was mainly 
welcomed. After a six-month running period, however, due to tensions 
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between the administrating and coordinating committee and other participants 
and building-associated financial shortages, the Anti-university had to leave its 
premises. It continued to operate at least until 1971 through meetings at 
people’s flats and other temporary locations largely coordinated via telephone.  
Jakobsen conducted a large part of his archival work on the Anti-university in 
the context of Documenta 13 (2012) and the adjacent project AndAndAnd 
(January 2012 until May 2013) and under the auspices of MayDay Rooms in 
London.43 Jakobsen’s archival work that includes visual documentation and 
new interviews and essays has led to the publication Antitabloid and the blog 
Antihistory.org, both available for free. For various reasons, Jakobsen shifted 
from being actively involved with the setting up and running of an actual free 
university in the early 2000s to conducting a thorough archival but also active 
work into the historical legacy and the twenty-first-century resonances of an 
anti-university in the late 1960s. Instead of interpreting the historical 
significance of this shift that would range from case-specific structural and 
practical reasons to a potential pertinence to a broader ‘archival’ turn – another 
purported recent turn in the art world, I would like to simply register the two 
different modes of engaging with the setting-up of alternative and mainly 
discursive institutions.  
Free/Slow University of Warsaw (F/SUW) is another university-project initiated 
in 2009 by Kuba Szreder, a freelance curator and currently a lecturer in the 
Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw in collaboration, with Bogna Świątkowska, 
the chairman and artistic director of Bęc Zmiana Foundation of Warsaw. In his 
PhD thesis (2014), Szreder describes F/SUW as an ‘unofficial research 
collective, which investigates conditions of contemporary cultural production, 
is involved in politicised self-education, partakes in public debates regarding 
cultural policies and publishes related materials.’44 F/SUW should be first and 
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foremost geographically differentiated from all the aforementioned practices, 
as it operates in a post-socialist capital city. Despite its rapidly developing 
economy and the adjacent enforced narratives of ‘transitioning’ to a 
progressive, capitalist democracy, contemporary Poland often shows little 
tolerance to Marxist or other forms of anti-capitalist discourse, even though it 
is only totalitarian practices that are officially outlawed. Marxist conferences 
and members of the Communist Party of Poland are semi-cencored or overly 
policed in what has been described as ‘anti-communist and anti-left witch 
hunt.’45 It should nonetheless be mentioned that a research study of a 
monographic output that explicitly examines the university as common comes 
from Poland (Krystian Szadkowski, 2015).46 In the midst of this dire political 
climate, F/SUW thematises the ‘conditions of cultural production’ and labour 
with an emphasis on ‘project-making’ as the dominant organisational structure 
‘under neoliberalism,’ to which it counterposes slowness. Initially, the 
strategies of F/SUW aimed at a ‘discursive critique’ of neoliberal amendments 
to cultural policy and included ‘critical discussions, seminars, bar-camps, 
workshops,’ the publication of the Polish translation of the European Cultural 
Policies 2015 report (Lind and Minichbauer, 2009) and the co-authored 
Manifesto of the Committee for Radical Change in Culture (2009). F/SUW’s 
activity shifted gradually from critique to research-orientated discourse without 
however diverting from its thematic areas. In early 2016, F/SUW released ‘Art 
Factory. Division of labour and distribution of resources in the Polish field of 
visual art,’ which Szreder regards as the project’s ‘most comprehensive 
report.’47  In 2016 and 2017, F/SUW organised two research summer camps 
respectively, the first in Poland and the second in Greece. In 2016, F/SUW 
collaborated with the Museum of Modern Art in Warsaw to host a session of 
Former West, a European transnational research project which I discuss 
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further in subsequent sections. The session focused on issues of creative 
labour under post-work conditions. Since 2018, F/SUW has been in a ‘dormant 
state’ and has ‘mutated into’ projects and organisations, some of which I refer 
to in following chapters.48  
F/SUW was an informal initiative with no official or legal status. It had no offices 
or set location and was mostly present at (artistic) discursive events such as 
international conferences.49 Unlike the CFU and the Anti-university of London, 
F/SUW (in cooperation with Bęc Zmiana Foundation) was partly supported by 
public funding (Municipality of Warsaw, Polish Ministry of Culture and National 
Heritage), even though it was openly critical to the Polish State’s cultural 
policies including ‘grant systems.’50 Furthermore, F/SUW proclaims its direct 
inspiration from Beuys’s Free International University.51 This influence is 
arguably accordant with F/SUW’s focus on the social conditions and relations 
of cultural production. 
The Silent University was initiated in 2012 in London by artist Ahmet Öğüt 
(born in Turkey, based in Amsterdam and Berlin). The project drew inspiration 
from the Society to Encourage Studies at Home, a Boston-based women’s 
network of education that operated through mail exchange (and therefore 
silence) and was founded as early as 1873 by Anna Eliot Ticknor.52 In a similar 
logic, the Silent University developed into a knowledge exchange platform 
among refugees, asylum seekers or other marginalised parts of society who 
have experienced displacement. Such displaced individuals are often not 
allowed to work or their skills/ expertise are not recognised as such in the 
country of residence due to legal, linguistic, cultural and other reasons.53 
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Silence refers both to the silenced subjects of knowledge as marginalised but 
also to the ‘silent’ modes of knowledge exchange and production. Such modes 
aspire to circumvent linguistic and disciplinary barriers and arguably extend 
towards enunciation and affective knowledge, through group reflection, 
performance and gesture, writing and other visual elements of the knowledge 
exchange/production process.54 The Silent University operates through 
lectures, discussions, events, publications and resource archives. Titles of 
accessible online courses include ‘How to Set up Your Own Business’, ‘the 
History of Kurdish Literature’ and ‘Outside of Asylum’.55 The teaching of 
courses is open to anyone who wants to share their professional or academic 
knowledge or their lived experience and anecdotal knowledge of displacement. 
Contrary to the previous university-projects, the Silent University has been not 
only renowned in the art world but also supported by and collaborated with 
prestigious art institutions throughout its course. It started in the context of a 
residency that Öğüt had with Tate Modern and Delfina Foundation and was 
thus supported by the two institutions and developed in collaboration with the 
Tate’s curators Nora Razian and Cynthia Griffin. The project later migrated into 
other European art institutions such as the Showroom in London, Tensta 
Konsthall and ABF Stockholm in Sweden and Stadtkuratorin Hamburg, was 
active in Aman, Jordan and Athens, Greece and gradually developed into a 
small-scale organisation or, indeed a project-institution. In 2013, the Silent 
University won the Visible Award.56 The project is currently active and has 
developed into further collaborative permutations of itself such as the Silent 
University Ruhr (active since 2015) in Mülheim an der Ruhr – a collaboration 
between Impulse Theater Festival, Ringlokschuppen Ruhr and Urbane Künste 
Ruhr. In 2018, the Silent University returned to Stadtkuratorin Hamburg and 
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implemented anti-racist events such as the ‘We ‘ll Come United: the Silent 
University Truck with Open Mike.’57  
 
The discursive, the exhibitionary and the ‘eye of power’58 
 
This analysis of university-projects should not give the impression that the 
curatorial/pedagogical landscape led by discursive practices has shifted or 
strives toward democratic production and distribution of knowledge and 
participatory work ethos. Despite their seeming democratising effects, 
discursive practices are not always celebrated. For example, Peio Aguirre 
states the following: ‘instead of lecture series we have “discursive projects,” 
because the former is now construed as boring; instead of exhibitions, we have 
“multifaceted” events, because the former is now deemed visually hierarchical 
and one-dimensional.’59 Aguirre’s ironic use of quotation marks as well as the 
implied passivity with which ‘we’ are supposedly enduring a situation that is 
‘now’ inflicted upon us allude to another established state of affairs whereby 
‘discursive projects’ and ‘multifaceted’ events form a new methodological 
imperative.  
In his thorough ethnographic analysis of the global biennial circuit from the 
1990s onwards, Panos Kompatsiaris discusses the idea of the ‘discursive 
exhibition’ that refers to ‘widespread conceptions of the art exhibition as a site 
of constructing, rather than merely replicating or reflecting visions of the 
world.’60 According to Kompatsiaris, the discursive exhibition designates a 
‘participatory and discursive mode of address’ that overarches the formats, 
intentions and aims of the exhibition.61 Documenta X (1997) curated by 
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Catherine David is (widely) considered to signal a paradigm shift to the 
discursive exhibition in global large-scale terms.62 Importantly, however, such 
mode of address ultimately bears the authorship of the curator: ‘The 
indisputable author of this discursive happening is the curator, a figure of 
enhanced creative autonomy that partly through the biennial often rises to the 
status of a luminous and acknowledged semi-celebrity.’63 Kompatsiaris’s 
observations indicate that the art world has not exactly switched to discursive 
practices, despite any tendencies towards such switch. Rather, discursivity is 
incorporated in multiple scales into the curatorial-exhibitionary complex 
whereby authorial expertise, individual authorship and spectacularisation are 
far from eradicated. To make matters worse, the purportedly democratising 
shift toward the affective and a-significatory knowledge production appears to 
remain rather limited. In Rogoff’s view, albeit a ‘huge conversation’, the art 
world ultimately hinges and depends on the idea of art as a predominantly 
object-based spectacle: ‘art is, again and again, brought into one single 
category whose ultimate expressions are visual excitements, displayable 
objects, or other ‘consumables’.’64 Furthermore, from a managerial and 
organisational perspective, flattened hierarchies and increased participation 
may not balance the effects of power asymmetries; the absence of 
rationalisation and pre-defined roles goes hand in hand with self-evaluation 
and self-criticism, leading to an increased dependence on power relations built 
on prestige and confidence which in turn are largely attributable to social 
inequalities and biases. In other words, more democratic formats and 
structures do not necessarily reduce dependence on power as expertise in the 
art world, while this expertise translates into familiarity with the discursive 
game and a sense or performance of one’s self-image. This predicament 
arguably extends beyond the labour relations and hierarchies of institutional 
constellations in the art world and reaches existing or potential audiences, 
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oftentimes with highly alienating effects. I return to some of these issues in 
later sections of this chapter. 
In order to begin to disentangle some of the emergent paradoxes or dissonant 
narratives regarding the democratising potential of discursive practices in the 
art world, we need to tap into the core of the discursive in its relation to 
pedagogy in (art) institutional terms and, perhaps more broadly, consider 
potential useful interactions with the conceptual terrain of instituent praxis. Is 
there a more productive way of reformulating the recurring conundrum that 
infallibly fuses the increase of audience participation and public engagement 
with a process of spectacularisation adjacent to discount, squander and other 
symptoms of commodity fetishism? How do otherwise democratising 
processes relate with persisting asymmetries of power, when such 
asymmetries appear unsubstantiated outside the discursive power game but 
really are subordinate to broader social inequalities?  
Simon Sheikh incisively argues that the educational or discursive turn in the 
art world is actually a ‘return’ in that the historical context wherein education is 
examined in relation to power within institutions of display is at least a few 
centuries old, thus predating the expansion of discursive and participatory 
formats in the 1990s, as well as the rise of curating as an expanded and distinct 
professional field.65 Sheikh draws on Tony Bennett’s analysis of museums, 
exhibitions and other institutions of display from the eighteenth century onward 
in North and West Europe in his groundbreaking essay ‘The Exhibitionary 
Complex.’66 Bennett discusses these institutions as formative of people’s taste, 
class consciousness and social mobility, historical and geopolitical 
perspectives and even everyday behavioural habits as these pertain to off-
work time, leisure or the consumption of spectacles. In this, he critiques 
Douglas Crimp’s perspective, which is partly responsible for the association of 
the museums and the disciplines of the art world with the Foucauldian oeuvre 
on institutions of confinement such as ‘the asylum, the clinic and the prison.’67 
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Bennett suggests that there should be a distinction between the purely 
coercive power of institutions of punishment, incarceration and surveillance, 
as addressed by Foucault, and power through persuasion, as encountered in 
European museums or expositions since the eighteenth century, without 
implying that the former mode of power is necessarily absent from such 
exhibitionary institutions.68 According to Bennett’s elaboration on Foucault’s 
writings, the later phase of the carceral system (nineteenth century onwards) 
finds the penitentiary ’removed from the public gaze‘ and aiming at the 
’correction of the offender’ rather than the ‘production of signs for society.’69 
Unlike previous forms of punishment that included public display, in this phase, 
the body of the convicted represented nothing.70 The technologies of 
panopticism ensured that everything was visible to the ‘eye of power’ and 
prevented all other flows of vision and signification.71 The only aim was to 
manipulate and transform the ‘behaviour’ of individual offenders ‘through 
repetition’ and coercion.72  
By contrast, Bennett associates the exhibitionary institutions that developed in 
the same period with display technologies that pertain to the ‘panorama’ as 
much as the panopticon.73 The architectural construction of Crystal Palace, the 
transparent, iron-and-glass, greenhouse-like building that was first designed 
to host the Great Exhibition in 1851 in London, exemplifies a system that allows 
for wide panoramic views from most positions of its interior.74 Such 
exhibitionary technologies encountered also in museums and fairs offered ‘the 
public’ panoramic views to the exhibits but also included points from which 
‘everyone could be seen, thus combining the functions of the spectacle and 
surveillance.’75 Bennett crucially argues that, on the one hand, in this 
exhibitionary context, the ‘specular dominance of the eye of power’ is 
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‘democratised’ and becomes ‘available to all,’ as, unlike the dynamics of 
visibility in the panopticon, ‘the crowd’ can see everything and everyone in the 
crowd.76 At the same time, the crowd becomes ‘visible to itself’ as ‘the ultimate 
spectacle’ and thus, due to the coercive effect of being visible by power, the 
crowd is ‘regulated through self-observation.’77 Furthermore, Bennett argues 
that in contrast to the dynamics of the panopticon where the convicts are 
related to the eye of power as individuals, the crowd permits signification ‘en 
masse’.78 Therefore, in the exhibitionary complex, the specular public does not 
simply function as a mirror/screen for coerced self-surveillant individuals; it is 
also a coming together in order to willingly watch, learn and transform.  
Following up on this discussion, Sheikh concurs that ‘the right way of seeing 
was not to be enforced on the spectators but, through the exhibitionary 
complex, was offered as narrative pleasure, giving the spectator access to the 
viewpoints of power […].’79 Regarding contemporary institutions of the art 
world, Sheikh contends that they sustain this dual implication of both the 
‘means of control over the language on art’ and the simultaneous provision of 
the means ‘to know what power knows, to know what is both desirable and 
attainable.’80 The educational or the discursive turn is understood as a 
contemporary facet of the curatorial, mediational and pedagogic functions 
which are distinct merely on the basis of rhetoric.81 Essentially, the pedagogy 
at play as mediation and/or as curating is ‘constitutive of the institution.’82 For 
Sheikh, pedagogy as institutional mediation amounts to the formulation of a 
‘mode of address’ that ‘produces a public.’83 This mode of address unfolds as 
‘the exhibition […] places the spectators in a specific relation to works and 
narratives.’84 Or more broadly, this mode unfolds in all those curatorial and 
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organisational ‘processes’ of the institution and – I would add – the project-
institution, that ‘inscribe both subjects and objects in specific relations of power 
and knowledge, in a transfer of knowledge and a coordination of desire and 
agency.’85 Thus, in Sheikh’s view, the production of a public as pedagogy is 
inherent in the function of the institution and refers to the production of subjects 
through and with (objects of) knowledge, desire and agency. The question that 
immediately arises on a definitional level is whether what is particular about 
instituent praxis would approximate conceptually Sheikh’s understanding of 
the production of publics through modes of address.  
 
The public sphere and counterpublics 
 
Sheikh’s conceptualisation of the public follows up explicitly the theoretical 
thread or tradition of the public sphere as it was postulated by Jürgen 
Habermas in the 1960s and later critiqued and redefined by various authors.86 
Habermas’s notion of the bourgeois public sphere rests upon the idea of 
private individuals of the newly emerging bourgeoisie coming together on the 
premise of rational and critical deliberation on matters that concern them.87 In 
this sphere, the bourgeoisie could identify and publicly deliberate on its 
economic but also ‘psychological’ particularities and ‘interests’ and for the first 
time claim them as separate from and defensible by the newly emerging and 
shifting modern State and its authority.88 The public sphere was thus seen as 
positioned between the ‘private realm’ (comprising the ‘conjugal family’s 
internal space’ and the ‘realm of commodity exchange and social labour’) and 
the State that was shifting from aristocratic and feudal forms into modern, 
bureaucratic and nationally centralised structures.89 This in-between public 
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realm took shape in newly founded ‘institutions’ such as ‘the world of letters,’ 
the press and the parliament.90 Habermas historicised the public sphere as in 
principle willing to include the ‘public at large’; ‘everyone had to be able to 
participate’ and open to subjects of all social and educational statuses.91 At the 
same time, he historicised the real inaccessibility of the public sphere to large 
parts of the population and surveyed the reflection of principles of the public 
sphere in liberalist theory, as well as in socialist or other critiques, which uphold 
the impossibility of generalisations within a classed society.92 Many authors 
including Alexander Kluge, Oscar Negt and Nancy Fraser have advanced such 
critiques with concepts that range from the ‘proletarian’ ‘counterpublic’ sphere 
(Kluge and Negt) to ‘subaltern counterpublics’ (Fraser).93 Some of their main 
aims have been to highlight the exclusions that the concept of a singular public 
sphere would (inevitably) entail but also to open up the theoretical potential for 
its emancipatory aspects to serve disempowered social strata. For instance, in 
Fraser’s framework, subaltern counterpublics are defined as ‘parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups’ such as 
‘women, workers, peoples of colour, and gays and lesbians’ develop and 
practise ‘counterdiscourses.’94 Fraser argues that such publics need not 
identify common internal interests or concerns prior to the process of public 
deliberation; the counterpublic’s ‘common good’ could be ‘chimerical’ while 
multiple and conflicting interests within it are plausible.95 Fraser also refers to 
‘inter-public discursive interaction’ among ‘differentially empowered publics’ – 
a condition underscored by the very definition of the counterpublics as 
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subordinate to ‘dominant social groups.’96 Counterpublics are spaces for 
‘withdrawal and regroupment’ as much as they are ‘bases and training grounds 
for agitational activities directed towards wider publics.’97 Members of 
(counter)publics seek to ‘disseminate’ their ‘discourse into ever widening 
arenas’ and ‘understand themselves as part of a potentially wider public,’ 
indeed, as per Habermas, the public at large.98  
What is the political relevance of counterpublics today and is there a potential 
relation to instituent praxis in their production or development? Fraser crucially 
suggests that counterpublics could be ‘explicitly anti-democratic and anti-
egalitarian’ and, if not, they can still be informally or implicitly exclusionary or 
marginalising.99 Yet, she contends that, on the whole, counterpublics ‘help 
expand discursive space’ since they derive from exclusions on behalf of more 
dominant publics.100 This conclusion should be further problematised at least 
on empirical grounds given the current, inflated conditions of discursivity within 
the networked and digitally mediated world, whereby the dividing line between 
counterpublics, virtual clans and other phenomena of fanatic overidentification 
and violent exclusion wears thin. One of the obvious dangers lies in the 
reinvigoration of neo-fascism as well as platforms for the so-called ‘alt-right’ – 
a supposedly alternative right wing – globally as well as the dangerously 
shrinking distance and blurred boundaries between obviously sarcastic and 
literally supportive statements of such (and other) ideology. I would suggest 
then that expanding the space for discourse is not or is no longer in and of 
itself sufficient to lead to more solidly democratic and emancipated societies. 
Rather, the operative conditions and dominant modalities that shape the 
discursive space contribute equally and can be determining, if not detrimental, 
especially considering that – and Fraser would concur to this – these extend 
beyond the designated spaces for the rational and the critical and into 
psychological, ethical, affective, quotidian and domestic realms. On a 
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preliminary basis, I would argue that in order to examine contemporary 
discursivity there is a necessity for concepts that prioritise neither rational and 
critical discourse nor its psychic and affective elements, but rather, affective 
knowledge and an instituent contingency that could hope to foreclose market 
equilibria of fanatic identification or disidentification. In relation to this, I will 
refer further to the fragile relation between the market and the public. In any 
case, it remains contestable whether the concept of the counterpublic is 
adequate towards emancipatory ends, if it can encompass on equal terms anti-
egalitarian, anti-democratic and reactionary social formations. 
Furthermore, even though the common good of a public can be chimerical, the 
public arguably maintains – at least in Fraser’s account – its conceptual 
specificity based on a discursive arena ultimately grounded on some type of 
(perceived) commonality or common good. Perversely, however, in 
conjunction with its expansive and widening tendency, the counterpublic runs 
the danger of lapsing into an identity-propagating and hyper-polarising 
machine through the – perhaps unconscious – designation of public 
identification or disidentification as the ultimate condition for inclusion in the 
public discourse. The ongoing anxiety about publicly claiming or disclaiming 
one’s own identity and its nuances often through the invocation of perceived 
moral codes attests to such designation. Contra liberal calls for general unity 
despite differences, it should be evident that this situation is the result of 
broader social inequalities and hierarchies as experienced by oppressed and 
marginalised parts of the population. 
However, even in cases of disempowered counterpublics with emancipatory 
and egalitarian agendas, the discursive identificatory imperative rather than 
protecting particularly sensitive members of the counterpublic tends to operate 
at the expense of intersectionality, solidarity and further struggle. For instance, 
a recent gender-related fiery issue has been the dissonance between feminists 
who oppose the right of trans-women to self-identify as women and thereby be 
part of women-only spaces and trans-advocate feminists that they often 
characterise the former group as trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERF), 
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an internet-acronym often used and perceived as slur.101 The former view is 
often justified with actual occurrences of transgender violent attacks towards 
women in female prisons but also with accusations on the premise of 
transgender women perpetuating gender binaries and stereotypes in the form 
of outfit and cosmetics choices. While the latter group is seen as representing 
a younger generation of social-media-lingo savants, the former is depicted as 
old-school and representative of a bygone generation – either side presented 
positively or negatively depending on the article. As Judith Butler noted in one 
of her lectures on ‘non-violence’, even though there are difficult issues to be 
tackled around violence in safe spaces for women that involve transgender 
women, there is no excuse for giving up on solidarity and intersectionality 
between trans people and women who face exclusion and gender-related 
bigotry from the broader and dominant patriarchal conditions.102 What is of 
particular relevance to discursivity is that the declining predisposition for 
(fruitful) discourse among disagreeing fronts of gender-related emancipation 
might be associated with identity-fixated micro-counterpublics that deem their 
identificatory-representative credentials too sacrosanct to jeopardise with 
opportunities for solidarity. 
These observations will be further clarified once they are examined in the 
context of the discursive art world. Sheikh has used the concept of the 
counterpublic proposing the interpretation of the art world as a ‘public sphere’ 
consisting in internal fractions that take the form of counterpublics.103 In his 
later analysis that focuses on the pedagogical and the exhibitionary in their 
relation to art institutions, instead of expanding on the ‘counter-’ relation, he 
places the emphasis on the mode of address that carries the potential to 
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produce publics and calls for ‘a renewal of how “publics” are conceived and 
produced.’104 Sheikh does not provide a thorough description of this renewal 
but he gives hints. First, he focuses on Michael Warner’s definition of the public 
– a specific public out of many possible ones that can be produced ‘by virtue 
of being addressed.’105 Warner writes: ‘A public is a space of discourse 
organized by nothing other than discourse itself. It is autotelic; it exists only as 
the end for which books are published, shows broadcast, Web sites posted, 
speeches delivered, opinions produced.’106 This is a definition that denotes the 
‘textual’ nature of publics and is fairly compliant with Kwon’s understanding of 
the discursive as (inter)textual and transitively experienceable. Echoed in this 
textual logic of the public is Sheikh’s exhibitionary/pedagogical/curatorial mode 
of address that the art institution lays the ground for and articulates. In this 
context, it is also noteworthy that Sheikh refers to the production of subjects in 
relation to power and knowledge within the notion of a public that is being 
produced through a specific mode of address. This reference brings us in the 
vicinity of instituent praxis and the production of a transversal subjectivity and 
permits further deliberation on these relations. The second hint that Sheikh 
provides is the distinction between the singular public and multiple publics in 
the context of exhibitionary institutions – a distinction already articulated in 
broader terms by Fraser, Kluge and Negt and even Habermas in relation to 
the publics omitted, excluded and precluded by the bourgeois public sphere 
that masks as singular. Sheikh points to the ‘historical role’ of exhibitionary 
institutions in producing ‘a national citizenry and […] a specific bourgeois 
subject-of-reason’ as a single public, nodding to Bennett’s analysis of the 
growing bourgeois class in Europe.107 Sheikh asserts that there is no longer a 
unified public and that the museum has lost its centralising role, even when it 
acts as a ‘mass-medium’ of blockbuster exhibitions.108 Sheikh recognises the 
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decline of a unified (bourgeois) public sphere as he cautions against the 
fragmentation of publics in the form of market segments ‘with particular 
demands to be catered to and commodified.’109 Referring more broadly to the 
realm of culture industry, he observes that the ‘contingent modes of access 
and articulation’ operative within a public are straightforwardly ‘replaced’ by 
modes of access of the market such as ‘commodity-exchange and 
consumption.’110 The question he is led to crucially returns to the art institution:  
If the art institution had the historical role of affirming and 
constituting the bourgeois class and its values, and thus tried to 
produce it as a public through very specific modes of address, 
what modes of address shall be put in its place, what imagined 
publics shall be represented and authorised, and how?111  
 
Sheikh deals with this question by proposing ‘to think of a contradictory and 
non-unitary notion of a public sphere, and of the art institution as the possible 
embodiment of this sphere.’112 He thereby urges for a ‘conflictual’ rather than 
‘consensual’ understanding of the art institution.113 
The issue at stake here is not whether Sheikh constructs the art institution as 
singular or as fragmented into sub-institutions, since he resolves this relation 
through Mouffe’s agonistic framework, which I have already discussed in 
previous chapters.114 However, without in the least diminishing the importance 
of producing counterpublics and understanding their internally and externally 
diverse character, I seek to distance the understanding of institution, at least 
in its processual sense, from its reduction to the concretisation of the discursive 
space that allows for the realisation or the production of a public or the public 
as a sphere.  
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Instituent praxis and the concept of the public 
 
The advocation of the public that brackets off the historicisation of the public 
sphere cannot escape being affirmative, at least partially, even when it 
addresses its own exclusions. This could explain why Nancy Fraser is so 
devoted in her divestment of the concept from its misconstrued liberal 
connotations, despite Habermas’s historicisation of the concept of the 
bourgeois public sphere in tandem with a critique of both its potential 
appropriation by liberal ideology and its relation to Enlightenment philosophy. 
The bourgeois class emancipated itself from the authority of the State by 
coming together on the basis of its common traits and interests – 
psychological, literary, domestic, economic, political, and thereby excluding 
those who could not afford to gather under these specific interests. Thus, any 
advocation of the (bourgeois or general) public sphere would affirm such and 
other exclusions as well as the logic of the market itself; the bourgeoisie sought 
to advance its private profit-related interests and its literary development 
through internal exchange (literary salons and letters) was, arguably, already 
one of cultural production and consumption. Furthermore, due to a primary 
grounding on commonality, any possible contingencies within the public’s 
modes of access and articulation are secondary or marginal. Thus, they fail to 
shield the public from the identificatory mechanisms at the service of the profit-
driven market, further compounding the aforementioned binary dead-end that 
oscillates between affirmation and utopia in the context of the institution of art 
as an ideological construction. This condition is directly extendable to 
counterpublics. Even as they denounce their own being-excluded by dominant 
social groups and even if they only form chimerical common interests, the 
counterpublics cannot avoid affirming their own micro-exclusions as well as an 
internally dominant concrete logic/affect that cannot escape from being 
marketable/consumable. This is why the public appears so easily transmutable 
into the market segment or the culture industry. The public sphere has always 
been fully compliant and symbiotic with the market to begin with, even in the 
form of the securement of bourgeois entrepreneurial interests. It is the 
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concreteness of needs, desires and interests of counterpublics irrespectively 
of their critical attitude that not simply permits but facilitates the market’s 
operation within the public. The plurality of needs, desires and interests does 
little to forestall this facilitation; it has hardly ever been an insurmountable 
problem for the market to diversify, re-identify and target accordingly.  
A definition of the public as textual, transitive and triggered by a specific mode 
of address would not escape this conundrum, as the public could still be 
primarily grounded on a concrete commonality that could simply amount to the 
initial address. Alternatively, the address is completely ignored and thereby 
fails to produce a public. In reference to the exhibitionary complex, Sheikh 
writes: ‘Subjects may negate mediation indirectly by refusing to turn up, thus 
refusing to become, however nominally, “the public”.’115 Unlike the modes of 
access and articulation of a public, its formation is indeed contingent. But in all 
these definitions of the public, its formation rests on dependency. Warner’s 
textual definitions of publics range from the viewers of an advert to ‘[t]he 
people, scholarship, the Republic of Letters, posterity, the younger generation, 
the nation, the Left, the movement, the world, the vanguard, the enlightened 
few, right-thinking people everywhere,’ assuming they have all become the 
target of an address.116 This reduction of publics into rhetorical or literal 
addresses, is (a) as real as market segmentation and (b) indicative of the 
contingency of publics as reliant on an external force, which is not even 
necessarily oppressive or exploitative towards them. 
Thus, Sheikh’s use of Warner’s definition risks rendering the formation of the 
public and the implicated subjectivity too dependent on power/knowledge 
implicit in the art institution. In this, on the one hand, Sheikh is right to point out 
the ‘transfer of knowledge’ and the ‘coordination of desire and agency,’ 
indicative of the panorama/panopticon complex. On the other hand, the 
supposed agency of subjects produced in and through their being permitted to 
access the eye of institutional/curatorial/pedagogical power can be 
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problematised in two senses. First, the panoramic function that Bennett 
identifies is deeply eroded in a neoliberal, post-television and post-internet era 
of marketed algorithmic art institutions and a transiently discursive art world. If 
it is granted that in the panorama, the violence of state power is not entirely at 
play, as its viewpoint becomes radically and collectively accessible ‘en masse,’ 
in the post-internet era, this condition does not quite hold. The panorama is 
now personal, atomised and customised, while it eloquently pretends to still be 
a panorama, something that provides access to all information and all 
spectacle. At the same time, the panopticon is ever more present and its 
private, concentrated algorithmic eye visible only to those who own it. As I 
discuss in Chapter 3 and further expand in subsequent sections, project-
institutions in the (discursive) art world hardly escape this conundrum. 
Secondly, the theory of instituent praxis and the production of subjectivity as 
well as a great part of Foucault’s philosophy suggest forms of agency that go 
beyond a power-dependent notion of the public, whereby subjects are 
produced by virtue of being addressed by the institution and invited to access 
the eye of power. I return to this point at the end of this chapter. Sheikh’s 
position could alternatively be interpreted as implying the self-producing of 
publics, insofar as art institutions, apart from utterers of an address, are seen 
themselves as publics. Even in this case, however, the production or 
construction of institutions by emerging subjectivities cannot be adequately 
elucidated as creative, unless the theory of instituent praxis is employed. 
Nonetheless, the affirmative function of (counter)public spheres far from 
annihilates their necessity and potential. It was perhaps in a similar logic that 
Bürger ultimately wished for the affirmative autonomy of art to persist in light 
of the pervasive means-end rationality. Admittedly, insofar as counterpublics 
recognise and address their own micro-exclusions and their own assumptions 
or reproductions of power, affirmation as a function grounded on its being-
hidden appears (again) as flimsy in its inadequacy to fully account for its own 
internal contradictions. Affirmation might even appear irrelevant, to the extent 
that the publics make no claims of actually or imaginarily fulfilling a sphere that 
escapes or brackets off the logic of the market or a means-end rationality. 
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(Utopic, wishful, speculative or even programmatic visions do not have to 
operate through an affirmative sphere.) However, the conceptual constellation 
of the public prioritises and upholds concrete and formative commonality over 
differences, conflict and plurality, even if it accommodates the latter. The 
dangers of concretising and fetishising common identity and identification 
remain crucial, as they jeopardise the concurrent operation of the modalities 
of autopoiesis and heterogenesis that the proposed extended definition of 
instituent praxis involves. The two complex and abstract concepts working in 
tandem allow for ontogenetic virtuality and secure the production – rather than 
petrification – of transversal subjectivity, as they operate beyond or beneath 
commonality in terms of identification and at the level of co-production of new 
significations as rules of law.  
The inadequacy of the use of plurality as a caveat that would supposedly 
safeguard from commonality as a form of closure can also be observed in 
relation to some of the thinking on instituent practices. Rogoff has suggested 
that ‘it is not only the moment of instituting oneself but also the plurality of the 
activities involved […] that are the hallmarks of instituent practices, which 
thereby refuse the possibility of being internally cohered and branded.’117 It 
remains doubtful whether the plurality of activities involved are enough to 
foreclose internal coherence, given the current ultra-sophisticated tools of 
marketing customisation even beyond the conscious control of individuals. The 
conversational and discursive art world have tried to accommodate plurality in 
the name of postulates to democracy and agonism, through discursive formats 
that reference a parliamentary quality often encountered in roundtables, panel 
discussions and workshops, but also project-institutions such as the ones I 
have already analysed. However, such attempts have been critiqued. 
Bassam El Baroni has argued that Mouffe’s agonistics and Habermas’s 
concept of the public sphere, despite differences of political philosophical 
tradition, are both instantiated in the parliament, the former as a ‘perpetual 
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battleground’ and the latter as intrinsically involving ‘conflict.’118 In relation to 
the art world, El Baroni observes that agonism has turned into ‘a franchising of 
democracy’ and suggests that ‘[t]he value of political conflict as an abstract 
force upholding pluralist democracy is the only content in the license obtained 
by the art sphere; everything else is considered as form and technicality.’119 
Echoing Gardner’s view of democracy as an empty signifier (discussed in the 
Introduction), El Baroni is not only wary of agonism turning into a mere 
‘blueprint’ or ‘formula’ in the discursive art world, but also of its ‘latent’ 
hegemony due to its purported insurmountable technology of democracy.120 
Thus, agonism’s predetermined dependence on a battleground structure of 
hegemony is liable to forcibly construct ‘others as concrete’ and cast them into 
an ‘us/them relationship.’121 In a similar vein, commenting in particular on 
discursive, process-based, and self-organised formats at the crossroads of 
education and curating, Rogoff advises caution against privileging such 
formats and ‘the coming-together of people in space’ over ‘recognising when 
and why something important is being said.’122 
These remarks are not to suggest that questions around discursive 
pedagogical formats and schematics should be discarded as of lower 
importance to what is being reasoned, argued, communicated, taught, and 
learnt, or – equally – the publics or subjects involved in these processes. Such 
questions would be directly implicated with curatorial, institutional, 
organisational and infrastructural methodologies and formations whose 
specifications obviously matter extremely in terms of endeavouring various 
modes of address.  However, several questions emerge. Are formats and 
schematics more emancipatory when they constitute minorities or margins to 
dominant ones, as for example, theorists such as Krasny would argue about 
informal conversational formats in the art world? Furthermore, how should 
such formats and schematics be approached and examined when they 
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become popular or eventually canonical, either overthrowing (and replacing) 
the old canon or co-existing on a par with it – the latter case being arguably 
applicable to the discursive and educational art-world formats (new canon) and 
exhibitions (old canon)? Since what is at stake in these questions lies clearly 
beyond a competition that would lead into a typology of emancipatory value, I 
will approach them through further analysis around, first, Foucault’s concept of 
‘parrhesia’ as he develops it in a lecture series in the early 1980s, and 
secondly, issues of access and other parameters of the contemporary 
discursive art world.123 
 
Parrhesia, Cynicism and the ‘currency’124 
 
To address the need to distinguish important utterances from non-important 
ones as they emerge in the context of discursive formats, Rogoff has invoked 
Michel Foucault’s concept of parrhesia as a mode of truth-telling.125 
Importantly, however, Rogoff stresses that truth, in this mode of truth-telling, 
remains a ‘drive rather than a position.’126 The discourse around parrhesia is 
not about the search for truth as axiom or dogma nor about the definition of 
truth as such. Instead, the object of the discourse around parrhesia is the 
exercise of the methodology of truth-telling while truth remains deliberately 
undefined in metaphysical or absolute terms.  
Parrhesia is a concept that Foucault researched thoroughly in his later work, 
seeing it as a mode of truth-telling that requires willingly speaking one’s own 
mind ‘without concealing anything’ even though it always involves risk for the 
person who speaks.127 Parrhesia differs from other modes of truth-telling such 
as ‘prophecy, wisdom, teaching and technique.’ It is a mode of truth-telling that 
                                                          
123 Foucault, Courage of Truth. (See Introduction, fn. 40) 
124 Ibid., 239. 
125 Rogoff, ‘Turning,’ 45. 
126 Ibid., 46. 
127 Foucault, Courage of Truth, 9-11. 




‘speaks polemically about individuals and situations’ as opposed to 
‘enigmatically,’ ‘apodictically,’ or ‘demonstratively.’128  
Foucault describes two types of parrhesia before he arrives at his analysis of 
Cynicism in Antiquity. First, he discusses political truth-telling which ‘manifests 
itself as someone’s assertion that they are capable of telling the truth’ and ‘is 
addressed courageously, on its own, to an Assembly or a tyrant who does not 
want to hear it [i.e., the truth].’129 Foucault also defines ethical or Socratic 
parrhesia as the practice of epimeleia or the care of self. 130 Socrates cares for 
others by teaching them to take care of themselves.131 Epimeleia requires 
investigation, testing, and care for the self.132 It is about learning to turn inwards 
and test oneself in the sense of conjoining rational discourse (logos) with a 
way of living within the social (bios).133 This form of parrhesia is directly 
associated with Cynicism, which is described as the parrhesiastic way of life.134 
Foucault defines Cynicism as ‘the idea of a mode of life as the irruptive, violent, 
scandalous manifestation of the truth.’135 In other words, Cynicism is about the 
practice and manifestation of truth through and in one’s life: ‘Cynicism makes 
life, existence, bios, what could be called an alethurgy, a manifestation of 
truth.’136 Cynicism is not another version of parrhesia but the conduct of life 
that fronts parrhesia and its manifestation. 
Raunig too has used the concept of parrhesia to suggest that instituent 
practices could move beyond the dead-ends of Institutional Critique by being 
both critical and propositional, by constantly striving against structuralisation 
and by performing both political parrhesia, i.e. in the realm of politeia, and 
ethical parrhesia, through a subject-forming self-inquiry.137 In Chapter 2, I have 
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discussed the first section of his argument in the context of instituent praxis 
and in relation to his ambiguous use of constituent power. Regarding the latter 
part which involves parrhesia, even though it is insightful, it is unclear how (and 
if) it relates to the theory of instituent practice and/or constituent power. It is 
also at times arbitrarily paired with specific sets of practices. For instance, 
Raunig considers the second form of truth-speaking (ethical parrhesia) to be 
the most pertinent to ‘the relation between teaching and learning’ because it 
upholds a mode of investigation, i.e., a ‘calling-into-question’ and a ‘self-
inquiry,’ that leads to care for the self.138 He argues that, in this case, 
knowledge is not fixed in a centre because ‘knowledge production lies 
precisely in the movement from the inquirer to those who are guided by the 
inquiry to exercise self-care, to give account of the coherence between rational 
discourse and manner of living.’139 Instead, Raunig thinks that Cynicism (and 
the practice of the Cynics) is not so pertinent to the relation of teaching and 
learning as it is to what he calls ‘the new activisms of the twenty-first 
century.’140 In fact, he sees roughly all current activism as a contemporary 
instantiation of Cynicism in antiquity.141  
I would refrain from constructing a neat typology that straightforwardly matches 
isolated concepts of Foucault’s archaeology with arbitrarily divided segments 
of contemporary social practice such as activism and teaching and learning. In 
a crucial passage in Foucault’s lectures where he discusses the ‘shifts and 
changes in parrhesia,’ he elaborates on the relation between the ‘three poles’ 
of parrhesia—namely, truth-telling, ‘politeia (the political institution, the 
distribution and organization of relations of power),’ and ‘the formation of ēthos 
or of the subject.’142 Albeit irreducible to one another, the three poles are 
always inextricably linked to one another in a ‘necessary and mutual 
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relationship.’143 This constellation gathered around Cynicism and parrhesia is 
not dissimilar to the potential remit for instituent praxis, at least in terms of the 
discursive art world and the broader contemporary conditions of public 
discourse. The irreducible interrelation of truth-telling, political institutions and 
power and the formation of an ethos or subject nods to the theorisation of 
instituent praxis as unconstrained by the segmentations between constituent 
power, official and officialised law, administrative and technological structures 
and infrastructures and organisational schematics and formats. Rather, 
through an epistemological habitation of their interstices, overlaps and 
interrelations including those among discourse, ethics and the psyche, we 
might begin to further grasp the remit of the shift from power to instituent praxis. 
As I have discussed in Chapter 2, instituent praxis goes beyond both explicit 
power or implicit ground-power, as it does not aim at legitimising or officialising 
a sovereign pre-existing subject (thus, non-explicit) and the implicated 
particular or partial produced subjectivity becomes conscious of its (internal) 
unconscious code (thus, non-implicit). Yet, Foucault’s mapping of the poles of 
parrhesia that sees power as diffused within knowledge and political structures 
all the way to signifiers and subjects might help denote not only the breadth 
but also the density of what might be stopping instituent praxis to perform its 
shift from power. In this, I do not intend to exhaust or reduce Foucault’s 
philosophy that focuses on articulating a grammar of power into a concept 
deriving from the relatively more speculative and politically propositional – if 
not utopian – tradition of the Common. Instead, I propose Foucault’s 
theorisation of power as the epistemological limit against which or despite 
which a theorisation of instituent praxis would have to develop, especially if 
such theorisation borrows from his later focus on parrhesia and the 
interrelation of its poles. 
The ‘Delphic precept “alter the currency” (parakharaxon to nomisma)’ permits 
the tracing of a strong association between instituent praxis and Foucault’s 




parrhesia and Cynicism.144 The precept was addressed by the Delphi oracle 
to Diogenes the Cynic after he enquired on how he could expand or improve 
his reputation.145 According to Foucault, the precept expresses one of the main 
principles of Cynicism.146 The story of Diogenes the Cynic has multiple 
divergent versions but the crucial ambiguity rests on the multiple 
interpretations attributable to the precept that could be grouped in narrow ones 
and more abstract, metaphorical ones.147 The former group refers to urges to 
dishonestly falsify or counterfeit the financial value of the currency or, as 
Foucault notes, ‘a change of the effigy stamped on the coin, a change which 
enables the true value of the coin to be reestablished.’148 The latter group of 
interpretations denotes two interrelated types of alteration, the initial 
juxtaposition of which Foucault retrieves from Julian.149 First, the idea that the 
oracle referred to Diogenes’s own currency and Julian’s theory that the 
alteration of one’s own currency requires self-inquiry. Diogenes is thus being 
urged to pass from the current, ‘counterfeit’ image of himself that includes 
others’ views of himself through the ‘true currency of self-knowledge’ into the 
‘revaluation’ of his own currency.150 In short, Foucault refers here to accessing 
one’s own currency as self-value through self-knowledge. A slight shift in 
perspective would suffice to regard this analysis as psychoanalytically 
connoted with elements of autopoiesis and self-creation with reference to 
making explicit an unconscious imaginary: ‘to get to know himself, Diogenes 
had to be able to recognize himself, and be recognized by others, as superior 
to Alexander himself.’151 Indeed, the parrhesia which is associated to 
epimeleia and the care of self ‘addresses the psukhē of individuals and aims 
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at the formation of their ēthos’ and Foucault discusses on various occasions 
within his lectures the ‘soul’ in relation to the body, intellect and parrhesiastic, 
Cynic life.152 This is not however, a mere turn to the individual. The second 
alteration that Foucault discerns relies on the common signification between 
nomisma (currency) and ‘nomos, the law, custom.’153 The precept then 
amounts to ‘changing the custom, breaking with it, breaking up the rules, 
habits, conventions and laws.’154 Foucault places the core principles of 
Cynicism in a critical synthesis of the various approaches of altering the 
currency: 
The Cynic battle is therefore not simply that military or athletic 
battle by which the individual ensures self-mastery and thereby 
benefits others. The Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional, and 
constant aggression directed at humanity in general, at humanity 
in its real life, and whose horizon or objective is to change its 
moral attitude (its ēthos) but, at the same time and thereby, its 
customs, conventions, and ways of living.155 
 
This close interweaving of self-knowledge, ethics, customs, laws reflects the 
rigorous intricacies of the component of instituent praxis. It is in the core 
principles of Cynicism that we find resonances with instituent praxis that 
extend beyond logos or discourse, i.e. the production of subjectivity and the 
explicit polemics towards common forms of law, customs and conventions. As 
I will suggest, however, in the contemporary hyper-mediated and globalised 
world, such polemics are not enough as the Cynic way of life is in many ways 
inverted if not perverted. Regarding the discursive art world, the irreducible 
interrelation of the poles of parrhesia suggests that the consideration of the 
methods that focus on what is being said and its importance cannot take place 
independently of a critical examination of discursive formats and the variety of 
participatory qualities that they permit. I will focus this examination by 
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comparing two discursive projects-institutions from the art world that could be 
seen as aspiring to a parrhesiastic function in terms of knowledge structures. 
 
Inversions and perversions of Cynicism in discursive 
practices: Former West and La Colonie 
 
Former West (2008-2016) was a collaborative research project whose remit 
was transnational – predominantly European but also global – and 
transdisciplinary. The project was initiated by BAK, an Utrecht-based art 
institution, founded (in 2003) and directed by Maria Hlavajova. Hlavajova has 
been Former West’s artistic director since its initiation.156 Despite BAK’s 
organisational contribution, the project has had a distinct presence in the 
discursive art world. Its network of collaborators comprised some of the most 
influential art and Higher Education institutions in Europe, such as Afterall 
(London), Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, Goldsmiths (London), Reina Sofia 
Museum (Madrid), VanAbbe Museum (Eindhoven), SKOR Foundation for Art 
and Public Domain (Amsterdam), Tranzit.hu (Budapest), and Tranzit.cz 
(Prague). It was mainly funded by the Creative Europe programme of the 
European Union.157 Other funders included Mondriaan Fonds Amsterdam, City 
Council of Utrecht, European Cultural Foundation Amsterdam, and ERSTE 
Foundation.  
Former West’s primary aim has been to rethink the impact of the end of the 
Cold War and the categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ through the remit of art and 
politics. This enquiry's starting point has been the belief that the post-Cold War 
impact on the so-called West has not been adequately acknowledged. The 
argument here is that even though the end of the Cold War and the advent of 
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globalisation render the classification of the world into First, Second, and Third 
irrelevant, labels that imply Western hegemony such as ‘former East’—a label 
used to describe countries that underwent a transition from state socialism to 
capitalism after 1989—still persist. Former West inverts this label in an ironic 
gesture that seeks to undermine this hegemonic relationship and attempts to 
reimagine a global horizon of equality. It defines itself in the following way:  
a long-term international research, education, publishing, and 
exhibition project, which from within the field of contemporary art 
and theory: first, reflects upon the changes introduced to the 
world (and thus to the so-called West) by the political, cultural, 
artistic, and economic events of 1989; second, engages in 
rethinking the global histories of the last two decades in dialogue 
with post-communist and postcolonial thought; and third, 
speculates about a ‘post-bloc’ future that recognizes differences 
yet evolves through the political imperative of equality and the 
notion of ‘one world.’158 
 
Former West took mainly the form of Research Congresses – large-scale 
public conferences, which average 300 attendees, at which academics, artists, 
curators, theorists, and/or other contributors are invited to present their work, 
give talks, or participate in panel discussions. These congresses took place in 
art institutions and art schools. Former West also employed other formats such 
as the Research Exhibition, the Research Seminar, and the Research 
Interview. During its initial phase in 2009 and 2010, Former West focused on 
Research Seminars, which were smaller in scale and shorter in duration than 
the Congresses, and Research Interviews with theorists, artists, curators, etc. 
in order to set a framework for ideas and propositions. Until 2014, Research 
Exhibitions were conducted one to three times per year in European art 
institutions. The project’s culminating phase (2014-2016) took the form of 
Research Congresses as Public Editorial Meetings that led to a major 
publication of approximately 70 contributions entitled FORMER WEST: Art and 
the Contemporary after 1989 (2017). 
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It could be argued that Former West epitomises the canonisation of discursive 
formats in the art world. It secured an upscale budget and a relatively long-
term duration and featured a large number of prominent contributors and 
participants, who range from senior to young and emerging academics, 
theorists, and independent researchers, artists, curators, and activists.159 It 
largely interrelated with and depended on some of the most solid and official 
transnational institutions in the world such as the Creative Europe programme 
and various official and high-ranking art schools. Such scale and officiality can 
be contrasted to the aforementioned university-projects that operated within 
largely unofficial formats at the relative margins or peripheries of official art 
institutions (Universities, museums, galleries). This scale and format allowed 
Former West to initiate and sustain a long-term discussion around some of the 
most politically-urgent global issues of post-Cold War history, situating them 
within a wider theoretical context and often inviting radical perspectives on 
them.160  
At the same time, despite its relatively large-scale and institutional grounding, 
Former West did not lose sight of informal knowledge (visual, artistic, 
curatorial, or theoretical) as co-produced. It is also remarkable that the platform 
that accommodated multiple global contributions and projects from east and 
west, south and north started from a rather personal idea that Maria Hlavajova 
had when she moved from Slovakia to the Netherlands around 2000.161 In a 
Former West session in London, Hlavajova explained that the project came 
about as a proposition to invert the so-called ‘former East.’ Importantly, Former 
West sought to reflect on and speculate on alternative geopolitical horizons 
                                                          
159 For a list of contributors, see: ‘Contributors,’ Former West, 
http://www.formerwest.org/Contributors. 
For the Former West budget, see: Creative Europe Programme, ‘Creative Europe Projects.’ 
160 Indicative titles of Former West congresses or sessions: Art, its discourses, and the world at large 
(1989/2001/2008/2009), Representations of art in the Former West: exhibitions, art institutions, art 
market (1989-2009), and Who is a ‘people’? Constructions of the ‘we’ (2015). 
161 Maria Hlavajova, ‘Rael Artel, Maria Hlavajova, Iliyana Nedkova, Katarzyna Kosmala: Sexing the 
Border,’ (Conversation at Word Power Books, Edinburgh, March 23, 2015) accessed September 12, 
2015, https://vimeo.com/130040477. This event was the launch of Kosmala’s edited collection, 
Katarzyna Kosmala, ed., Sexing the Border: Gender, Art and New Media in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). 




rather than to promote a prescribed or predetermined agenda – not dissimilarly 
to the university-projects that prioritised a processual and discursive research 
methodology.   
Predictably, the extensive involvement of established figures and institutions 
hardly escaped the reproduction of existing power relations in the art world and 
a western-centric discourse. Nevertheless, it remains important to examine 
whether or how Former West is enmeshed in exclusionary, clan-generating 
mechanisms of power beyond the critique of its reproducing the symbolic 
power of certain individuals, organisations or geopolitical centres. In this 
examination, a useful parallel could be drawn between Former West and 
Foucault’s account of the French Communist Party. In his analysis of Cynicism 
in the modern period, Foucault refers briefly to the leftism of his time and the 
French Communist Party after the 1920s. Foucault locates an interesting 
inversion of the scandal of the revolutionary life in the French Communist 
Party:  
In the present situation, all forms and styles of life which might 
have the value of a scandalous manifestation of an unacceptable 
truth have been banished , but the theme of the style of life 
nevertheless remains absolutely important in the militantism of 
the French Communist Party, in the form of the […] inverted 
injunction to adopt and assert persistently and visibly in one’s 
style of life all the accepted values, all the most customary forms 
of behavior, and all the most traditional schemas of conduct. So 
that the scandal of the revolutionary life—as form of life which, 
breaking with all accepted life, reveals the truth and bears 
witness to it—is now inverted in these institutional structures of 
the French Communist Party, [with] the implementation of 
accepted values, customary behavior, and traditional schemas 
of conduct, as opposed to bourgeois decadence or leftist 
madness.162  
 
In other words, Foucault understands the structures of the party to have 
created norms and customary forms of behaviour within which the 
revolutionary life acquires a ‘conformity of existence.’163 On top of that, 
                                                          




everyone involved adopts persistently and visibly these norms and forms of 
behaviour, while, for some reason, there is no hope for them to scandalously 
manifest an unacceptable truth. For Foucault, this situation is paradoxical and 
worthy of further research. In any case, it provides a short glimpse into this 
contemporary inversion of Cynicism. People with radical ideas institute a 
mechanism that overturns (or seeks to overturn) a given institutional order (in 
this case, capitalism). As soon as this mechanism is instituted, norms and 
customary behaviours are being developed and adopted persistently, visibly 
and also hopelessly by the mechanism’s participants.  
Arguably, something analogous is taking place in the case of Former West and 
possibly other institutional components of the discursive art world. The blatant 
manifestation of newly created and adopted norms, behaviours and discursive 
structures can be drastically exclusionary despite all (honest) intentions for 
radical inclusion. Furthermore, exposing the conformity of the inverted scandal 
of the revolutionary life neither subverts nor scandalises its established norms 
and fails to advance the practice of the Cynic way of life. Perhaps in a 
rearticulated kind of significational affirmation, complex mediatic mechanisms 
can decontextualise and recontextualise exposing attempts, render them 
neutral or play with the distance of their initial intention and their actual effect. 
Thus, such attempts become spectacularised and, as I will further discuss, the 
way they function socially depends largely on psychological elements. 
The importance of the realm of the psyche in discursive practice has not 
escaped French-Algerian artist Kader Attia, who, in Reason’s Oxymoron’s 
(2015), provides a highly insightful interview-based documentary video, that 
focuses on mental illness in relation to migration and the variety of 
psychological enunciations and representations in radically different cultural 
contexts. In 2016, the same artist founded La Colonie (La Colonie), a space 
that aspires to be a predominantly discursive zone for the ‘decolonialisation 
not only of peoples but also of knowledge, attitudes and practices.’164 Albeit 
less canon-aspiring than Former West, La Colonie is another discursive 
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project-institution that might be responding with parrhesia to knowledge and 
discourse. Besides being a space, La Colonie is also apparently an artistic 
project, as it appears on the Long List of Visible Award 2018, which ‘brings to 
light and gives strength to artistic actions which have a real capacity to 
experiment and produce visions that can have impact on the social and cultural 
imagination of our contemporary world’.165 As a project-institution, La Colonie’s 
proclaimed agenda is decolonial as opposed to postcolonial. In broad terms, it 
might be argued that the former approach is relatively more frontal in that it 
assumes a hands-on process of correction or counter-correction that, in some 
sense, aims to directly counteract or even undo the corrective or even coercive 
forces of institutional colonial violence, often perceived as involving 
technologies of the panopticon. La Colonie discursively directs its potential 
audience to identify with its struggle immediately through the project title, 
despite its irony and despite its otherwise claim to ‘a trans-cultural, trans-
disciplinary and trans-generational approach.’166 By contrast and despite 
resonating with similar issues of displacement, the Silent University is less 
forceful in its presentation of itself and thus disrupts immediate responses, 
such as the yearning to consume or the compulsion to reject.  
Another associated issue is La Colonie’s subtle yet discernible aversion to 
academic discourse which is perceived as solely or obsessively critical, non-
propositional or somehow inadequate to the creation of ‘a place where 
everyone can re-appropriate their own space of freedom to think and act as 
they want to.’167 Attia implies that this perceived inadequacy of ‘academics who 
work critically on the history of colonisation,’ should be compensated by 
including ‘feminists, refugees, architects and activists’ as well as ‘artists and 
thinkers working on the Anthropocene’ in the (discursive) programme of La 
Colonie.168 In an article that announces the opening of La Colonie, Alyssa 
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Buffenstein describes the space as committed to ‘cross-disciplinary, anti-
academic, artistic thought and discussion.’169 This close association of 
academic thought and discussion with inactive and disciplinarily confined 
critique is often encountered in the context of cultural practice and it should 
arguably be problematised. It is indeed likely that this association stems from 
the experience of exclusionary and disciplinary academic structures. However, 
the aforementioned parameter of access to or exclusion from the ‘eye of power’ 
is not an issue specific to academic structures but the entire (discursive) art 
world and its institutions. Furthermore, we should be mindful of the process of 
idealisation in such advocations for non-disciplinary spaces for the fulfillment 
of self-knowledge away from academic/critical oppression, as if power and 
discourse could be eradicated. The invocation at stake is often grounded on a 
supposed psychic or affective freedom and creative or activist self-fulfillment 
in opposition to an intellectual path to self-knowledge. This assumed 
opposition goes against a Guattarian perspective of affective knowledge and 
strips the production of subjectivity from autopoiesis and heterogenesis. 
Knowledge as a-signification and affect suggests that creative self-fulfillment, 
or rather, the production of subjectivity, is not opposed to an intellectual path 
to self-knowledge. Rather, the path to self-knowledge is always affective, even 
if it is intellectual. Furthermore, the production of subjectivity through 
autopoiesis and heterogenesis does not seek to usurpe any instance of 
discourse or signification; rather, it strives towards ontogenetic epistemological 
and ethico-aesthetic relations, via machinic assemblages of enunciation. From 
a more Foucauldian perspective, the concept of epimeleia clearly postulates 
the irreducibility of the interrelation between parrhesia, as a specific modality 
of discourse, and self-inquiry, as the formation of the ethos and the psyche of 
the subject. 
Former West and La Colonie perhaps portray two forms of perversion of 
Cynicism and its involvement of the psychic or affective aspects. In the former, 
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the spectacularisation in terms of specific disciplines and intensification of 
aspiring-to-be parrhesiastic discourse leads to an exacerbation and 
hyperinflation of the discourse’s pathic function, to the extent that the scandal 
of the truth is no longer a scandal or able to alter the currency – at least not 
beyond the specific disciplines. The currency itself is permeated by its pathic 
element and the forces that understand this are privileged. These are either 
forces of private capital or forces that are willing to consider the political 
implications of this articulation of the currency. Simply using this intuition in 
order to circulate aspiring-to-be parrhesiastic discourse or, in other words, 
hype-up critical discourse is, if necessary, by no means a sufficient strategy 
towards altering the currency. A related perversion takes place in the case of 
La Colonie, which attempts to do away altogether with the vehicle of critical 
discourse in favour of an alleged emancipatory alteration of the currency 
through affective terms. As I have already suggested, it is futile to seek to 
eradicate discourse or signification. Instituent praxis points to the 
irreducibilities of a-signification, pre-personal and machinic aspects, rather 
than their assumed usurpation of everything else. 
Therefore, it is important to further examine the conditions of discourse and its 
formats as they are encountered in various media forms, social media 
platforms, online fora and comment sections of online media, not least 
because such conditions end up shaping the current historical political as well 
as cultural momentum. Perhaps what Foucault observed in relation to the FCP 
and the Left wing in general was the proto-instances of what currently amounts 
to an unassuming and hopeless preaching to the converted that becomes a 
self-absorbed spectacle. Decades after his writings, such instances dominate 
public discourse and are blatantly developed into online and offline discursive 
call-outs that even if they genuinely aim at righting wrong they end up caught 
up in a competitive game of moral self-superiority, which either produces a 
self-satisfied echo chamber where ideas circulate or intensifies and solidifies 
the targeted-as-morally-bad behaviour and rarely leads to actual autopoiesis 
or heterogenesis. At best, this condition appeases sentiments of frustration 
and guilt that abound due to knowledge-asymmetries and practical 
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inconsequentiality within (and outwith) otherwise revolutionary edifices. Mark 
Fisher’s aforementioned plea for the ridding of self-loathing and guilt attests to 
this. Andrew Stewart has upheld in broader terms the need to address ‘the part 
of Left culture that engages in a near-exhibitionist mea culpa breast beating 
routine over their privilege.’170 Commenting on a major part of leftist discourse 
that may understandably seek to use their privilege to ‘magnify and benefit the 
voices of those who are oppressed,’ he cautions on the potentially alienating 
effects, arguably due to discursive modalities: 
I certainly accede the need, time, and place for such 
acknowledgement of privilege. But I also have seen working 
class women of color feel alienated from the rituals because they 
come straight from a middle-class guilt complex rather than 
working class desire to even the playing field.171 
 
I do not attempt here to determine the appropriateness of specific 
emancipatory strategies. Rather, at stake are the mechanisms that radically 
condition contemporary discourse and can by extension be detrimental or 
beneficial to both emancipatory and repressive or exclusionary strategies.  
The overall crucial ambiguity is the extent to which the enunciators of 
contemporary discourse that aspires to alter the currency (at least with honest 
intentions) are in control of or even conscious of the ethical and political 
problems at stake. This extent of course directly relates with knowledge/power 
asymmetries that in practice weight on corporate power as well as high-ranking 
bureaucratic and elected policy-makers. But the nature of the ambiguity rests 
on the conditions and parameters of discourse. In his analysis on the online 
discourse around the 2016 EU referendum and US election, media analyst 
Jamie Bartlett stresses the role of psychoanalytic parameters in the shaping of 
‘beliefs’ through ‘debate.’172 He observes that such parameters tend to obstruct 
the reformulation of one’s opinion through discourse, unless the discourse 
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takes the form of ‘a slow and laborious process’ that accommodates 
‘arguments that are carefully made, detailed and involve an understanding of 
other people’s mindset or background.’173 He notes that this kind of discourse 
is rarely encountered in ‘digital communication’ wherein ‘interaction with rivals 
or opponents is typically swift, fleeting and emotionally heightened.’174 Bartlett 
also refers to the psychological mechanisms at play in the algorithmic structure 
of social media that create ‘small tribes’ on the internet and sets them at war.175 
This viewpoint directly reflects the aforementioned dangers that pertain to 
phenomena of overidentification in relation to publics. Indeed, publics as tribes 
at war are even more prone to become market segments, as the hugely profit-
making psychographics advertising industry based on big data suggests. 
Relatedly, Bartlett underscores two tendencies that might be seen as paving 
the way for fascism or other authoritarian-exclusionary forms: the general 
desire for ‘swift, immediate and total answers,’ such as constructing and 
blaming other social groups, and a ‘sense of tribal belonging in a digital world, 
characterised by confusion, uncertainty and information overload.’176  
What should arguably be accentuated is the pivotal importance of the 
underlying psychological or psychosocial aspects of discourse that traditionally 
go unnoticed or as of minimal influence to the rational and linear significatory 
mechanisms operative within the discourse. Guattari’s specifications on a non-
discursive, pathic, machinic, a-significational and pre-personal relevance 
could not be more pertinent here and of course, the corporations that atomise, 
customise and exploit this relevance for economic profit are well aware of it. 
Considering instituent praxis (i.e. the conscious co-production of rules of law 
as new significations) in the remit of discursive practices ensures that the 
collective past or unconscious – from which these significations arise and 
which crucially involves a-significatory, pathic, pre-personal and proto-
subjective realms – are not depreciated or sidestepped in favour of rational or 
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linear discursivity and signification. The production of rules of law should in no 
way cast such realms of subjectivity as of lower importance; instituent praxis 
rejects the binarity comprising on the one hand, rules of law made of linear 
significations and on the other, irrational psychic forces. Signification in 
instituent praxis should arguably be theorised close to enunciation as the 
function of a-significatory, pathic and desiring machinic assemblages, if it is to 
operate (conceptually) in creation-relevant fields, from algorithmic, 
administrative and judicial to socioeconomic, political and aesthetic.  
A key issue that remains to be fully addressed is the parameter of access to 
or exclusion from the eye of power. In terms of the discursive art world, this 
parameter can be seen as expressible through another permutation of a 
panopticon/panorama complex, one grounded on a transitive and hypertextual 
discursivity. The university-projects already hint at this parameter as, to 
various extents, they sought to work towards archival outputs based on their 
discursive, process-based work in the form of archival publications, or 
documentation material accessible online (in the case of the Silent University). 
The content produced since 2008 in the context of Former West can be publicly 
accessed online in its entirety (mostly in video form). The possible funding 
reasons (or absence thereof) that prescribe or perpetuate this archival 
tendency is secondary to the observation that it is mostly intended to enlarge 
access to the output of the projects. In what follows, I examine further the 
perpetuation of power structures within the discursive art world and its complex 
relation to issues of access. 
 
Access / Ràdio Web MACBA 
 
Foucault refers to Cynicism as a popular practice and a popular philosophy 
whose ‘precise and particular places’ are ‘the streets’ and ‘the doors of the 
temple.’177 He asserts that Cynicism’s ‘discourses and interventions were 
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addressed to a wide and consequently not very cultured public, and its recruits 
came from outside the educated elites who usually practiced philosophy.’178 
Foucault also identifies a circular relation between Cynicism’s ‘doctrinal 
thinness’ and ‘popular recruitment.’179 Cynicism was a popular philosophy with 
a banal and poor theoretical doctrine. However, Cynicism’s doctrinal thinness 
had to do with the paramount importance of the use of askesis 
(exercise/practice) as learning method rather than the ‘relatively easy’ and 
‘lengthy’ way of logos (discourse).180 In today’s dominant conditions of 
discourse that include large parts of the discursive art world, Foucault’s insight 
is once again perverted. Far from allowing askesis, doctrinal thinness 
accommodates and legitimates easy discursive shortcuts, unexercised to the 
mechanisms that prey on them.  
In the context of the discursive art world, the issue of doctrinal thinness or 
theoretical or other complexity relates with practical expressions of popular 
recruitment or access. As Morgan Quaintance’s account in Chapter 3 would 
merely reiterate, access continues to be a majorly unresolved issue in the 
(discursive) art world. In referring to projects such as free universities in 
Beuys’s tradition that use ‘art as a space for informal educational initiatives,’ 
artist, author, and curator Marion von Osten has suggested that they cannot 
‘provide accessibility for more than the very few’ as they ‘operate in the 
symbolic, heavily-under financed space of the art world.’181 In his famous study 
The Love of Art: European Art Museums and Their Public, first published in 
1969, Pierre Bourdieu suggests that working-class museum visitors tend to 
prefer their visits to be guided.182 Guidance involves ‘the help of a guide or a 
friend,’ the visit being ‘signposted with arrows,’ and the art works being 
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‘supplemented by explanatory panels.’183 Bourdieu observes that ‘working 
class visitors occasionally see, in the absence of any information which might 
make their visit easier, evidence of a desire to exclude through esotericism, or 
if not, as the more cultivated visitors are more willing to suggest, a commercial 
intent (in other words to promote the sale of catalogues).’184 Bourdieu also 
notes that ‘hostility towards efforts to make works of art more accessible is 
mostly encountered amongst members of the cultivated class’ while ‘working-
class visitors are well placed to appreciate that the love of art is not love at first 
sight but is born of long familiarity.’185  
These findings might need to be complicated today given the advent of the 
populist mega-museum, which involves consumer satisfaction measurement 
systems and quantifiable targets of accessibility. Yet, writing over thirty years 
after Bourdieu, Andrea Fraser is not convinced by the efficiency of such system 
to attract working class audiences:  
[…] the enormous expansion of museum audiences, celebrated 
under the banner of populism, has proceeded hand in hand with 
the continuous rise of entrance fees, excluding more and more 
lower-income visitors, and the creation of new forms of elite 
participation with increasingly differentiated hierarchies of 
membership, viewings, and galas, the exclusivity of which is 
broadly advertised in fashion magazines and society pages. Far 
from becoming less elitist, ever-more-popular museums have 
become vehicles for the mass-marketing of elite tastes and 
practices that, while perhaps less rarified in terms of the 
aesthetic competencies they demand, are ever more rarified 
economically as prices rise.186 
 
To what extent would it be adequate to aim at an art institutional paradigm that 
would abolish elitist and exclusive forms of art distribution, consumption and 
participation, if its required aesthetic competencies remained less rarified? Is 
there even a way of cleanly differentiating and disassociating the extended art-
world practice that involves curatorial, discursive, managerial, organisational, 
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administrative practice from its economic administration, the former being only 
aesthetically valued and the latter only economically? An empirical and 
practical answer to this question would require volumes of further research and 
would divert from the issue in question which pertains more broadly to access. 
In terms of theory, however, Rogoff has drawn a pertinent distinction between 
access and accessibility, the latter instrumentalising the former and aiming at 
consumption ‘rather than experience.’187 Rogoff understands accessibility as 
‘the model of a client-based relationship with consumers who know what they 
want and can evaluate their satisfaction from it.’188 For Rogoff, accessibility in 
such terms implies ‘entry points that assume a fully completed entity that can 
be entered frontally.’189 Importantly, Rogoff also associates accessibility with 
an understanding of inclusion as ‘necessarily’ reliant on cultural representation 
through ‘identity groups’.190 However, she does not quite reject accessibility in 
the name of an authorial freedom to create undisturbed by institutional 
bureaucracy and marketing strategies.191 Rather, in line with her remarks that 
all constituencies of the art world ultimately morph into a huge conversation, 
she argues that by insisting on models centered upon accessibility, ‘the 
possibility of shifting paradigms through and within the work as jointly 
experienced by makers, displayers and viewers is entirely lost.’192 Rogoff 
attempts instead to theorise a notion of access that preserves this possibility 
of joint experience away from accessibility and the enforcement of 
‘complexity’-free programming and knowledge as consumable content.193 Her 
idea of access in ‘the museum’ as much as in ‘spaces of learning’ is based on 
the importance of one’s simple ‘being-there,’ without specified agendas, 
allowed to inhabit, ‘fail’ and experience various encounters beyond the 
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confirmation of identity, such as the ‘unexpected, the speculative, the 
seductive.’194  
In the context of the discursive art world, it could be argued that a key 
parameter could be found in Bourdieu’s term ‘long familiarity,’ i.e., knowledge 
understood less as a body of knowledge (content) than as being with and 
around art and participating in art-related discussions. Bourdieu has identified 
a crucial function in museum guidance tools that should be extended to spaces 
of art discourse: ‘[guidance tools] would proclaim, simply by existing, the right 
to be uninformed, the right to be there and uninformed, and the right of 
uninformed people to be there.’195 In some respects, Former West’s openly 
accessible online archive could be seen as suggestive of the right to be 
accessed and attended by uninformed users. However, it is likely that despite 
Former West’s praise of participation and its attempt to understand knowledge 
as informal and co-produced, the ‘esotericism’ of its discourse is blatant and 
cannot but appear exclusionary to those unfamiliar with art-world discourse. 
Perhaps a counter example can be found in the discursive art-world 
project/institution Ràdio Web MACBA, the online radio of the Museu d'Art 
Contemporani de Barcelona that is fully grounded on online accessible 
archives. The project/institution was initiated in 2006 as an archival outlet 
accompanying the exhibition programme of the museum, but later grew to also 
produce and curate a podcast-based selection independent of the exhibitions. 
Available podcasts range from interviews with philosophers, educators, artists 
and curators to sound and radio art, experimental music, audio archives and 
documentaries and music related features. The radio project is non-profit and 
partly funded by Creative Europe’s programme Re-imagine Europe, a four-
year collaboration that joins ten cultural organisations with artists and 
audiences across nine European countries. The radio project explicitly 
operates in the realm of ‘popular education,’ which suggests that it is 
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addressed at wide audiences that might not be familiar with art or art-world 
discourse.  
Institutional endeavours that both aim at a popular education and wide 
outreach without compromising their aesthetics or left-wing politics are indeed 
rare occasions. Unlike La Colonie and despite aiming at popular education, 
the radio project does not shun critical intellectual discourse or theoretical 
deliberation. Unlike both Former West and La Colonie, Ràdio Web MACBA 
does not explicitly posit a specific emancipatory or power-exposing agenda. 
This could be associable with aspects of the museum panorama, as the 
project’s attachment to MACBA might be indicating; in not explicitly addressing 
specific audiences or publics, the project resembles the open-to-all spirit of the 
museum for the rising middle classes. However, as I have suggested, 
preserving aspects of the panoramic access to the eye of power hardly 




Referring more broadly to art-world (discursive) institutions, issues of access 
to the discursive and institutional infrastructure should be of utmost 
importance. Such infrastructure shapes decisively more visible structures, 
while it remains typically invisible to both audiences and lower-level cultural 
workers. In an internally circulated report commissioned and partly funded by 
Creative Scotland to the collaborative arts/media project Variant, Gesa Helms, 
Leigh French, Lisa Bradley and the Variant Editorial Group present the 
outcomes of a two-year empirical research into ‘forms and practices of 
communication, principally within the contemporary visual arts of Scotland’s 
cultural sector.’196 In this report, the authors identify a problem that is arguably 
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beyond the European (semi-)periphery of Scotland, namely, that ‘fear over loss 
of network access motivates against voicing opinion that is not supportive of 
the dominant perspectives of cultural and political power.’197 The authors 
maintain that ‘in order to pursue personal advancement and avoid any 
potential negative evaluation that could restrict access, one in effect becomes 
obliged to perform and so internalise modes of strategic self-presentation or 
impression management.’198 The detrimental effect of this condition is that 
despite the abundance or general increase of public discursive programming, 
there is an alarming absence of ‘agonistic public debate’ regarding ‘policy 
processes (the means by which policy objectives and approaches are 
identified, selected and implemented).’199 Thus, according to the report, what 
could otherwise constitute a ‘key space of the production and enactment of 
cultural democracy’ is reduced to ‘personal, private and informal forms of 
exchange’ largely in terms of ‘sharing or protecting secrets, gossip or tittle-
tattle (often being awarded a respective moral judgement).’200 Thus, workers 
that are only precariously positioned in the art world or those who have not yet 
accessed it have scarce options beyond strategies of compliant personal 
advancement. What is reflected here is the personal or institutional-as-private 
persistence of power relations, which are largely unquantifiable, publicly 
unaccountable and permeable by social inequalities. This condition is to the 
detriment of any potential audience or (counter)public formation around art 
institutions or an art community conceived in the widest possible sense, unless 
there is a switch from diffused power relations to instituent praxis. Such praxis 
would not suffice as mere implementation of legislation/regulation against 
unofficial power relations and socially conditioned privilege, even though this 
is also necessary. Instituent praxis would have to centrally contain – in its 
creative function – aspects of a-signification and desire, in terms of producing 
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a collective subjectivity. In this, power relations are not magically cancelled out 
or bracketed off. Instituent praxis becomes an attempt not to accept the 
conscious and unconscious relations and sedimentations of diffused power as 
quintessential. It is a matter of collectively becoming conscious of such 
relations, registering and documenting them and enunciating a heterogenetic 
code.   
Speaking relative truth to power is not enough to alter the currency in a non-
explicitly tyrannical yet oppressive context, which is perpetuated by the 
capitalist and monopolistic channeling of asignification via the linguistic 
signifier and experienced subconsciously and transitively as much as 
concretely. The conditions of public discourse today conduce to a mutilating 
shift in the function of parrhesia: from a form of practical learning or askesis 
that proceeds by self-inquiry, investigation, testing and care for the self, to a 
competitive, personified, individualised or identitarian power game show, 
whereby the winners expose the most scandalous truth and the losers are 
revealed to have failed to adequately conjoin rational discourse with their way 
of living within the social. Meanwhile, the process of learning is reduced to 
reality spectacles and any exposed personalised truth hardly alters the 
currency, apart from shifts approved by capital or, at best, regulatory and/or 
(nominally) public institutions.  
Instituent praxis postulates configurations that would go beyond a presumed 
power symmetry through equal access to the viewpoint of power, even if this 
was achievable. The posited praxis exceeds power at least in its explicit forms 
in setting out to create or co-produce the currency, through the conscious co-
production of new significations that aspire to become rules of law. At the same 
time, even if this refers to the conscious praxis that disalienates the group from 
its own internal code, the involved subjectivity-in-the-making cannot but be 
produced in and through affective knowledge and the psychic implications 
within it. These are, however, domains where power can be intrinsic. Far from 
abolishable, then, power could be seen as either the limit of instituent praxis 
or, at best, its push. Foucault pre-empts this in his assertion that power 
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relations should be studied as the procedures by which people’s conduct is 
governed, rather than as an emanation of a substantial and invasive power. 
He also sees the possibility of resistance in the same planes, relations and 
fluxes in terms of subjectivity, desire and discourse. Such terrains could, 
however, be more productively framed through the Guattarian nexus of the 
artificial real.  
The subjectivity involved in instituent praxis exceeds notions of counter-
publics, insofar as the latter ultimately rest on concrete needs or interests, 
commonality or a common good. The problem with such aspects is that they 
are easily appropriable by the identificatory mechanisms of the market 
including spectacularisation, which limit emancipation and intersectionality, 
according to whatever capital allows for. The advantage of the political 
principle of the common through instituent praxis is that unappropriability is 
postulated as artificially instituted, on the grounds of co-operation and co-
obligation and through a non-pre-existing subjectivity which can go beyond 
commonality as identification.  
Despite their democratising or parrhesiastic intentions, formats, structures and 
project-institutions in the discursive art world hardly constitute a democratic 
front, insofar as they subscribe to the curatorial/exhibitionary context, which at 
best offers access to the eye of power, and at worst, turns into a franchise, 
blueprint or empty signifier for democracy. The fetishisation of such formulaic 
concerns facilitates the unhindered performance of progression in the art world 
and can obfuscate ongoing exclusions and alienations. Nonetheless, beyond 
such fetishisation, instituent praxis resonates with the quest for institutionally 
experimental forms that are socially responsive in their geopolitical context and 
faithful to a non-defeatist, desire-fueled and subjectivity-forming conception of 
the real as artificial. The next chapter explores this in relation to art institutions 
in Europe’s semi-periphery.  
 
 








This chapter furthers the discourse around art institutional experimentation in 
a European framework and critically examines geopolitical gaps that arise in 
historiographical attempts. The proliferation of public or non-profit, small-scale 
or medium-scale art institutions in the contemporary period is not irrelevant to 
the rise of this discourse, which has, however, attempted to look for and 
theorise beyond quantity experimental or alternative institutional/curatorial 
modalities. The current of the so-called New Institutionalism (NI henceforth) 
that emerged in 2000s in Europe has been central in such discourse. In my 
analysis, I use this current as merely a starting point in order to discuss the 
conditions for the emergence of experimental institutions in the European 
region, through an approach accordant with what is institutionally at stake 
today. I employ tactically the geopolitical concept of semi-periphery, in order 
to frame tensions between cores and peripheries, beyond sedimented socio-
political power landscapes and according to dynamic idiosyncrasies posed by 
instituent praxis and shifting realities in contemporary Europe. This focus 
should not obfuscate the discursive and practical experimentation with 
alternative or non-dominant art institutional settings that preceded the 
contemporary period and exceeded the confinement of a western-centric 
canon. It hopes instead to facilitate methodological links with further research 
of a widened and decentralised scope. 
The term ‘New Institutionalism’ was coined by Jonas Ekeberg in an 
homonymous publication as part of the Norwegian series Verksted (2003).1 NI 
is associated mainly – yet not exclusively – with a selection of art institutions 
                                                          




in Northern and Central-Western Europe. Widely referenced are Witte de With 
in Amsterdam, Palais de Tokyo in Paris, Rooseum in Malmo, Platform Garanti 
in Istanbul, Kunstverein München, Bergen Kunsthall and the Nordic Institute 
for Contemporary Art (NIFCA) in Helsinki. Lucie Kolb and Gabriel Flückiger 
have concisely described NI as 
a series of curatorial, art educational as well as administrative 
practices that from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s endeavored to 
reorganize the structures of mostly medium-sized, publicly funded 
contemporary art institutions, and to define alternative forms of 
institutional activity.2 
Curator and central figure of NI Charles Esche’s now-famous phrase ‘part 
community centre, part laboratory and part academy, with less need for the 
established showroom function‘ describes quite accurately what these art 
institutions aspired to be.3 Their visions explicitly renounced the standard 
characteristics of mainstream exhibition spaces (mega-halls, populist and 
tourist-oriented programming, as well as austere, plain white cubes) in favour 
of increased participation and public engagement, social sensitivity to the local 
context, educational focus and a general flow of experimentation and 
democratisation across activities. Finally, despite its emphasis on 
curatorial/institutional decisions, NI allegedly facilitated artistic production. 
Notably, curator and director of Kunstverein München from 2002 to 2004 Maria 
Lind has asserted a broader responsiveness to ‘the lead of art and artists to 
think about how an institution could be more sensitive to them, to be in the 
service of and in an interesting dialogue with artists.’4  
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NI’s historicisation has been heavily dependent on a curatorially specific 
discourse produced predominantly by practising curators that ponder on their 
own or their peers’ work within specific institutions. By extension, most of the 
aforementioned art institutions are typically discussed as examples of NI 
specifically under the directorship of particular curators. Vicky Chainey 
Gagnon has noted that NI was a ‘loose association of individuals—many of 
whom were former independent curators and had recently become directors 
of art institutions and museums — who chose no predetermined program of 
action.’5  
Yet, some of the implicated curators (such as Nina Möntmann, curator at 
NIFCA from 2003 to 2006) have denounced the indexical effect generated by 
the invention of an umbrella term for certain actions, especially when there is 
not enough ‘temporal distance’.6 Indeed, ten years after the Verksted issue on 
NI, Ekeberg himself acknowledges that he introduced NI ‘rather offhandedly’ 
as a concept.7 However, he responds to relevant criticism by arguing that ‘even 
though the term might be rejected, the discussion on NI was a welcome 
opportunity to focus on the relation between artistic production, public 
institutions and social change’.8 All in all, NI concentrates a set of traits and 
visions that some institutions in Europe seemed to share, regardless of 
whether NI should be used as an umbrella term.  
NI strategies incorporate a critical stance towards the dominance of the 
exhibition form and experiment with ways of encountering art other than the 
showroom. As many aforementioned examples in this thesis would suggest, 
this stance is not new to the fields of either art or curating. Relatedly, Gagnon 
also references the practice of Group Material (active from 1979 to 1996) who 
                                                          
5 Vicky C. Gagnon, ‘From the Populist Museum to the Research Platform: New Art Exhibition 
Practices Today,’ ETC, no. 95 (Feb/May 2012): 32, accessed November 3, 2014, 
https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/65948ac. [emphasis added]. 
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Flückiger, ‘New Institutionalism Revisited,’ 8. 
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Steine Hebert and Anne Szefer Karlsen (London: Open Editions; Bergen: Hordaland Art Centre, 2013), 
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8 Ekeberg, ‘Institutional Experiments,’ 53. 
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experimented with more democratic exhibition (or non-exhibition) forms, 
heavily loaded with roundtables and other pedagogical and educational 
formats –including their groundbreaking exhibition Democracy (1988-89) at the 
Dia Art Foundation in New York.9 In the Verksted publication, Rebecca Gordon 
Nesbitt traces NI’s experimental and exhibition-skeptic momentum into 
previously DIY artistic production. She argues that in the 1990s, NI 
endeavoured to incorporate the already thriving – at least in the United 
Kingdom – Do It Yourself (DIY) ethos of artist-led and artist-run projects and 
initiatives, gradually undermining their political claim to self-organisation 
‘outside the officially sanctioned institutions’.10 Gordon Nesbitt refers to the 
persisting gap between artistic and institutional practice whereby the latter 
ascended at the expense of the former, despite the proclaimed central position 
artists occupied in the context of NI.11 The general idea is that artists receive 
only a fraction of whatever financial resources are available. Funding is more 
easily and directly absorbed by the mediating institutional infrastructure, whose 
expenditure involves or even prioritises costs of institutional maintenance over 
direct investment in art production.12 In the case of NI, Gordon Nesbitt 
suggests that the relatively small institutions had to also deal with ‘budget 
shortages,’ curbing even further the resources available to artists.13 She also 
cautions against the centralisation and concentration of power observable in 
regions where specific art institutions ‘can be seen as having usurped some of 
the traditional territory of artist-led initiatives.’14 
However, Gordon Nesbitt’s critique reproduces the inside/outside dichotomy 
regarding the institution, which leads to no fruitful questions or conclusions for 
reasons I have addressed in previous chapters. Even if a hierarchy between 
art and art institution manifested clearly within the specific spatial and temporal 
conditions that Gordon Nesbitt comments on, it would be problematised by the 
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current European (UK-included) condition of neoliberal austerity that 
enmeshes art institutions in a survival struggle, already apparent with NI’s 
decline in the late 2000s. Arguably, it would be theoretically unsustainable not 
to conceive of artist-run initiatives and projects themselves as art institutions. 
Even if a differentiation has to be made between publicly funded institutions 
and more temporary DIY or artist-run initiatives, I would argue as per Mouffe 
that singleheartedly favouring withdrawal from established institutions is a 
problematic strategy and nurtures a limiting either/or condition. The vision and 
desire of NI to abstain from the sphere of mainstream, neoliberal, populist 
institutions and to experiment with new formats went hand-in-hand with a 
persistent self-interrogation. It is this experimentation with an institution’s 
institutional ‘being’, as it were, that I will uphold and focus on, in terms of some 
of its forms, limitations and versatile dynamics across parts of the European 
region that are seen as semi-peripheral. 
New Institutionalism and the semi-periphery 
 
The discourse on NI and the relevant curatorial/discursive activity have dealt 
unevenly with the geographic delineations of such institutionally experimental 
dynamics in the region. Ekeberg has registered the viewpoint that NI was 
predominantly a northern European phenomenon in the assumption that in the 
1980s and 1990s social democracy and the welfare state were not undermined 
despite the advent of neoliberalism, allowing for ample public funding for art 
institutions. However, Ekeberg seems to challenge this viewpoint not only in 
the Verksted publication (2003) where he refers to Platform Garanti in Istanbul 
(under the directorship of internationally acclaimed curator Vasif Kortun 
between 2001 and 2007) as a core part of NI, but also in the Self-organised 
publication in 2013, where he makes a case of MACBA in Barcelona 
demonstrating ‘already since before it opened in 1995’ a proclivity to activist 
urgencies in a ‘similar approach’ to the Rooseum and NIFCA. Furthermore, 
while the discourse on NI had just emerged, its practising curatorial 
counterpart was already to some extent preoccupied with exploring its 
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common ground with institutional experimentations outside the dominant 
metropolitan centers of contemporary art in Europe and the regions that still 
enjoyed the benefits of social democracy. For instance, Institution2 a long-term 
exhibition and series of seminars curated by Jens Hoffmann and organised by 
NIFCA (2003-2004) aimed at exploring ‘different examples of institutional work 
from various cultural and geographic contexts that manifest a flexible and 
progressive approach to a critical engagement with art and the exchange with 
the public.’15 Platform Garanti in Istanbul, Contemporary Art Center in Vilnius 
and Foksal Gallery Foundation in Warsaw were among the 10 participating art 
institutions, most of which located in Northwest Europe.  
However, such instances seem to be more informed by the desire to include 
and network with more peripheral areas without shifting the main protagonists, 
rather than sustained research into other European areas that might portray 
similar or equivalent institutional experimentation. This could be attested by 
the direct association of NI’s decline with the Nordic context, bestowing the 
latter with an element of origin and dominance within NI as a whole. Ekeberg 
suggests that the decline of NI is signaled by the closure of the Rooseum in 
2006 and NIFCA in 2007, as ‘the advantageous conditions created by social 
democratic cultural policies and neoliberal governmental reforms hit the 
Scandinavian countries.’16 In Möntmann’s account that includes Baltic and 
other Northern European examples, there were budget cuts, tightening of the 
demands in programming, changes in directors, and institutions becoming 
branches of well-established museums or other cultural institutions.17 
Möntmann characteristically writes: ‘most of the institutions seem to have been 
put in their place like insubordinate teenagers.’18 What she implies is that 
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‘criticality’ is no longer tolerated by funders and other supporting institutions 
that have fully internalised a ‘corporate’ logic.  
For Möntmann, the fall of NI indicates an ‘urgent need for emancipatory forms 
of action in the institutionalized art field and thus for new institutions’.19 
Indicatively, she refers to examples of community projects in three Indian cities 
(Delhi, Mumbai and Jakarta) whose activity is ‘participatory’, ‘institution-
forming’ and of a ‘quasi-institutional status.’ These are initiatives by people in 
the art field who start working together, in a small space (often used for ‘other 
community activities such as discussions and parties’) and the programming 
is often the work of friends and art peers.20 Möntmann sees an expansion of 
such activity, as those involved ‘fundraise internationally’, ‘invite foreign 
curators and artists, organize film programs, edit magazines and so on.’21 
Some of the characteristics of the local context that give rise to such activities 
are relatively fewer ‘institutional infrastructures’, lack of access to them, ‘few 
official contemporary institutions’ and no easy access to private and public 
funding.22 By contrast, Möntmann asserts, ‘institutions in Western countries 
need to reduce the number of structures and standards, and disengage spaces 
from too many codes and contexts’.23 In the West ‘alternatives are always 
measured against the official system that already exists and is increasingly 
defined by the politics of city marketing and sponsorship’.24  
Möntmann recognises that western alternatives (and presumably those in the 
Global North) are measured against an official or mainstream system and yet 
does not go as far as examining how the supposed eastern/southern 
alternatives are in turn measured against the western/northern mainstream 
and alternative structures. In this, there is the danger of idealising the creative 
practice that takes place despite the problems and obstacles created by the 
lack of infrastructural and institutional access, as well as perpetuating the 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 157. 
20 Ibid., 158. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 157-58. 




assumption that there is no future potentiality for (access to) institutional 
infrastructure in the contexts of such practice.  
As the discourse and curatorial activity that focused on experimental art 
institutions globally grew and to a great extent moved away from NI, examples 
from more peripheral areas became increasingly apparent. In the conference 
‘Desire Lines: A Symposium on Experimental Institutional Formats’ at David 
Roberts Arts Foundation (DRAF) in London in 2014, some of the participating 
institutions were 98weeks in Beirut, Beirut in Cairo and Kunsthalle Lissabon in 
Lisbon.25 The articles ‘Et in Arcadia ego: A Project for a Ubiquitous Kunsthalle’ 
by Filipa Ramos, referring to ‘the Most Beautiful Kunsthalle in the World’ 
project by Fondazione Antonio Ratti in Como, ‘The Hidden Law of a Probable 
Outcome: On the Development of a Southern Kunsthalle’ by João Mourão and 
Luís Silva, referring to Kunsthalle Lissabon in South as a State of Mind, as well 
as the column ‘Off-spaces’ in the magazine Art Review have also focused on 
experimental or alternative institutions in relatively peripheral areas.26  
In some respects, my cases studies in this chapter respond and seek to 
contribute to a similar discourse that focuses on the European terrain, while 
remaining aware of the danger of a tokenistic approach that reserves a 
peripheral space for peripheral institutions or even a celebratory sentiment 
towards the occasional off-space that makes it into the mainstream, 
Northwest-led discourse, without really addressing more structural problems. 
One such problem is that in the case of western liberal institutions, the 
historical context of each respective institution is largely known or more visible 
and discussed, whereas when it comes to peripheral institutions, their 
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historical context is not simply more obscure but is also stereotypically 
presupposed. Even though there is truth to divisions between centres and 
peripheries in Europe, disambiguation is necessary on a few key aspects, as 
well as further specification on the modality of the mechanisms that condition 
and maintain notions and functions of periphery.  
Kolb and Flückiger have suggested that NI’s 
failure cannot be explained entirely with reference to hegemonial 
political conditions, but that institutions as agents did not manage to 
constitute or mobilize the (sub-)publics necessary to oppose the 
closure of an institution under political pressure, and which might by 
their very existence legitimate the direction of the program.27 
This comment relates to aspects of the art institution that I have discussed in 
previous chapters. It is its underlying pertinence to aspects of instituent praxis 
that I want to focus on; the issue of producing publics, or rather, collective 
subjectivity, while co-producing rules of law as new significations conditioned 
by one’s own (phantasmatic) past. As the institutional exceeds the economic, 
the narrative of an economic hierarchy that corresponds linearly to an (art) 
institutional one does not adequately describe the implicated functions. Taking 
this remainder into consideration, I will employ the concept of semi-periphery, 
as imported from the social sciences into geopolitical discourses of the art 
world, to address the dynamics of some key driving forces operative among 
unequal segments in the European region.  
Immanuel Wallerstein has used the term semi-periphery to refer to countries 
that are classified in between the ‘core’ and the ‘peripheral’ countries, as 
regards the profitability, diversification, technological development and wage 
capacity of production.28 Wallerstein suggests that the semi-peripheral 
countries operate as core countries for the peripheral ones and as peripheral 
for the core ones, in multiple and complex ways.29 In 1976, when globalisation 
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29 Wallerstein, ‘Semi-Peripheral Countries,’ 463. 
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was nascent at best, Wallerstein classified the Southern European region 
comprising Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, the Eastern tier as well as 
Norway and Finland as semi-peripheral.30 Three of the southern countries 
would not join the European Economic Community until 1981 (Greece) and 
1987 (Spain and Portugal) and of course, the Eastern tier comprised largely 
so-called socialist states, ‘that is, those with governments ruled by a Marxist-
Leninist party, which has nationalized the basic means of production.’31 In 
developing the literature on semi-periphery, Christopher Chase-Dunn and 
Thomas D. Hall have articulated a clear institutional pertinence: ‘the semi-
periphery includes […] regions in which institutional features are in 
intermediate form in between those forms found in adjacent core and 
peripheral areas.’32 In the publication Former West: Art and the Contemporary 
after 1989, the Polish cultural researcher Ewa Majewska has discussed the 
currency of the semi-periphery today in describing ‘those countries that are 
seduced and disciplined to perhaps one day join the West.’33 In this, she 
discerns a ‘semi-colonial dependency’ which is battled in vain, especially when 
it lacks ‘the spoils of colonial accumulation.’34 Majewska argues that the post-
socialist condition has left Eastern Europe with the exacerbation of social 
inequality due to a ‘hyper-exploitative neoliberalism,’ while the western 
dominant narrative that primarily upholds the Eastern democratic deficit has 
‘been internalized, and finds expression in self-depreciation, guilt, and 
inferiority complexes, only encouraging populations of the East to make 
authoritarian political choices.’35 Majewska notes that the harshness of 
experiences in Eastern Europe had been unthinkable to the West until the 
fiscal and debt crisis in Greece.36 In 2011, soon after the Greek crisis had 
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erupted and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (2008), Angela 
Dimitrakaki argued, that the whole of Europe (not just the part of the continent 
identified as ‘Eastern’) is in a post–socialist condition, in the sense of Europe 
being in transition to a new stage in capitalism.37 However, there are still 
internal conflicts and imbalances, and even new and emergent ones – with the 
North/South division being central, as also Dimitrakaki notes.38  
Through these viewpoints, I hope to screenshot some of the shifting dynamics 
in European geopolitics while accentuating the semi-peripheral condition as a 
process of concurrency between complex mechanisms of desire and 
legitimisation. There is a constant negotiation over what comes to be 
acknowledged as the sovereign desire of the semi-periphery, through 
processes of legitimation, pacts and deals. Institutional creativity occupies an 
increasingly important role in this process, which should be measured through 
instituent praxis, i.e., the co-production of new significations as rules of law. 
The terms of the negotiation are largely (perceived as) dictated by the core 
centres (including the semi-peripheries that function as centres to the 
peripheries). However, the condition of the semi-periphery involves perversion; 
the semi-colonial dependence is desired by the semi-periphery that hopes to 
gain access to the core status, while it is often the frustration of this desire 
rather than the factuality of any given socioeconomic dependence that 
spearheads nationalism, authoritarianism and the reproduction of forced 
dependencies. As the ironic Greek-based Facebook page the Institute for the 
Management of the Athenian Post-Documenta Melancholy (or IDAMM) which 
I present in detail in Chapter 6 would suggest, accusations around neo-
colonialism towards Documenta 14 were inscribed in such frustration, even as 
socioeconomic factuality is also present and active.  
Perhaps a more substantiated criticism towards NI (as discourse and practice) 
than its alleged compromise of the institutionally critical potential attained by 
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DIY artistic production and Institutional Critique could be raised against the 
discursive seclusion of NI as predominantly a Nordic or Northwestern current. 
If this particular focus runs the risk of failing to adequately vindicate its ties to 
the history of Institutional Critique, it does so also in terms of omitting the 
institutionally critical history of various geopolitical contexts. Despite discursive 
or curatorial efforts to include peripheral areas, the mechanisms of semi-
periphery are still operative in maintaining the periphery. For instance, such 
mechanisms are arguably intensified when the conditioning of the present by 
the past is ignored, repressed and solidified as a stable phantasm, while well-
intended inclusive efforts have space or time only for the contemporary 
institutional iterations of the perceived-as-peripheral areas. Yet, skipping the 
history of the semi-peripheral areas contributes in their appearing solely as 
peripheries, as constantly trying to catch up and as never quite succeeding. 
My argument here is twofold. On the one hand, I uphold the necessity to visibly 
consider the history of whatever periphery or semi-periphery is to be included, 
as well as those cases when the clear hierarchy between centre and periphery 
would be challenged. On the other hand, I propose the viewpoint of the semi-
periphery, not only as an outward gaze directed to the peripheral other but also 
as introspection within the (supposed) centre. Thus, the focus would be placed 
on the commonality that arises from the relativity of position, as opposed to the 
absolute points of the core and the periphery.  
Building historical perspective through counter-accounts 
 
A pertinent account that complicates and nuances the decline of NI can be 
found in Marita Muukkonen’s deliberations on the closure of NIFCA in 2007. 
Muukkonen was curator at NIFCA. Her account delves deep into the history of 
the formation of national identity and her Nordic and Finnish focus takes well 
into consideration the socioeconomic, political and mediatic shifts that have 
shaped nationalism from early on in the twentieth century. Her examination 
articulates the passage from the ‘welfare state nationalism’ (1960s to 1990s) 
in the Nordic countries to ‘competitive nationalism,’ as also a European 




neoliberal phenomenon permitted by the instrumentalisation of cultural 
economies as national products.39 She makes a strong case of persisting 
nationalism centred around the Nordic identity as a unity that was cultivated in 
Finland since the ideological preparation of its national independence at the 
end of the late nineteenth century. Since the 1990s, the narrative of economic 
competitiveness within the European Union led Finnish (and presumably other 
Nordic) governmental policy to essentially solidify the Nordic identity through 
a ‘multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism’ that ultimately excludes the 
‘immigrant or the other.’ For Muukkonen, this condition partly explains to a 
great extent the governmental hostility towards art institutions such as NIFCA, 
which attempted to ‘take an active role in the Nordic policy-making level and 
make a stand to the effect that "culture" or the arts should not be 
instrumentalised in an attempt to construct and cement a mythical Nordic 
identity and a unity of Nordicness.’40 Thus, according to Muukkonen,  
a crucial point in NIFCA's art praxis was not attempting to speak 
for others, be they refugees, unemployed, precarious workers, 
or anyone else, but rather to consider how NIFCA as an art 
institution might function as a mediator, a translator, and a 
meeting place for practices in art and other disciplines, between 
the practitioners and their public […].41 
 
Developments of the last decade that see nationalism and authoritarianism on 
the rise in Europe as a whole comes to confirm Muukkonen’s account, her 
deixis of the underlying exclusion of both working-class subjects and displaced 
others and the long-lasting, historically diffused thread of nationalism that can 
never be attributed to a single cause and effect instance, as salient problems 
also in Nordic Europe prior to and throughout the period of globalisation. 
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Taking into account that the historicisation of a European semi-peripheral 
tradition of Institutional Critique is a colossal research endeavour on which 
volumes have already been devoted, I will refer to a pre-1989 example that fits 
the core of Institutional Critique, both in terms of theme and methodology. This 
is a centrifugal attempt to merely acknowledge a relatively more invisible but 
equally rich discourse alongside the western-centric historical background that 
this thesis has largely employed in terms of Institutional Critique before 1989.42 
Galéria Ganku is a fictive art institution initiated in 1971 and carried on in 
various ‘self-archiving’ forms through the 1980s by internationally acclaimed 
Slovak artist Július Koller. Galéria Ganku refers to the homonymous mountain 
peak in the High Tatra mountain range (height: 2459 meters) located along the 
border of Slovakia and Poland. Koller employed this peak as the imaginary site 
of his art institution through a creative process of drawing, writing, tracing and 
mapping on photographs of the site largely found in mountain tourism 
magazines (but also photos of family trips to the Tatras, postcards and other 
related everyday paraphernalia), as the culture of mountaineering was growing 
in the region. This process has been described by Daniel Grúň as ‘factographic 
fiction.’43 The peak is largely inaccessible and sets a challenge to high-skilled 
climbers – an aspect relevant to Koller’s work that commonly incorporated 
sports and games references.44 More relevant to Institutional Critique is the 
‘ironic idea of a private gallery,’ in the context of socialist Czechoslovakia, 
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where private galleries and the art market have not been formed and belong 
to an external, western world. Grúň writes: 
The Ganek Gallery is not a utopian vision of an institution […]; it 
is rather an institution constituted for utopian visions. Koller 
privatised a space for the gallery in an inaccessible mountain 
terrain as a reaction to the inadequacy of other exhibiting 
opportunities. He imitated and also ridiculed the principles of 
institutional operation. […] In this process the artist himself 
becomes the holder of the archive, thus compensating for the 
insufficient or non-existent collective interest on the part of public 
institutions.45 
 
A collective archival iteration of Galéria Ganku (one out of many that emerged 
from informal gatherings in apartments) took the form of a statute that played 
with language as a ‘bureaucratic apparatus’ – similarly to methodologies of 
western-centric traditions of Institutional Critique.46 However, Galéria Ganku’s 
relation to its own (art) institutional context and its perception of the western 
institutional context should be seen as complicating an analysis of such 
relation in historical accounts of western Institutional Critique. According to 
Grúň: 
In contrast to the former West, where critical dialogue with the 
bureaucratic and ideological apparatus of the museum brought 
artists in direct confrontation with the art institution, among artists 
in Slovakia there was rather a growing desire for the museum, 
which led to the foundation of parallel initiatives and alternative 
forms of presentation for unofficial art. Expressions of this desire 
for the museum were accompanied by the trauma symptom of 
split personality (the artists became simultaneously the regime’s 
decorators and its opponents) and symbolic exclusion from the 
institutional operation of real socialism.47 
 
I do not endeavour to validate or dispute the historical specificity or accuracy 
of the psychosocially experienced and acted upon institutional absence or lack 
during Koller’s period that Grúň alludes to, as the mere register of this condition 
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clearly informs the post-1989 semi-periphery that I discuss in this chapter. 
Galéria Ganku becomes significant to this thesis as a non-Western pre-1989 
case study that not only contributes pertinently and originally to a western 
artistic tradition of Institutional Critique but also portrays elements of transitive 
discursivity assignable to the thread of discursive practice analysed in Chapter 
4. Moreover, the fictive gallery could be seen as part of the historical 
background for the imaginary and mock-institutional projects that I discuss in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
Muzeum Sztuki in Łódź (Poland) is another institution of the European semi-
periphery that both challenges the clear institutional dichotomies of core and 
periphery and experiments with its own institutional positionality and vision. 
This museum owns and hosts one of the oldest and most historically significant 
international modern and contemporary art collections in Europe. This 
significance is attributable to a few key aspects. First, its initiation (1929) 
coincides with the period when notable western institutions such as The 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York or the Landesmuseum in Hanover 
begun to develop their own twentieth century art collections.48 Secondly, 
Muzeum Sztuki’s collection was initiated and run by a group of avant-garde 
artists under the name ‘a.r.’, that stands for revolutionary artists or real avant-
garde. Founding members of the group were Władysław Strzemiński, 
Katarzyna Kobro and Henryk Stażewski. The poets Julian Przyboś and Jan 
Brzękowski are also considered contributing initiators of the collection.49 The 
group members were artistically active only individually both in Poland and 
internationally. According to Magdalena Wróblewska, their group practice was 
curatorial, involving organisational and publishing work that was largely co-
ordinated via post.50 Their endeavour in putting together the collection (mainly 
1929-1932, extended until 1938) was met with great appreciation by western 
artists of the European avant-garde of the time, such as Hans Arp, Fernand 
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Léger, Max Ernst and Kurt Schwitters.51 These artists donated works to the 
collection, foregrounding a tradition of prominent European artists that would 
follow through with their own artistic 
contributions.52 The collection aspired from 
early on to maintain and accentuate the 
connection between Polish movements or 
streams thereof (such as Formism, 
Constructivism and Unism) and wider 
European avant-gardes and strategically 
made a point of including Polish artists who 
refused to conform with the prescriptions of 
socialist realism.53 Moreover, the local 
authorities of Łódź were unusually 
accommodating, as, in 1931, they allowed 
the core of the collection to be publicly 
displayed in the Julian and Kazimierz 
Bartoszewicz Museum of History and Art in 
Łódź, that would later turn into Muzeum 
Sztuki.54  
Despite its global art historical significance, 
Muzeum Sztuki and its collection is disproportionately visible within the 
European art institutional landscape. Such relative invisibility can be observed 
both in the art-institutional discourse and in the realm of collaborative 
institutional networks or initiatives with diverse funding resources, of the scale 
of traditionally core and predominantly western institutions that own modern 
and contemporary art collections. In a personal interview (2017), Ewa 
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Jarosław Suchan, the museum’s 
director since 2006 has stated: ‘At 
the beginning, Strzemiński tried to 
gather and present such a collection 
in Warsaw. However, this proposal 
proved too revolutionary for the 
city. The [then] socialist municipal 
authorities of Łódź took more 
favourable approach towards the 
whole idea. One of the councillors, 
Przecław Smolik, was the most avid 
proponent of displaying the 
collection in a museum in Łódź. It is 
worth mentioning that Łódź was a 
rather new city, it did not carry such 
heavy historical burden as Warsaw, 
Kraków or Poznań. This may have 
been the reason for its openness to 
such revolutionary initiatives. 
Concentration of industry gave birth 
to a modern social structure with 
new bourgeoisie, who did not really 
want to build their cultural identity 
based on references to the past. 
Last but not least, Łódź was a really 
cosmopolitan city. Apart from the 
Poles, there were Russians, 
Germans, Jews, as well as others.’  
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Majewska emphatically confirmed the institution’s unacknowledged historical 
value. This, I argue, should be associated both with the actuality of the 
absence of the art market in state-socialist Poland, at least from the end of 
World War II until 1989, and with the broader perceived and mythologised 
institutional and infrastructural deficit in relation to the (former) West that 
relates to this economic and political discrepancy and persists in the post-
socialist condition. The artist-run methodologies of the a.r. group in developing 
the collection that was largely dependent on the group’s network of affiliates 
and amical donations as contributions by other artists could be juxtaposed with 
the potency displayed by institutions such as the Tate, MoMa in New York or 
the Landesmuseum that were already endowed with the institutional 
legitimacy, public or governmental blessing and power to robustly claim and 
acquire their collections.55 As Magdalena Wróblewska has suggested 
regarding the collection, ‘[t]he project’s success was largely associated with 
Strzemiński’s formidable status in Łódź, which stemmed from his personality 
and charisma, rather than his official obligations.’56 
The museum’s enduring importance in terms of instituent praxis can be 
glimpsed in the understanding of its own historical agency: ‘The primary value 
of the collection, for the most part experimental, is its attitude of constant 
openness to contemporary times, which are a derivative of the tradition of the 
past.’57 Adjacent to this temporal and historical experimentation is the 
museum’s sustained reflection of its own institutional perception, projection 
and vision regarding its internal (Polish) and external (global) affinities and 
limitations, not least in terms of visibility. Since 2013, the museum has been 
collaborating with MoMA’s network, Contemporary and Modern Art 
Perspectives (C-MAP), ‘a cross-departmental, internal research program at 
MoMA that fosters the multiyear study of art histories outside North America 
and Western Europe.’58 Furthermore, since 2008, the museum has been the 
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official working site for the Łódzkie Towarzystwo Zachęty Sztuk Pięknych (the 
Łódź Society for the Encouragement of Fine Arts), that has formed a partnering 
collection focussing on contemporary Polish and Łódź-based artists, akin to 
the avant-garde spirit of the Muzeum Sztuki collection. According to Majewska, 
the current internal conflicts within the museum and the management of its 
collection often concern curatorial tensions between postcolonial and 
decolonial attitudes, in terms of whether or not (or how to) differentiate the 
curatorial engagement with the geography of Eastern and Central Europe in 
relation to the rest of Europe and the globe.59 Arguably, the museum’s 
collaboration with C-MAP demonstrates the tendency to inhabit the post-
colonial condition, as the network has been initiated by a core institutional pillar 
of western culture that openly seeks to consider and perhaps amend the 
visibility gap as regards the history of geopolitical (semi-)peripheries. Perhaps 
in a more assertive attempt to position itself as a global art-institutional 
playmaker, in 2012, the museum begun collaborating with Google Art Project, 
making a small part of the collection available for online display through 
Google’s platform. The museum’s director Jarosław Suchan has referred to 
this collaboration as merely a part of the broader tendency for online cultural 
consumption, without commenting on the corporate aspect of it.60 It is likely 
that the Google collaboration undermines the collection’s avant-garde ethos, 
as it could be taken to prioritise corporate global institutional agents over more 
independent or publicly funded institutional networks, such as L’ Internationale. 
Nonetheless, the difficulties of experimentation with and intervention into an 
institution’s self-positioning from the particular position of the semi-periphery 
should not be downplayed. In the case of the Muzeum Sztuki, a tension could 
be discerned between striving to drastically compensate what could be 
interpreted as an imposed and largely undeserved position outside of the 
(western) centre and remaining faithful to a radical or avant-garde 
curatorial/institutional past.  
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Case studies: Kunsthalle Athena and Vector  
 
Kunsthalle Athena (KA) in Athens and Vector in Iași constitute relevant 
contemporary examples in a discourse that examines critical or alternative 
institutions in the semi-periphery. Arguably KA and Vector should be examined 
in the context of both NI and the dominant neoliberal institutions to which NI 
has been an alternative, not least as they bear strong similarities to the 
characteristics Möntmann describes referring to the art institutions in India.  
The examination of these two institutions does not aim at constructing a semi-
peripheral Southeastern institutional cluster as barricaded from the dominant 
historicisation of NI as a Northwestern core. Rather, it seeks to annotate 
common threads and flag up issues that might surface as crossing and 
traversing art institutions in Europe. 
Even though I discuss both Vector’s and KA’s sociopolitical, economic and 
cultural contexts as semi-peripheral, they are by no means equated. Vector is 
situated in a small city in a country where private galleries and foundations 
could operate only after 1989. Kunsthalle Athena is situated in the capital city 
of a Mediterranean country with an uninterrupted capitalist economy since the 
19th century. Yet Greece is typically placed in the periphery of Europe, and 
since 2010 it features on the list of countries forming the new P.I.I.G.S. ‘bloc’. 
Greece has been an exception in the Balkans, having followed the trajectory 
of Western European culture and not having experienced the formidable 
upheavals of former ‘communist’ states in the region branded ‘transitional’ 
during the 1990s.61 Moreover, unlike Spain, Portugal and Italy, also in PIIGS, 
Greece does not have an imperial history but rather sees itself as having been 
colonised by the Ottoman Empire up to the early 19th century.  
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Vector is a contemporary art institution situated in Iași, Romania’s fourth most 
populous city (of just over three hundred thousand inhabitants). Vector was 
founded in 2001 by eight artists, and its activity began to fade in 2009 when its 
space was closed.62 Iași is a university city (with Romania’s oldest university) 
and a cultural and historical centre situated in the geographical periphery of 
the country, 406 kilometers away from Bucharest. Its remoteness has been a 
formative issue for Vector’s institutional course and development. According 
to founding member and former director Livia Pancu,   
when Vector was initiated there was no museum or other kind of 
national institution focused on contemporary art in Romania. Vector 
and other active organisations were therefore acting as substitutes, 
and were taking responsibility for critical discourse across the 
country. The National Museum of Contemporary Art was only 
inaugurated in 2004 in Bucharest. Soon after, the activities of this 
museum became almost irrelevant for part of the Romanian 
contemporary art scene.63  
In 2001, Romania had been in a post-socialist condition or period of ‘transition’ 
for more than ten years, which means that commercial galleries and private 
funding had begun to have a stake in the art field. In 1993, the Soros Center 
for Contemporary Art (George Soros being one of the most important private 
investors globally) based in Budapest branches out with offices in Bucharest 
(as well as Riga, Vilnius, Kiev, Ljubljana and Sofia, after Bratislava, Moscow, 
Prague, Tallinn and Warsaw in 1992).64 By 2004, numerous private 
contemporary art galleries such as Possibila, Arnaid and H’art were operating 
in Bucharest. In contrast to this fast pace of keeping up with the art market of 
non-former-socialist countries, there seemed to be a concurrent deficit of 
public or independent institutions relevant to specific publics and able to 
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generate critical discourse. Pancu’s observation that critical discourse in 
relation to contemporary art hardly existed is indicative. Vector’s co-founder, 
Matei Bejenaru, also stated, referring to the period of 1993-1994: 
It was George Soros who came and put his own philosophy and 
structure into place in the region. Now I am critical of Soros, but at 
the time his projects were maybe a necessary step. There was no 
infrastructure. Civic society was undeveloped. Independent 
initiatives were very weak.65  
Vlad Morariu who joined Vector in 2004 describes the local community of Iași 
as largely conservative, religious and not familiar with contemporary art and 
the local authorities as unsupportive, not simply in terms of funding but also 
delaying administrative processes.66  
Vector emerged out of a group of artists who since 1997 had been organising 
Periferic, a yearly performance festival that was initiated by Bejenaru and 
funded by the French Cultural Centre in Iași. The festival gradually turned into 
Periferic Biennial and was incorporated into Vector’s projects. According to its 
description, ‘Periferic Biennial is the most extensive contemporary art initiative 
in post-communist Romania, collecting and presenting a wide range of artistic 
attitudes concerned with the relationship between centre and periphery’.67 
Vector became a legal organisational entity in 2001 but it only acquired a 
gallery space and offices in 2004 with funding it received from Pro Helvetia (a 
Swiss cultural foundation that at the time sponsored cultural programmes in 
Balkan countries) for the cARTtier three-year project (2004-2007). Apart from 
financing Vector’s space and to a large extent the development of Periferic 
Biennial, cARTtier was a socio-cultural project in a stricter sense that allowed 
for direct interaction with the Iași community. According to Morariu, the project 
included urban interventions such as murals on building facades (an innovative 
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project in the Romanian context) and it involved ‘initiative groups’ from the 
neighbourhood in co-organising local festivals. In 2004, Vector re-expanded 
its hitherto team with sociologists and social workers, who also contributed in 
this socially-engaged practice. Vector’s activity also included a residency 
programme, offsite exhibitions (for instance, at the former Turkish bath in 
2004) and two periodical publications (Vector – Art and Culture in Context, 
2005-2007, and Vector – Critical Research in Context, 2010 - present).  
The last Periferic Biennial took place in 2008. In 2010, Bejenaru left Vector. 
Together with his decision to leave, he organised a conference with people 
who had collaborated with Vector in the past to discuss the institution’s future. 
This resulted in a publication documenting Vector’s activity from 1997 to 
2010.68 Shortly after this, Pancu decided to test out an entirely new strategy 
by which Vector would cease its local activity and increase instead its visibility 
–indeed presence – abroad, by accepting international invitations for all sorts 
of collaboration. Thus, Vector spent a ‘year on the road,’ whose stops included 
major western/core commercial art fairs such as the Frame section of Frieze 
Art Fair (2010), Vienna Art Fair (2011) and Preview Berlin Art Fair (2011).69 
Through this process, Vector reinvigorated its introspection as an art institution 
on different grounds.70 Following this year and shifts in the dynamics of the 
group, Vector decided to cease all its public activity and launch what Pancu 
calls the ‘strategy of invisibility’.71 Pancu maintains that they were trying to 
resist their retroactive desire to produce; ‘we would feel less inclined to work 
with projects created by inertia and instead be inspired by the reality 
surrounding us’.72 Pancu’s text in Self-organised could be the ‘first sign of 
visibility’ for Vector after the organisation’s ‘invisibility’ period, even though she 
had already left Vector (2012) and thus, her text does not necessarily represent 
the team.73 Since 2013, the Vector – Critical Research in Context publication 
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has evolved into a collaboration with ‘George Enescu’ National University of 
the Arts in Iași.74 In 2016, Vector announced that is was present again on the 
Iași art scene under the coordination of Dan Acostioaei.75  
Throughout its course, Vector was experimenting with its institutional format 
and positioning. However, this experimentation was not one of pure form and 
it did not take place in a vacuum – carried, that is, out for experimentation’s 
sake – but was conditioned by material and immaterial necessities defining 
Vector’s daily reality. 
Vector’s institutional status fluctuated according to shifting urgencies and 
multiple clashing visions of stakeholders. Pancu describes this among other 
characteristics by signposting a phrase that could capture Vector’s oscillating 
nature as an institution, ‘The Almost Institution’.76 Initially, Vector resembled 
more a self-organised group of people or an artist collective who share 
authorship and experiment with their art and their local context. However, 
Vector’s urge and effort to transform itself into a stable institution, one which 
would exceed the practice and visions of its members, was evident nearly from 
the start. Despite intentions however, reality seemed to fall short of both the 
ambition for equal power among the team members and the desire to set up 
an institution (rather than a group of people). As Pancu writes, ‘we often 
described ourselves as “a group of people”, while our behaviour could 
periodically be characterised by strict rules and hierarchy’77 and elsewhere, 
‘we never allowed ourselves to become personally detached from Vector, and 
the knowledge we gradually developed over time stayed within our own 
group’.78 
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Pancu also refers to ‘overproduction’ in relation to Vector’s programming and 
activities that left no ‘room for reflection on the contents and the direction things 
were taking’.79 Vector’s long and ambitious list of activities was being 
supported only by personal contacts from people working in the arts and 
funding structures that expressed specific demands on these activities.80 
Pancu often mentions the team’s exhaustion and the need of some of them ‘to 
work second jobs to earn their living’.81 According to Morariu, Vector’s team 
was constantly overworked. Those who were present prior to the funding from 
Pro Helvetia were volunteering and afterwards, Vector’s members were merely 
surviving on salaries of the scale of 150 euros per month. Morariu registers a 
somewhat frenetic atmosphere whereby it felt like there were scarce viable job 
alternatives (in cultural work and in general) and the workers were embracing 
these conditions in a self-exploitative context. Furthermore, in Vector, there 
was a general sense of disorganisation as well as ambiguity or arbitrariness in 
the allocation of roles and tasks:  
If there was a sense of organisation it was because of individual 
people – some people did a lot of work. It was definitely 
unhealthy, things were not straight, organisational roles were 
overlapping. It had to do more with the individuals assuming the 
roles rather than sticking with the preplanned structure (that 
existed only for applications). 
Pancu explains that the urge to ‘over-produce’ had its grounds on the ‘lack of 
strong institutions, and the need for production platforms for contemporary 
art’.82 She states: 
For those running Vector, it was essential to facilitate the production 
of art that connected with the international scene and with large-
scale exhibitions as a means to create and educate an audience. 
Throughout the years, a big institutional infrastructure was 
simulated by organising a wide variety of projects. […] The 
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disadvantage of this was that we behaved in a mimetic manner, 
trying to follow and apply models that came from somewhere else.83 
Pancu’s viewpoint indicates an attempt to emulate big institutional 
infrastructure while underestimating how this would interact with Vector’s 
resources and its overall socio-economic context. Morariu specifies that 
Vector’s overproduction was directly attributable to clear aspirations to 
resemble western/core art institutional paradigms, despite collaborations and 
associations with institutions and practitioners from other – similarly semi-
peripheral – former-socialist contexts such as Novi Sad (Serbia), Slovenia and 
Hungary. Vector’s members strived for ‘the promise of institutionalisation’ that 
would provide them with a ‘stable model’.84 They believed that Vector’s activity 
was in need of ‘a stable platform with a proper infrastructure to operate in a 
sustainable manner.’85 For Pancu, institutionalisation understood as stability 
and sustainability of an appropriate infrastructure would be a process by which 
Vector would shift from being an ‘almost’ institution to being a proper institution. 
She suggests that ‘stability meant first of all a singular vision in order to have 
a high degree of flexibility in approaching funding bodies’, that were expected 
to favour permanent, ‘institutionalised’ structures.86  
Yet, the shift towards stable and sustainable infrastructure was desired for 
different reasons by different group members. According to Pancu, the initial 
members, who were artists, reached a point where they wanted to use Vector 
– primarily or even exclusively – as a platform to exhibit their own work in a 
consolidated context of display and critical review.87 For the initial members, 
those who joined later and took over organisational roles inevitably imposed 
‘institutionalisation.’88 According to Morariu, ‘artists wanted to show their work 
or did not have time to show their work because of the organisational overload.’ 
There was also internal conflict regarding the political overtness of the 
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publications. More broadly, disagreements among the members regarding 
their visions for Vector were directly associated with the project’s failure to 
achieve a stable form.89 Such predicaments are far from uncommon in 
conditions of semi-periphery. The uncertainty and shakiness of conscious or 
unconscious aspirations torn between transcending or soberly negotiating the 
institution’s geopolitical position constitute semi-peripheral characteristics and 
it is hardly surprising that they would translate into internal friction.  
 
Kunsthalle Athena 
Kunsthalle Athena was initiated in 2010, at the breakout the Greek economic 
crisis. It was founded by Greek curator Marina Fokidis, being in many respects 
in a DIY, independent gesture that denounced some of the problems that the 
particular context of the Greek economy and policy entails in relation to visual 
art. As she explained in a 2014 interview:  
If we were fed up with something, this was the way that [arts] 
institutions operate in Greece – very bureaucratic, in close relation 
with state corruption, inflexible, not friendly to audiences, stagnant. 
On the other hand, there exist the private collectors’ institutions 
[foundations] that might think they operate in an open, flexible and 
democratic way. But they are not really […]. When we started, we 
had no idea that Kunsthalle Athena would become established as a 
sort of ‘real’ institution and would run for four years now. And it was 
born out of collective ‘lack’, out of collective needs, out of collective 
worries and collective passion. Not out of a state or governmental 
cultural strategy. KA started with no solid base either in terms of 
funding or space.90 
The initial idea was that KA would constitute a proposal for a potential 
institution in Athens that would be consumed in an exhibition event. Project by 
project, it became popular with Athenian and international audiences. Perhaps 
in opposition to Vector’s initial stages, the experimental character of KA in 
terms of its institutional status was clear from the start. Instead of attempting 
                                                          
89 Ibid., 80. 
90 Personal interview with Marina Fokidis, 2014. 
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mimetic strategies, KA’s experimentation went hand in hand with sensitivity to 
its context.  
In more practical terms, KA can be described as an independent art centre for 
contemporary art with an international network of collaborators. It received no 
funding from neither public nor private entities. It was run on a voluntary and 
largely part-time basis, although working hours tended to be flexible. Its space 
is a centrally located, disused neo-classical building in need of repairs and of 
a ‘squat aesthetic’, granted by its owner on a ‘temporary basis.’ The economic 
value of the building was rising through its use as an art centre in 
Metaxourghio, a generally downgraded, poor, ethnically diverse and slowly 
gentrified area of central Athens. Part of the production costs were covered by 
small voluntary donations by visitors or modest sponsorships (mostly from 
alcoholic beverage companies or local sellers). The organisational structure 
was quite loose, with most of the staff enjoying a high degree of personal 
initiative and creative management of issues.  
Concerning its activities, KA mounted group or solo exhibitions, commissioned 
exhibitions to external curators and ran a parallel programme called ‘Political 
Speeches’ that included performances, talks, discussions and screenings. 
Participating artists, curators and theorists were Greek or international and 
KA’s network of collaborators from abroad is noteworthy. This network was 
partly what made possible the initiation of a biannual publication in English, 
South as a State of Mind’, distributed in numerous countries in Europe and 
North America. The decision to initiate the magazine was partly connected with 
the fact that KA’s space is closed down during the winter months because of 
maintenance issues and the lack of central heating.  
KA’s name was an ironic gesture towards the impossibility of setting up 
institutions of the type of a German Kunsthalle in Greece, given the 
aforementioned context. Kunsthalles, existing predominantly in German-
speaking countries, are publicly funded institutions usually aiming at promoting 
contemporary art. They have an official character and it would be difficult to 
characterise the exhibitions they host as experimental, even though they 




usually are of high quality. However, as Fokidis asserts, KA is not at all against 
any institutional framework. In fact, KA ‘adopts the model of a Kunstverein’, 
even though it is called Kunsthalle. The term ‘Kunstverein’ refers to more 
informal art centres that often prioritise community issues and social exchange 
than an austere exhibition programming. So, as Fokidis explains, adopting the 
term Kunsthalle was ‘a soft hijacking’ of the institutional connotations of a 
Kunsthalle: ‘when we decided to stay independent, we turned our project into 
a study, an experiment on how an institution like a kunsthalle should operate 
ideally,’ in the Athenian context.  
KA was indirectly but substantially implicated in one of the most significant 
global contemporary art exhibitions/institutions, that of Documenta, mostly 
through South as a State of Mind, the sibling publication of KA, run and staffed 
by the same people, with a similar network of collaborators and similar creative 
input and style. Fokidis was initially appointed Head of Artistic Office in Athens 
(later Curatorial Advisor) and South as a State of Mind was turned into the 
official magazine of Documenta 14. According to Fokidis, Documenta’s 
(working) title ‘Learning from Athens’ alluded to the fact that one of the oldest 
most solid institutions for contemporary art (with state and private funding, a 
series of boards behind it and reaching about a million visitors each time) 
actually wanted to learn as well from ‘independent initiatives coming from an 
economically and socially wounded country’. At the same time, she recognises 
what was in turn offered to the Athenian initiatives as well as the collaborative 
terms of this institutional encounter:  
Not only will we have a break from the urgency of surviving, an 
urgency that has exhausted us to the limits of our capacity, but we 
will also open up to a larger spectrum of discussions and 
collaborations and also possibly to a much larger audience. […] A 
great paradox is that the magazine South as a State of Mind and 
Documenta have been discussing this merger [as] equal 
institutional entities. And although we all know that this is the way it 
should be, it is not always evident [that] a small magazine and one 
of the largest art institutions [would] have such a fair encounter. 
The transition of KA’s core staff into working for Documenta 14 led organically 
to KA’s closure as an institution, and the post-Documenta era finds the team’s 
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Athens-based members having progressed to new projects.91 KA’s building 
eventually became the (legal squatting) basis of Communitism, a collective 
active in the area of Metaxourghio since 2015. Communitism attempts to mildly 
intervene on infrastructure problems in a spirit of creative commons or Do It 
Ourselves (DIO), involving and bringing together diverse local communities as 
well as international creatives.92 
The relation of infrastructure and instituent praxis through 
Vector and Kunsthalle Athena 
 
In many respects, it seems reasonable to suggest that both Vector and KA are 
assignable to the experimental art-institutional stream paved by NI – even as 
they had to situate themselves within relatively more uncertain sociopolitical, 
economic and institutional frameworks that did not facilitate experimentation. 
Public funding was granted to organisations normally associated with NI with 
relative ease and through overt processes (at least during its peak), while 
Vector and KA had to struggle against the aforementioned limitations arising 
from Romania and Greece’s socio-economic and cultural contexts, regarding 
both access to funding and working conditions. Despite the contextual scarcity 
and difficulty, the two semi-peripheral art institutions showcased awareness of, 
and agency on, their institutional entity, as well as their surrounding global 
realities. Vector initially tried to simulate big infrastructure in order to make up 
for the lack of strong art institutions in Romania. Later on, it abandoned this 
strategy and experimented with different and even radical forms of operation, 
that eventually revealed the importance of the process of reaching a common 
vision, not least in order to articulate a relation to the public. KA sought to 
approach institutions of the kunstverein type, aware of the impossibility of 
direct simulations and ‘toying’ with the idea of transposing – indeed, translating 
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– the institutional examples of kunsthalles and kunstvereins within the Greek 
context. 
Arguably, Vector and KA’s diverse contexts of semi-periphery instantiate 
iterations whereby the affective aspect of infrastructure is accentuated, 
validating Rogoff’s focus on infrastructure’s affective surplus in Chapter 3 as 
well as Möntmann’s urge to disengage from too many codes and standards. 
Specifically, the perception of infrastructure imbalances can reproduce 
mechanisms of semi-periphery, whereby institutions respond to infrastructural 
lack by striving for ‘big’ infrastructure, or alternatively, by coming up with 
creatively ironic infrastructural versions, that are given up once big 
infrastructure becomes available. Thus, infrastructure functions as 
signification, and a possible way for it to be understood away from the 
formulaic import/export of pre-existing and stable systems, codes and 
processes is through the realm of instituent praxis, that appeals to 
infrastructure’s affective aspect. This is not an appeal to infrastructure’s allure 
as remnant of (paternalistic) modernism; rather, this and other kinds of 
seduction or repulsion evoked by infrastructure participate in enunciation and 
signification and potentially, in pre-personal, proto-subjective collective 
assemblages. If understood in a Guattarian framework, the conceptual realm 
of instituent praxis designating the creation of new significations as rules of law 
in and through the production of a subjectivity (or subject group) would already 
understand infrastructure in terms of (a)signification and treat it as affective 
knowledge. The irreducibilities of actual work conditions and the actualities of 
specific publics would be at play in the group’s enunciative shift from the given 
code in its unconscious to conscious instituent praxis. Infrastructure is indeed 
often desired (or loathed) depending on the (perceived) presence or absence 
of a geopolitical context whereby stability or flexibility and (public) regulation 
secure non-exploitative working conditions and enable uninterrupted cultural 
production that relates with publics. Instituent praxis suggests that this desire 
should be linked primarily with a process of co-producing the system of rules 
and its control/feedback. Such process would generate an administrative 
infrastructure as much as it would be induced with affect.  
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Furthering the art-institutional experimental thread in 
Europe’s semi-periphery: Examples from 2013 onwards 
 
In continuation of a European open-ended thread of art institutions that 
respond critically to historically urgent conditions, I will refer briefly to more 
recent examples of institutions or institutional networks around Europe. These 
involve responses to issues that have emerged after the eruption of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and after the surge of the European refugee crisis that 
could be roughly chronicled in 2013. For instance, the economic precarity and 
the casualisation of working conditions that are partly linked to broader 
austerity policies in the European Union exacerbating the gender-based 
imbalances both in the working sector and in a wider biopolitical sphere. Other 
issues pertain to the repercussions of the displacement, transfer and detention 
of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East, Near East 
and Africa, involving largely the Mediterranean and other European borders. 
This crisis has been associated – notably by theorist Judith Butler – with 
questions around the unequal distribution of ‘grievability’ of lives.93 In this 
context that has prepared the ground for heightened nationalism, 
conservatism, racism and other authoritarian tendencies, Étienne Balibar’s 
critical elaborations in 2004 of a ‘transnational citizenship’ that discuss the 
conditions of a potential redundancy of national borders and State sovereignty 
would seem today wishfully premised, albeit even more urgent.94 
CAMP is an art institution in Copenhagen that has been founded in 2015 by 
Danish curators Frederikke Hansen and Tone Olaf Nielsen who since 2005 
have been known as the transnational feminist curatorial collective Kuratorisk 
Aktion.95 CAMP is a ‘self-governing institution’ entirely devoted to issues 
around ‘displacement, migration, immigration, and asylum’ – traits that render 
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it a unique institution, at least in the Scandinavian context.96 The institution is 
based in Trampoline House, an independent community centre for refugees 
and asylum seekers in Denmark, campaigning for refugee issues and 
providing training and support. Trampoline House was established in 2010 
collectively by artists, asylum seekers, students, and professionals (including 
Nielsen and artists Morten Goll and Joachim Hamou and more than 100 
asylum seekers and migration justice activists), in response to Danish 
immigration law and policy.97 Even though CAMP has a fully developed and 
globally relevant curatorial and discursive programme distinct from the activity 
of the refugee community centre, in some respects, it breaks fundamentally 
from the observable relation that at least a part of NI maintained with 
community projects and activist agendas. CAMP is not first and foremost an 
art institution that generously hosts and facilitates community and activist 
agency, in a space that would otherwise reproduce the hierarchies of the 
exhibitionary complex. Rather, CAMP was founded specifically in order to 
mobilise art towards a ‘greater understanding between displaced people and 
the communities that receive them – and to stimulate new visions for a more 
inclusive and equitable migration, refugee, and asylum policy.’98 In this sense, 
its art-institutional function is adjacent or even supplementary to the 
community centre rather than the reverse.  
It should also be stressed that, as Dimitrakaki has noted, the founding 
curatorial duo has been since before 2008 upholding ‘its right to be openly 
positional – to be openly feminist, anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist and queer – 
irrespective of the existence of a social movement that could provide its 
ideological safety net.’99 Yet, what is also noteworthy in the case of CAMP is 
the shift on behalf of the curatorial collective from a DIY approach and a 
‘necessary relationship with the institution of art’ to the full adjacency to a 
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specific institution (Trampoline House).100 This shift should be attributed to 
both the increased urgency of the global refugee and migrant crisis as well as 
the precarity and gendered condition of freelance cultural labour, that, as 
Dimitrakaki observes, is also present in a Scandinavian context.101 
Artists at Risk (AR) is ‘an institution at the intersection of human rights and the 
arts.’102 AR acquired its name and current form in 2016, but its mission and 
practice has already been present since 2013, in the context of Perpetuum 
Mobile, a ‘curatorial vehicle’ co-founded by Marita Muukkonen and Ivor 
Stodolsky in 2007 and registered in Finland.103 AR aims at a worldwide scope 
but it is predominantly active in and around the European region. AR is 
‘dedicated to mapping the field of persecuted visual art practitioners, facilitating 
their safe passage from their countries of origin, hosting them at “AR-
Residencies” and curating related projects, including the “AR Pavilion”.’104 The 
AR residencies have so far developed as collaborations with other European 
(art) institutions. The inaugural one that marked AR’s current form took place 
in Helsinki in 2016.105 The AR Pavilion amounts to exhibitionary documentation 
of AR’s activity. AR is arguably a pioneering institutional network that 
intervenes in the artistic, biopolitical and institutional logistics of persecuted 
creative subjects, with a hands-on approach that involves ‘legal assistance’ 
and engagement with a ‘safe exit from countries of origin,’ as much as 
guidance through the European (art) institutional network of residencies.106 
A less curatorially radical but discursively ambitious institution is the Institute 
of Radical Imagination (IRI), a ‘think-tank’ for knowledge exchange and 
production among ‘experts – political scientists, economists, lawyers, 
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architects, hackers, activists, artists and cultural producers,’ specifically in the 
European South and the Mediterranean region.107 Post-capitalism and the 
commons are strong keywords that underpin the theoretical connotations of 
IRI, as it aspires to be ‘a hybrid between a travelling research centre, a refuge 
for intellectuals and artists at risk, a radical museum and a policy-making body 
generating ideas and applied knowledge that respond to specific urgent needs 
on the ground.’108 Its activity consists in medium to large-scale discursive 
events that since 2017 have taken place in Napoli (2017), Madrid (2018) and 
Athens (2019). IRI’s contribution to a European semi-peripheral cartography 
would be mainly locatable in the mobilisation of non-state/private art-relevant 
resources towards building connections and networks among local activist 
projects and groups that tend to self-organise around socioeconomic problems 
in the region.109 It should be noted that the project is co-ordinated largely by 
more or less prominent figures of the (discursive) art world active in the 
region.110  
The ‘Consortium for Post-Artistic Practices’ (KPP) is an informal activist 
research/discursive project that has been active in Poland since 2016. It 
started officially as a working group for the Congress of Culture in Warsaw in 
2016, although the formulation of the project’s main idea of the post-artistic 
sprung up through the exhibition ‘Making Use. Life in Postartistic Times,’ 
curated by Sebastian Cichocki, the former director of the Museum of Modern 
Art in Warsaw. In some respects, the Consortium was developed in 
continuation of F/SUW that was discussed in Chapter 4 and responds to the 
critical time of aggravated conservatism and oppression in Poland in the face 
of reinvigorated nationalism and fascist anti-immigratory rhetoric and the 
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depreciation of the rights of non-binary gendered people and women's 
reproductive rights.111 Szreder who has a coordinating role in the Consortium 
has emphasised the ‘pro-democratic,’ ‘anti-authoritarian’ and anti-fascist 
orientation of the project.112 A particularity of this project rests on the 
involvement of art affiliates in promoting a post-artistic shift that could be 
understood both as the extension of art worlds into less art-specific institutions 
and as the displacement of art-world concerns from art per se to the direct 
organisation of anti-fascist, feminist, pro-workers and pro-refugees 
mobilisation and action. According to Adam Mazur, this shift could be 
associated with the disillusionment among the politicised or socially aware 
Polish artistic community regarding the potential of art to be employed as a 
platform for socio-political change.113 Another particularity is that, according to 
Szreder, the Consortium endeavours to implement a ‘multi-authored’ 
methodology without an author/director despite the presence of ‘initiators’ or 
‘animators.’114 Instead, it promotes an activity more associable with a ‘platform 
of individual projects,’ as ‘everybody usually attributes his/her project to 
herself/himself’ and not directly to the Consortium, which has a ‘low-key,’ 
‘background’ presence, so as to avoid becoming ‘yet another art collective.’ 
Finally, Collection Collective is a ‘prototypical international art collection 
established, owned, and managed collectively by its members’ that started as 
a ‘speculative curatorial proposal.’115 It was initiated in 2017, when three 
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Romanian curators (Judit Angel, Raluca Voinea, and Vlad Morariu) invited 
cultural workers and previous collaborators with whom there was a relationship 
of ‘friendship and mutual trust’ to become members of and contribute to the 
Collective. The first stage of the project was instantiated in Bratislava with the 
exhibition Collection Collective: Template for a Future Model of Representation 
(Tranzit.sk, 2017) that operated as an hypothetical collection and as the 
vehicle for discursive interaction and speculation among the members towards 
a more grounded, implementational phase. The latter continued through 2018, 
when the member count reached fifty. The second iteration of the project in 
October 2018 took the form of a public seminar (‘Collection Collective: Tools 
for Self-Representation’) that coincided with the collective’s website launch in 
Bucharest at Tranzit.ro. Collection Collective makes a theoretical and practical 
case towards collectivising and self-curating the significatory imaginary of the 
subjectivities attached to an institution of property that has been traditionally 
associated with an individual and private (usually male) subject, the subjects 
involved in a public/official institutional regime with boards of trustees, curators 
and other experts, or in private corporations.116 As Morariu suggests: 
in relation to anonymous and abstract subjects, Collection 
Collective does not position itself as a supra-subject, but as a 
collection of subjects that are attempting to collaborate, and as a 
self-curated collective that recognises both affinities and 
differences. This is why friendship and mutual recognition remain 
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In this chapter, I have attempted to unsettle parts of the discursive canon that 
has historicised experimental institutional practice in the contemporary 
European art world. The concept of the semi-periphery has been employed in 
order to address the mechanisms implicit in the process of canonisation and 
the power asymmetries it entails. The canon itself is not a regimented 
institution agreed upon in some normative political sense among participating 
and excluded agents. The sedimentation of the canon in a hegemonic sense 
is but one part of the analysis. In the theory of instituent praxis, this 
sedimentation is active in the collective past or phantasmatic unconscious that 
conditions the present or future conscious becoming, which can in turn 
acknowledge the implicated semi-peripheral mechanisms and, in this light, 
make significational propositions. Such propositions reflect what should be just 
and aspire to undertake legal or deontic status.  
From the perspective of instituent praxis, institutional experimentation should 
disengage from the search for static definitions for the delineation of the art 
institution, as if the issue at stake was simply a matter of power switching 
between presence and absence in the depths of subjectivity or the platitudes 
of social and political systems and as if power’s complete abolition was the 
concrete and attainable end of criticality, or, as Rancière would put it, 
litigiousness. What matters instead is the potential for any practice, field, space 
or collectivity to consciously and creatively produce subjectivity in a code-
breaking and rule-inventing enunciation. This is not to equate all practices in 
the art world regardless of their institutional grounding. Experimentation and 
analysis are indispensable towards instituent praxis, if at least the explicit 
forms of power are to be contained by co-produced rule-making. My analysis 
has added to a discourse of instances whereby institutionally inventive 
experimentation takes place in conditions of high risk and out of a sense of 
epimeleia or self-inquiry. Affective and ethical aspects cannot be stressed 
enough, particularly in contexts where official frameworks are not simply 




oppressive but also absent and replaceable by forms of authoritarianism. Such 
aspects are not simply present in aesthetic or curatorial concerns in terms of 
parrhesiastic counter-formats; they should be seen as active in the conditions 
of and decisions around implicated labour, survival and liveability. As many 
case studies in this chapter would indicate, in semi-peripheral contexts, 
experimentation and analysis might appear as operating in a deadlock of 
overidentification and other forms of external influence/dependence rather 
than a creative and propositional self-inquiry: structural heteronomy instead of 
heterogenesis. However, these two states could easily be simultaneously 
encountered in any semi-periphery or even centre. The juxtaposition of these 
two states should not constitute a clear geopolitical divide, as it cannot directly 
translate to a simple case dictated by disadvantaged contexts against 
privileged ones.  
On the other hand, seeking to disrupt the linear association of the potential of 
conscious becoming with economically or infrastructurally privileged contexts 
should not be conducive to a case-by-case individualistic approach for each 
institution and its context. This would be a liberal understanding that would 
preclude any collective formation of subjectivity through processes of 
autopoiesis and heterogenesis. Any emergent differences should be examined 
in light of instituent praxis. The discourse around alternative or experimental 
art institutions is equally symptomatic of what I described in Chapter 4 as 
perversions of currency-altering intentions. Institutional experimentation often 
subscribes to celebratory assertions aspiring to increased visibility, while it fails 
to engage in adequate heterogenetic or autopoietic functions that would 
generate currency-altering and currency-creating subjectivities and ontologies. 
Thereby, such experimentation can turn into an affirmative spectacle, for 
certain privileged fractions that desire to appreciate it. In Chapter 6, I discuss 
further what is left of or lost from aspirations of parrhesiastic institutional 
propositions, through a closer examination of the operative links between 
































6. Instituent Imaginaries and the Artificial Real: A 
Figurative Manual of Alter-/Para-/Mock- Institutions 
 
An introductory note on para-institutions and alter-
institutions  
 
Sven Lütticken has argued that the twenty-first century finds the financialised 
art institutional sphere in a constant state of flux away from the inertia 
commonly associated with the institutional.1 This is a state of contradictions 
whereby even in the context of mega-institutions but also in institutions of other 
scales, supposedly activist programming and agendas designed by curators 
and managers go hand in hand with exploitative, stale, market-like and 
competition-driven working conditions for supporting and mid-level staff as well 
as a perpetual game of symbolic and non-symbolic art-market value.2 
According to Lütticken, this fluctuating, micro-contradictory and all-
encompassing financialised condition leaves no room for the 'immanent' 
tendencies of Institutional Critique or related practices.3 Rather, practitioners 
that seek to circumvent or reject this condition create what Lütticken calls 'alter-
institutional and para-institutional organisations.'4 Regarding the former, 
Lütticken refers to alternative networks and connections between art 
institutions such as L' Internationale (discussed in chapter 3) and Cluster or 
other forms of local-to-global networks that transgress canonical art 
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2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. Lütticken borrows the term 'para-institution' from Tania Bruguera's and Fernando García-
Dory's respective personal websites. See Tania Bruguera and Pablo Helguera, ‘On Transpedagogy,’ 
accessed May 21, 2018, http://www.taniabruguera.com/cms/239-0-On+transpedagogy.htm and 
Fernando García-Dory, ‘Inland (2010—…)’, accessed May 21, 2018, 
http://fernandogarciadory.com/index.php?/projects/inland/.  
[emphasis in the original] 
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institutional frameworks.5 Such networks can be found both ‘outside the 
mainstream of art-world capital flows and institutional hypertrophy’ and in 
global institutional meccas; Lütticken mentions Ruangrupa in Jakarta and 
CAMP in Mumbai as well as 16 Beaver in New York, MayDay Rooms in 
London, Casco — Office for Art, Design and Theory in Utrecht, footnoting that 
Casco's director Binna Choi is his partner.6 Lütticken argues that such 
organisations expand the typical art-institutional stakeholders by bringing 
together 'artists, intellectuals and activists as well as groups that art institutions 
rarely consider "target audiences", such as cleaners or refugees.'7 The 
implication is that contrary to a show-orientated programming logic these 
organisations prioritise pedagogical, socially-engaged, community-based or 
downright activist agendas. It becomes clear that such agendas could be seen 
as aligning with the institutional experimentation discussed in previous 
chapters and would also to some extent resonate with Mouffe's and other 
authors' calls to reclaim art institutions. What is particularly interesting is that 
Lütticken takes note of the diversity of the 'legal status' of such organisations 
and suggests that '[s]ome are foundations and may look like "regular" art 
institutions on paper, yet are run differently, with more collective decision-
making and input from various networks and communities.'8 This chapter 
begins from such ambivalent discrepancies and emulations between the 'on 
paper' or nominal (art-institutional) legal status, the idea of a normative art-
institutional legal or organisational status and the idea of an organisation's 
actual mode of conduct and aims at situating them within a theoretical context 
that pertains to institution and artificiality.  
To this end, Lütticken's conception of para-institutional organisations is key, 
even though the 'alter-' element of alter-institutions is also directly related to 
                                                          
5 Lütticken, ‘Social Media,’ 7-8. Cluster is a network of eight contemporary art organisations (seven in 
Europe, one in Israel) situated in peripheral and/or residential urban locations. Its members are CAC 
Brétigny, Brétigny s/Orge, France; CA2M Centro Dos De Mayo, Madrid, Spain; Casco – Office for art 
Design and Theory, Utrecht, The Netherlands; Les Laboratoires d'Aubervilliers, Aubervilliers, France; 
Tensta Konsthall, Stockholm, Sweden; The Israeli Center for Digital Art, Holon, Israel; The Showroom, 
London, UK; Zavod P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E., Ljubljana. Slovenia. 
6 Lütticken, ‘Social Media,’ 8.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 




such discrepancies. In fact, Lütticken does not aim at a clear-cut distinction 
between alter-institutions and para-institutions and acknowledges that they are 
all similarly entangled within more or less art-world networks. More broadly, it 
could be argued that such attempts to create typologies of art institutions or 
organisations often seem overdetermining or neglectful of specific populations 
of examples most of which could easily challenge the remit or the viability of 
each typology. However, the logics behind Lütticken’s understanding of the 
para-institutional conduce to tracing the ambivalences that arise in the artificial 
real and the late capitalist institutional context.  
Lütticken associates the para-institutional element of certain projects or 
organisations with their cooperation with more 'traditionally established 
institutions', their variable or non-existent legal status and their potential 
initiation by or identification with a single artist.9 The latter attribute implies that 
para-institutions thusly associated with a single artist are not actual 
organisations and therefore there is a deceitful (whether intentional or not) or 
fake element to their alleged organisational status. Lütticken does not expand 
on this commentary which seems to be made in passing. I will attempt to 
associate it with strategic and self-branding issues which in turn pertain to 
artificiality. Furthermore, Lütticken suggests that by forging 'alliances' with 
institutions, para-institutions are prone to downgrading their institutional 
positionality of rejection and resistance to 'a purely strategic and pragmatic 
approach'.10 However, as I have argued extensively in Chapter 3 and as I will 
further discuss in relation to mockstitutions, such an approach is not only 
unavoidable but also potentially effective as regards a desired resistance to 
dominant paradigms. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the possibility 
that para-, alter- and mockstitutional modalities have been appropriated by 
reinvigorated far-right expressions and sentiments. I also examine the possible 
contribution of instituent praxis in this discussion. 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 9. 
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The New World Summit and the para-institutional 
Some examples of para-institutions that Lütticken refers to include Ahmet 
Öğüt’s the Silent University (discussed in chapter 4) and the New World 
Summit, a project initiated by the Dutch artist Jonas Staal in 2012.11 The New 
World Summit defines itself as an artistic and political organisation which is 
‘dedicated to providing “alternative parliaments” hosting organizations that 
currently find themselves excluded from democracy.'12 The project co-funds, 
facilitates and organises communication through public discursive events 
between organisations that are classified or listed as terrorist, such as the 
Kurdish Women’s Movement, the Basque Independence Movement, the 
National Liberation Movement of Azawad and the National Democratic 
Movement of the Philippines and relevant experts including lawyers, 
diplomats, public prosecutors, judges, governmental advisors, international 
politicians, journalists, academics, students and artists. Staal’s project regards 
these organisations as methodically excluded from the 'political order' in the 
name of 'democratism,' a perversion of democracy that aims at 'expansionist, 
military and colonial gains'.13 The New World Summit largely takes the form of 
two-day summits – since 2012, these have taken place in Berlin, Leiden, Kochi, 
Brussels, Rojava, Utrecht and Oslo. It also constitutes an umbrella-
organisation for sub-projects such as the New World Academy, the New World 
Embassy, the contribution to the construction of a public parliament building in 
Rojava and visual art/architecture exhibitions at various art institutions.14 For 
the New World Academy, Staal in collaboration with BAK organised 
discursive/educational sessions (2013-2016) where representatives of political 
organisations such as the National Democratic Movement of the Philippines, 
the We Are Here refugee collective, and open-source advocates of 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 8. F/SUW, Kunsthalle Athena, Galéria Ganku as well as other projects/institutions that I have 
discussed as discursive or experimental could also be seen as mockstitutions.  
12 ‘New World Summit: About,’ New World Summit, accessed June 8, 2018, 
http://newworldsummit.org/about/. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The project develops embassies (entitled New World Embassies) in collaboration with stateless 
states, autonomist groups, and blacklisted political organisations, which amount to architectural 
constructions aimed at discursivity and alternative forms of (stateless) democracy. 




international Pirate Parties exchanged knowledge, produced work and 
discussed the potential of transformative politics through art along with 
students and artists.15 
 The New World Summit has used multiple and variable funding sources. For 
instance, Stateless State, the summit that took place in Brussels in 2014, was 
co-funded by the Royal Flemish Theater (KVS) in Brussels, the Mondriaan 
Foundation in the Netherlands and the Center for Visual Art in Rotterdam and 
was logistically supported by the Progress Lawyers Network and the 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) – both based in 
Brussels.16 While the two latter are partnering organisations in that they offer 
useful resources of a logistical nature, the former organisations are (visual) art 
institutions (the Mondriaan Foundation offers public funding for visual art and 
cultural heritage). The new public parliament for the Democratic Self-
Administration of Rojava in northern-Syria (opened in April 2018) was co-
financed equally by the autonomous Kurdish government and the New World 
Summit (through the Mondriaan Foundation, the Van Abbemuseum in 
Eindhoven and income from sales of architectural models of the parliament).17 
It is also worth noting that partner organisations and funding bodies are visibly 
involved with the project’s activity; their representatives participate in the 
summits ‘with statements on their organizations, short lectures, or by chairing 
sessions.’18  
The diversity of the funding sources that range from well-established European 
cultural institutions to militant political organisations classified as terrorist by 
international intelligence institutions reflects the fact that the New World 
Summit operates within a terrain where the artistic and the political merge even 
at the disciplinary institutional level. Staal has suggested that for the New 
                                                          
15 ‘New World Academy,’ BAK online, accessed July 13, 2018, https://www.bakonline.org/long-term-
project/new-world-academy/. 
16 Personal interview with Staal, 2016. 
17 Ibid. Since 2011 and the Syrian conflict, there has been an armed Kurdish-led struggle for 
autonomy and self-administration in the region of Rojava, promoting a (socialist) logic of 




World Summit ‘the core of being an artistic and political organization’ is ‘to re-
imagine art through a new politics, and to re-imagine politics through a new 
art.’19 Staal maintains that new political visions are being proposed through the 
New World Summit; ‘perspectives on alternative models of independence and 
autonomy’ and ‘claims on alternative world histories and understanding of 
existing structures of geopolitics’ are being disseminated by participating 
speakers to other New World Summit participants and its publics.20 At the 
same time, ‘as artists, designers and architects,’ the participants of the project 
also ‘contribute to a new imaginary’ that creates ‘new designs and 
visualizations of assembly that result in [...] “stateless parliaments.”’21 Indeed, 
had not the project evoked its artistic nature, many of the summits could have 
been deemed illegal, persecuted from various authorities or excluded from 
funding sources.22 Despite advocating the coincident nature of the artistic and 
the political, Staal’s description betrays traces of the usual dual logic that 
associates the former with the domain of the imaginary and the latter with the 
domain of reality – resembling the art and life duality discussed in previous 
chapters. Before addressing the significance of reconstructing or articulating 
this duality in terms of the imaginary and the real, we should enquire into its 
potential affiliation with the particular qualities of the para-institutional. 
According to Lütticken’s logic, one could argue that the para-institutional 
aspect of the New World Summit lies in its parasitical or orbital relation to other 
usually more established or disciplinary institutions. The issue of legitimacy or 
legitimisation is often key here, especially when it is understood both in its 
ethical and in its legal function. For instance, the semantic function of the prefix 
para- in the meaning of para-military organisations would indicate an 
illegitimate or semi-legitimate but systematic institutionality situated alongside 
a legitimate one (legitimate military forces). Arguably, institutional legitimacy 




22 Regarding the The New World Summit’s censorship and ban in the context of the 1st Kochi-Muziris 
Biennale (2012-2013) see: ‘Part I: The Choreography of Censorship’, New World Summit, accessed 
July 16, 2018, http://newworldsummit.org/news/invitation-new-world-summit-kochi/. 




corresponds to a spectrum rather than the binary of legitimacy/non-legitimacy 
and thus, the para-institutional aspect exists within such spectrum. Altering 
legal frameworks can legitimate previously illegitimate or semi-legitimate para-
institutions or legitimate previously legitimate ones. Moreover, cultural and 
ethical perspectives can legitimate officially illegitimate actions, or indeed, 
para-institutions, as well as de-legitimise officially legitimate ones. Such shifts 
range from globally historical turns, from international treaties to everyday 
actions, such as driving while having exceeded the drinking limit just by a small 
amount of alcohol units because of the personal/cultural discretion that abiding 
to the legal prescriptions in this instance would be pointless. In some social or 
art-world contexts, unpaid work, such as curatorial internships or participation 
in art exhibitions without payment, could be seen as a para-institutional 
practice that moves in a spectrum of legitimacy, understood both officially and 
ethically. In showcasing the fluidity between cultural, ethical and official 
legitimacy spectra, the New World Summit experiments with or moulds the 
variable of legitimisation, in terms of the semi-legitimate organisations 
involved, and by presenting everything also in an art context. The category of 
the para-institutional could be contributive in understanding ambiguous (art) 
projects such as the New World Summit, if it is granted that the prefix para- 
can be found in a spectrum of legitimacy that almost annihilates the quality of 
the fully legitimate, non-para-institution. It is arguably difficult to locate an 
example of an institution that has not developed any orbital or parasitical 
relationships to other institutions or that has consistently had widespread and 
absolute cultural, ethical, historical and official legitimacy. In order to further 
problematise the quality of the para-institutional, I consider two approaches on 
para-institutions irrelevant to art.  
 
Para-institutions – exhibit A 
 
Para-institutionalism is a parasitic politics that is born of 
dissatisfaction with the enclosures we find ourselves in. 
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Anarchists, communists, even liberals are like foreign agents that 
might suddenly spawn discontent and possible parasitic currents 
within an institution itself. Para-institutionalism co-opts the 
strength and organs of institutions toward a destratifying end. 
Coming from within, parasitic para-institutional agents might 
upset the duplication technology of an institution toward 
reproducing heterogeneously.23 
This excerpt is taken from a short text entitled ‘Instituting the para-institution’, 
posted under the pseudonym of u/Proudhons_butt in the online community 
‘r/Radical Christianity’ hosted by the platform Reddit.24 The user argues that 
‘Radical Christians’ could borrow from para-institutionalism in order to 
destratify the deep-rooted institution of the church and create the ‘para-church’ 
as ‘an assemblage that learns to abide in heterogeneity and difference’ and is 
‘mobile, agile and maybe nomadic.’25 This might constitute a contemporary 
form of affirmation; the formal pattern of a para-institution that is mobile, agile 
and has the potential to heterogenise the powerful institution (church) is 
isolated and presented as progressive. The emancipatory potential of 
secularism is thereby precluded as a progressive option since what is 
oppressive about the church can be purportedly subverted in the realm of the 
para-institution. 
Para-institutions – exhibit B 
 
Leland Tabares regards corporations that provide funding schemes to 
universities as para-institutions to the academic institution. Tabares focuses 
on the case of Apple Inc. and argues that the company has used its financial 
support to Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) as an excuse 
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to veto one of its shareholders’ proposition to advance some specific minority 
inclusion policies in senior management.26 In this context, Tabares writes: 
By not pressuring these moments, we allow para-institutions to 
sustain their hegemonic processes in the name of the academy, 
thus turning the academy into a tool to be used by corporate 
entities and making the academy appear unfit to combat 
discriminatory practices outside of its own institutional 
contexts.27 
It becomes clear that Tabares assigns the parasitical aspect of the para-
institutional to the private mega-corporation. This automatically generates a 
power-asymmetry in favour of the para-institution, while Tabares seeks to 
redeem the category of the main, non-para-institution. Another perhaps more 
typical reading of the situation could uphold Apple Inc. as one of the most 
robust iterations of the dominant corporative model based on innovative 
technology, and the academy as a dependent institution and thereby, a para-
institution, considering the alleged discriminatory actions as exploitative to the 
academy. Such reading would also be more aligned with Lütticken’s implicit 
suggestion that the para-institution can carry a progressive potential towards 
challenging oppressive dominant paradigms. Arguably, given the reversibility 
of Tabares’s reading, the ethical illegitimacy inscribed to the Apple Inc. policies 
by Tabares through an attribution to the para-institutional falls short of a 
generalisable sustained critique. Such a critique would be in need of further 
theoretical and historical tools.  
Para-institutions – a decision 
These two cases indicate that the para-institutional is limited to a schematic 
pattern that can be broadly applied to many types of relations between many 
different kinds of organisations, to the extent that it is questionable whether the 
                                                          
26 For further information on HBCU, see: 'What is an HBCU,' White House Initiative on Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities, accessed July 16, 2018, https://sites.ed.gov/whhbcu/one-hundred-
and-five-historically-black-colleges-and-universities/. 
27 Leland Tabares, ‘The Contexts of Critique: Para-Institutions and the Multiple Lives of 




para-institutional should be seen as potentially subversive in terms of power in 
an art institutional context. Lütticken’s warning of a purely strategic and 
pragmatic approach is more than pertinent here; far from constituting simply 
an occasional danger for para-institutions, the para-institutional perspective 
itself can be reduced to pure strategy, if not tactic. Arguably, the para-
institutional quality contributes in describing what is particular about case 
studies such as the New World Summit, mainly insofar as it underlines the 
function of legitimisation as a malleable parameter. Even though at this stage 
it tells us little about the relation in question between the imaginary and the 
real, the para-institutional alludes to the relevance of the spectrum of 
legitimisation, which could in turn be associated with an intervention into what 
should be just. 
The blurred and uncertain character of this spectrum borders with Searle’s 
notion of deontology as well as instituent praxis. Similar to a non-exclusively 
official or legal legitimisation, deontology as a quality particular to the 
institutional relates to perceived rights, obligations and power relations 
encountered within a cultural, ethical, official and legal pool of expectations 
that ebb, flow and emerge within the spectrum of legitimisation. It is however 
instituent praxis that places the focus on the production of a subjectivity which 
enunciates – consciously, collectively and creatively – the breaking of its own 
code and the self-institution of a new one. As Dardot and Laval have argued, 
instituent praxis refers to neither the legal officialisation of a pre-existing norm 
nor to norms that fall under customary law, as the latter merely reflects the 
unconscious transmission of ancient rules.   
Mockstitutions as a broader imperative 
 
In 2010, Greg Sholette coined the term mock-institutions or mockstitutions to 
describe recreated ‘facsimiles of institutions’ permeated by ‘the 




superimposition of reality and fiction, play and power.’28 The case studies he 
discusses are art practices that mimic the 'administrative, affective, and 
intellectual power of institutions.'29 Sholette refers to corporate, state and other 
kinds of institutional structures. Some of his key examples are the YesMen 
(Chapter 3) and the group/project Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK). NSK 
consists of Slovenian artists and groups of artists and musicians and was 
founded in Ljubljana in 1984, before the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ceased to exist (1992) and Slovenia became an independent state 
(1991). In 1991, NSK initiate NSK State, a self-proclaimed artificial state with 
‘fictive embassies in nearby countries’ and an online passport-issuing service, 
which people have actually attempted to use for immigrating purposes.30 
Sholette refers to such artificial passports as ‘parafictional documents’ and 
regards NSK State as a ‘paradoxical,’ ‘politically risky’ and ‘compelling’ 
‘hacking into the official national imaginary.’31 Similarly, the YesMen mockingly 
emulate corporate structures and identities and their practice is often 
underpinned by contextual commentary.  
Two recent European small projects that could be added to Sholette’s long list 
of mockstitutions are Let's Get Together and Call Ourselves an Institute 
(LGTACOAI), initiated in 2012, and the Institute for the Management of the 
Athenian Post-Documenta Melancholy (the Greek acronym is IDAMM), 
initiated in 2015. The former project is a group of five curators and art 
graduates mainly based in Scotland who comment sarcastically on the general 
proliferation of DIY or self-initiated institutions by adopting the ironic name Let's 
Get Together and Call Ourselves an Institute and by half-purposefully 
remaining inactive (until 2017), even though individually they were including 
the project in their art-field CVs.32 Idamm operated through a public Facebook 
                                                          
28 Gregory Sholette, ‘Mockstitutions,’ in Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture 
(London: Pluto Press, 2011), 161. 
29 Sholette, ‘Mockstitutions,’ 152. 
30 Ibid. 158. 
31 Ibid. 158. 
32 Personal interview with Benjamin Fallon, 2016. The members of LGTACOAI were Emma Balkind, 
Luke Cooke-Yarborough, Julie-Ann Delaney, Benjamin Fallon and Kirsteen Macdonald. Their 
inactivity, which was partly due to practical and personal obstructions of the members, was briefly 
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page that during the period leading up to Documenta 14 assumed the identity 
of an interdisciplinary research institute that would assist in dealing 
psychologically with the aftermath of Documenta 14 in Athens.  In February 
2016, Idamm published a Facebook post in the form of a mission statement 
according to which in the context of Documenta 14: 
Athens is not being instrumentalized as a general example of 
failure, but as some sort of paradigm that has something to 
teach. The ignorant will become teachers, Greek artists will sell 
like hot cakes in the art markets and they will finally get to 
participate in exhibitions abroad. […] However there are also 
those who through spiteful reactions to what they call the neo-
colonial, exoticist, hegemonic existence of the documenta, they 
mock the intentions of the organization, claiming that the 
indigenous artistic subjects are being reduced to trivago 
(www.trivago.com) by the professional art tourists, and so on.33  
 
The detectable sarcasm throughout Idamm's Facebook presence suggests 
that the people behind it would actually side with the viewpoint that sees neo-
colonialism and exoticisation in Documenta 14. However, as the page 
administrators remain anonymous and refuse to reveal their actual intentions, 
one can only take their proposition as what it presents itself to be, a parody of 
a research institute that purports to adopt a psychoanalytical approach to deal 
with the social aftermath of Documenta 14.34 Through its parody, Idamm might 
have implied that such an institute has actually been necessary, given the 
perceived gentrifying shifts Documenta 14 would cause to the Athenian art 
community. It might have also sought to denounce the pseudo-intellectual and 
                                                          
interrupted by an appearance of one of their texts in Prawn’s Pee (organised by Rob Churm and 
Rebecca Wilcox), a small newspaper-publication and series of events in the context of the Glasgow 
International Festival in 2012. In October 2017, the inactivity was properly broken as LGTACOAI 
would transform into a six-month project (a resource space including archives, works and series of 
events) in the context of Chapter Thirteen, a Glasgow-based curatorial co-operative and project 
space also initiated in October 2017. Current members of Chapter Thirteen are Benjamin Fallon, 
James Hutchinson, Kirsteen Macdonald and Lesley Young. 
33 Idamm, 'Institute for the Management of the Athenian Post-documenta Melancholy (IDAMM),' 
Facebook, February 26, 2016, accessed May 5, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/idammathens/posts/153015061751043. Trivago.com is an online travel 
agency. 
34 Personal communication with the page administrators in May 2016 for the purposes of this 
research made it clear that they wanted to remain anonymous and that they were not willing to 
reveal any intentions other than the ones already made public on Facebook.  




pseudo-scientific observational character of the discourse around Documenta 
14, at a time when Athens is riddled with concrete social and financial problems 
which are supposedly amplified by Documenta 14. Idamm arguably 
exemplifies a very contemporary version of a mockstitution that not only 
employs online satire or caustic irony abundant in user-based platforms, but 
also manipulates the mannerisms of art discourse. 
Even though Lütticken refers to the neoliberal condition and includes Casco 
which was initiated as early as 1990 in his discussion of alter-institutions, he 
does not draw explicitly distinct geopolitical or clear historical lines. His focus 
is rather the globally financialised art institution of the twenty-first century which 
ranges from peripheral areas to places of institutional hypertrophy. By contrast, 
Sholette situates explicitly his analysis within the 'post-industrial economy' and 
'post-Fordist neoliberalism' which emerges 'after the post-war era of 
administered society.'35 He also mostly refers to post-1989 case studies 
including Eastern European ones and argues relatedly that in some instances, 
the groups initiating the discussed practices are of a generation that has only 
ever directly experienced a corroded 'non-commercial public realm' and the 
associated concepts of 'affiliation, solidarity, or collectivity' as 'short term 
individual need' and usually through 'the distributed community of social 
networks.'36 In short, mockstitutions deal with their own 'redundancy' through 
'self-creation and mythification' and thereby flourish within societies whose 
'previous forms of human connectivity' have eroded.37 However, as I intend to 
argue, the quality of self-creation and mythification that Sholette considers 
paradigmatic of more or less art-related mockstitutions within a specific 
generational and geopolitical range is also extendable to the overall 
institutional landscape of the current global condition. Moreover, it should be 
acknowledged that the mockstitutional modalities (as well as para-institutions 
and alter-institutions as discussed by Lütticken) follow up many of the earlier 
                                                          
35 Sholette, ‘Mockstitutions,’ 152-61. 
36 Ibid., 166. 
37 Ibid., 154. 
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methodologies of artistic Institutional Critique, as well as early twentieth 
century avant-gardes that ridiculed art-deontic conventions. 
Sholette describes insightfully the mechanisms at play in the function of 
mockstitutions after having collected primary research data from art collectives 
globally (but mainly from Europe and North America). He captures accurately 
many of the practical aspects that instantiate the treatment of organisational 
and institutional form as medium. Such treatment involves a meta-moulding of 
semiotics and simulative fragments and the creative management of 
official/legal expectations and infrastructures. Sholette suggests that even 
though mockstitutions do not employ irony or parody 'for its own sake' as would 
be the case with a great amount of comedy, they are 'so indifferent to proper 
organizational structure that they adopt any convenient form of governance.'38 
They emulate and experiment with 'the intangible realm of organizational 
signification and embodiment' and engage in processes of 'self-branding' in 
order to manage their 'visibility' both within and outside the 'art world.'39 
Sholette considers our age one 'of overt deregulation and semiotic warfare' 
and symptomatic of the popularity of 'perfunctory compliance with official 
cultural regulators' among art-group strategies.40 According to his 
observations, most groups are either deliberately uninterested in their legal 
status as organisations or are unregistered.41 Furthermore, even those who 
are registered as 'for-profit' organisations usually operate 'collectively and 
ideologically against the marketplace.'42 Sholette regards mockstitutions as 
turning 'aesthetic parafiction' into 'full-blown simulations of organizations even 
as their internal “moving parts” remain administratively deceptive and 
flexible.'43 He argues that mockstitutions stage and enter a 'confidence game' 
between seemingly fixed institutions such as 'the state, city, corporation, 
prison, museum, school, even the European Union' and 'miniature replica[s] of 
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institutional cohesion and legitimacy.'44 Mockstitutions also win the confidence 
game by being taken seriously when 'all the correct significations of 
organizational value are artfully displayed' while this 'manipulation of 
institutional sobriety' becomes the means of circumventing 'anticipated forms 
of behavior and disciplinary visibility within the increasingly hegemonic, 
entrepreneurial art market.'45  
Sholette suggests that what is at stake with mockstitutions goes beyond the 
replication of organisations and institutional structure; mockstitutions transform 
the remnants of old failing or extinct institutions into 'an improved, second-
order social reality extraordinaire,' as they 'use their virtual offices to confront 
and intervene in the real world of actual corporations, businesses, 
municipalities, and states.'46 The real world and this so-called second-order 
reality are superimposed upon one another through 'the tactical plagiarism of 
institutional function.'47 Rather than any (art) critical potential, Sholette often 
upholds this superimposition that creates a 'peculiar state of difference and 
similitude' as what is most engaging about mockstitutions.48  
Crucially, however, he does comment on the role their art-world ties play in 
this peculiar state. Sholette suggests that mockstitutions have 'access' to an 
'imaginative license' which is 'granted only to artists,' despite their tendency to 
avoid identifying as artists and their marginal positioning within various 
mappings of the art world.49 Sholette paints a picture whereby in the twenty-
first century the ‘leakage of imaginary institutions into the everyday’ has 
dramatically increased, even though ‘artfully crafted counterfeit realities have 
been migrating out of the art world and into the fabric of the everyday life’ since 
the Institutional Critique of the early 1960s, if not, I would add, since the early 
twentieth century avant-gardes.50 Sholette does not equate the function of all 
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48 Ibid., 166. 
49 Ibid., 167. 
50 Ibid., 156. 
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phases of Institutional Critique. For instance, he acknowledges that, operating 
predominantly from the 1990s onwards and participating directly within a 
commercial sphere, so-called ‘meta-commercial’ mockstitutions coincide 
practically with corporate and market-like activity to the extent that they vacate 
the type of Institutional Critique that maintains – or used to maintain – a clear 
ironic or critical aspect, even from a complicit art-institutional position.51 
Sholette also mentions the relatively recent increase in supply of unpaid labour 
on behalf of people wanting to establish themselves in the arts as a point of 
convergence between businesses and art institutions including ‘alternative’ 
ones.52  
His description of mockstitutions introduces in great detail the inextricable 
relation between the artful display of organisational form, the simulative 
semiotics of self-image and the creative management of institutional structure 
that involves encrypted actuality. This relation showcases how organisation, 
management and self-branding can be interwoven with artistic or aesthetic 
practices, understood as producing affective knowledge. In turn, this 
interrelation constitutes an alternative response to the questions raised in 
Chapter 3; the duality of technological, or in this case managerial, 
infrastructure versus human free will, the former constructed as always already 
determinate and the latter as inherently indeterminate seems to fall through. 
Sholette's accentuation of the superimposition of reality and fiction and his 
reference to parafiction point toward the centrality of artificiality in relation to 
the instituent, not as the artificial versus the real but as the real. Arguably, 
instituent praxis could and should be actualised within a terrain where desire 
and affect are fused with administrative structures, channels of legitimisation 
and holograms of institutional sobriety. 
Sholette, however, seems to remain captive to the idea that the mockstitutional 
modality is the exclusive privilege of art-world-marginal yet art-related small 
groups that are somehow reactive toward their redundancy and thus critical or 
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accusatory of the dominant neoliberal system. This becomes particularly clear 
in his propositions that (a) there is an access to an imaginative license granted 
only to artists and (b) there is a monodirectional leakage of imaginary 
institutions from the art world to the everyday (strangely, despite his 
acknowledgement that the separation of the imaginary or the fictional and the 
real has become too awkward and unbefitting). Before unpacking these two 
propositions, I intend to argue that artificiality is not just a tactical weapon for 
art-related mockstitutions; rather, it is the condition of the real, in terms of a 
broadly understood institution-making. The current impromptu and tactical 
institutional creativity performed by the most otherwise known as stale, 
monolithic or powerful institutions, such as the state and the corporation, or 
supranational institutions, such as the European Union should not be 
overlooked or discarded as sterile or inert by default. Blatant examples could 
be the fast-paced institutional creativity of the European Union from the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007) to the GDPR (2018, discussed in Chapter 2) to the initiatives 
EDAL and ELENA of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles.53 
Moreover, the omnipresent mediascape of so-called alternative facts and fake 
news as well as the proliferation of counterfeit organisations oftentimes with 
the support of large-scale political campaigns should also be taken into 
account. This is important to stress because arguably insituent praxis should 
not discard any of these terrains, as they constitute the conditions out of which 
it can arise. Mutatis mutandis, it is useful to note that the Athenian democracy 
emerged amidst pre-existing and co-existing political systems of tyranny and 
monarchy and survived alongside slavery and other forms of social 
exploitation. 
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Instituent praxis, artificiality and the New World Summit 
Rather than classifying specific practices into appropriate categories such as 
para-institutions and mockstitutions, I seek to identify possible terrains for 
instituent praxis within a diverse spectrum of practices. Sholette's description 
of mockstitutions adds to the analysis of the para-institutional. Even though the 
Silent University and the New World Summit (both initiated after 2010) are 
categorised by Lütticken as para-institutions, they bear strong resemblances 
with mockstitutions in terms of handling their self-image, moulding 
organisational structure, manipulating institutional sobriety and more broadly, 
constituting documents of the current condition of the real in its artificiality. 
Arguably, however, the New World Summit exceeds mockstitutions as they 
were discussed by Sholette and facilitates, through Sholette’s propositions (a) 
and (b), the interrogation of the distinction between the real and the imaginary, 
and the co-extensive duality of the art-world and the everyday. 
In her discussion of infrastructure Marina Vishmidt suggested that practices 
such as the New World Academy could be regarded as 'productive 
reversioning of artistic agency in the infrastructural mode' and as 'frontal 
assumption of political and economic sovereignty.'54 In light of this 
interpretation, the New World Summit could be read as more propositional, 
straightforward and ambitious in scale and scope of reach comparing to many 
mockstitutions described by Sholette. On one hand, Staal’s project is indeed a 
mockstitution as it critically – and in some respects, mockingly – manipulates, 
moulds and recontextualises through an art-world lens institutional structures 
such as the summit, the parliament, the state and lists of designated terrorist 
organisations. As Staal has argued, ‘rather than formal models of the nation-
state,’ the proposed alternative parliaments are ‘states of mind’ that contribute 
to an ‘ongoing series of imaginaries and performative understandings of what 
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a people is /could/should be.’55 At the same time, however, the New World 
Summit operates in the straightforward terrain of political organisations and 
state politics that would not normally be thusly tied up to artistic or art-world 
practice. For example, it is highly doubtful whether there would be a parliament 
building for the Kurdish Autonomist Movement and whether it could have 
attained the levels of discursive exposure and networking with other politically 
neighbouring organisations and individuals, if it wasn’t for an art project’s 
facilitation and funding. Maria Hlavajova has similarly argued that the New 
World Academy’s project with the We Are Here Collective that works with 
‘undocumented, undeportable refugees in limbo in the Netherlands’ would also 
have otherwise been impossible.56 This is not to suggest a messianic function 
for art, but rather to take note of the particularities of the reversioning of artistic 
agency that Vishmidt referred to, which allegedly portrays a ‘desire for power 
in and over the real.’57 Seen in this light, the New World Summit seems less 
ironic, more earnest and actual than other mockstitutions. This is probably 
however, a difference in scale rather than quality; all of the discussed projects 
are to different extents mocking as well as earnest/propositional. Is there 
however a difference in their relation to the real?  
Sholette’s proposition (a) is partly proven true; the New World Summit is 
indeed using a license granted only to artists since without it so many of these 
borderline illegal projects would have not been allowed, let alone funded. 
However, to what extent is this license due to art’s exclusivity to the imaginative 
or the imaginary? Art's exclusivity to the imaginary is but another myth, upon 
which institutional edifices have been built and revolted against – not least by 
artistic avant-gardes. The myth is unsustainable at least in contemporary 
contexts, if we take into account the creativity of the largely uncertain, 
simulative and short-attention-based global mediascape, as well as 
institutional entities, ranging from shady algorithmic infrastructures to 
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monetary funds and schemes, able and permitted to determine the course of 
history for populations of entire nations and international regions. However, 
this is not an acknowledgment nor a defence of creativity as an aspect of 
nominally non-art organisations, as that would reduce creativity to a 
fragmented and commodifiable understanding. Rather, if the imaginary is 
understood as part and parcel of the instituent aspect, i.e. as attached to the 
creation of the new and artificiality, then it reveals itself as the real. This 
realisation trivialises the search for those disciplines, fields or sectors that 
could monopolise the imaginary in the first place.  
Sholette’s proposition (b) according to which there has been a monodirectional 
leakage of imaginary institutions from the art world to the everyday should also 
be nuanced. Relatedly, Maria Hlavajova has suggested that the New World 
Summit makes use of ‘what is left of artistic autonomy’ in order to perform 
actual change and Staal has confirmed that simply relying on ‘the notion of art 
as the domain of the imaginary […] leaves art to imagine everything but change 
nothing – in order for it to remain art.’58 All of these articulations suggest that 
the autonomy of art or the art world from everyday life perceived as real life or 
reality is somehow preserved. Is the ideological edifice of the autonomous 
institution of art still alive and thus operative as an alibi for practices such as 
the New World Summit? As I have argued in Chapter 1, the ideological edifice 
of the autonomous institution of art as a unified sphere is refutable and the 
institutional aspect reflects many other factors apart from the ideological 
edifice of freedom from the means-end rationality. Even if it was granted that 
the artistic and the everyday as the real were once constructed as two distinct 
spheres, the leakage of imaginary institutions from the art world to the 
everyday can only legitimately refer to a historical transition partly traceable in 
twentieth century (neo)avant-gardes, that leaves the two spheres merged. 
Contemporary parafictional mock-institutions are a product of the art world as 
much as they are part of the non-art-world.  
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The modality of institutional construction that might have once resonated with 
a discourse around ideology could be rearticulated through a discourse of 
instituent praxis and artificiality. A pure and simple epistemological relation 
between concealment and disclosure on which ideology rests collapses, given 
the complexity, virtuality and heterogenesis (as the generativity of ontological 
otherness) of the terms and conditions of visibility and semiotics, which 
permeate the artificial real and instituent praxis. Therefore, references to 
remnants of art's autonomy should read as partial, virtual and molecular 
spectres of persisting autonomy rather than actual distinct spheres of 
ideological autonomy. Ideological construction presupposes the non-
constructed or the less-constructed real, even as a (materialist) utopia, which 
is proclaimed as more ‘real’ or realist than whatever is idealised or affirmative. 
In the suggested theoretical framework of instituent praxis, such duality would 
be discarded and the real heralded as always already artificial even in its 
materialist realist utopian version. It is perhaps due to the virtual or spectral 
remnants of autonomy that the spectrum of legitimisation is allowed to widen 
and accommodate otherwise probably impossible or banned activity, as the 
New World Summit’s practice indicates. That an identical practice could be 
taking place without carrying the label of art if the legal environment was 
different seems obvious, common knowledge. Crucially, however, the fact that 
the project proceeds without legal problems (with the exception of Kochi-
Muziris Biennale) furthers and reconfigures processes of legitimisation in the 
artificial real. This observation does not intimate that the New World Summit 
should necessarily be seen as implementing instituent praxis. Advancing such 
proposition would entail a close psychoanalytic examination of the subjectivity 
involved (including all participating institutions and states, as well as possibly 
implicated observers) as a subject group. Crucially, this examination would 
have to trace an a-signifying rupture in a significational hierarchy; a rupture 
that would in turn take the form of a rule, as a commonly-produced legal 
quantum. My argument is instead concerned with instituent praxis as 
constructing the possibility of such a-signifying rupture, in line with an instituent 




Managing the visible as proto-legible: From the politics of 
display to the channelling of significational artificiality  
Lütticken has argued that ‘New World Academy,’ a collaborative exhibition 
between Staal and BAK in Centraal Museum in Utrecht (2015), ‘obscured any 
clashes between the conceptual grid and productive logic of Staal’s practice 
and some of the participants’ agendas’ and ‘glossed over the vagaries of 
exchange and co-production in favour of a clarity of presentation that shaded 
into quasi-corporate branding.’59 The exhibition was a curatorial endeavour 
that combined a visual archiving of five New World Academy sessions that 
took place between 2013 and 2015 and works from the Centraal Museum 
collection selected by Staal. This postproduction, narrativising retrospective 
appears to be prone to a reductive or at least partial representation already 
because of its exhibitionary format. However, acknowledged partiality is not 
necessarily problematic; it is a common characteristic of all curatorial attempts 
that refer to past (discursive) events, since an unmediated representation of 
the past is impossible, and idealising, as an aim. Nonetheless, an argument 
could still be made about Staal's strategy opting for glossification, simplification 
and accessibility and obfuscating raw vagaries and internal clashes.  
The recurring polarity between clear and accessible visibility and raw, 
conflictual obscurity could be further complicated. An issue could be raised 
about whether the exhibition's glossed presentation is part of a tactical 
mockstitutional modality that employs the dominant, specular regime of the art 
world as an encryption code so as not to jeopardise the actual summits, their 
funding and subsequently all the work that is done through them. In that case, 
this could be an example of visibility-as-encryption becoming a tactical tool that 
siphons the dominant spectacle-affiliated conditions of display in the art world. 
In other words, what is thereby showcased is the tactical cohabitation of visible 
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(glossified, display-centric, spectacular) and invisible (awkward, self-
contradictory, omissive, cryptic) qualities in the mockstitutional, propositional 
and perhaps instituent modality.  
Staal writes: 
It’s true we make use of the exceptional space that art grants for 
imagining our assemblies differently, at least in our part of the 
world. At the same time, that is a possibility not merely granted 
by art, but also by the organizations themselves. Whether it is 
the refugee collective We Are Here, the National Liberation 
Movement of Azawad, or the Kurdish Women’s Movement, if 
they did not recognize art as a site of struggle, then these 
collaborations would never have taken place. To be sure, it is not 
just the institution of art that grants space to emancipatory 
politics; it’s through emancipatory politics that the legitimacy and 
relevance of art is determined.60 
Albeit maintaining the aforementioned duality about the institution of art as 
distinct to an emancipatory politics, Staal’s statement betrays a self-organised 
handling and measuring of legitimacy and relevance in the significational 
ensemble advanced through the project/para-institution. In this significational 
understanding the visible is broken down to the proto-legible, to borrow 
Lütticken’s analogy. Far from proclaiming art as the only messianic sphere 
where emancipatory politics can unfold, it could be argued that Staal and the 
participating organisations practise a management or a channelling –in the 
sense of repurposing and reorganising – of significational terms and conditions 
pertaining to the overlaps and congruences of the global art world, politics and 
diplomacy. Such practice becomes the basis for interventions in the 
contingencies and possibilities within these overlapping areas.  
Mock-, alter-, para-institutions and the far right 
 
By way of concluding this chapter, I want to inscribe para-institutional, alter-
institutional and mockstitutional tactical qualities within a broader discussion 
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that has raised concerns about far-right tendencies and their intensified 
expression in cultural, aesthetic and critical modalities, tropes and discourses, 
mainly after 2010. The aim is to explore how instituent praxis could be 
contributive in such discussion. Even though I refer to fascism and its relation 
to capitalism through Guattari’s historicisation, my intention is not to examine 
the history or the political theory of fascism. Rather, I discuss the possibility 
that my hitherto analysis in this chapter and the prism of instituent praxis might 
help navigate or maneuver some operative aspects within fascism or other 
forms of authoritarian politics.  
Irony, transgression and other modalities of ‘non-conformity’ have been 
discussed in terms of their proclivity to be co-opted by reinvigorated 
expressions of far-right politics, from overt fascism to the so-called alt-right or 
alt-light. For Angela Nagle, such expressions migrated (predominantly within 
a US context) from marginal corners of the internet and the para-philology of 
cult figures outside ‘mainstream’ politics to widely used online platforms, such 
as 4Chan (2003) and Reddit (2005). In such platforms, far right sentiments 
thrived in the form of aesthetic and discursive themes and tools, such as 
memes, trolling, pranks and name-calling. Nagle associates this development 
with the period leading up to 2012 and the containment of Occupy and other 
related insurrections across the globe, in which the aesthetic of anonymity and 
its online networked forms carried emancipatory potential.61 In her reading, by 
operating through anonymous/pseudonymous usership, 4Chan and Reddit 
became an appropriate place for ‘the rightist side of the culture’ to unleash its 
‘expert style of anti-PC shock humor memes.’ This was apparently concurrent 
with the retreat of ‘the more libertarian left-leaning element within [4chan] 
culture’ linked to ‘state-spying and repression during the height of 
Anonymous’s public profile from around 2010 to 2012.’62 Nagle traces political 
shifts in the US since that period and makes a case for how ‘transgression, 
subversion and counterculture, have turned out to be the defining features of 
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an online far right that finds itself full of old bigotries of the far right but liberated 
from any Christian moral constraints by its Nietzschean anti-moralism.’63 
Nagle’s ensuing call for the left is to disengage from ‘the very recent and very 
modern aesthetic values of counterculture and the entire paradigm’ and ‘create 
something new.’ However, her conception of the new is hardly named or 
outlined and can thereby conduce in sustaining what she calls ‘the 
mainstream.’64 At any rate, abandoning the currency of subversion and non-
conformity is hardly conducive to anything other than the preservation of the 
general late capitalist status quo.  
Other authors have examined (neo-)reactionary resurgences as possibly 
reproduced in post-internet art (online and offline). For instance, Larne Abse 
Gogarty has periodised this discussion as the aftermath of the global economic 
crisis of 2008. In this period, earnest cultural expressions of radical politics 
around gender, race and class were mainstreamed and pitted against ‘not-so-
ironic’ ‘anti-PC’ fronts incubated in the expansion of Vice culture since the 
1990s.65 She suggests that Nagle has failed to address some of these 
continuities and nuances as part of a longer history of left politics and feminism. 
In terms of contemporary art articulations, which Gogarty sees as lendable to 
but not necessarily intentionally expressive of far-right ideologies, she 
identifies, on one hand, the recurrence of a poignant nihilism through a ‘flat’, 
‘unmediated’ aesthetic. This involves the erasure of historical and social 
parameters and the promotion of seemingly natural combinations of ‘ancestral’ 
and futuristic elements. On the other hand, she observes a stream of diverse 
practices that favour irony, humour, play and pleasure, as well as a ‘constantly 
metamorphosing’ ‘referentiality.’ Memes are read in this light as an updated 
form of montage that allows for relationality, mediation and an appeal to 
transformation. Such qualities are typical of this second stream as opposed to 
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the flat, unmediated one. Even though this metamorphosing, mediated 
category is not didactic and does not point towards an idealised ‘modelling of 
social transformation,’ Gogarty sees in it the potential to hint at ‘how capitalism 
permeates and has the capacity to infiltrate relations but also not to entirely 
access them or to access them partially and strangely.’ This stream of 
practices indexes a system that is ‘degraded and breaking down, constantly 
stitching itself back together, as people living within it have forms of relationality 
that are both dominated by capital but also try to move outside it.’ Gogarty 
suggests that the ‘sense of exuberance’ amidst an underwhelming, ‘gross’ and 
‘melting’ reality are crucial to this indexical effect. Thus, she is skeptical of both 
Nagle’s ‘peculiar faith to the mainstream’ and the dismissal of the whole ground 
of counterculture as a ‘banal or infantile transgression.’ Such dismissal, 
Gogarty argues, would unnecessarily forgo the potential for iterations of 
montage that allow for mediation and the implication of history and relate to 
‘pleasure, tactility and the feminine as a contested field.’ ‘Irony is not latently 
fascist,’ she notes, ‘nor is transgression.’ 
In this debate, I want to annotate the modalities that feature in the discussed 
practices, as they might be akin to mock-institutional, alter-institutional and 
para-institutional ones; especially so, the more such modalities are historically 
encountered away from traditional (neo-)avant-garde contexts and closer to 
meta-commercial/no-outside ones. The ironic mimicry or mocking similitude 
involved could be seen as part of wider threads of cultural practices that open 
themselves out to far-right appropriations. As Gogarty has intimated, irony, 
subversion and non-conformity in montage-like techniques do not inherently 
or latently point to the far right, as long as they refrain from the flattening of 
historicity and the cancellation of the potential for social transformation. 
However, the value or currency of transgressive criticality or non-conformity as 
such, and as a possible (overarching) force within mock-, para-, and alter-
institutional modalities, should arguably be further problematised and 
defended against a hypothesised latency towards the far-right. This is because 
it is precisely this currency that oftentimes draws people to far-right or 
authoritarian ideologies.  




Morgan Quaintance has argued that, apart from the common association of 
the rise of such ideologies or para-philologies and para-practices with the 
‘stereotypical disenfranchised, alienated lack of prospects within a fragmented 
society’ and the search for a ‘unified identity or history,’ there is another 
important aspect at play.66 This relates to a sort of ‘intellectual curiosity’ that 
Quaintance has identified as active in the ‘cultic milieu.’ The latter refers to a 
discursive/practical complex that includes alt-right, neo-fascist and ‘neo-
reactionary conspiracy theories’ akin to ‘ancient para-mythologies, gnosticism 
and white supremacy.’ This complex thrives on a ‘need to go back to some 
past, long gone epochal system,’ often instantiated in ‘elements of ancient 
Greek antiquity’ and ‘para-religious storytelling.’ Importantly, Quaintance 
suggests that people who are drawn to this ‘seek for a different intellect to what 
they perceive as mainstream. They fall for alternative knowledge due to the 
prior assertion that what is being taught officially or traditionally or through 
education or mainstream media is a system of imposed ignorance.’ At the 
same time, he asserts, their ultimate drive is one of feeling, (i.e. ‘it feels right,’) 
rather than an evidence-based, ‘skeptical, logical [or] critical process.’  
This condition is reminiscent of the inversions/perversions of parrhesia that I 
examined in Chapter 4. Parrhesia, as the polemic and risk-involving form of 
truth-telling to power and self-knowledge, could be schematically assimilated 
to the risk-involving and polemical impulse against what is perceived as 
mainstream and imposed structures of knowledge. This assimilation is flawed 
because in the cultic milieu there is no test, investigation or self-inquiry, in the 
sense of a learning practice that cares for the self and others. In cultic beliefs 
and systems of knowledge, truth is seen as a position rather than a drive. The 
subject’s relation to truth and the self is fixed and unwilling to admit a truth-
telling that would unsettle this fixed relation towards self-knowledge. This is 
evident even in conspiracy theories such as Flat Earth, eloquently investigated 
in the documentary Behind the Curve (2018) directed by Daniel J. Clark.67 The 
                                                          
66 Morgan Quaintance, ‘Our Cultic Milieu’ (Lecture at Propositions #4: Unpacking Aesthetics and the 
Far Right, BAK, Utrecht, March 17, 2017, accessed March 6, 2019, https://vimeo.com/266048694). 
67 Daniel J. Clark, Behind the Curve (Los Angeles, CA: Delta-v Productions, 2018; Netflix, 2019). 
302 
 
documentary features Flat Earth believers/subscribers (Flat Earthers) 
conducting DIY experiments in order to draw their own conclusions away from 
the influence of mainstream scientific/political institutions. Even though their 
experiments consistently disprove their beliefs, Flat Earthers persist with their 
cause: to never unsubscribe from their fixed form of truth, despite all the 
counterevidence which themselves create. Flat Earthers feel safer in their own 
fixed knowledge and failed ‘investigation,’ as opposed to the subject-producing 
and self-caring knowledge that denounced established structures, disciplines 
or institutions of human science might be active in a form of truth-telling. As 
Behind the Curve denotes, such institutions might in turn invert parrhesia 
themselves, in ways that relate with disciplinary control, market orientation and 
the development of exclusionary norms, thereby becoming the currency that 
the Flat Earthers seek to alter. In doing so, however, they are driven by what 
‘feels right’ and they evince known psychoanalytic behavioural patterns, as 
psychologist Dr Per Espen Stoknes and psychiatrist Joe Pierre suggest in the 
documentary. In terms of subjectivity, knowledge/power and truth-telling, it 
could also be argued that the implicated subject subscribes to a new but fixed 
knowledge/power, while truth-telling as the revaluation of the currency of self-
knowledge is ignored. 
This issue could be reframed particularly in relation to para-institutional or 
alter-institutional qualities, in that they point to semi-legitimate or alternative 
(knowledge) structures or institutions, which, articulated through a 
micromanagement of proto-legible signification and processes of 
legitimisation, possibly preserve a critical potential, but could also be 
appropriable by authoritarian systems of knowledge or anti-emancipatory 
politics. The aforementioned ‘Radical Christianity’ post on Reddit could be an 
example of this. In its employment of the para-institution and the language of 
emancipatory politics towards tolerance within a particular institutional form 
(church) of Christianity, this post, arguably, assumes that the heterogeneity 
inserted by the schema of the para-institution could compensate for the anti-
emancipatory and patriarchal moments in the discourses and institutions of 
Christianity. Unlike the heavily historicised and theorised concept of Foucault’s 




parrhesia, the tactical schema of the para-institution is far more lendable to 
such appropriations. For this reason, I employ instituent praxis and the 
Guattarian framework in order to analyse whether and how fascism and by 
extension other anti-emancipatory ideology might be latent in instances that 
resemble critical, parrhesiastic truth-telling, insofar as they attempt to break 
with forms of power and employ modes of ethos and the psyche. 
In 1973, long before these contemporary historical developments, Guattari 
discussed fascism and its permutations as ‘microfascism’ or ‘new forms of 
molecular fascism’ in relation to his conceptions of desire, which could be 
understood in the context of desiring machines, as these have been discussed 
in previous chapters.68 Guattari draws a distinction between fascism and 
capitalist totalitarian machines, both of which in some senses respond to the 
workers’ ‘potentiality for desire.’69 Capitalist totalitarian machines ‘divide, 
particularize, and molecuralize the workers’ and their subjectivity; capitalism is 
afraid of mass movements and ‘confines’ them in economic or localised 
terms.70 The totalitarian machine of capitalism is on the lookout for ‘structures 
capable of adapting desire to the profit economy.’71 More broadly, the 
‘micropolitical economy of desire’ that Guattari examines is ‘inseparable from 
the evolution of the productive forces.’72 In fascism, however, at least in its 
German and Italian iterations that culminated in World War II, a ‘fantastic 
collective death instinct,’ was activated in the masses, as they ‘reterritorialised’ 
their ‘desire onto a leader, a people, and a race,’ so as to ‘abolish a reality 
which they detested.’73 The ‘minimum of economic solutions’ that the fascist 
regimes promised or offered are seen as inconsequential comparing to this 
instinct and the reterritorialised desire of the masses – a complex which 
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combined  representations of ‘love and death’ and is present in ‘all fascist 
meanings.’  
Referring to the ‘technical machines and economic systems’ of the time of his 
writing (1973), he argues that ‘it’s because their mode of production is forced 
to carry out this liberation [of increasingly greater fluxes of desire], that the 
forms of repression are equally incited to become molecularized.’74 Guattari 
alludes here to the close entwinement of the ‘deterritorialised’ driving forces of 
production in capitalism (such as, industrial and post-industrial shifts) with ‘new 
forms of molecular fascism […] in familialism, in school, in racism, in every kind 
of ghetto.’75 Guattari seems to suggest that even though the exacerbation and 
culmination of fascism in a massive murderous and suicidal thrust possibly 
threatens a given form of the capitalist system, there is a crucial common 
thread between capitalism and fascism in terms of their channeling of desire.76 
This relates to what Guattari calls ‘Oedipalization’ or the ‘chasing of desire 
back into familialism.’77 Oedipalisation refers to any ‘personological’ 
psychoanalytic framework that includes the conjugal parental form or remains 
within interpersonal or intrafamilial relations. It also refers to any sociological 
or historical interpretations of structures as causations of such frameworks. In 
line with his thinking on desiring machines, Guattari hopes for an emancipation 
of desire as a ‘nonhuman transsexuality […] established in the social realm 
[…] through a multiplicity of material and semiotic fluxes,’ as a possible 
alternative to the conundrum that sees ‘the entire individual libidinal economy 
clos[ing] back onto itself.’78 This possibility is found in asignification; signifying 
semiologies ‘cut desire off from the real,’ as they dominate over ‘asignifying 
fluxes’ – the ‘semiotic practices which use signs in order to transform the real 
and which constitute, precisely, the privileged site for the investment of desire 
in the social arena.’79 Thus, Guattari suggests that ‘desire is inseparable from 
                                                          
74 Ibid., 175. 
75 Ibid., 171. 
76 Ibid., 168. 
77 Ibid., 173. 
78 Ibid., 172. 
79 Ibid., 174. 




the existence of semiotic chains of all kinds, and at the same time, it has 
nothing to do with the redundancies of significant semiologies, with dominant 
mental representations and repressive interpretations – except when it invests 
them as such in a fascist-Oedipal micropolitics.’ Put simply, (a) desire is 
irreducibly present in signification but its emancipated potential form is 
contained and confined by the redundancies of significant semiologies and 
repressive interpretations and (b) in (micro)fascism, desire breaks from such 
confinement through an exacerbated love and death complex, which is, at the 
same time, reinvested into (a micropolitics of) the same kind of Oedipalised 
significant semiologies.  
This significational glitch is what could be at play in far-right micro-instances of 
co-opted irony or transgression. If irony, transgression and other counter-
cultural tropes attempt to disrupt the redundancies of significant semiologies, 
in the hope of emancipating (transformative) desire, it is not surprising that 
their fascist, authoritarian and esoteric anti-emancipatory iterations hijack such 
psychosocially loaded methods. However, the latter are geared towards 
reinvested Oedipalised semiologies, whose drives are deadly or stagnating 
rather than transformative. Moreover, such iterations draw their impetus from 
a desire-driven disruptiveness towards or diversion from what they perceive 
as mainstream, which at times includes capitalist motors or symbols, but rarely 
capitalism as such in all its contradictions – at least not in fascist, cultic 
understandings. Indeed, this impetus reterritorialises the redundancies of 
significant semiologies, but only to reshuffle them in an Oedipalised context. 
Cultic beliefs and fascist or authoritarian discourses cannot bear the proper 
place of critique, as the process of courageous truth-telling and caring for the 
self as caring for others, nor the unsettlement and indeterminacy this process 
brings to the Oedipalised, pre-determined and fixed subject-object relations of 
desire, knowledge and power. An important distinction has then to be drawn 
between irony or similar methods, contexts and discourses ascribing to a 
machinic assemblage of enunciation and generating diverse and multiple 
ontology and virtuality, to those that fail to do so. As Guattari explains, it is not 
a matter of ‘magically denying signification by rendering language absurd and 
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falling back into the techniques of word play, […], but of placing semiotic 
systems in conjunction with each other, beginning with asignifying semiotics 
[…].’80  
Thus, we return to the context of instituent praxis and the implicated production 
of subjectivity and creation of signification, framed through autopoiesis, 
heterogenesis and an abstract machinic asignification. It is in a thusly 
conjunctive, ethico-aesthetic and instituent configuration, that mock-, alter-, 
para-institutions should seek to ascribe to even in their micro-scale of (ethical) 
legitimisation and proto-legible semiotics. It might be difficult to see how such 
assemblages could be prevented from mutating into microfascism, given that 
a micropolitics of desire is acted out within semiotic virtualities and in a 
spectrum of de/legitimisation as rule-making. But as Guattari’s framework hints 
at, the crucial, decisive aspect would rest on autopoiesis or the production of 
a machinic, pre-personal and pathic proto-subjectivity, that would not close 
back onto a libidinal economy of human individuation and would not switch 
itself off from a constant process of heterogenesis. It is such processes of 
subjectivity that instituent praxis involves, crucially, in its conscious nomos-
producing elements that reflect new significations – not necessarily as new 
signifiers, but as new enunciative cartographies that involve asignification. In 
rejecting transgression, irony, divergence, there is the implicit presupposition 
that these have upgraded to despotic signifiers hinging on oppressive 
meanings. However, this function is only partially operative; beyond it, irony, 
montage, non-conformity and mediating counterculture can be conducive to 
truth-telling that aims at (self-)transformation. In other words, they can 
participate in the crafting of significational and asignificational micro-
assemblages towards a new code, accordant with the desire of an emergent 
subjectivity, which is ontologically and historically generative, rather than 
reinvested in identitarian commonality, Oedipalisation and the exacerbation of 
death instincts. 
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In this thesis, I have elaborated and expanded on the concept of instituent 
praxis and its relation to power in the context of the European art world and its 
porous instances with a broader contemporary condition. The analysis has 
included a diversity of case studies in an attempt to move beyond – or in the 
crossings of – neat typologies that couple theoretical concepts with specific 
categories of instituent, or otherwise institutionally experimental, practices as 
actualisations of the concepts. Such typologies risk leaving no room for the 
consideration of potentially excluded (categories of) practices, or, conversely, 
reducing the proposed concepts to the particularities of practices. Possible 
examples of this could be MACBA in terms of New Institutionality, L’ 
Internationale and alter-institutionality, Rooseum, NIFCA and others in the 
case of New Institutionalism, or even Park Fiction in the case of instituent 
practices. To some extent this is inevitable, insofar as it is a symptom of the 
curatorial/discursive art world, whereby often the aim is precisely to self-
historicise one’s own practical engagement, by naming it in a new, 
theoretical/conceptual light. Thus, even though I have not avoided explicitly 
discussing such case studies or strands of practices, I have tried to complicate 
their position in the discourse. Chapter 5, which considered and furthered the 
geopolitical remit of (the discourse around) institutionally experimental 
projects-institutions in Europe, and Chapter 6, a commentary on typologies of 
alter-, para-, and mock-institutions, have specifically responded to such 
concerns, albeit from different angles. This final section comprises three parts 
that summarise some of the main conclusions from individual chapters and 
articulate propositions and arguments extracted from the thesis overall. 





From the art institution to instituent praxis 
 
In addressing the relation of art and its institutions or art as an institution, I 
have problematised the polarity of art against reality or everyday ‘life praxis’, 
as it features in accounts of (neo)avant-garde and Institutional Critique intents. 
I have discussed Bürger’s understanding of the institution of art as the 
prevalent definition(s) of the social function of art in its historical contingence. 
He has diagnosed a clean-cut affirmative function, which sees the ideologically 
constructed institution of art in bourgeois society as an entire autonomous 
sphere of imagination, efficiently inconsequential to reality or ‘life praxis’, albeit 
critical to the means-end rationality that pervades such praxis. I have 
complicated his postulation through a few suggestions: 
- Art and real life praxis are not two clearly demarcated spheres, awaiting for 
their sublation, as I have discussed through Foster. Art in the contemporary as 
well as its institutional elements act upon the everyday and the real in various 
ways; not least by being fully enmeshed in and governed by market forces, as 
I have argued through Andrea Fraser. It is from within the latter condition, 
which also denotes the subjective subsumption of labour under capital, that 
immanent critique is possible. 
- If affirmation persists as a function, it operates at a micro-level: it is hardly 
referred to a single and all-encompassing sphere as institution, resting on a 
clear division between the real and the imaginary. Affirmation is also a 
methodologically problematic concept, in that it requires a hidden quality in 
order to operate – one that is, however, visible only to those who explore its 
function, and, at any rate, conceived in its structure to never be adequately 
exposable. 
- Bürger’s definition of the institution of art as the prevalent definition of art’s 
social function in its historical contingency is closer to what is at stake with 
institutional ontology, in marking an ideological prevalence. Through Buchloh, 
I have shown that the institutional pertains to administrative, legalistic and 
economic power as well as linguistic and discursive convention. Visibility as 




specularity and its imbrication with subjectivity are also relevant in power 
complexes made of norms and conventions. 
- I have argued that the process of canonisation through repetition does not 
exhaust the meaning of institutionalisation. There is more to the institution than 
norms and conventions, even though deontology – power relations, rights, 
obligations, collectively accepted systems of rules – is characteristic of the 
institution. 
If Fraser draws the art institutional line in its coincidence to discourses, Raunig 
has sought for a non-dialectical way out of purely negating or affirming the 
institution, in terms of positions of complicity. Raunig regards instituent 
practice(s) as performing a propositional self-instituting that constantly strives 
against structuralisation, without deludedly aiming at the latter’s abolition. Even 
though my line of argument agrees with Raunig’s intention, his theorisation of 
instituent practice(s) or process(es) goes hand in hand with his use of Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of constituent power, aspects of which Dardot and Laval’s 
instituent praxis moves away from. Moreover, the precise relationship of 
Raunig’s concept of the instituent to the constituent lacks theoretical specificity 
and tends to evaporate within the particularity of practices, such as 
occupations, alongside Hardt and Negri’s constituent. Instituent praxis is then 
defined as the process that involves the co-production of historically new 
significations that aspire to become rules of law and the concurrent production 
of a non-preexisting collective subjectivity. Instituent praxis goes beyond 
legislative and governmental (explicit) power, in that it refers to the creation of 
deontic significations, i.e. what could be conceived of and agreed upon as just 
by and for a collective subjectivity. 
Through Guattari’s (later) writing, I expand on the aspects of subjectivity in 
order to include machinic (technical and abstract), pre-personal, nonhuman 
and pathic/affective iterations. Relatedly, the production of new significations 
is referred to the realms of asignification, desire and machinic assemblages of 
enunciation. These productive and creative processes of subjectivity and 
enunciation should not be seen as simple caveats, but as crucial and 
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constitutive within instituent praxis, whose aspect of artificiality – as opposed 
to spontaneity or naturalness – is key. Guattari’s core understanding of the real 
as artificial is central to my argument and relates to my expansion of instituent 
praxis. Guattari’s two main principles, autopoiesis and heterogenesis are in 
line with this. They permeate these incorporeal, virtual, ontogenetic as well as 
corporeal universes, by promoting the reappropriation of the means of 
production of subjectivity, through processes that constantly generate 
dissimilarity and thwart linear homogenising transcendental archi-writings. 
Guattari writes:  
Capital smashes all other modes of valorisation. The Signifier 
silences the infinite virtualities of minor languages and partial 
expressions. Being is like an imprisonment which blinds us to the 
richness and multivalence of Universes of value which, 
nonetheless, proliferate under our noses. There is an ethical choice 
in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the 
virtual that decorporealises and deterritorialises contingency, linear 
causality and the pressure of circumstances and significations 
which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility and 
resingularisation.1  
Such are the modalities of autopoiesis and heterogenesis: ethico-aesthetic, 
virtual, processual, irreversible and resingularising. Such is also the modality 
of the new. In Castoriadis, the unconscious creation of the radically new that 
did not pre-exist in representation is the action of the social/historical as a force 
participated by no-one in particular. Dardot and Laval assign to this function 
an emerging conscious subjectivity, which is conceived in the post-structuralist 
psychoanalytic terms set by Guattari. Subjectivity in instituent praxis does not 
pre-exist and is produced through autopoiesis and heterogenesis in and 
through the praxis. It is also worth noting that Guattari’s engagement with the 
possible moves beyond the affirmation/utopia duality. His insight into the 
blinding – rather than the hidden – condition of Being and hierarchies of value 
is non-authorial. The possible is addressable through an ethical choice rather 
than an inaccessible Enlightenment.  
                                                          
1 Guattari, Chaosmosis, 29. 




Labour, infrastructure and instituent praxis 
 
I have attempted to chart a partial economics for instituent praxis – in terms of 
exploring the nemein of the artificiality of the possible and the virtual – that 
highlights and crosses the art world in its porosity with broader social realities. 
Instituent praxis eludes the polarity between withdrawal from and engagement 
with (art) institutions, and moves beyond naïve spontaneous, direct action as 
prefiguration; too-literal (or too-concrete) takes of autonomist exit; as well as 
liberal institutional reforms. The perspective of instituent praxis is compliant 
with reclaiming and not withdrawing from art institutions. Fisher’s call for 
indirect action involving a managerial and organisational approach for Leftist 
fronts, so that they both reclaim and govern even hitherto neoliberal 
institutions, resonates with instituent praxis, which does not simply theorise 
forms of dissensus but also outlines the institution (as creation of new 
constitutive rules) of the political principle of the common. Unlike Mouffe’s 
agonism that accentuates the strife between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces, instituent praxis elucidates the creation of new possibilities, 
which are not reducible to counter-actions to existing hegemony within and 
beyond the art world.  
Engaging with art institutions crucially entails exploring their back office, apart 
from their programming, in terms of artistic, creative and administrative labour 
together with managerial and organisational structures and their associated 
hierarchies. Research into the back-office infrastructure of art institutions 
should consider synergies with a broader, non-art-world repoliticisation of the 
workplace, that would involve reimagining institutional forms of unionisation 
and collectivisation of labour. Relevant art/activist practice that examines the 
organisation of artistic labour, whereby exploitation and unpaid work tend to 
thrive, is encountered across Europe – the examples used in the thesis are 
drawn from the UK (Carrotworkers, Precarious Workers Brigade, Future 
Interns), Poland (Free/Slow University Warsaw, the Consortium for Postartistic 
Practices), or are international (Artleaks). Eichhorn’s 5 weeks, 25 days, 175 
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hours reveals the inertia of the infrastructure of the automated non-profit 
gallery, in its quirky response to unwaged labour, and its plea for the value of 
not labouring and the waging of producing nothing. Her work also implicates 
work hierarchies and their interrelation with managerial constraints. 
Documenta 14 and its managerial/economic shortcomings, despite its 
mindfulness of labour hierarchies and conditions, indicate the importance and 
fragility of the back office of the art institution.  
I have discussed Francke and Jardine’s predicate for the administrator as 
creative subject, based on the hypothesis that technological standardisation 
deprives administrative work of its authorship. Administrators turn into 
maintenance infrastructure for deserving subjects that participate in the public 
arena authorially and creatively. The repoliticisation of work should take into 
account this proposition, in its common ground with domestic labour, which is 
also invisible to and taken for granted by deserving subjects. However, such 
tactical demands should not be seen as theoretically generalisable. For 
instance, visibility in itself is not necessarily emancipatory; apart from 
specularised aspects, it can also coincide with an infrastructure of surveillance, 
of the logic of the panopticon, which can be limiting and oppressive to 
marginalised subjectivities (such as women dependent on interrelated systems 
of welfare and prison), in disciplining them individually and depriving them of 
any access to the eye of power. This observation is extendable to art 
institutions which, in seeking to experiment with institutional form, cannot 
afford to comply with the transparency and due diligence requirements of 
funding bodies – an issue thematised by the NIFCA-affiliated exhibition project 
Opacity.  
Moreover, administration in itself is not identical with tediously standardised 
infrastructure and can be fully imbricated with creation, even if, in capitalism, 
this translates into strategic innovation for the market. This creation/innovation 
is what drives and moves private profit and the whole (techno)capitalist global 
economy. It is this creative momentum that anything alternative to capitalism 
should seek to reclaim, in different terms, but out of given conditions. 
Algorithmic institutional governance points to the reduction of the code (in 




software) to the law of a privately administered logic, evidenced in contexts 
ranging from the nominally public contemporary art museum of a European 
capital to the EU regulatory framework GDPR. If, even in hypothetical 
scenarios of nationalisation of technocapitalist oligopolies/monopolies, any 
agency seems to ultimately lie with capital forces, it is because subjectivity, 
desire and creation are not adequately mobilised towards instituent praxis. The 
latter opens up a theoretical framework from which to conceive of, imagine and 
realise democracy as autonomy or the political principle of the common as 
curatable and creatable and as code enunciated consciously by subjectivities-
in-the-making. Instituent praxis takes the form of a conscious non-causal 
resingularisation which is, nonetheless, conditioned by unconscious 
phantasms and stereotypical pasts. Given, capitalist, oversignifying conditions 
are not to be hopelessly repressed or negated, or even regulated ad hoc. The 
proposition of instituent praxis, autopoiesis and heterogenesis is an 
enunciation of code and desire that should be able to institute a reality beyond 
the capitalist abduction of desire and the marketisation of the means of 
production of subjectivity.  
Through Irit Rogoff, I have advocated for an affective or asignificatory 
understanding of infrastructure, that heterogenises its reduction to 
functionality. This has been pertinent to my examination of art institutional 
experimentation in the context of a European semi-periphery. In tracing the 
geopolitical gaps and power asymmetries in (the discourse of) such 
experimentation, I have invoked the concept of semi-periphery as one that 
apprehends the relativity of positionality ensuing from the amalgamation of 
desire and legitimisation in the complex mechanisms of seduction and 
discipline. For instance, in the cases of Vector and Kunsthalle Athena different 
perceptions of ‘big’ or core infrastructure led to different institutional formations 
and responses, which cannot be reduced to the different economic or material 
conditioning. Many of the discussed case studies in the European semi-
periphery could be seen as indexing an affective take of institutional 
infrastructure. Vector and Periferic Biennial experimented with art institutional 
infrastructure of a range of visibility and public engagement, in a negotiation 
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with the Romanian context of Iași. Kunsthalle Athena toyed with the affective 
connotations of Kunsthalles and Kunstvereins. Galéria Ganku commented on 
institutional insufficiency by ironically imagining a private gallery on a mountain 
peak in a state socialist context, while displaying the psychosocially relevant 
(dis)identification with this institutional context and its Western-capitalist 
institutional externality. Muzeum Sztuki’s historical landmark of a collection 
was an artist-led project-institution all along, built on friendship and avant-
garde camaraderie networks. Artists at Risk is a paradigmatic case of logistical 
and infrastructural enactment that grew out of biopolitical, affective and 
creative considerations and conditions. Relatedly, CAMP’s institutional 
experimentation goes beyond New Institutionalism’s generous social 
engagement with the community, as permissible by art structures. CAMP’s 
infrastructural experimentation is first and foremost driven by affect and the 
effects of biopolitical displacement, whereby art is supplementary.  
However, the full nexus of instituent praxis indicates that what is at stake in 
such cases is not simply an ethico-aesthetic take of functional or non-
functional infrastructure, but highly propositional deontologies as well as 
subjectivity-forming relations, taking into account the hierarchies and 
(discursive) power relations active through the condition of the semi-periphery. 
Muzeum Sztuki and Galeria Ganku point to discursive omissions of historicity, 
which are highly active in – but not causing – the real institutional 
experimentation with and creation of one’s self-positioning. Collection 
Collective speculates and experiments with collective, worker-led and self-
organising forms of owning and collecting. The Consortium for Post-Artistic 
Practices channels art affiliation into direct anti-fascist, pro-refugees, feminist, 
and pro-workers mobilisation. It also experiments with forms of distributing 
authorship between the collective’s members and the collective itself. Artists 
at Risk have crafted legal avenues for excluded creative subjects, tapping into 
new deontic powers and desire at once. Arguably, this is irreducible to 
humanitarian aid (and to propositional/experimental infrastructure), not 
because the excluded subjects are creative, in the narrow sense, and therefore 




deserving, but because the project points to the possibility of co-producing new 
or heterogenetic significations as deontologies.  
 
Discourse, power and instituent praxis 
 
I have argued that the perspective of instituent praxis can also contribute in 
examining discursivity and knowledge production in the art world in a number 
of fashions. To unravel this contribution, I have considered the broader 
discursive context in the art world and referred to practices of diverse formats 
– from small-scale university-projects, which rethink experimentally and 
propositionally the form of the educational institution par excellence, to large-
scale and long-term transnational research projects such as Former West. 
Through Kompatsiaris, Sheikh, Aguirre and Rogoff, I have traced some of the 
ways in which discursive practices, despite their democratising intentions or 
radicalising discursive contributions of variable degrees and the challenge they 
have posed to the object-based and specular exhibition form, continue to 
subscribe in the exhibitionary/curatorial complex. Thus, they perpetuate the art 
world as a huge exclusive and exclusionary conversation around visual 
excitements, displayable objects or other consumables, including consumable 
knowledge. This could be attested by the reception of Documenta 14 which 
sidelined the importance of the long-term grass-roots and largely discursive 
public programme ‘The Parliament of Bodies’, and focused instead on 
accusations of neo-colonialism.  
Sheikh has discussed this condition by referring it historically to the (art) 
institutional function of the exhibitionary complex which is at once pedagogical, 
mediational and curatorial. He argues that this power/knowledge and desire-
transferring function, apart from disciplining and correcting, also gives access 
to the viewpoint of power. It can thereby create a public en masse, insofar as 
the latter becomes conscious of itself as such. Thus, for Sheikh, the art 
institutional function essentially entails the articulation of a mode of address 
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that produces publics. In addressing the historical and theoretical decline of a 
singular public sphere that gives way to counterpublics, Sheikh has called for 
reimagining modes of address, along the lines of a conflictual rather than 
consensual understanding of the art institution. I have referred to the danger 
that lies in this invoked agonistic approach, which stages the conflictual 
pluralisation of discourse according to a parliamentary model and risks turning 
into a formulaic blueprint or an empty signifier for democracy. Even if Sheikh’s 
suggestion is interpreted as identifying the art institutional function with a self-
producing of publics, i.e. art institutions are themselves publics or 
counterpublics, it remains unclear how a new mode of address would be 
uttered as institutionally creative production of a non-preexisting subjectivity, 
unless the theory of instituent praxis is employed.  
My analysis of the concept of the public sphere and notions of counterpublics 
has contended that, by ultimately depending on commonality or at least 
concreteness of needs/interests, publics are susceptible to market 
identificatory mechanisms, despite caveats of pluralisation and conflict. The 
subjectivity involved in instituent praxis posits instead the production of 
dissimilarity and resingularisation according to heterogenesis. Crucially, far 
from rejecting the necessity of emancipatory causes against specific forms of 
social exclusions that are often instantiated in counter-publics, the postulate of 
instituent praxis and its adjacent production of subjectivity is a parallel one; it 
suggests that unappropriability has to be instituted artificially and that it should 
also be defendable without being tied to any form of natural or naturalised 
belonging. Instituent praxis involves the creation of deontic significations by a 
non-preexisting subject, which is only tied by co-obligation and co-operation in 
the context of such creation.  
Another approach in response to some of the aforementioned discursive art 
world’s predicaments – object-based and specular primacy, consumable 
knowledge/power, the obfuscation of labour in art institutions – has invoked 
Foucault’s theoretical constellation around parrhesia and Cynicism. This 
invocation has often taken the form of an advocated direct instantiation of such 
concepts within instituent (discursive) practices. Against this type of 




association, I have revisited Foucault’s concepts in order to trace pertinences 
and frictions with instituent praxis in its Guattarian expansion. This analysis 
has referred to a set of deliberately diverse discursive practices all of which 
might (at first glance) be described as aiming at parrhesia, in terms of both 
format and content of discourse, or rather, in ethico-aesthetic terms.  A number 
of conclusive and new to the discussion observations can be drawn: 
- The alteration of currency as a main principle of Cynicism could be 
strongly associated with instituent praxis. This is because this principle 
involves a twofold simultaneous alteration: the psychoanalytically 
connoted practice of accessing one’s own currency as self-value 
through self-knowledge alongside changing the custom, breaking up 
the rules, habits, conventions and laws (the currency as nomos). Thus, 
the resonance of Cynicism and instituent praxis is revealed to extend 
beyond logos or discourse and into asignificatory realms. 
- Aspects of discursive practices or project-institutions such as Former 
West and La Colonie demonstrate contemporary inversions and 
perversions of Cynicism. These are attributable to the conditions of 
discourse both in the art world and beyond. Despite the parrhesiastic 
aspiration evident in Former West’s geopolitically loaded and informally 
co-produced knowledge-production rhetoric, the project showcases the 
inversion of Cynicism through newly accepted customary behaviours, 
norms and traditional schemas of conduct. These perpetuate 
exclusions, despite all intentions for inclusion, while, exposing attempts 
are rendered neutral, spectacular or perversely decontextualised, in a 
kind of twisted significational affirmation. Arguably, this process 
crucially involves heavily underexamined affective and pathic aspects 
in the contemporary context of such discourse. Aspiring-to-be-
parrhesiastic discourse cannot alter the currency (beyond its discipline), 
partly due to the hyperinflated and spectacularised pathic elements 
invested in it. This is not ideology or affirmation in the Marcusian sense; 
it is desire adapted in the capitalist, personalised, non-heterogenetic 
sense. Similar to the marketisation of counterpublics, the 
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spectacularisation of currency-altering aspirations moves towards an 
intuited, perhaps unconscious, emancipation, only to the extent that 
capital allows. The precise psychoanalytic functions within these kinds 
of discursive conditions could be further researched. 
- The example of La Colonie and its proclaimed anti-academicism or anti-
intellectualism portray a related perversion of a possibly otherwise 
parrhesiastic rhetoric around decolonisation. The problem here is the 
illusion or fantasy of doing away altogether with (critical) discourse in 
favour of an alleged emancipatory alteration of the currency, purely 
through affective terms. Instituent praxis points to knowledge as 
irreducibly affective and a-significatory, acknowledging the impossibility 
of eradicating discourse or signification. 
- The anti-academism evidenced in La Colonie could be seen as another 
distortion of Foucault’s association of Cynicism with doctrinal thinness 
(aiming at askesis) and popular recruitment, against the ‘easy’ and 
‘lengthy’ way of logos. This is because Foucault’s association is aimed 
at a pedagogical, learning askesis rather than the illusory indulgence of 
the abolition of logos. Distortions persist in the broader discursive art 
world whereby the lengthy way of logos is not easy at all and hardly 
makes way for the practice (askesis) of those who might learn. This is 
arguably not unrelated to the aforementioned hyperinflated investment 
in the medium of discourse and the dominant signifiers therein.  
- Ràdio Web MACBA could be seen as a discursive practice that aims at 
wide access, by avoiding exclusionary formats or targeted rhetoric. It 
thus alludes to the function of the panorama; the provision of access to 
the viewpoint of power, which in turn sees en masse and thus produces 
the public. However, in the post-internet, late capitalist condition, this 
function takes the form of an entirely customised and personalised 
mediation that only pretends to be panoramic. It provides individually 
consumed atomised glimpses into the multiple perspectives of power. 
Yet, power is also fragmented and diffused in algorithmic or other code 
and transgressions thereof. 




The Foucauldian tradition of parrhesia and Cynicism seeks to use these 
concepts as fuel for contemporary dissensus without stripping them of 
historical and theoretical specificity. Foucault argued that parrhesia was a 
polemic form of truth-telling, distinct from apodictic, demonstrative or enigmatic 
forms. In this sense, Cynicism is reminiscent of Rancière’s dissensus or 
litigiousness, which claims otherwise undeserved stakes in the nemein that 
founds the communal nomos. Rancière’s caveat accentuates the possibility of 
a subject being excluded, wronged or unaccounted for, even after the liminal 
shift whereby the subject overthrows the distribution of the power to rule 
(archein) so that it is included. Similarly, despite nurturing the alteration of the 
currency, Cynicism seems to remain protective of the remit of a persistent 
dissensus against a leap into the creation or co-production of new 
significations as rules of law. But if, in an attempt to articulate the subject 
proper to politics, Rancière refers to the power to rule, or even the instituent-
echoing nemein that founds the communal nomos, Foucault refers to a 
currency expanded throughout bios and logos, i.e. the remit of Cynicism. What 
could be implicit then in Foucault’s protectiveness is a concern about the 
embodied and diffusive topology of power. Yet, not least through parrhesia and 
Cynicism, Foucault also theorised potential resistances in terms of the 
subject’s relation to power. The Foucauldian concern around power could be 
seen as liminal to the project of instituent praxis, which should nonetheless be 
aimed at – not as a utopia but as the practice of the artificial real – if power is 
to be contained or even channeled towards such praxis. Without conceding 
the caveat of the parrhesiastic alteration of the currency, instituent praxis 
includes creation, as autopoiesis and heterogenesis – virtual ontologenetic 
corporeal and incorporeal universes. If Foucault’s topology of power blurs the 
division between explicit forms of power and groundpower, then power should 
be assigned into a broader chartography: that of machinic, nonhuman, pre-
personal subjectivity, asignificatory desire and the edifices of the artificial real, 
whereby instituent praxis could become the administrative, modelling clay of 
commonly produced (a)significatory quanta of justice.  
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Possible glitches in instituent praxis and artificiality 
 
Mock-, alter-, para–institutions, such as the New World Summit, Idamm, Let’s 
Get Together and Call Ourselves an Institute, as well as the university-projects 
that play with the form of the university and the Social Mining Union’s mocking-
but-earnest infrastructural/institutional critique could be seen as symptomatic 
of the broader condition of the artificial real. Some of them are more 
critical/mocking (Let’s get Together, Idamm), while others could be seen as 
more earnest or propositional (the New World Summit, the Silent University, 
the Anti-university of London, the Copenhagen Free University, the Free/Slow 
University of Warsaw and the Social Mining Union). To some extent, they are 
all mocking, critical, earnest and propositional; even if they involve irony, they 
are mindful of not sacrificing an earnest proposal or concern. Importantly, 
however, the real in which they intervene is already permeated by facsimiles 
of institutional sobriety, administrative/legal infrastructure or absence thereof 
and a spectrum of shifting ethical and official legitimisation – all invested with 
affect. In this terrain, the practice of the aforementioned project-institutions 
consists in a micro-management of moulding, siphoning and encrypting proto-
legible (a)significations and instances of shifting/emergent legitimisation. Such 
management can also be observed in the Consortium for Post-artistic 
Practices that seeks to advance a system of split individual authorship in order 
not to subscribe to or even perhaps deflate the name-related specular currency 
of art collectives, while still practising under the collective. It is in this terrain of 
the artificial real, whereby instituent praxis could unfold, as the production of a 
collective, machinic, pre-personal, autopoietic subjectivity that enunciates 
desire and code anew and generates multiple and virtual ontologies, beyond 
Oedipalised and personified signifiers and investments of desire adapted to 
capital.  
The virtual spectres of the autonomous sphere of art operate as significational 
indexes allowing for the encryption of code enunciated by project-institutions. 
This code takes the form of propositional channeling of infrastructural or 




institutional platforms or schemes. Such is the case, for instance, with the New 
World Summit, but also with the Institute for Radical Imagination and CAMP. 
This repurposing of art-spectral significations as encryption code can be 
different to socially-engaged art which operates in a terrain of absent social 
welfare. The encrypted repurposing operates in officially non-legitimate or 
semi-legitimate terrains, as, for instance, in the case of the New World Summit. 
Differences between socially-engaged art and an encrypted repurposing might 
also concern the parity of the participants’ agency and authorial input. 
However, an examination of this proposition would be beyond the remit of this 
thesis and would require further research.  
Ironic or earnest, critical or propositional, para/alter/mock-institutions perform 
a micromanagement of signification and legitimisation, whereby material and 
semiotic universes are multiply involved in either unsettling or meta-
documenting the redundancies of dominant mental significations. Through 
Guattari, I have suggested that it is in this reconfigured scale and potential 
unsettling, that tactical practices can relapse into Oedipalised investments and 
far-right sentiments. This often goes hand in hand with a schematic take of 
parrhesia as espousing alternative or non-mainstream systems of knowledge, 
in an impulse to condemn perceived-as-imposed media and educational 
systems. This could be evidenced also in non-explicitly far-right cultic systems, 
such as Christian para-institutional renderings, as well as conspiracy theories 
like Flat Earth. This schematic tendency towards marginal knowledge-systems 
– which, as I have begun to suggest, differs substantially from Foucault’s 
parrhesia – and potential overlaps with fascism could constitute another path 
for future research. My thesis only examines such relations in the last section 
of the final chapter through proposing the context of instituent praxis as a 
navigating tool for the functions of desire, subjectivity and signification in 
expressions of microfascism.  
It takes a great deal of speculation to be able to discern the extent or the form 
of threat that the current forms of microfascism pose to the global and 
financialised late capitalist system; the far right’s love and hate relationships to 
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the power of – media and other – big corporations are at least inconsistent. 
However, it is hardly news that there are major capitalist ventures profiting from 
and fueling far-right shifts – from profitable far-right leaning news and media 
outlets to financial speculation around outcomes of major political events. 
Molecularised microfascism can use network structures, such as the internet 
and its dark sides, as well as global financialised and speculative capital, in 
order to grow its common aspirations without compromising its locally 
irreducible forms.2   
Earnest cultural interventions along the lines of so-called ‘no-platforming’ and 
battling anti-political correctness should refrain from ignoring the reality of 
desire, asignification and other realms of the psyche, or by postulating the 
compulsive consideration of an ethically (re)invented code (which is always 
partial), when at the same time desire is ‘parked’ at, entrusted with and 
adapted by capital. Such code-obsessive and often performative process can 
be just in itself but hardly produces any transformation, insofar as subjectivity-
forming, non-identitarian desire is bracketed off. Moreover, the performance of 
an earnest abiding to an ethical code should not be seen as identical to anti-
fascist intentions. The discursively violent anti-PC 4Chan-racist/sexist slur 
uttered by anonymous users (who otherwise might not see themselves as 
racist or sexist) could be accommodating saliently different operative forces to 
the massive re-surging waves of reactionary, nationalist, authoritarian and far-
right political tendencies – throughout Europe – espousing vocally and 
practically or adjusting rhetorically what they see as very much earnest and 
code-abiding approaches, from The National Democratic Party of Germany 
(AfD) to the Greek neo-Nazi organisation and political party Golden Dawn.3 
                                                          
2 Open Democracy has been following the ‘dark money’ that fueled far-right politics in Europe. See: 
Claire Provost, ‘Revealed: Trump-Linked US Christian ‘Fundamentalists’ Pour Millions of ‘Dark 




3 For European samples of such rhetoric, see: Angela Giuffrida, ‘Europe’s Far-Right Leaders Unite 
with a Vow to “Change History”,’ The Guardian, May 18, 2019, accessed May 21, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/18/europe-far-right-leaders-unite-milan-vow-to-
change-history. 




The interrelation between anti-PC language and fascist rhetoric and practice 
requires further research, in psychoanalytic and discursive terms. 
The contribution of instituent praxis is to uphold autonomy in the sense of the 
production of subjectivity through the enunciation of a code and desire 
accordant with autopoiesis and heterogenesis, rather than fascist-Oedipal 
death instincts. In other words, according to ontogenetic universes, rather than 
pre-determined and fixed subject-to-object relations of desire, knowledge and 
power. If fascism claims autonomy as its right to design and perform its own 
code, its desire is a deadly Oedipalised one, reinvested in fixed and regressive 
ethico-aesthetic significations, beyond heterogenesis. If capitalism owns the 
code seemingly to the detriment of any alternative, it is because desire and 
asignifiction are being constantly abducted in their historically creative 
moments and adapted into the capitalist code. Instituent praxis glitches at 
those moments when desire does not simply push beyond one code or another 
but when it pushes towards the breakdown of all conscious or unconscious 
code that would take the form of a collective subjectivity, without aspiring to 
the artifice of other enunciative assemblages. These are probably moments of 
fundamentally pure or asocial violence, that would pose a limit to the potential 
of instituent praxis and would need to be further researched alongside 
psychoanalysis and, perhaps, in contradistinction to sociological accounts or 
cultural expressions of violence.  
Instituent praxis today 
David Harvey has argued that apart from the exploitation of labour in terms of 
surplus value, capital can also accumulate by ‘thievery, robbery, usury, 
commercial cheating and scams of all sorts.’4 In a 2019 interview, he lists some 
contemporary examples of such scams: ‘[b]ankruptcy moves by major 
corporations (e.g. airlines)’ due to which employees lose their ‘pension and 
heath care rights,’ ‘monopoly pricing in pharmaceuticals, in 
                                                          
4 David Harvey, ‘“The Neoliberal Project is Alive But Has Lost Its Legitimacy”: David Harvey,’ interview 




telecommunications, in health care insurance in the USA’ and ‘[r]entier 
extractions based on accumulation by dispossession (e.g. acquiring land or 
mineral resources illegally or at cut rates).’5 The latter extractions have 
increased as capital finds it increasingly difficult to ‘precure productive uses for 
surplus capital.’ In the same interview, Harvey asserts that even though the 
‘neo-liberal project is alive and well,’ it has ‘lost its legitimacy’ and it ‘no longer 
commands the consent of the mass of the population.’ This is denoted by 
protests globally and the general economic climate which has clearly shifted 
from that of ‘the 1980s and early 1990s’: ‘everyone now sees [that] neo-
liberalism is about lining the pockets of the rich at the expense of the people.’ 
However, this casualty of neo-liberal legitimacy is also reflected in 
neoliberalism’s necessary ‘alliance[s] with state authoritarianism’ – already 
observable since the 2000s, and more recently with ‘neo-fascism.’ At any rate, 
the possibilities that this historical curb of legitimacy might open up should be 
carefully examined, given that, arguably, the post-1989 no-alternative narrative 
that has been embraced by the Left assumes the inextricability between the 
neoliberal logic and its canonical, lawful and legitimate character. By 
extension, it often assumes either a communist utopian end point whereby – 
and not before – desire would be realised as a legitimate outcome; or the 
potential of imminent moments of spontaneous, revolutionary desire to 
eventually attain the common, presupposing again a hinge on means of 
illegality. The agonistic approach, which would not discard the battle for 
legitimacy on behalf of counter-hegemonic struggles, recognises the vitality of 
this conundrum. However, it falls short of an articulation of subjectivity (beyond 
the people, translated as the non-elite) that embraces desire and artificiality as 
ontologically creative (or heterogenetic) and psychoanalytically pertinent. 
Seductive in its practical mandate for anti-elitism, agonism is not safeguarded 
by a clear methodology under which the counter-hegemonic struggle would 
not end up embracing or platforming populist authoritarianism or (economic) 
nationalism, masked as anti-elitism. 
                                                          
5 Harvey, ‘“The Neoliberal Project”.’ 




Instituent praxis suggests that the process of founding a communal nomos is 
key to the whole trajectory of politics. Such praxis permits the hypothesis that 
a legitimacy crisis of the neo-liberal project could be channeled towards the 
institution of a much-needed, newly and commonly legitimised reality, instead 
of the neo-liberal project’s spasmodic alliances with state authoritarianism and 
neo-fascism, which seem to easily accommodate the desire of the masses – 
in and through micro-instances. Such reality could amount to the institution of 
the common, insofar as this is what would be desired and produced as a 
communal nomos through instituent praxis. The indicative European practices 
I have discussed in this thesis have pointed to a transversal, extendable 
framework: instituent praxis should not be reduced to selected instituent 



























































Abse Gogarty, Larne. ‘The Art Right.’ Art Monthly, April 2017, 6-10. 
 
–––. ‘Coherence and Complicity: On the Wholeness of Post-Internet 
Aesthetics.’ Lecture at Propositions #4: Unpacking Aesthetics and the Far 
Right, BAK, Utrecht, March 17, 2017. Accessed March 6, 2019, 
https://vimeo.com/266048660. 
 
Abse Gogarty, Larne, and Ellen Feiss. ‘Capitalist Life.’ In Re-Materialising 
Feminism, edited by Alice Brooke, Giulia Smith and Rózsa Farkas, xxxix-iIvi. 
London: Arcadia Missa Publications, 2015. 
 
Aguirre, Peio. “Education With Innovations: Beyond Art-Pedagogical 
Projects” In Curating and the Educational Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill and 
Mick Wilson, 174–185. London: Open Editions, 2010. 
 
Albin, Einat, and Virginia Mantouvalou. ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic 
Workers: From the Shadows to the Light.’ Industrial Law Journal 41, no. 1. 
(2012): 67-78. Accessed February 11, 2018, doi: 10.1093/indlaw/dws001. 
 
Allen, Kate, and Guy Chazan. ‘Germany Reaps a €2.9bn Gain from Greek 
Bond Holdings.’ Financial Times, June 22, 2018. Accessed January 20, 
2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9b3d38a2-7574-11e8-aa31-31da4279a601. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition, 2nd edition. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
Art Review. ‘Power 100.’ Accessed September 12, 2015, 
http://artreview.com/power_100/. 
 
Artists at Risk. ‘About.’ Accessed November 15, 2018, 
https://artistsatrisk.org/about/?lang=en. 
 
Athanasiou, Athena. ‘Performing the Institution “As If It Were Possible”.’ In 
Former West: Art and the Contemporary After 1989, edited by Maria 
Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh, 679-91. Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele 




Attia, Kader. ‘Biography.’ KaderAttia.de. Accessed March 3, 2018, 
http://kaderattia.de/biography/. 
 
–––. ‘Re-appropriating the Colony: An Interview With Artist Kader Attia About 
La Colonie in Paris.’ Interview by Cathérine Hug, Spike, January 16, 2017. 
Accessed March 3, 2018, https://www.spikeartmagazine.com/en/articles/re-
appropriating-colony. 
 
Badovinac, Zdenka. ‘The Critical Institution.’ In Inside Out: Critical Discourses 
Concerning Institutions, edited by Alenka Gregoric and Suzana Milveska, 50-
61. Ljubljana: Museums and Galleries of Ljubljana and City Art Gallery 
Ljubljana, 2017. 
 
BAK online. ‘New World Academy.’ Accessed July 13, 2018, 
https://www.bakonline.org/long-term-project/new-world-academy/. 
 
Balibar, Étienne. We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational 
Citizenship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. 
 
Barnett, Anthony. ‘Democracy and the Machinations of Mind Control.’ The 




Bartlett, Jamie. The People vs Tech: How the Internet is Killing Democracy 
(and how We Save It). London: Ebury Press, 2018. 
 
Basciano, Oliver. ‘Off-Space no 13: Jerusalem, on the road.’ Art Review 
(Summer 2013). Accessed December 15, 2014, 
http://artreview.com/opinion/off-space_no_13_jerusalem/. 
 
Bejenaru, Matei. ‘Associations: Interview with Vector Association Part 1.’ In 
conversation with Kristina Lee Podesva and Livia Pancu, Arc Post: Online 
Space for Artist-Run Culture, March 2011. Accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://arcpost.ca/articles/interview-with-vector-association. 
 
Bennett, Tony. ‘The Exhibitionary Complex.’ New Formations, no. 4 (Spring 
1988): 73-102. 
 
Bindel, Julie. ‘Why Woke Keyboard Warriors Should Respect Their Elders.’ 
UnHerd, October 24, 2018. Accessed December 3, 2018, 
https://unherd.com/2018/10/woke-keyboard-warriors-respect-elders/. 
 




Bishop, Claire. Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship. London: Verso, 2012. 
 
Boltanski, Luc, and Eve Chiapello. “The New Spirit of Capitalism.” International 
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 18, no.3 (2005): 161–88. Accessed 
September 10, 2015. doi:10.1007/s10767-006-9006-9. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. The Love of Art: European Art Museum and Their Public. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. 
 
Brandom, Russel. ‘Facebook and Google hit with $8.8 billion in lawsuits on 




Bruguera, Tania, and Pablo Helguera. ‘On Transpedagogy.’ Accessed May 
21, 2018, http://www.taniabruguera.com/cms/239-0-On+transpedagogy.htm. 
 
Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. ‘Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of 
Administration to the Critique of Institutions.’ October 55 (Winter 1990): 105-
43. Accessed May 11, 2016, https://www.jstor.org/stable/778941. 
 
Buddeus, Hana. ‘Infiltrating the Art World through Photography.’ Third Text 
32, no. 4 (2018): 468-84. Accessed, February 11, 2019, DOI: 
10.1080/09528822.2018.1505314. 
 
Buffenstein, Alyssa. ‘Kader Attia Opens Hybrid Restaurant and Art Space in 
Paris: It's called “La Colonie”.’ Artnet, October 18, 2016. Accessed March 3, 
2018, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/kader-attia-la-colonie-paris-705002. 
 
Bürger, Peter. ‘Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde: An Attempt to Answer 
Certain Critics of "Theory of the Avant-Garde".’ In ‘What is an Avant-Garde?’ 
Edited by Jonathan P. Eburne and Rita Felski, special issue, New Literary 
History 41, no. 4 (2010): 695-715. Accessed May 3, 2017. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23012702. 
 
–––. ‘The Institution of “Art” as a Category in the Sociology of Literature.’ 





–––. Theory of the Avant-Garde. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984. 
 
Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable. London: Verso, 2009. 
 
–––. 'My Life, Your Life: Equality and the Philosophy of Non-Violence.' The 
Gifford Lectures, Bute Hall, University of Glasgow, October 1-3, 2018. 
 
Byford, Tee. ‘The Social Mining Union,’ Art Work. Accessed November 18, 
2017, http://www.tearlach.co.uk/index.php/art-work/the-social-mining-union/. 
 
CAMP. ‘About CAMP.’ Accessed November 14, 2018, 
http://campcph.org/about-camp/. 
 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. Crossroads in the Labyrinth, translated by Kate Soper 
and Martin H. Ryle. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984. 
 
–––. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. 
 
–––. ‘Power, Politics, Autonomy.’ In Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in 
Political Philosophy, edited by David Ames Curtis, 143-74. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
 
–––. ‘Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary.’ In The 
Castoriadis Reader, edited by David Ames Curtis, 319-37. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997. 
 
–––. World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Imagination, edited by David Ames Curtis. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Thomas D. Hall.  Rise and Demise: Comparing 
World-Systems. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. 
 
Chavance, Bernard. L’Économie Institutionnelle. Paris: La Découverte, 2012. 
 
Chollet, François. Deep Learning with Python. Shelter Island, NY: Manning, 
2018. 
 
–––. ‘What Worries Me About AI.’ Medium, March 28, 2018. Accessed 
February 10, 2019, https://medium.com/@francois.chollet/what-worries-me-
about-ai-ed9df072b704. 





Chun, Wendy Hui Kyong. ‘Crisis, Crisis, Crisis, or Sovereignty and Networks.’ 
Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011): 91-112. Accessed March 7, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276411418490. 
 
Clark, Daniel J.. Behind the Curve. Los Angeles, CA: Delta-v Productions, 
2018; Netflix, 2019. 
 
Collection Collective. ‘Collection Collective: Brief History.’ Accessed February 
10, 2019, http://www.collectioncollective.art/about. 
 
Communitism. ‘Communitism Philosophy and Purpose.’ Medium, March 23, 




Creative Europe Programme. ‘Creative Europe Projects.’ Accessed 
September 28, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-
europe/projects/. 
 
Creative Scotland. ‘What We Do.’ Accessed October 4, 2018, 
https://www.creativescotland.com/what-we-do. 
 
Crimp, Douglas. On the Museum’s Ruins. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1993. 
 
Danto, Arthur. ‘The Artworld.’ The Journal of Philosophy 61, No. 19, American 
Philosophical Association Eastern Division Sixty-First Annual Meeting (Oct. 
15, 1964): 571-84. Accessed April 12, 2016. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2022937. 
 
Dardot, Pierre, and Christian Laval. Commun: Essai sur la Révolution au 
XXIème Siècle. Paris: La Découverte, 2014. Translated by Matthew 
MacLellan as Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 
 
Davies, Christian. ‘Poland's President Addresses Far Right at Independence 






Deleuze, Gilles. ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control,’ October 59 (Winter, 
1992): 3-7. Accessed November 22, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/778828. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. ‘As If It Were Possible, “Within Such Limits”.’ In Paper 
Machine, translated by Rachel Bowldy, 73-99. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Dimitrakaki, Angela. ‘Art and Instituting for a Feminist Common/s: Thoughts 
on Interventions in the New “New Europe”.’ In Inside Out: Critical Discourses 
Concerning Institutions, edited by Alenka Gregoric and Suzana Milveska, 38-
49. Ljubljana: Museums and Galleries of Ljubljana and City Art Gallery 
Ljubljana, 2017. 
 
–––. ‘Art, Globalisation and the Exhibition Form.’ Third Text 26, no. 3 (2012): 
305-319. Accessed September 17, 2015, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09528822.2012.679039.   
 
–––. ‘Feminist Politics and Institutional Critiques: Imagining a Curatorial 
Commons.’ In Working with Feminism: Curating and Exhibitions in Eastern 
Europe, edited by Katrin Kivimaa, 19-39. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 
2012. 
 
–––. Gender, artWork and the Global Imperative. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013. 
 
–––. ‘Hospitality and Hostis: An Essay on Dividing Lines, Divisive Politics and 
the Art Field.’ In Greece: Archaeology of the Future, edited by Kateryna 
Botanova and Christos Chrissopoulos, 128-47. Basel: Culturescapes, 2017. 
 




Ekeberg, Jonas. ‘Insitutional Experiments Between Aesthetics and Activism.’ 
In Self-Organised, edited by Steine Hebert and Anne Szefer Karlsen, 50-61. 
London: Open Editions; Bergen: Hordaland Art Centre, 2013. 
 
–––, ed. New Institutionalism, Verksted, no. 1. Oslo: Office for Contemporary 
Art Norway, 2003. 
 
El Baroni, Bassam. ‘The Post-Agonistic Institution: Four Positions on the 
Structural Relation Between Art and Democracy.’ In How Institutions Think: 
Between Contemporary Art and Curatorial Discourse, edited by Paul O’Neill, 
Lucy Steeds and Mick Wilson, 229-35. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. 





Erić, Zoran, and Stevan Vuković, eds. ‘Precarious Labour in the Field of Art.’ 
On-Curating.org, no. 16. Zurich: Dorothee Richter and the Department of 
Cultural Analysis, Zurich University of the Arts, 2013. 
 
Esanu, Octavian. ‘SCCA.’ Contimporary. Accessed October 21, 2014, 
http://www.contimporary.org/dictionary/view/7. 
 
Esche, Charles. ‘Start with a Table…’ In Curating and the Educational Turn, 
edited by Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson, 310-19. London: Open Editions, 2010. 
 
–––. ‘What's the Point of Art Centres Anyway? Possibility, Art and Democratic 
Deviance.’ Republicart, April 2004. Accessed November 7, 2014, 
http://republicart.net/disc/institution/esche01_en.htm. 
 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles. ‘ECRE: homepage.’ Accessed 
June 27, 2018, https://www.ecre.org/. 
 
F/SUW. ‘F/SUW.’ Accessed October 30, 2018, http://www.wuw-
warsaw.pl/oprojekcie.php?lang=eng. 
 
Fauconnet, Paul, and Marcel Mauss, ‘La Sociologie, Objet et Méthode,’ in 
Essais de Sociologie, edited by Marcel Mauss. Paris: Le Seuil, 1971. 
 
Fehér, Ferenc. ‘What Is Beyond Art?,’ Thesis Eleven: Critical Theory and 
Historical Sociology 5-6, No. 1 (1982): 5-19. Accessed May 10, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/072551368200500102. 
 
Fisher, Mark. ‘Accelerate Management.’ In ‘Management,’ edited by Henric 
Benesch, Andrea Phillips, Erling Björgvinsson, Parse Journal, No. 5 (Spring 
2017): 12-21. 
 
–––. ‘The Commons As The Survival of The “Public”: Panel with Andrea 
Phillips, Mark Fisher and Massimiliano Mollona.’ Presentation at Other 
Survivalisms, Former West Public Editorial Meeting, Utrechts Archief, 
Utrecht, May 16, 2014. 
 
–––. ‘Indirect Action: Some Misgivings About Horizontalism.’ In Institutional 
Attitudes: Instituting Art in a Flat World, edited by Pascal Gielen, 101-14. 
Amsterdam: Valiz, 2013. 
 
Flynn, Paul. ‘Paris Lees is more than a transgender rights activist, she’s the 






Former West. ‘About.’ Accessed 11 September, 2015, 
http://www.formerwest.org/About. 
 
Foster, Hal. The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the 
Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 
 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on 
Language. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. 
 
–––. The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures 
at the Collège de France, 1983-1984. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
 
Francke, Andrea, and Ross Jardine. ‘Bureaucracy’s Labour: The 
Administrator as Subject.’ In ‘Management,’ edited by Henric Benesch, 
Andrea Phillips and Erling Björgvinsson, Parse Journal, No. 5 (Spring 2017): 
22-33. 
 
Fraser, Andrea. ‘From the Critique of Institutions to an Institution of Critique.’ 
In Institutional Critique and After, edited by John C. Welchman, 123-36. 
Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2006. 
 
–––. Interview by Praxis (Delia Bajo and Brainard Carey), The Brooklyn Rail. 
October 1, 2004. Accessed June 3, 2017, 
https://brooklynrail.org/2004/10/art/andrea-fraser. 
 
–––. ‘What is Institutional Critique?’ In Institutional Critique and After, edited 
by John C. Welchman, 305-10. Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2006. 
 
Fraser, Nancy. ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique 
of Actually Existing Democracy.’ Social Text, no. 25/26 (1990): 56-80. 
Accessed March 5, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/466240. 
 
The Free U Resistance Committee of June 18, 2011. ‘All Power to the Free 




Gagnon, Vicky Chainey. ‘From the Populist Museum to the Research 
Platform: New Art Exhibition Practices Today.’ Etc, no. 95 (2012). 
 




Gammel, Irene. Baroness Elsa: Gender, Dada, and Everyday Modernity. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002. 
 
García-Dory, Fernando. ‘Inland (2010—…).’ Accessed May 21, 2018, 
http://fernandogarciadory.com/index.php?/projects/inland/. 
 
Gardner, Anthony. Politically Unbecoming: Postsocialist Art Against 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. 
 
Gheorghe, Cătălin, ed. Vector – Critical Research in Context: After the 
Educational Turn. Iași: ‘George Enescu’ National University of the Arts; 
Vector Association, 2017. 
 
Giuffrida, Angela. ‘Europe’s Far-Right Leaders Unite with a Vow to “Change 




Goffey, Andrew. ‘Guattari and Transversality: Institutions, Analysis and 
Experimentation.’ Radical Philosophy, No. 195 (Jan/Feb 2016): 38-47. 
Accessed March 17, 2016. https://www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/wp-
content/files_mf/rp195_article_goffey_guattariandtransversality.pdf. 
 
Gordon Nesbitt, Rebecca. ‘Harnessing the Means of Production.’ In New 
Institutionalism, edited by Jonas Ekeberg, Verksted, no. 1, 59-87. Oslo: 
Office for Contemporary Art Norway, 2003. 
 
Grúň, Daniel. ‘Amateurism Under Socialism.’ Third Text 32, no. 4 (2018): 
434-449. Accessed February 11, 2019, DOI: 
10.1080/09528822.2018.1493838. 
 
–––. ‘A Guide to Ganek Gallery: The Archive of Július Koller’s Fictive 
Institution.’ In Július Koller: Galéria Ganku, edited by Daniel Grúň, 27-39. 
Vienna: Schlebrügge, 2014. 
 
Guattari, Félix. Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995. 
 
–––. ‘Everybody Wants to be a Fascist.’ In Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 





–––. ‘A Liberation of Desire: An Interview by George Stambolian.’ In The 
Guattari Reader, edited by Gary Genosko, 204-14. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
–––. ‘Microphysics of Power / Micropolitics of Desire.’ In The Guattari 
Reader, edited by Gary Genosko, 172-81. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
–––. Psychoanalysis and Transversality: Texts and Interviews 1955-1971. 
South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 2015. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1991. 
 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
 
–––. Declaration. New York: Argo, 2012. 
 
Harney, Stefano. ‘The New Rules of Algorithmic Institutions,’ in Former West: 
Art and the Contemporary after 1989, edited by Maria Hlavajova and Simon 
Sheikh, 447-57. Utrecht: BAK, basis voor actuele kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2016. 
 
Harvey, David. ‘“The Neoliberal Project is Alive But Has Lost Its Legitimacy”: 
David Harvey.’ Interview by Jipson John and Jitheesh P.M., The Wire, 
February 9, 2019. Accessed May 2, 2019, https://thewire.in/economy/david-
harvey-marxist-scholar-neo-liberalism. 
 
Helms, Gesa, Leigh French, Lisa Bradley and the Variant Editorial Group. 
‘Divergence and agonism: the different, the other and the one who disagrees; 
Cultural communication and democracy in Scotland.’ Report commissioned 
by Creative Scotland, March 2, 2016. 
 
Henriksson, Minna, Erik Krikortz and Airi Triisberg, eds. Art Workers: Material 
Conditions and Labour Struggles in Contemporary Art Practice. Berlin, 
Helsinki, Stockholm, Tallinn: Nordic-Baltic Art Workers’ Network for Fair Pay, 
2015. Accessed February 18, 2017, http://www.art-
workers.org/download/ArtWorkers.pdf. 
 
Hickley, Catherine. ‘Documenta Deficit Caused by Athens Overspending 
Widens to €7.6m in Final Audit.’ The Art Newspaper, November 30, 2018. 
Accessed January 25, 2019, 







Higgs, John. Stranger than We Can Imagine: Making Sense of the Twentieth 
Century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2015.  
 
Hlavajova, Maria. ‘Rael Artel, Maria Hlavajova, Iliyana Nedkova in 
conversation with Katarzyna Kosmala: Sexing the Border.’ Conversation at 
Word Power Books, Edinburgh, March 23, 2015. Accessed September 12, 
2015, https://vimeo.com/130040477. 
 
Holert, Tom, and Mick Wilson. ‘Latent Essentialisms: An E-mail Exchange on 
Art, Research and Education.’ In Curating and the Educational Turn, edited 
by Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson, 320-328. London: Open Editions, 2010. 
 
Hurwicz, Leonid. ‘Institutions as Families of Game Forms.’ The Japanese 
Economic Review 47, No. 2 (June 1996): 113-32. Accessed April 3, 2016, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00038.x. 
 
Hutchinson, Mark. ‘Who’d Be a Curator?’ Catalogue essay for Outpost 




Idamm. 'Institute for the Management of the Athenian Post-documenta 
Melancholy (IDAMM).' Facebook, February 26, 2016. Accessed May 5, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/idammathens/posts/153015061751043. 
 
Institute of Radical Imagination. ‘IRI: Towards the Constitution of a Think-
Tank for a Post-Capitalist Transition in the Mediterranean.’ Accessed 
January 18, 2019, https://instituteofradicalimagination.org/about/. 
 
L’Internationale. ‘About: L’Internationale.’ Accessed May 19, 2018, 
https://www.internationaleonline.org/about. 
 
–––. ‘Alter Institutionality,’ Research. Accessed May 19, 2018, 
https://www.internationaleonline.org/research/alter_institutionality/. 
 
Jakobsen, Jakob, ed. Antiuniversity of London: Antihistory Tabloid. London: 




–––. ‘The Pedagogy of Negating the Institution.’ Mute, November 14, 2013. 
Accessed October 3, 2015, 
http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/pedagogy-negating-institution. 
 
–––. ‘We Have Won!’ Presentation at the Creative Time Summit: Revolutions 
in Public Practice 2, the Cooper Union, New York, October 9, 2010. 
Accessed March 14, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3QlXOf1Hzw. 
 
Jarzębska, Aneta. ‘Transgressing the Borders of Gallery Space: Subversive 
Practices of Alternative Art Galleries in East Germany and Poland of the 





Julian. The Works of the Emperor Julian, vol. II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1913. 
 
Kelly, Susan. ‘Collectives and Precarity,’ presentation at Goldsmiths College 
Department of Art MFA Lectures, January 21, 2019. 
 
King, Mervyn. Back Office and Beyond: A guide to Procedure, Settlements 
and Risk in Financial Markets. Petersfield, Hampshire: Harriman House/ 
Gilmour Drummond Publishing, 2003. 
 
Kluge, Alexander, and Oscar Negt. Public Sphere and Experience: Toward 
an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere. Theory and 
History of Literature 85, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
 
Kolb, Lucie, and Gabriel Flückiger. ‘New Institutionalism Revisited.’ In ‘(New) 
Institution(alism),’ edited by Lucie Kolb and Gabriel Flückiger, Oncurating.org, 




Kompatsiaris, Panos. The Politics of Contemporary Art Biennials: Spectacles 
of Critique, Theory and Art. New York: Routledge, 2017. 
 
Kozłowski, Michał, Agnieszka Kurant, Jan Sowa, Krystian Szadkowski and 
Jakub Szreder, eds. Joy Forever: The Political Economy of Social Creativity. 
London: MayFlyBooks, 2014. 
 




Krasny, Elke. ‘The Conversational Turn in Curating or Let’s Twist and Talk.’ 
Open Space, no. 1 (January 2013), accessed May 4, 2014, 
http://www.openspace-zkp.org/2013/en/journal.php?j=1&t=11. 
 
Kwon, Miwon. ‘One Place After Another: Notes on Site Specificity.’ October 80 
(Spring 1997): 85-110.  
 
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan. London: 
Tavistock, 1977. 
 
Laertius, Diogenes. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Vol. II, Book VI. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1925. 
 
Leithäuser, Gerhard. ‘Kunstwerk und Warenform.’ In Literatur- und 
Kunstsoziologie, edited by Peter Bürger. Cologne: Kohlhammer, 1977. 
 
Lind, Maria. ‘“We Want to Become an Institution”: An Interview with Maria Lind.’ 
In ‘(New) Institution(alism),’ edited by Lucie Kolb and Gabriel Flückiger, 




Lowry, Glenn D. ‘Museum of modern art.’ Britannica. Accessed January 14, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/art/museum-of-modern-art-institution. 
 
Lütticken, Sven. ‘Social Media: Practices of (In)Visibility in Contemporary Art.’ 
Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context and Enquiry, no. 40 (Autumn/Winter 2015): 
4-19. Accessed November 21, 2016, https://doi-
org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/10.1086/684212. 
 
Lynch, Kathleen. ‘“New Managerialism” in Education: The Organisational 
Form of Neoliberalism.’ Open Democracy, September 16, 2014. Accessed 
June 10, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/kathleen-lynch/%27new-
managerialism%27-in-education-organisational-form-of-neoliberalism. 
 
Majewska, Ewa. ‘Peripheries, Housewives, and Artists in Revolt: Notes from 
the “Former East”.’ In Former West: Art and the Contemporary after 1989, 
edited by Maria Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh, 601-04. Utrecht: BAK, basis 
voor actuele kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture.’ In Negations: 




Martin, Stewart. ‘A Gallery Closed in Spring: on Maria Eichhorn’s 5 weeks, 25 
days, 175 hours.’ In Maria Eichhorn: 5 weeks, 25 days, 175 hours, edited by 
Katie Guggenheim and Polly Staple, 50-58. London: Chisenhale Gallery, 




Marx, Karl. ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.’ In The Marx-
Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. & Norton, 
1978. 
 
–––. ‘Thesis on Feuerbach.’ In The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. 
Tucker. New York: W.W. & Norton, 1978. 
 
Massumi, Brian. ‘Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements.’ In A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, translated by Brian Massumi, xvi-xix. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987. 
 
MayDay Rooms. ‘MayDay Rooms.’ Accessed March 14, 2016, 
http://maydayrooms.org/. 
 
Mazur, Adam. ’Polish Art in a Period of Populism.’ Erste Stiftung, January 10, 
2019. Accessed February 12, 2019, http://www.erstestiftung.org/en/polish-
art-in-a-period-of-populism/. 
 
Möntmann, Nina. ‘A Letter from Europe.’ In Inside Out: Critical Discourses 
Concerning Institutions, edited by Alenka Gregoric and Suzana Milveska, 
140-54. Ljubljana: Museums and Galleries of Ljubljana and City Art Gallery 
Ljubljana, 2017. 
 
–––. ‘Opacity: Current Considerations on Art Institutions and the Economy of 
Desire.’ In Art and Its Institutions, edited by Nina Möntmann, 100-13. London: 
Black Dog Publishing, 2006. 
 
–––. ‘The Rise and Fall of New Institutionalism: Perspectives on a Possible 
Future.’ In Art and Contemporary Critical Practice: Reinventing Institutional 
Critique, edited by Gerald Raunig and Gene Ray, 155-60. London: MayFly, 
2009.  
 
Morariu, Vlad. ‘Collection Collective: Rethinking Function, Ownership and 
Possession.’ Collection Collective, 2018. Accessed February 10, 2019,  







Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. London: Verso, 
2013. 
 
–––. ‘Institutions as Sites of Agonistic Intervention.’ In Institutional Attitudes: 
Instituting Art in a Flat World, edited by Pascal Gielen, 63-74. Amsterdam: 
Valiz, 2013.  
 
Mourão, João, and Luís Silva. ‘The Hidden Law of a Probable Outcome: On 
the Development of a Southern Kunsthalle.’ South as a State of Mind (Summer 
2012): 74-76. 
 
Murphy, Richard. Theorizing the Avant-Garde. Modernism, Expressionism, 
and the Problem of Postmodernity, Literature, Culture, Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. Accessed February 12, 2017, 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511483189. 
 
Muukkonen, Marita. ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Art Institutions and 
Creative Industries.’ In Contemporary Art and Nationalism: Critical Reader, 
edited by Minna Henriksson and Sezgin Boynik. Pristina: Institute of 
Contemporary Art “EXIT”, Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi”, 2007. 
 
Muzeum Sztuki. ‘History.’ Accessed January 14, 2019, 
https://msl.org.pl/en/museum/history.html. 
 
Muzeum Sztuki. ‘XX and XXI Century Art Collection.’ Accessed January 14, 
2019, https://msl.org.pl/en/collection/xx-and-xxi-century-art-collection.html. 
 
Nagle, Angela. Kill all Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan And Tumblr 
To Trump And The Alt-Right. Winchester: Zero Books, 2017. 
 
Naumann, Francis M., and Marcel Duchamp. ‘Affectueusement, Marcel: Ten 
Letters from Marcel Duchamp to Suzanne Duchamp and Jean Crotti.’ Archives 













NIFCA and Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma. ‘Art Institutions: The 
Ethics and Aesthetics of Working with Contemporary Art.’ E-flux 




North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Öğüt, Ahmet. ‘The Silent University.’ Ahmetogut.com. Accessed November 2, 
2018, http://www.ahmetogut.com/ahmetwebfrieze2012.html. Originally 
appeared as part of Sam Thorne, ‘New Schools: A survey of recently 
founded artist-run art academies and education programmes,’ Frieze, no. 
149, September 2012. 
 
O’Neill, Paul, and Mick Wilson. Introduction to Curating and the Educational 
Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson, 11–22. London: Open Editions, 
2010. 
 
Opstrup, Kasper. The Way Out: Invisible Insurrections and Radical 
Imaginaries in the UK Underground 1961-1991. Wivenhoe: Minor 
Compositions, 2017. 
 
Orel, Barbara. ‘Women’s Perspective: The Contribution of the Ljubljana 
Alternative Arts Scene in the 1980s.’ In Performative Gestures Political 
Moves, edited by Katja Kobolt and Lana Zdravković, 79-96. Zagreb: Red 
Athena University Press, 2014. 
 
Osten, Marion von, and Eva Egermann. ‘Twist and Shout: On Free 
Universities, Educational Reforms and Twists and Turns Inside and Outside 
the Art World.’ In Curating and the Educational Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill 
and Mick Wilson, 271–284. London: Open Editions, 2010. 
 
Oury, Jean. Psychiatrie et Psychothérapie Institutionnelle. Nîmes: Champ 
Social, 2001. 
 
Pancu, Livia. ‘The Almost Institution.’ In Self-Organised, edited by Steine 
Hebert and Anne Szefer, 74-81. Karlsen London: Open Editions; Bergen: 
Hordaland Art Centre, 2013. 
 




Perelman, Chaïm. Droit, Morale, Philosophie. Paris: LGDJ, 1968. 
 
Phillips, Andrea. ‘The Commons As The Survival of The “Public”: Panel with 
Andrea Phillips, Mark Fisher and Massimiliano Mollona.’ Presentation at Other 
Survivalisms, Former West Public Editiorial Meeting, Utrechts Archief, Utrecht, 
May 16, 2014. 
 
Polish Society of Antidiscrimination Law (PSAL) and International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH), ‘All downhill from here: The rapid degradation of 
the rule of law in Poland: what it means for women’s sexual and reproductive 
rights, and LGBT+ persons’ rights.’ Report, November 2018. Accessed 
March 2, 2019, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_pologne_web.pdf. 
 
Post: Notes on Modern and Contemporary Art Around the Globe. ‘About 
Post.’ Accessed January 15, 2019, https://post.at.moma.org/aboutpost. 
 
Provost, Claire. ‘Revealed: Trump-Linked US Christian ‘Fundamentalists’ Pour 
Millions of ‘Dark Money’ into Europe, Boosting the Far Right.’ Open 






Quaintance, Morgan. ‘Our Cultic Milieu.’ Lecture at Propositions #4: 
Unpacking Aesthetics and the Far Right, BAK, Utrecht, March 17, 2017. 
Accessed March 6, 2019, https://vimeo.com/266048694. 
 
–––. ‘The New Conservatism: Complicity and the UK Art World’s 
Performance of Progression.’ E-flux Conversations, October 2017. Accessed 
August 22, 2018, https://conversations.e-flux.com/t/the-new-conservatism-
complicity-and-the-uk-art-worlds-performance-of-progression/7200. 
 
Quijoux, Maxime. Néolibéralisme et Autogestion: L'Expérience Argentine. 
Paris: IHEAL, 2011. 
 
Ramos, Filipa. ‘Et in Arcadia ego: A project for a ubiquitous Kunsthalle,’ South 
as a State of Mind (Winter/Spring 2013): 46-50. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. London: 
Continuum, 2010. 
 





–––. ‘Flatness Rules: Instituent Practices and Institutions of the Common in a 
Flat World.’ In Institutional Attitudes: Instituting Art in a Flat World, edited by 
Pascal Gielen, 167-79. Amsterdam: Valiz, 2013. 
 
–––. ‘Instituent Practices: Fleeing, Instituting, Transforming.’ In Art and 
Contemporary Critical Practice: Reinventing Institutional Critique, edited by 
Gerald Raunig and Gene Ray, 3–11. London: MayFly, 2009. 
 
–––. ‘Instituent Practices, No. 2: Institutional Critique, Constituent Power, and 
the Persistence of Instituting.’ In Art and Contemporary Critical Practice: 
Reinventing Institutional Critique, edited by Gerald Raunig and Gene Ray, 
173–86. London: MayFly, 2009. 
 
Raunig, Gerald, and Stefan Nowotny. ‘Instituent Practices: New Introduction 
to the Revised Edition 2016.’ transversal texts, May 2016. Accessed June 3, 
2017, https://transversal.at/blog/Instituierende-Praxen-Introduction#_ftn1. 
Translated introduction of Gerald Raunig and Stefan Nowotny. Instituierende 
Praxen: Bruchlinien der Institutionskritik. Vienna, Linz: eipcp, transversal texts, 
2016. 
 
Reynolds, Simon. ‘Mark Fisher’s K-Punk Blogs Were Required Reading for a 




Ribalta, Jorge. ‘Experiments in a New Institutionality.’ In Relational Objects: 
MACBA Collections 2002-2007. Barcelona: MACBA Publications, 2010. 
 
Rockhill, Gabriel. ‘Jacques Rancière’s Politics of Perception.’ Introduction to 
the Politics of Aesthetics, by Jacques Rancière, translated by Gabriel Rockhill, 
1-6. London: Continuum, 2004. 
 
Romanian Cultural Centre London. ‘“Periferic – a Contemporary Art Biennial 
at the Edge of Europe” by Matei Bejenaru,’ September 2007. Accessed 
October 25, 2014, 
http://www.romanianculturalcentre.org.uk/post.php?id=524&v=1. 
 
Rogoff, Irit. ‘Free.’ E-flux Journal, no.14 (2010). Accessed September 05, 
2015. http://www.e-flux.com/journal/free/. 
 




–––. ‘On Being Serious in the Art World.’ In Visual Cultures as Seriousness, 
by Gavin Butt and Irit Rogoff, 63-80. London: Goldsmiths, University of 
London; Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013. 
 
–––. ‘Infrastructure.’ Keynote lecture at Former West: Documents, 
Constellations, Prospects, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, March 18-24, 




–––. ‘Turning.’ In Curating and the Educational Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill 
and Mick Wilson, 32–46. London: Open Editions, 2010. 
 
–––. ‘What is a Theorist.’ In The State of Art Criticism, edited by James Elkin 
and Michael Newman, 97-109. New York, London: Routledge, 2007. 
 




Sartre, Jean-Paul. Critique of Dialectical Reason, translated by Alan 
Sheridan-Smith. London: NLB, 1976. 
 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics, translated by Roy 
Harris. London: Duckworth, 1993. 
 
Searle, John R.. ‘What is an Institution?’ In Institutional Critique and After, 
edited by John C. Welchman, 21-52. Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2006. 
 
Sheikh, Simon. ‘Letter to Jane (Investigation of a Function).’ In Curating and 
the Educational Turn, edited by Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson, 61-75. London: 
Open Editions, 2010. 
 
–––. ‘The Magmas: On Institutions and Instituting.’ In How Institutions Think: 
Between Contemporary Art and Curatorial Discourse, edited by Paul O’Neill, 
Lucy Steeds, Mick Wilson, 126-31. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. 
 
–––. ‘From Para to Post: The Rise and Fall of Curatorial Reason.’ Springerin, 





–––. ‘Simon Sheikh explores the legacy of New Institutionalism.’ Paper 
presented at the symposium Desire Lines: A Symposium on Experimental 
Institutional Formats, David Roberts Art Foundation, London, November 28–
29, 2014. 
 
–––. ‘The Trouble with Institutions, or, Art and its Publics.’ In Art and its 
Institutions, edited by Nina Möntmann, 142-149. London: Black Dog Publishing, 
2006. 
 
Sholette, Gregory. ‘Mockstitutions.’ In Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age 
of Enterprise Culture, 162-85. London: Pluto Press, 2011. 
 
The Silent University. ‘The Silent University: Towards a Transversal 
Pedagogy.’ Accessed November 2, 2018, http://thesilentuniversity.org/. 
 
Slotover, Mathew. Conversation response to Morgan Quaintance, ‘The New 
Conservatism: Complicity and the UK Art World’s Performance of 




Smith, Helena. ‘“Crapumenta!”...Anger in Athens as the Blue Lambs of 




Sontag, Susan. ‘The Literary Criticism of Georg Lukács.’ In Against 
Interpretations and Other Essays, 82-92. London: Penguin Classics, 2009. 
 
Srnicek. Nick. Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017. 
 
–––. ‘We Need to Nationalise Google, Facebook and Amazon: Here’s Why.’ 




Staal, Jonas (in conversation with Maria Hlavajova). ‘World-Making as 
Commitment.’ In Former West: Art and the Contemporary after 1989, edited 
by Maria Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh, 667-78. Utrecht: BAK, basis voor 
actuele kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016. 
 




Stewart, Andrew. ‘Kill all Normies is an Awful Book.’ Counterpunch, 30 
August 2017. Accessed March 12, 2018, 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/08/30/kill-all-normies-is-an-awful-book/. 
 
Suchan, Jarosław. ‘Muzeum Sztuki in Łódź: Confronting Avant-garde with 
Modern Artistic Practice.’ Interview by Monika Kozub, Contemporary Lynx, 




Szadkowski, Krystian. Uniwersytet jako dobro wspólne. Podstawy 
krytycznych badań nad szkolnictwem wyższym [The University as Common 
Good: Critical Research in Higher Education] Warsaw: Polish Scientific 
Publishers PWN, 2015. 
 
Szreder, Kuba. ‘Exercises in the Curatorial Open Form: On the Example of 
Exhibition Making Use; Life in Postartistic Times.’ Art & the Public Sphere 6, 
No. 1-2, (September 2017): 51-67. Accessed October 3, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1386/aps.6.1-2.51_1. 
 
–––. ‘Politicising “Independent” Curatorial Practice under Neoliberalism: 
Critical Responses to the Structural Pressures of Project-Making.’ PhD diss., 
Loughborough University, 2014. 
 
Szymczyk, Adam. Interview by Despina Zefkili. Athinorama, May 2, 2017. 





Tate. ‘Tate Governance,’ About Us. Accessed July 5, 2018, 
https://www.tate.org.uk/about-us/governance. 
 
Tabares, Leland. ‘The Contexts of Critique: Para-Institutions and the Multiple 
Lives of Institutionality in the Neoliberal University.’ Lateral, no. 6.1 (Spring 
2017). Accessed October 2 2018, https://doi.org/10.25158/L6.1.16. 
 
Tietze, Tad. ‘The Failed Strategy.’ Jacobin, August 10, 2015. Accessed 
September 15, 2017, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/syriza-
referendum-podemos-austerity/. 
 





u/Proudhons_butt. ‘Instituting the Para-Institution.’ r/RadicalChristianity, 




UAW Local 2110: A Union for Technical, Office, and Professional Workers. 
‘What Is Local 2110?’ Accessed February 2, 2017, http://www.2110uaw.org/. 
 
Umezaki, Toru. ‘The Free University of New York:  The New Left’s Self-
Education and Transborder Activism.’ PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013. 
 
Virno, Paolo. A Grammar of the Multitude. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004. 
 
Vishmidt, Marina. ‘Between Not Everything and Not Nothing: Cuts Toward 
Infrastructural Critique.’ In Former West: Art and the Contemporary after 1989, 
edited by Maria Hlavajova and Simon Sheikh, 265-69. Utrecht: BAK, basis 
voor actuele kunst; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016. 
 
Visible Project. ‘About.’ Accessed March 3, 2018, 
https://www.visibleproject.org/blog/about/. 
 
Voon, Claire. ‘For Its Newest Exhibition, a Gallery Is Closed for a Month.’ 




Wallerstein, Immanuel. ‘Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary 
World Crisis.’ Theory and Society 3, no. 4 (1976): 461-83. Accessed May 3, 
2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/656810. 
 
Warner, Michael. ‘Publics and Counterpublics.’ Public Culture 14, No. 1 
(Winter 2002): 49-90. Accessed March 6, 2018, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/26277. 
 
White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities. ‘What 
is an HBCU.’ Accessed July 16, 2018, https://sites.ed.gov/whhbcu/one-
hundred-and-five-historically-black-colleges-and-universities/. 
 
Wilkström, Josefine. ‘A Not Radical Enough Gesture.’ Kunstkritikk, May 26, 
2016. Accessed July 11, 2017, https://kunstkritikk.com/a-not-radical-enough-
gesture/. 
 




Wilson, Mick. Panel presentation at On a Par? A Colloquy on Enquiry, 
Working Together, and Curating, co-organised by Framework and Valand 
Academy, The Pearce Institute, Glasgow, September 30, 2016. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Recherches Philosophiques. Paris: Gallimard, 2004. 
 
Wróblewska, Magdalena. ‘a.r. Group.’ Culture.pl. Last modified November, 
2018, https://culture.pl/en/artist/ar-group. 
 
 
 
 
